




Camera dei deputati



Senato della Repubblica

XVI LEGISLATURA



Documentazione e ricerche

Dimensione europea della Difesa

*Audizione del Ministro della difesa,
Giampaolo Di Paola
(6 dicembre 2012)*

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PREFACE

Over the last decade, the European Union (EU) has played a growing role as a crisis management actor dealing with both regional and global security problems. With the creation and subsequent expansion of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now called Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU has acquired new operational and institutional instruments for crisis management. Since 2003, when ESDP became operational, the EU has deployed 25 operations, including 17 civilian or civilian-military ones (of which nine are ongoing).

The “comprehensive security” model that inspires the EU aims not only to manage conflicts, but also to prevent them. It also includes a wide spectrum of peace-support activities: traditional peacekeeping, policing, promotion of the rule of law, reform of the security sector, and post-conflict institution building. This approach, which underpins the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003, has been reinforced by a number of new provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on December 1, 2009.

However, the European architecture for crisis management and its operational capabilities do not yet fully meet the needs dictated by the ambitious strategy defined in various EU planning documents. It is therefore imperative to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the EU system, as well as to identify the most appropriate ways and means to reinforce it.

This volume presents the main results of a research conducted by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in the framework of the Science for Peace project promoted by the Fondazione Umberto Veronesi. Its overall goal is to provide an overview of the most significant developments in the EU’s security and defence policies and actions, and to identify the critical elements and the potential for improvement in the coming years.

It analyses the latest developments in the area of ESDP/CSDP, outlines and discusses future scenarios and offers some policy suggestions to make the EU’s role in crisis management more consistent and effective. Special emphasis is placed on the capacity that the EU has developed in the civilian

and military sectors and the level of coordination between the two components. A set of proposals focuses, in particular, on how to improve civil-military cooperation.

The first chapter by Claudia Major and Christian Mölling (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP, Berlin) concentrates on challenges and opportunities, in and for Europe, in the field of defence, including the ways for increasing the pooling and sharing of resources, and discusses the longer-term perspective of a European army.

The second chapter by Isabelle Ioannides (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Université Libre de Bruxelles, ULB) addresses the civilian component of the EU's crisis management. It examines the Union's strategies and capabilities for civilian and civilian-military crisis management (such as for the reform of the security and justice sectors in post-conflict situations).

The third chapter by Gerrard Quille (European Parliament, Brussels) analyses the European External Action Service (EEAS), one of the most important institutional innovations in the Lisbon Treaty. It looks into the structural and operational features of the new European diplomatic service and assesses its potential impact on EU foreign and security policy.

The fourth chapter by Michele Comelli (Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI, Rome) deals with the obstacles and opportunities to enhance the democratic control over European security and defence policy through a stronger role of the European Parliament and deeper inter-parliamentary cooperation.

In the last chapter, Ettore Greco, Nicoletta Pirozzi and Stefano Silvestri offer a series of policy recommendations aimed at strengthening the crisis management capabilities and instruments of the European Union. They emphasize, *inter alia*, the crucial role of civilian capabilities, the need for a gradual integration of national resources and for the establishment of an effective democratic control over CSDP. They conclude by making eight final proposals to enable the Union to establish itself as a more coherent and effective crisis management actor on the international scene.

E.G.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFET	Committee on Foreign Affairs
BG	Battlegroups
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHG 2010	Civilian Headline Goal 2010
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMCO	Civil-Military Coordination
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
COAFR	Africa Working Party
COFACC	Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairpersons
COPS	Political and Security Committee
COSAC	Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRT	Civilian Response Team
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCAF	Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DCECI	Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DG AidCo	EuropeAid Cooperation Office

DG RELEX	Directorate General for External Relations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EATF	European Air Transport Fleet
ECAP	European Capability Action Plan
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EGF	European Gendarmerie Force
ENPI	European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU NAVFOR	
Somalia	European Union Naval Force in Somalia
EU	European Union
EUFOR	
Althea	European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EULEX	
Kosovo	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMM	
Georgia	European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPAT	European Union Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL	
Afghanistan	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EUTM	
Somalia	European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces
GNI	Gross National Income
HG 2010	Headline Goal 2010
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goal
HR	High Representative
IIA	Inter-Institutional Agreement
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

IPUs	Integrated Police Units
JRR	Justice Rapid Response
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHQ	Operation Headquarter
PHARE	Programme of Community Aid to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSCiD	Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SEDE	Sub-Committee on Security and Defence
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEC	Treaty Establishing the European Community
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
VP	Vice President
WEAG	Western Europe Armaments Group
WEAO	Western Europe Armaments Organization
WEU-ESDA	European Security and Defence Assembly of the Western European Union

1. EU MILITARY CAPABILITIES – SOME EUROPEAN TROOPS, BUT NOT YET A EUROPEAN ARMY

Claudia Major and Christian Mölling

Introduction

The European Union's military capabilities are a curious topic. On the one hand, some critics constantly blame the Member States for not delivering the military capabilities they have promised, thereby preventing the EU from becoming a credible military actor. At the same time, others warn, no less virulently, of the creeping militarisation of EU crisis management, thereby implying that the Union is not, after all, so short on military capabilities. Whom to believe? This article aims to shed light on the thorny topic of EU military capabilities. It seeks to give an overview of the efforts undertaken to generate military capabilities at the EU level, their results and the challenges ahead. It concludes with a set of recommendations on how to improve EU-level capabilities with a view to increasing the Union's capacity to engage in crisis management.

1. EU Military Capabilities: From St Malo to EU Battlegroups

1.1 From Strategies to Forces: Capabilities

While it is very fashionable to talk about capabilities, and even more so to lament the lack of such capabilities, the term itself is rarely defined. Both academics and practitioners are reluctant to give a con-

cise definition and prefer to define capabilities in relation to what should be achieved with them.

Efforts to generate capabilities should ideally be rooted in strategies that define the aims and means of military action in the wider security context. Military capabilities are the principal means of implementing military strategies. They are an intermediate step in the so-called “defence planning process” that is placed between the strategy and the actual deployment of a force. The military strategy makes it possible to develop different scenarios in which forces may be deployed and to outline the type of operations that it may be necessary to conduct, such as peacekeeping, separation of parties by force, humanitarian assistance etc. Capabilities are defined as the output of this planning process as those means that allow for the successful conduct of operations.

Hence, military actors are defined by a much wider set of elements enabling them to plan, decide and act in the military realm:

- 1) a strategy outlining scenarios and providing guidelines for capability development;
- 2) institutional structures for defence planning and command;
- 3) capabilities to conduct the missions envisaged in the scenarios.

The question is: does the EU have the right mix of those elements at hand?

1.2 The First Days of ESDP: From St. Malo to the Helsinki Headline Goal

The Franco-British Summit in St. Malo in December 1998 marked the starting point of cooperation in the area of security and defence at the EU level. The governments of the two most important military powers in Europe urged the EU to set up “the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so”. This call resulted mainly from the bitter experience of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, which demonstrated that although Europe had more than 2 million soldiers, it was not able to generate a force from this pool. On the one hand, the countries were ill-equipped for the required crisis management tasks. And on the other, there was simply no mechanism to generate an EU force.

While the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was formally conceived at the Cologne Summit in June 1999, decisions about capabilities were only taken at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The EU States agreed upon a collective capability goal at the EU level – the Helsinki

Headline Goal (HHG). With the HHG, they committed themselves to having a capability, by 2003, of 60,000 troops. These troops would be available in 60 days and able to remain in a theatre for one year and address the full spectrum of the existing catalogue of scenarios: the so-called “Petersberg tasks”.

In addition, the Member States agreed in 1999/2000 to establish new political and military bodies within the EU Council. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) were to decide on capability development along the lines of the newly designed process of EU defence planning. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the DG E VIII, a unit within the former High Representative’s General Directorate, were to support them.

Already in December 2001 the EU declared the first results of this process, while also pointing to serious shortfalls. As a consequence, EU leaders agreed that year on the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) to remedy these shortfalls by acquisitions or production. However, ECAP largely failed to hold any nation accountable for its political commitments. The only areas where significant progress was made were command and control capabilities. The EU secured two options to acquire operations headquarters (OHQ): 1) the use of NATO structures (based on the 2003 Berlin Plus agreement), or 2) the use of five OHQs that Member States provide for the EU.

The December 2003 European Council closed the process initiated in Helsinki, although the HHG had not been achieved in full. In fact, the quantitative targets had been met, but significant qualitative shortfalls remained in key capabilities such as transport or force protection. Particular problems emerged at the upper end of the spectrum of scale and intensity. Most observers claimed, therefore, that the HHG had not been met and that ESDP remained a symbolic political move.

1.3 Second Try: HG 2010, EU Battlegroups and European Defence Agency

France and the UK, in particular, were dissatisfied with the results of the HHG process. Even before it was closed they had already initiated a new capability development process that focused on smaller units and on the armaments sector. Additionally, 2003 became a key year for ESDP development: the EU turned operational and conducted its first military operation (Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of Congo). It also adopted the first ever European Security Strategy (ESS).

A new Headline Goal was eventually adopted in June 2004: the Headline Goal 2010. Member States agreed to “commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty”. The EU’s ability to deploy high-readiness forces in response to a crisis was considered a key element of the HG 2010 and was to be based on the EU Battlegroups (BG). Battlegroups are rapid response units of about 1,500-2,500 troops. They are composed of national or multinational contributions under the responsibility of a framework nation.

The development from the HHG to the HG 2010 was a learning process for the EU. Overall, the HG 2010 aimed to remedy the capability shortfalls recognised in the HHG process. It attempted to link the capability development process within the EU with a new framework reflecting recent operational experiences, such as the first ESDP operations, and such institutional innovations as the ESS and the recently established European Defence Agency (EDA). Unlike the HHG, the HG 2010 could build upon a consensus, reached within the EU in the form of the ESS, over the definition of threats, likely scenarios, the means to address them, and the role of military force. Moreover, the HHG focused on platforms, numbers and available capabilities, while the HG 2010 had a more qualitative or “effect-based” approach: it focused on the capabilities needed to transform the EU militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and enable them to address new threats. While the HHG was geared to the Balkan wars and focused in particular on quantitative targets, the HG 2010 focused on crisis management and qualitative targets. The force generation process under the HG 2010 eventually became auditable. This both facilitated its adoption and increased its EU-wide acceptance.

However, the overall method of governance did not change from Helsinki to the HG 2010, and no sanction mechanisms were introduced to monitor Member States’ commitments. From this perspective, the HG 2010 was more an adjusting of goalposts than an improvement of a method that was already showing its limits in the HHG.

The HHG also revealed several capability shortfalls in the EU armaments sector. The defence industry and market were still exempted at that time from the EU integration process, the EU single market rules, and the EU

capability development process. Article 296¹ of the EC Treaty *de facto* exempts the armaments sector from any Community initiative. Several attempts by the European Commission to water down these rules and allow for structural improvements in the defence industry and market were obstructed by national government measures that protect individual States' defence markets.

The devastating results of the capability review pushed the EU to consider collective solutions in this area also. France and the UK developed the idea of an EU Agency to encourage Member States to improve their capabilities. As a result, the Member States set up the EDA in 2003. Its purpose is to coordinate, optimize, and harmonize cooperation between the countries of the European Union.

1.4 The EU's Capability Balance in 2010: EU Battlegroups and a Bit More

Although the HG 2010 has not yet been formally assessed, several indications suggest that its success is unlikely to be overwhelming. In 2009, ESDP reached its 10th anniversary. It changed its name to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. However, several main capability shortfalls identified in 1999 and 2003 still persisted in the areas of intelligence and reconnaissance, strategic and tactical transport, and force protection. A quantitative assessment indicates that some progress has been made in terms of military reform.² However, reforming national military forces does not mean that the Member States have developed European capabilities.

The main success story is the EU Battlegroups (BG) initiative. Politically, the BG succeeded where all other initiatives had failed: in setting up a functioning capability-generation mechanism with a palpable output. Since 2007 two EU Battlegroups have always been on stand-by. They have significantly intensified cooperation among EU States, which comes with a socialisation of decision-makers in EU security affairs. However, the price for this is military ambiguity. The minimal criteria for participation have been watered down to allow every nation to participate. In turn, military effectiveness cannot be assured for all formations. The EU Battlegroups had

¹ Article 296 of the Treaty of the European Union became Article 346 in the Lisbon Treaty.

² Daniel Keohane and Charlotte Blommestijn, *Strength in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999*, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009 (ISS Policy Brief December 2009), available at: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/PolicyBrief-05.pdf>.

an important transformation effect, but this was limited to the very small portion of troops that took part in them.³

Besides the Battlegroups, command and control capabilities are also available, thanks to the Operations Headquarters. The limitations for strategic transport have to some extent been eased.

However, the EU has never deployed the EU Battlegroups. It prefers setting up *ad hoc* force generation processes. Capability generation and force generation are thus still not linked up. The EU Battlegroups have not been used; nor have any of the many capability catalogues and plans played a major role in setting up recent operations.

Another factor is that lessons from the field are rarely taken into account in capability development: multinational cooperation in operations often only runs smoothly because commanders and experts on the ground find innovative solutions. They also show what is possible without blurring national sovereignty. However, the nations are reluctant to transfer *ad hoc* solutions into longstanding institutions.

The main success of the capability-generation mechanisms is to keep Member States engaged in capability development under the EU framework. They need to acknowledge capability gaps and voluntarily commit to seeking ways to solve them.

The success of the European Defence Agency (EDA) is also limited. Starting with a very broad mandate, the agency soon felt the limitations imposed by the Member States. The tiny operational budget gives only very limited room for manoeuvre. Through different instruments and initiatives the EDA, but also the European Commission – which has a major stake in the industrial and market dimension of the armaments sector – have tried to break down, or at least lower, the national walls that still protect the EU's 27 armaments sectors. For example, the inefficient WEAG (Western European Armaments Group) was dissolved and its projects transferred to the EDA. Some success has also been achieved through the Code of Conduct created in 2006 to promote international tendering for procurement projects and through the creation of the Joint Investment Program in the area of research and technology. Moreover, the EDA and the European Commission have begun to establish closer links.

³ Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, *EU-Battlegroups. Bilanz und Optionen zur Weiterentwicklung europäischer Krisenreaktionskräfte*, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010 (SWP-Studie 2010/S 22, September 2010), available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=7371.

However, these initiatives have suffered severely from the continuing influence of intergovernmental structures, which prevent economic rules from being applied to the armaments sector. Only a marginal amount of money and number of contracts have come under the voluntary EDA Code of Conduct on Procurement. It has failed so far to have a structural impact. None of the Member States has shown a great appetite to buy equipment abroad. But the Commission's defence package of 2007, which addresses procurement and intra-EU transfers of military goods, has the potential to bring about far-reaching changes. It can not only qualify Member States' predominance in the armaments domain, but also lead to substantially new procurement practices. However, in 2010 the EU armaments sector is far from showing a tendency towards a single set of commonly accepted and exercised rules and harmonized procedures on competition, procurement, and export. The lion's share of procurement remains outside the EU framework. For the EDA, the painful first wave of lessons learned is not yet over. The future of the agency will especially depend on its positioning in the EU's institutional architecture and whether it gains control over major future armaments programmes.

To sum up, the Member States have developed some collective military capabilities at the EU level but need to recognise the severe shortfalls that remain. The main problem lies in the mechanisms for capability development, which are too weak to engage the Member States in a meaningful manner.

2. Current and Future Challenges and Opportunities in and for Europe

Three issues shape the framework within which EU Member States will in future develop military capabilities, namely the Union's loss of strategic scope, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, and the financial crisis.

2.1 The EU Has to Make Strategic Choices

2.1.1 What kind of an actor?

The EU is losing strategic scope. Member States still answer the question "why Europe in security?" in different ways. However, the States have chosen to keep quiet. And the Lisbon Treaty has raised more doubts than enthusiasm. One reason might be a general E/CSDP fatigue, as much

uncertainty persists about the kind of security actor the EU should be. Decision-makers have become tired after a decade of promoting ESDP, and especially its military dimension, as a core driver of EU integration. ESDP has never created the spill-over effects that some of its supporters had said it would. So far, EU missions have hardly had a strategic impact, in terms of living up to the aims of the European Security Strategy. Moreover, the EU is bidding farewell to “intervention happy”⁴ times. Although CSDP is not militarily involved in Afghanistan, many EU States are. Not only have they suffered many losses, but they have also struggled to legitimize such missions. This has reduced the appetite for future large-scale interventions, irrespective of the political framework.

2.1.2 Adapting capabilities to the future face of crisis management

The character of crisis management is changing: the overall importance of military force is declining; the classic intervention paradigm is in crisis. Future engagements are likely to be more civilian and more geared towards managing the complex interaction of a number of actors to achieve an integrated or comprehensive approach. The EU has already started to adapt to these modified parameters of crisis management: it has carried out both types of operations, but with a focus on civilian missions.⁵

Yet in terms of quantity, EU military or civilian capabilities do not suffice to address potential crisis management needs in such scenarios as Sudan or a re-escalation in Congo.⁶ Moreover, these capabilities and the related EU planning processes focus on either civilian or military scenarios: they do not envisage integrated civilian-military missions.

A first step towards a reorientation of capability development was made by the EU Council when it approved a Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities in 2008. This set out a more ambitious goal for the Union: the capacity to simultaneously conduct two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations involving up to 10,000 troops plus a civilian contingent; two rapid-response operations using EU Battlegroups; a civilian–military

⁴ We are grateful to Constance Stelzenmüller for this quote.

⁵ Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, *Breaking Pillars. Towards a Civil-Military Security Approach for the European Union*, Den Haag, Clingendael Institute, 2010 (Clingendael Security Paper 13/2010), available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100211_breaking_pillars.pdf.

⁶ Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities*, London, European Council and Foreign Relations, 2009 (ECFR report, October 2009), available at: http://ecfr.3cdn.net/3af9563db3c7ab2036_ecm6buqyw.pdf.

humanitarian assistance operation and around one dozen civilian missions, including one major operation involving up to 3,000 personnel. Moreover, the declaration advised Member States to investigate innovative methods for capability development, including the pooling and multinational management of assets.⁷

This level of ambition has not yet been translated into a new Headline Goal. In fact, the gap between available and desired capabilities has only widened.

2.2 Institutional Innovation and Inertia: The Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty comprises a series of innovations designed to increase the coherence and capabilities of the EU as a security actor. It envisages a new mechanism called Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence issues (PSCiD), which is designed to allow EU States who are able and willing to do so to enhance their cooperation in the area of capabilities, equipment and forces. Thus, once implemented, PSCiD will potentially have a double impact. First, it enables EU Member States to engage in a more coherent development of badly needed military capabilities. And second, it opens a mid-term perspective for savings in national defence budgets, which are currently seriously constrained.

However, until now EU States have shed away from tabling tangible suggestions to implement PSCiD, let alone committing themselves to any precise project. Three issues add to the current stalemate:

- First, ambiguous political visions and strategic objectives. Many ideas are in the air, but they are hardly compatible. Furthermore, current debates in policy and academia alike are short of specifics about what PSCiD could achieve for Member States and the EU. Nor do they clarify the benefits of PSCiD for participating states.
- Second, the road to implementation is not clear, since the principles and criteria to define the implementation of PSCiD are rather vague. What is lacking is an evolutionary approach capable of building on existing cooperation projects and integrating the various interests at stake.
- Third is the absence of the necessary financial boost: PSCiD implementation has been hit by the current financial crisis. Given the difficult state of debate the Member States consider investment in PSCiD as a financial risk.

⁷ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2010*, London, Routledge 2010.

National decision-makers find themselves unable to organise the financial basis for rapid transformation into a more EU-focused structure.

An ongoing stalemate would not only mean missing an important window of opportunity for defence cooperation: PSCiD is also one of the few tangible innovations in CSDP. Failing to deliver in PSCiD would seriously damage CSDP.

2.3 Financial Crisis: The Strategic Impact of Long-term Withdrawal of Resources

The economic and financial crisis has put State budgets throughout the European Union under severe pressure. After massive debt-financed recovery programmes, European States now seek fiscal consolidation through measures aimed at reducing public spending. This consolidation process includes structural spending reforms designed to have an effect in the medium term. Hence, the crisis is likely to have a severe and long-lasting impact on EU crisis management capabilities. As public budgets decrease, so do investment in security and defence. Resources available for crisis management will become leaner.

Military capabilities in the EU are likely to be hit hard. Crisis-induced budget cuts are only one part of the picture. In addition, ongoing foreign operations and growing personnel costs are further squeezing the resources available for research, development and procurement. While some observers consider this situation a chance to deepen EU integration in the military realm, current national choices point in the opposite direction.

States tend to plan and implement their cuts at the national level, without much coordination or even communication at the EU level. The national reflex remains strong and creates the risk of a growing capability gap. If Member States continue to proceed in this uncoordinated manner, they may well risk a severe loss of Europe's overall military capabilities. Such a situation would further damage CSDP, as it would diminish the various instruments of EU action. Uncoordinated savings will also impact on the European technological and defence industrial base.

Nevertheless, for two reasons, cooperation does not seem to be on Member States' agenda at the moment. First, EU countries are concerned to varying degrees about the crisis. Some – like the UK or Spain – have suffered tremendously from it. Others – like Sweden or Poland – have experienced a relatively limited increase in their national budgets. Second, Member States

that are severely concerned about the crisis are implementing defence cuts in different ways: while the UK and Germany have planned to implement significant cuts in their defence budgets and procurement programmes, France and Italy have still to make significant structural changes. Yet budget pressures are likely to remain high in the decade to come and will certainly impact the defence realm. It is debatable whether the required savings can be achieved by simply trimming back the existing model without touching on the structure.⁸

3. Recommendations: The why and how of Future EU Capability Development

Why should Europe keep on trying to enhance its military actorness? All the examples given above may well limit the appetite for more initiatives leading to greater cooperation. However, two arguments clarify that such initiatives are less a question of choice than of the necessary responsibilities of governments vis-à-vis their populations.

The US, the actor that for so long has not only backed but considerably enabled Europe, is likely to be less and less able and willing to provide the resources and means needed to meet European security requirements. It will be looking increasingly to Asia. Moreover, the US no longer perceives a more integrated EU defence policy as a threat to NATO. Rather, it is more inclined to acknowledge the positive effects that an EU security and defence pillar could have for the Atlantic Alliance. This requires that the EU take on more responsibility in international crisis management.

A second argument for deeper European cooperation has to do with the trend towards weakening national sovereignty. Indeed, the persistent attachment to national sovereignty is a major stumbling block hindering deeper cooperation. The only way to preserve sovereignty, however, understood as the capacity to act, is for the countries of Europe to enhance reciprocal cooperation and integration.

Sovereignty always has a fundamental output dimension, which is measured by the capability to act. How capable are the individual Member States?

⁸ Christian Mölling, Sophie-Charlotte Brune and Marcel Dickow, *Finanzkrise und Verteidigungskooperation. Materialien zu acht europäischen Ländern und den USA*, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010 (SWP-Arbeitspapier, FG3 AP4, October 2010), available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=7442.

What are Germany, Italy, Sweden or even France and the UK able to do on their own in the military realm? Can they cope with the emerging threats by themselves? The answer, increasingly, is “no”. Such factors as the financial crisis and the demographic outlook reinforce this tendency. Sovereignty, understood, as we have said, as the capacity to act, depends to a great extent on collective efforts and intensified cooperation at the EU level.

Each Member State should consider three key questions:

- Can national objectives still be achieved without a common EU defence capacity?
- How should growing interdependencies be addressed?
- What is the price to pay to preserve national autonomy through national capabilities?

3.1 Strategic Adaptation

3.1.1 A European White Paper on Defence

The EU Member States should work on a European White Paper on Defence with the overall aim of improving the collective use of national capabilities. Such a document would serve the purpose of identifying both the necessary capabilities and a roadmap to acquire them. It would be illusory to expect this White Paper to translate immediately into political action. However, a joint effort to define aims and means would be an important learning process for the Member States.

The White Paper should identify capability shortfalls and provide suggestions for improvement in specific areas. Its guidelines could be implemented by the European Defence Agency. As a central and independent actor, the EDA could provide a framework for the transformation of armed forces across Europe, and a link to the development of Permanent Structured Cooperation. With a view to increasing the capabilities at the EU’s disposal and cementing the European security partnership, a European Defence White Paper could be open to contributions from candidate countries such as Croatia.

3.1.2 A Civilian-Military Headline Goal 2020 to implement the new level of ambition

In the 2008 Declaration on strengthening capabilities the Union outlines a new level of ambition. It describes the kind of scenarios in which the Union wants to be able to intervene, and the means with which it would do so. Currently the EU only has civilian or military capabilities, neither of which

are genuinely made for integrated scenarios. The Union therefore has to adapt them to integrated environments on a case-by-case basis. While the new level of ambition recognises the complex character of crisis scenarios, this is not reflected in the capability-development process, where civil and military demands continue to be treated separately. This civilian-military dichotomy needs to be overcome.

The existing civilian and military Headline Goals will expire in 2010. Instead of establishing yet another separate military or civilian headline goal, the Member States should strive to set up an integrated civil-military one. Truly integrated scenarios should inform the development of such capabilities. Hence, as a first step, the EU should begin to revise its current scenarios. It should create “real world” scenarios: crises rarely present purely civilian or purely military scenarios. Consequently, the Member States need to develop a variety of scenarios that reflect the intersection of civilian and military challenges and can subsequently be translated into capability requirements at the EU level. These could be framed in a new integrated Civilian-Military Headline Goal 2020.

3.1.3 EU Headquarters

A third step towards both strategic adaptation and institutional rationalisation is to merge capability planning, operational planning and operations command into a single permanent civilian-military planning and command structure, an EU Headquarters (EU HQ).

EU operations have shown that the current planning and command structures do not respond to the needs of effective crisis management. Their shortcomings result in a waste of resources, loss of time, and frictions, all of which undermine the effectiveness of these operations. Most notably, the lessons identified from EU missions are considered only marginally when it comes to discussions about capability shortfalls and capability development. Given the current challenges, future scenarios and the EU preference for a comprehensive approach, a purely military structure would be neither suited to meet future challenges nor in tune with the comprehensive character of the EU security policy. An EU HQ should not therefore be a purely military structure, but an integrated civilian-military one. The starting point for this new structure would be the existing institutions – the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and the EU Military Staff.

In April 2010 France, Poland and Germany (the Weimar Triangle) launched

a trilateral initiative to strengthen CSDP, in which they call, *inter alia*, for the establishment of a permanent civilian-military planning and command structure of this nature.⁹ Precise ideas are therefore on the table. The other Member States would be well advised to support this endeavour.

3.2 Institutional Evolution

3.2.1 Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence

The EU Member States should stop shying away from tabling serious ideas about how to implement Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence (PSCiD). They should engage in debates on how to use such cooperation as an enabling tool for those Member States that are willing and able to advance more quickly and effectively in the development of capabilities. To speed up the process the PSCiD could be based on existing cooperation projects, especially those aimed at remedying serious capability shortfalls. A very suitable showcase already to hand could be the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF). PSCiD would here mean a more coordinated use of already existing or planned national capabilities. The States contributing to EATF would share the operation of the aircraft, with the European Air Transport Command playing a leading and coordinating role. One example for a new initiative based on existing capabilities would be to pool EU national air force capabilities for “air policing” EU air space, using existing jet planes. Demand for pooling also exists in the area of unmanned aircraft (UAVs) and transport helicopters.

3.2.2 Using the full potential of the European Defence Agency

The Member States should make better use of the capacities and potential of the European Defence Agency.

First, they should entrust the EDA with the task of driving and establishing a framework for the development, pooling and sharing of projects. The Agency could serve as a forum in which the Member States develop a common understanding of multinational projects as a complement to national ones. This would be the pre-condition for pooling and sharing initiatives in various areas, such as equipment or logistics.

Second, the EDA should serve as a central and independent certification authority for military capabilities, particularly the Battlegroups, assessing if

⁹ See Claudia Major, *Zivil-militärische Planungs- und Führungsstrukturen für die EU*, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010 (SWP-Aktuell, forthcoming).

and to what extent they meet planned requirements such as deployability. This task of the EDA's would go hand-in-hand with its planning activities. Third, in view of the expected civilian-military scenarios in crisis management, the Member States should also consider using the agency to create civilian-military synergies. In such a perspective, the EDA could, for example, support the development of joint civilian-military transport arrangements.

Fourth, the Agency would provide the right framework for drafting a European White Paper on Defence with a view to giving capability development both a strategic basis and a procedural road map.

Finally, in order to integrate the economic dimension and give a new *élan* to the original purpose of the agency, namely to allow Member States to get more "bang for their euros", finance ministers should play a stronger role in the EDA. This would be especially important, as defence ministries tend to think much more in national terms and are sometimes less aware of the price tag attached to one or the other solution.

3.3 Advancing Military Integration by Incrementally Extending Islands of Cooperation

The EU Battlegroups are currently the best developed mechanisms for regular and intensive military cooperation at the EU level. They should be used as a starting point for a gradually deepening degree of cooperation that could take the form of continuation and expansion, as set out below.

- Continuation: more continuity could be achieved if a group of Member States took on the responsibility of manning a Battlegroup on a permanent basis. Currently, BGs change according to a six-month rotation scheme. The starting point for such long-term cooperation could be the existing regular cooperation between individual countries, for instance in the context of the Nordic Battlegroup. Apart from its political symbolism, continuation would also bring military and economic advantages: logistics, command and control, and planning arrangements could be used continuously. Each unit's institutional knowledge at the command level would be continuously available. This solution could contribute to the further harmonization of standards.

- Expansion: The BG concept could be expanded to include more troops and encompass diverse capabilities. The aim would be to transfer the high degree of readiness associated with Battlegroups to a larger body of EU armed forces. Instead of the ten-day readiness anchored in the original BG

concept, a gradual approach to readiness could be introduced. A larger formation of this sort would comprise troop units exhibiting various degrees of readiness, from 48 hours to 60 days. Each time a part of the larger unit was deployed, another troop unit with the same ability, but lower degree of readiness, would follow. Thus, the overall troop component would remain at the highest possible level.

3.4 *Financing of Capabilities*

3.4.1 Reacting to the financial crisis

The financial crisis challenges all EU Member States. It could also affect the collective use of military capabilities. Indeed, the way European countries react to the crisis and its repercussions will heavily influence the EU's ability to act collectively. The challenge is to achieve savings in a coordinated way while guaranteeing the Union's and Member States' capacity to act. Dealing with the crisis requires action on two levels: first, identification of internal restructuring and rationalisation potential; and second, specialisation and cooperation with partners. Savings can be achieved through international cooperation and by internationalising defence production.

The Member States should: 1) define strategic priorities at the EU level in order to guide and direct restructuring processes; and 2) commit to transparent information policies as to who wants to cut what. That should ensure that national processes occur in a concurrent manner. And 3), Member States should also define complementarities in cuts in order to pool and share existing capabilities, as well as investments in future ones. This would avoid *ad hoc* and uncoordinated decisions in defence reductions across the EU.

3.4.2 Pooling & Sharing in logistics and beyond

The EU Member States should make more use of pooling and sharing (P&S) and actively engage in joint initiatives, whether in the area of capabilities, logistics or equipment. The current financial crisis increases the need for better spending, and might act as a catalyst for pooling and sharing initiatives. P&S makes it possible to reduce costs and may ensure greater reliability of the desired common good. One example is logistics. With the help of framework agreements, the EU should pool the logistical aspects of EU operations. This would require all Member States to agree on basic standards, for life support, for example, in order to create transparent requi-

rements for the (civilian) contractors. It would simplify tenders, facilitate quality checks and make it possible to enter into enforceable contracts. As mentioned above, the EDA could play a key role here.

Additionally, the Member States could pool their resources in logistical warehouses. The European Air Transport Fleet (EATF), conceived in 2008, will pool European air transport capacities once it begins operating in 2014. Comparable models should be envisaged for sea and land transport.

3.5 Long-term Perspective: A European Army – Forever Elusive?

Numerous politicians, including the German and the Italian foreign ministers, have called for the establishment of a European Army. In the light of the rather limited achievements discussed above, this may sound utopian. What can Europe's people reasonably expect from the defence efforts of its Member States? The answer is: less than many of the professional friends of Europe and military-power talkers dream of, but more than Member States have achieved thus far. EU military capability development has suffered from a lack of understanding of the complexity of the defence planning and strategy development required by a new entity such as ESDP/CSDP. But it has also suffered from Member States' reluctance to live up to their commitments. If Europe is to play a role in international peace and security, it needs to develop the appropriate capabilities. This demands leadership and responsibility. Qualities that can only be achieved by adapting to the new realities, chief among which the growing erosion of national sovereignty and the ensuing need to establish new forms of sovereignty through deeper transnational cooperation and integration.

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2. EU CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION WITH THE MILITARY SECTOR

Isabelle Ioannides

Introduction

The European Union's gradual emergence as a major player on the international scene in the field of crisis management - partly born out of the lessons drawn from the Yugoslav crises and in particular the tragedies in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo - first revealed its civilian distinctiveness. Indeed, out of the 25 missions the EU has launched since 2003 when the European - now Common - Security and Defence Policy became operational, 17 have been civilian (out of which 9 are ongoing) and two can be characterised as hybrid (combining civilian and military aspects).¹ In parallel, these efforts have been supported by European Community instruments attesting to the cross-cutting character of EU civilian crisis management in which both the European Commission and the Council of the European Union participate. In an effort to ensure that both legs of civilian crisis management work effec-

¹ The EU civilian missions include: EU Police Missions (*EUPOL RD Congo*, *EUPOL Kinshasa*, *EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, *EUPOL PROXIMA* and *EUPAT* in Macedonia, *EUPOL Afghanistan* and *EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories*), EU Rule of Law Missions (*EULEX Kosovo*, *EUJUST LEX for Iraq* and *EUJUST THEMIS* in Georgia), EU Monitoring Missions (*EUMM in Georgia*, *EUMM in Former Yugoslavia* and *EU AMM in Aceh*), EU Border Assistance Missions (*EUBAM Rafah* and the European Commission-funded *Moldova and Ukraine border missions*). The hybrid missions are the recently completed *EU Security Sector Reform mission in Guinea-Bissau* (it was only recently closed down on 30 September 2010) and the *EU support to AMIS (Darfur)*. Ongoing missions are indicated in *italics*.

tively, EU representatives and scholars have increasingly emphasised the importance of designing and executing a comprehensive and ultimately integrated approach to crisis response, management and stabilisation, thus utilising civilian and military elements in parallel. Accordingly, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has not only expanded its action far and wide (from the Western Balkans to the South Caucasus, from Africa to the Middle East and Asia), but it has also diversified the substance of operations: strengthening police missions are supported by executive powers; policing is moving towards the broader rule of law reform framework; monitoring borders is complemented by a growing demand for more complex and comprehensive operations, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The EU is commonly seen to be in a unique position to make a significant contribution to complex crisis management operations due to the broad range of political, economic, civilian and military instruments at its disposal. In 2003, the European Security Strategy affirmed that the EU “could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities”,² which today is a reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, for instance, where the Union plays a leading role. EU crisis management has therefore mirrored developments in international peacekeeping, which recognises that new wars - in Mary Kaldor’s words - have become an amalgam of war, crime and human rights violations and whereby “the agents of cosmopolitan law-enforcement have to be a mixture of soldiers and policemen”.³ Equally, it has followed the tendency towards an increasing blurring of boundaries between the internal and external order of States, which the EU explicitly acknowledged in Council Conclusions.⁴

This chapter examines the main developments in the field of EU civilian crisis management and, building on the previous chapter, assesses how EU civilian capabilities work with the military sector. Given that crisis management instruments have been created at different times, within different insti-

² See Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 11, available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

³ See Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity, 2005, p. 11.

⁴ See Council of the European Union, *A Strategy for the External Dimension of the Area JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice*, Doc. 15446/05, Brussels, 6 December 2005, available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st15/st15446.en05.pdf>; Didier Bigo, “The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)”, in Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid (eds.), *Identities, Borders, Orders - Rethinking IR Theory, Borderlines*, Minneapolis, University Minnesota Press, 2001, pp. 91-116.

tutional structures and for different purposes, ensuring that they are used in a coordinated and coherent manner in support of crisis management objectives has been a formidable challenge. This study first analyses the EU strategies for civilian crisis management and then examines the EU institutions and tools available in order to pin point their strengths and weaknesses. As the CSDP matures, its future contours and evolution become clearer. Hence, the last part of the chapter offers a series of recommendations for improving the coherence and effectiveness between EU civilian and military capabilities.

1. Strategies for Civilian and Civilian-Military Crisis Management

Understood quintessentially as a European concept,⁵ “civilian crisis management” is a subject that falls firmly under the framework of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose objectives as set out in the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union encompass:

*“to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; and preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders”.*⁶

Nonetheless, the actual notion of EU “civilian crisis management” remains ambiguous and has not been defined in EU documents.⁷ One of the first reports devoted to the issue defined it as “the intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution”.⁸ Annex III of the Feira Council Conclusions (June 2000) stipulated that the reinforcement of EU civilian capabilities should provide the Union with

⁵ See Renata Dwan, *Civilian Tasks and Capabilities in EU Operations*, London, The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE, 2004, available at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityReport/DwanPaperCivilianCapacities.pdf>.

⁶ See “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”, in *Official Journal of the European Union* C 83, Volume 53, 30 March 2010, p. 29, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML>.

⁷ See Giovanna Bono and Ståle Ulriksen (eds.), “The EU, Crisis Management and Peace Support Operations”, *Special issue of International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2004.

⁸ See Chris Lindborg, *European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management*, BASIC Special Report, London, British American Security Information Council, March 2002, p. 4.

adequate means to face complex political crises at different phases by “ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg tasks.”⁹ These common objectives and norms underpinning outside intervention are given shape in the European Security Strategy, which recognises that civilian capabilities are vital for the negotiation of the broad range of threats that confront us in the 21st century and the only tool for their long-term management. Thus, in the absence of a civilian crisis management strategy *per se*, it has become easier to think of this field of action as synergy rather than strategy, therefore linking together different threads from conflict prevention, crisis management, peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation, even development.

Civilian crisis management lies at the heart of the EU discourse on the human security-based approach to global security and provides an important step towards a common EU understanding on democratic governance. Specifically, it has promoted the mainstreaming of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance and rule of law in all policy sectors. In 2003, the European Security Strategy added a dimension and prompted the discourse on enhancing EU civilian-military cooperation, when discussing the threats to the EU which it saw as neither “purely military; nor [as] tackled by purely military means”, but rather as “require[ing] a mixture of instruments”.¹⁰ It had followed on the learning from mistakes made in the management of the Western Balkan crises. The deployment of the EU military mission - EUFOR Althea - in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004 is a case in point. Initially, overlapping mandates resulted in the two EU missions - EUPM (police) and EUFOR (military) - being involved in the fight against organised crime, crime control and law enforcement. It is worth noting, however, that at the time the EU had not conceptualised the dividing line between police and military as a newcomer to the post-conflict stabilisation field.¹¹ With the revision of the EUPM mandate in 2006, the parallel EU

⁹ According to the Lisbon TEU (art. 43), these “shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation”. See “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”, cit., p. 39.

¹⁰ See Council of the European Union, ‘*A Secure Europe in a Better World*’. *European Security Strategy*, cit., p. 7.

¹¹ See Susan E. Penksa, “Security Governance, Complex Peace Support Operations and the Blurring of Civil-Military Tasks”, in Christopher Daase and Cornelius Friesendorf (eds.), *Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences*, New York, NY, Routledge, 2010, pp. 46-47.

police and military missions agreed to a set of common operational guidelines to govern their relationship with local law enforcement officials:¹² EUFOR's involvement in crime control has since been limited to providing essential operational support to local authorities when the EU Police Mission endorses the action as legitimate and necessary.¹³

This example explains the EU's recent endorsement of a security sector reform policy, which conceptually is holistic and integrative, and operationally assembles activities in which the EU is already engaged in (e.g. defence, police, intelligence and juridical reforms). Strategically, it reaffirms the EU's normative commitment to democracy, the consolidation and promotion of human rights, and good governance.¹⁴ In many ways, this policy seemed to remove the damaging consequences of excessively complex institutional arrangements and the dogmatic conceptual distinction between security and development issues, which is nonsensical in crisis situations that threaten fragile states. Still, submitting all peace support operation components to a single political vision can be a source of friction between the norms of SSR - focused on the separation of military from civilian functions - and operational reality, which sees the military and gendarmerie engaging in enforcement tasks during crisis management.

The 2008 report of the European Council on the implementation of the European Security Strategy further emphasised coherence and coordination as key challenges for EU security.¹⁵ Accordingly, Council conclusions that followed emphasised the need for "civil-military synergy" with a view to maximising "effectiveness in the field as well as at Brussels level".¹⁶ Similarly, the 2008 Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities included hybrid missions among the types of operations envisaged under CSDP. The

¹² See Council of the European Union, *Common Operational Guidelines for EUPM-EUFOR Support to the Fight against Organised Crime*, Sarajevo, 11 May 2006. The document was declassified on 25 March 2010 and is available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st10/st10769-re01.en06.pdf>.

¹³ See Susan E. Penksa, "Security Governance, Complex Peace Support Operations and the Blurring of Civil-Military Tasks", cit., pp. 47-48.

¹⁴ See Isabelle Ioannides, "European Union Security Sector Reform Policy: What Added Value", in *Eyes on Europe*, December 2009, p. 37, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533860>.

¹⁵ See Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels, 11 December 2008, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

¹⁶ See Council of the European Union, *Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development*, Doc. 15475/09, Brussels, 9 November 2009, p. 2, available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15475.en09.pdf>.

implementation of the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010), which built on the CHG 2008 followed suit: it launched a new common pilot illustrative scenario supportive of both civilian and military CSDP capability development processes, including relevant capabilities in the European Commission.¹⁷ The development of a systematic approach on human resources to create a clear framework on recruitment was also initiated. In parallel and more concretely, the EU developed two concepts which sum up efforts to interconnect civilian and military approaches to crisis management: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO). The former appertains to cooperation at operational and tactical levels and aims to ensure the coordination and cooperation between EU military missions and civil actors (external to the EU), including the local population and authorities, as well as international and non-governmental organisations and agencies.¹⁸ The limits of CIMIC for a comprehensive coordination between civilian and military sides of ever more complex EU crisis management operations lie on the fact that the concept was derived from a military perspective: it is primarily concerned with force protection and cooperation with non-military actors is subordinated to that aim.¹⁹ What is of importance here is CMCO - a work in progress - which addresses "the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU's response to crisis".²⁰ In other words, CMCO is about the internal coordination of EU structures in crisis management - both civil-civil and civil-military coordination - and it is understood to be required at all levels of

¹⁷ See Council of the European Union, *Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (approved by the Ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 19 November 2007 - doc. 14823/07)*, Brussels, 2007, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf.

¹⁸ See Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) for EU-led Military Operations*, Doc. 11716/1/08, Brussels, 3 February 2009, available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st11/st11716-re01.en08.pdf>.

¹⁹ See Radek Khol, "Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management", in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2006 (Chaillot Paper No. 90), p. 124, available at: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp090.pdf>.

²⁰ See Council of the European Union, *Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)*, Doc. 14457/03, Brussels, 7 November 2003, p. 2, available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/servlet/driver?page=Result&lang=EN&typ=Advanced&cmsid=639&ff_COTE_DOCUMENT=14457%2F03&ff_COTE_DOSSIER_INST=&ff_TITRE=&ff_FT_TEXT=&ff_SOUS_COTE_MATIERE=&dd_DATE_DOCUMENT=&dd_DATE_REUNION=&dd_FT_DATE=&fc=REGAISEN&srm=25&md=100&ssf=DATE_DOCUMENT+DESC.

the management of crises. The Crisis Management Concept, which constitutes the “conceptual framework describing the overall approach of the EU to the management of a particular crisis”, is central to CMCO.²¹ While the preferred approach to sustain and develop a culture of coordination rather than establish detailed structures and procedures avoided burdening the crisis response process with a rigid set of rules, it also exposed the reluctance of relevant institutions to be constrained by specific commitments.²² Ultimately, genuine coordination of all planning stages has remained limited and comprehensive planning between the civilian and military arms is obstructed, despite repeated EU declarations to the contrary.

2. EU Civilian Institutions and Capabilities

Competence for civilian crisis management between second and first pillars of the EU has long been a contested issue: short-term activities aimed to de-escalate crises are conducted through the CSDP procedure, while European Community (EC) mechanisms are utilised for long-term reconstruction efforts and designed to support a broader range of implementing actors.

The Community has been engaged in a range of activities that provide assistance to third countries in crisis, in line with the overarching objectives set out in the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)²³ and the “political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations” agreed on in the 2001 Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. A range of instruments were established to deliver Community assistance in pre-crisis, active crisis and post-

²¹ See Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level*, Doc. 10687/08, Brussels, 16 June 2008, p. 10, available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st10/st10687.en08.pdf>.

²² See Giovanni Grevi, “EU Institutions”, in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, Brussels, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 54, available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf; Ursula C. Schroeder, “Governance of EU Crisis-Management”, in Michael Emerson and Eva Gross (eds.), *Evaluating the EU Crisis Missions in the Balkans*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2007, p. 26, available at: <http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1538.pdf>.

²³ These included most notably the promotion of stable conditions for human and economic development and the promotion of human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms.

crisis situations and aiming, among other, to: support political and diplomatic initiatives to defuse a crisis; foster stability during periods of transition; safeguard human rights and strengthen democratic processes; and reboot the process of economic and social development.²⁴

These included a number of geographic (e.g. PHARE, CARDS and TACIS) and specialised sectoral (e.g. the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights) financial instruments, which were radically rationalised in 2007. Until then, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) - a Community instrument established in 2001 to provide quick, flexible, short-term (up to six months) support for safeguarding or re-establishing conditions of stability in crisis situations and linking to longer-term assistance to countries in crisis - would initially be launched. It usually followed up on specialised sectoral instruments that provide emergency support in politically unstable or crisis environments, which include EC humanitarian assistance and the Member States capabilities mobilised under the EC Civil Protection Mechanism.²⁵ In fact, only a very small part of Commission assistance was available for tackling the root causes of conflict: the majority of EC assistance was delivered through its long-term geographic instruments, which served as the main channel for EU financial and technical cooperation (training or specialised equipment, assistance in drafting relevant legislation and strategic advice) aiming at long-term structural changes.²⁶

The EC instruments were rationalised by concentrating around 30 geographical and 50 thematic budget lines, which had grown over time in an *ad hoc* manner, into six categories of external activities. These introduced greater flexibility into the instruments, enabling *inter alia* linkages between short-term actions and long-term development. Three are designed as horizontal instruments to respond to particular needs (humanitarian aid instrument, stability instrument - replacing the RRM - and instrument for macro-financial assistance) and three have a defined geographical coverage to implement particular policies - Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

²⁴ See Catriona Gourlay, "Community Instruments for Civilian Crisis Management", in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, cit., p. 49.

²⁵ It should be noted that EC humanitarian aid delivered under Council Resolution (EC) No. 1257/96 through the EC Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) is not considered a crisis management tool since it is delivered solely on the basis of need and cannot be subsumed to the political logic of crisis management. This study only deals with EC crisis management capabilities and will not analyse these two instruments. For further information, please see Catriona Gourlay, "Community Instruments for Civilian Crisis Management", cit., pp. 49-67.

²⁶ See Catriona Gourlay, "European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management", in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 404-421.

(IPA), European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument (DCECI). In particular, the Instrument for Stability, in place since January 2007, has allowed the European Commission to considerably intensify its work in the area of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding and to broaden the scope of its action in such areas as support to mediation, confidence building, interim administrations, strengthening rule of law, transitional justice or the role of natural resources in conflict.

At an institutional level, the streamlining of Community crisis management capacity began with the creation of the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (DG AidCo) in January 2001, which merged the tasks of programme implementation previously carried out separately for external relations and development. DG AidCo undertook project identification and appraisal, contracting, disbursement of funds, monitoring and *ex post* evaluation. Then followed the extensive devolution of management responsibilities (i.e. transfer of personnel, programme appraisal and financial and implementation responsibility) - "deconcentration" as the process is known - from DG AidCo to the EC Delegations in third States.

On the CSDP side, the Council mandated the incoming Finnish presidency in June 1999 to address non-military crisis management. The EU committed itself to the establishment of four important, mutually dependent instruments: police cooperation, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. These Civilian Headline Goals have developed - and continue to develop - in order to guide and re-evaluate the quantity, scope and quality of EU capabilities (instruments and institutions) build up. To achieve the goals set, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) in the EU Council Secretariat, established in June 2002, organised pledging conferences under successive EU Presidencies, whereby phased targets on capabilities were agreed upon and maintained through voluntary contributions by Member States.²⁷ The Danish presidency declared five months later that specific objectives for the four civilian headline goals had been met. As the Table below demonstrates, these initial targets were successfully updated and even exceeded at the December 2004 capabilities conference.

²⁷ Agnieszka Nowak, "Civilian Crisis Management within ESDP", in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, cit., pp. 15-38.

Table 1. - EU Civilian Capabilities

Police	The EU aims to be capable of carrying out any police operation, from advisory, assistance and training tasks to substituting local police forces. Member States have undertaken to provide more than 5000 police officers (5761), of who up to 1400 can be deployed in less than 30 days.
Strengthening the rule of law	Efforts deployed on an international scale to reinforce and if necessary restore credible local police forces can only be successful if a properly functioning judicial and penitentiary system backs up the police forces. Member States have undertaken to provide 631 officers in charge of crisis management operations in that area (prosecutors, judges, prison officers).
Civilian administration	As regards civilian administration, a pool of experts has been created, capable of accepting civilian administration missions in the context of crisis-management operations, and if necessary, being deployed at very short notice. Member States have pledged a total of 565 staff.
Civil protection	In this area too, the objective has been achieved, and consists of: a) 2 or 3 assessment and/or coordination teams, capable of being mobilised around the clock; b) intervention teams of up to 2000 persons for deployment at short notice; and c) additional or more specialised means which could be dispatched within 2 to 7 days depending on the particular needs of each crisis. Member States have committed 579 civil protection experts and 4445 staff for intervention teams.
Monitoring	Monitoring capability, identified by the December 2004 European Council, has become a generic tool for conflict prevention/resolution and/or crisis management and/or peacebuilding. An important function of monitoring missions is to contribute to “prevention/deterrence by presence” and they also enhance EU visibility on the ground, demonstrating EU engagement and commitment to a crisis or region. Member States have committed 505 personnel.
Strengthening of EUSR offices	Strengthening the offices of EU Special Representatives.
<p><i>Source:</i> Adapted from EU Council Secretariat, <i>European Security and Defence Policy: The Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</i>, Updated August 2009 civ/03, Brussels, August 2009, p. 2.</p>	

It is such quantitative criteria, borrowed from the EU experience in developing military capabilities and largely decided upon randomly (rather than in response to a needs analysis), which have driven the approach to the development of EU civilian capabilities. Moreover, while these goals were met on paper, qualitative analysis of their actual readiness, deployability, or sustainability were in doubt.²⁸ Importantly, most civilian CSDP missions have focused on rule of law assistance, particularly police reform, and therefore most deployed staff has been drawn from the first two categories. Nonetheless, concerns have repeatedly been expressed regarding the continued shortfalls in the areas of police, rule of law and civilian administration, and particularly the lack of use of the valuable Civilian Response Team (CRT) instrument.²⁹ In late 2007 and early 2008, the EU drafted a new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 which featured the launch of an operational Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) unit within the Council Secretariat (explained below), while simultaneously watering down military ambitions.³⁰

Numbers were also important in the development of civilian expertise in the EU Council Secretariat in Brussels. In parallel to the Council structures at political level, namely the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and CIVCOM, the Helsinki European Council established new permanent political and civilian bodies within the EU Council Secretariat to support the organisation and launching of CSDP missions, including the Directorate General for External Economic Relations and Politico-Military Affairs (DG E IX) and its sub-divisions (e.g. the Police Unit). Whereas the establishment

²⁸ Author's discussion with an EU Member States representative in CIVCOM, Brussels, September 2006.

²⁹ A CRT is a multi-functional civilian crisis management rapid reaction capability of flexible size and composition, consisting of Member State experts with, in principle, Council Secretariat and European Commission participation. Its tasks can include: to carry out assessment and fact-finding missions in a crisis or impending crisis situation and, when appropriate, provide input to the development of a crisis management concept; to establish a rapid initial operational presence in the field after a Joint Action is adopted; and to provide, as appropriate, timely reinforcement of existing EU mechanisms for crisis management at country and regional level in response to urgent and distinct needs (e.g. conflict mediation, confidence-building measures, monitoring). See European Parliament, *Implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP*, European Parliament Resolution of 5 June 2008 on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP (2008/2003(INI)), P6_TA(2008)0255, Brussels, 5 June 2008, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0255>.

³⁰ Anand Menon and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Instruments and Intentionality: Civilian Crisis Management and Enlargement Conditionality in EU Security Policy", in *West European Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2010, pp. 83-84.

of a sizeable military staff (around 150) in the Council was swift, it took a year for agreement to be reached on the establishment of the Police Unit and only on a restricted basis, at a time when the EU was essentially deploying police missions.³¹ As part of the move towards holistic EU crisis management, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was created and became operational in 2008, in order to answer to the lack of planning and command structures for civilian missions. The new structure is responsible for the provision of planning for the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Its efficiency and efforts to create a culture of coordination have been mixed: on one hand, the Council and the Commission have been involved in the fact-finding and planning stages of CSDP missions and the EU has used EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) to strengthen its political presence in theatre. On the other hand, there has been a lack of common tools and templates for setting standards, reporting, training and the implementation of gathered experience.³² These institutions and instruments, as well as the ones falling under the European Commission, will be moved into the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is hoped will also further streamline command and control mechanisms.

The complex and highly fragmented institutional configuration with divisions as much within each pillar as between pillars (Community instruments versus CSDP missions) led to competitive, ineffective, incoherent - sometimes even acrimonious - civilian-civilian relations, especially in the Western Balkans. It was indeed one of the reasons for the rationalisation of instruments and the removal of the pillar system in the Lisbon Treaty. Institutional one-off innovations used in theatre demonstrated that the integration of instruments across pillars can enhance the effectiveness of crisis management. One such example was the “double-hatting” of Erwan Fouéré as the Head of the EC Delegation in Skopje and EU Special Representative - thus combining the representation of the Council and the Commission - a formula which dealt with the conflictual relationship between these two offices. This formula was utilised again

³¹ Several Council officials, in Brussels, admitted in interviews (in April-May 2005 and 2006) that because the Police Unit was understaffed, it could not cope with the increasing number of civilian operations.

³² See Nik Hynek, *Consolidating the EU's Crisis Management Structures: Civil-Military Coordination and the Future of the EU OHQ*, Brussels, Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union/Directorate B, European Parliament, 2010, p. 9, available at: <http://tepsa.be/Hynek%20Consolidating%20the%20EUs%20Crisis%20Management%20Structures.pdf>.

with the appointment of Koen Vervaeke as both EU Special Representative to the African Union and Head of the EC Delegation in Addis Ababa.

3. Working with the Military Sector

The dissolution of traditional borders between civilian and military crisis management, primarily through deliberate efforts to deploy hybrid civilian-military operations, has been one of the crucial trends in EU crisis management. Illustrations include the civilian mission in Aceh (Aceh Monitoring Mission - AMM), which was carried out primarily by the military; EU initiatives in Sudan and Somalia, which were explicitly categorised as civilian-military support actions; or the EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau, which is the first example of a civilian-military CSDP operation.

In order to support integrated missions and promote the EU quest for a comprehensive approach to crisis management, the Council has developed relevant bodies. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) ensures coordinated EU action as it receives advice from the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and EU Military Committee (EUMC) during decision-taking on launching EU operation and then serves as the main point of reporting to by EU actors in a field. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is responsible for planning and implementing CIMIC at political and strategic levels. Particularly, its Civ-Mil Cell (operational since 2006) is the first standing EU body that fully integrates military and civilian expertise, including from the European Commission, thus contributing to CMCO. At a political level, it reports both to CIVCOM and EUMC, and it aims to provide the EU with an autonomous planning capacity, a strategic planning cell and its integral Operations Centre (operational since January 2007), to conduct the conceptual work on hybrid CSDP mission, particularly on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). The final addition to the Civ-Mil Cell was the Watch-Keeping Capability, which became operation in mid-2008 and was supposed to be available to both military and civilian operational planning. Accordingly, the Civ-Mil Cell is also well situated to integrate reports on lessons learned from separate civilian and military operation conducted side-by-side in one territory, as is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³³

³³ See Radek Khol, "Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management", cit., p. 125.

There remain nonetheless important loopholes. Despite having roughly equal numbers of civilian and military staff and having included a Civilian Operation Commander responsible for the direction and support of civilian Heads of Mission, the Civ-Mil Cell is seen to have a military bias due to its location within the EU Military Staff.³⁴ Hence, its potential to improve CMCO has been undermined, particularly as there is little sign of a genuine culture of coordination. EU Special Representatives are leading political representatives of the EU on the ground, but they do not have a supreme coordination authority over EU Force Commanders, who report to the EU Military Committee and receive political instructions directly from the PSC. The military is understandably very anxious to keep this chain of command intact and separate from the civilian side.³⁵ It regards the civilian planning as overly optimistic about the environments into which the EU deploys, while the civilian elements are wary of militarising EU policy.³⁶

The central problem for the Civ-Mil Cell, which was conceived as a system integrator, is that the crisis management concept (CMC) is not comprehensive - it does not incorporate civilian and political-military elements. While the Civ-Mil Cell contributed to specific civilian-military missions (e.g. the Aceh Monitoring mission), the drafting of the CMC remained in the hands of an *ad hoc* body in the EUMS, the so called Crisis Response Coordinating Team. This matter, though, was tackled with the creation of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). This latest institution created in December 2008 aimed to take the EU quest for comprehensiveness in crisis management a step further: it merged civilian and military aspects of the planning for EU missions - DG E IX and DG E VIII respectively in the EU Council Secretariat - into a single Directorate to coordinate civilian and military tasks. Specifically, it is responsible for the Crisis Management Concept and its main value is seen in facilitating progress in areas such as strategic planning, mission and operation reviews and reporting, lessons identified and concept deve-

³⁴ See Stuart Gordon, "Exploring the Civil-Military Interface and its Impact on European Strategic and Operational Personalities: 'Civilianisation' and Limiting Military Roles In Stabilisation Operations?", in *European Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, pp. 339-361.

³⁵ See Radek Khol, "Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management", cit., pp. 123-124.

³⁶ See Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, *Matching Ambition with Institutional Innovation: The EU's Comprehensive Approach and Civil-Military Organisation*, Oslo, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2009, p. 17.

lopment at strategic and operational levels.³⁷ As this new structure is now taking shape, however, the military aspect has once again been given vastly disproportionate weight and civilian experts have been pushed out of the decision-making structures.³⁸ The ongoing complexity of the chain of command among relevant bodies working on external relations is also perceived as a particularly problematic situation.

In addition to the use of Integrated Police Units (IPUs), the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)³⁹ - set up in 2004, with permanent headquarters in Vicenza (Italy) and composed of military police from France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain - is also an important factor when considering the move towards integrated crisis management and the development of civilian-military cooperation. This is especially true in the context of an EU move towards multi-functional capabilities packages with these two bodies being deployed in parallel with civilian CSDP missions (primarily police missions). The IPUs and the EGF are seen as being able to facilitate a smoother transition from the military to civilian phase of a peace support operation and limit the problem of combat soldiers undertaking civilian police missions in crisis management.⁴⁰

The tendency for partial inter-institutional operational meshing is also observed in the field. Indeed, in some cases, local realities in conflict-torn environments have forced the EU to be solution oriented and provide on-the-whim answers to political imbroglios that originate in Brussels and EU Member States capitals. For instance, when EU attempts to formulate an SSR policy were still split into two concept papers in the EC and Council, the EU was able to agree on a comprehensive approach to SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), thus bringing the two legs of SSR

³⁷ See Council of the European Union, *Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development*, cit., p. 5; Luis Simón, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations*, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, January 2010 (Occasional Paper No. 81), p. 26, available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Planning_for_EU_military_operations.pdf

³⁸ See Alain Délétoz, "The Spoils of EU Reform", *Reuters*, 19 February 2010. Accessed on 19 August 2010 from <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate-uk/2010/02/19/the-spoils-of-eu-reform/>.

³⁹ In the context of the European Gendarmerie Force, a 3,000 strong force should be available with 800 personnel deployable within 30 days to substitute or supplement local police in crisis management operations.

⁴⁰ See Alice Hills, "The Inherent Limits of Military Forces in Policing Peace Operations", in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2001, pp. 79-98.

together at an operational level.⁴¹ More recently, the Joint Action that authorised the deployment of EU SRR Guinea Bissau explicitly outlined that the mission is complementary to development programmes and other Community activities managed by the European Commission.

4. Policy Recommendations

In terms of functional diversity and geographical spread, the EU has managed to expand its field of action in crisis management substantially from civilian to military, and to add civilian-military elements. While this is in itself an accomplishment, the synthesis the EU seeks in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and, especially, civil-military coordination (CMCO) remains largely underdeveloped. The recommendations below aim to improve the comprehensiveness, coherence and effectiveness of EU crisis management.

- Strengthen the link between CFSP and CSDP

At a political level, CSDP missions continue to be perceived and developed as apolitical and technical operations and as such remain disconnected from the broader peacebuilding framework. EULEX Kosovo is a case in point. In order to bypass the unresolved status question and achieve concrete results, EULEX officials were forced to adopt a pragmatic approach to the given mandate: they devised programmes in a technical and seemingly apolitical manner allowing them to be co-located inside the Kosovo institutions, which the EU *per se* does not recognise.⁴² As the EU moves towards a holistic approach to crisis management, its missions cover such fields as security sector reform, which demand leadership to provide clear strategies and strategic control, a situation which is compounded when the mission has an executive mandate - as is the case with Kosovo - that aims to address entrenched aspects of organised crime and corruption. EU operations are accused of being “small, lacking in ambition and often strategically irrelevant”⁴³, and as being deployed in regions, territories, countries for

⁴¹ See *A Comprehensive EU Approach to SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*, Brussels, November 2006, p. 2. Unpublished document prepared by the European institutions.

⁴² Author's interviews with EULEX officials, Pristina, May 2010.

⁴³ See Daniel Kroski and Richard Gowan, *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capabilities*, London, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 24, available at: http://ecfr.3cdn.net/3af9563db3c7ab2036_ecm6buqyw.pdf.

which the EU has no long-term policy and/or commitment.⁴⁴ The evidence points to the fact that CFSP and CSDP policies are decoupled. Yet, in order for CSDP operations to produce sustainable results, they must be guided by clear long-term political strategies that are more intricately connected to the CFSP.

- ***Institutionalise learning***

Thus far, CSDP learning and its translation into broader operational lessons has taken place on an *ad hoc* basis. Much of the EU learning is based on the cross-fertilisation of expertise of individual officials and the rotation of key experts from one EU mission to the next.⁴⁵ It is these individual attempts/initiatives that shape and impact on the potential for learning and lead to institutional maturation at the operational level. Drafting a solid programme strategy and strengthening evaluation mechanisms for EULEX Kosovo, systematically consulting Kosovo civil society, or engaging in reforms of the entire spectrum of Rule of Law (police, justice and customs) rather than its individual components, all constitute lessons stemming from EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT in Macedonia and EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, there are important limitations to this *ad hoc* learning approach: the lessons identified remain at an operational level and are not systematised or standardised at Brussels level. However, a balanced and comprehensive approach to crisis management requires that relevant EU bodies exchange views at key steps of the processes (e.g. defining generic scenarios; setting requirements; identifying overlapping requirements; gathering EU Member States contributions potentially available; and assessing and addressing shortfalls).⁴⁷ Thus, identifying common methodologies and tools to address these diverse milestones, that would help institutionalise learning, is important.

⁴⁴ Discussion with CSDP official, Brussels, February 2010. Author's interviews with EULEX Kosovo officials, Pristina, April-May 2010.

⁴⁵ This has been the case, for instance, with EULEX Kosovo where numerous key officials had previously been deployed in other CSDP missions, most notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.

⁴⁶ See Isabelle Ioannides, "Police Mission in Macedonia", in Michael Emerson and Eva Gross (eds.), *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Management Missions in the Balkans*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007, pp. 106-118, available at: <http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1538.pdf>.

⁴⁷ See Council of the European Union, *Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development*, cit., p. 3.

- Promote cross-cutting training

Scholars and practitioners have long argued that improving civilian contribution to multi-dimensional operations is best achieved through training together with military partners. In this spirit, it is suggested that the EU set up a European Security Academy or a European Institute for Peace, which would become the EU's main provider of core training and where EU civilian and military staff and other international actors would learn to work together in theatre.⁴⁸ The EU already recognises that “synergies should be sought in the field of training (strategic, operational and tactical levels) where benefits have commonly been identified in the two processes”.⁴⁹ Such training would complement courses offered by EU Member States at national level for their own personnel. To ensure common standards across the EU, a training inspectorate could be set up in the EU Council Secretariat to inspect facilities and programmes across Member States.⁵⁰

- Develop dual use capabilities

In order to foster synergies, concrete dual use capabilities should be developed and their potential availability to CSDP civilian and military operations - within the boundaries of each one's specificities - should be facilitated. The creation of a pool of SSR experts from the EU Member States constitutes an example of such civilian-military synergy. Other areas for strengthened synergies in capability development could include *inter alia*: logistical support; communication and information systems; security and protection of personnel and infrastructure; and exchange of specific technical expertise (e.g. in counter-explosive devices, de-mining, finance and justice).⁵¹

- Streamline CSDP funding

The different funding mechanisms for civilian and military actions still impede the conduct of integrated CSDP operations. The planning of EULEX Kosovo, the most complex civilian CSDP mission, exemplified that

⁴⁸ See Jonathan Holslag and David H. Doyle, *The New Global Security Landscape: Recommendations from the 2010 Security Jam*, Brussels, Security & Defence Agenda, 2010, p. 21, available at: http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Portals/7/2010/Publications/SDA_JAM_Report_highres.pdf.

⁴⁹ See Council of the European Union, *Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development*, cit., p. 5.

⁵⁰ See Daniel Kroski and Richard Gowan, *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States?*, cit., p. 18.

⁵¹ See Council of the European Union, *Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development*, cit., pp. 4-5.

the existing financial framework cannot provide sufficient and timely support for the new requirements and tasks of larger and more complex operations. Civilian missions are currently financed directly through the collective CFSP budget, while military operations follow the principle of “costs lie where they fall”, with only a small proportion (common expenditures) funded through the Athena mechanism.⁵² The reform to streamline existing cost distribution mechanism for operations is a pressing issue, especially in light of the deployment of larger civilian-military contingents.

- Create a permanent strategic planning structure

Despite achieving full operational capacity in the Operation Centre of the Civ-Mil Cell, setting up the CPCC and creating the CMPD, the EU still does not have a comprehensive civilian-military structure for planning and carrying out CSDP operations.⁵³ Such an endeavour would imply integrating all the intelligence gathering, early warning, monitoring and watch-keeping units within the Council and the European Commission, as well as clarifying the linkage among the different relevant bodies on external relations (especially in the context of the forthcoming EEAS). The establishment of a permanent strategic planning and conduct structure would also help increase EU institutional memory. It would lead to comprehensiveness, greater coherence and consistency in applying civilian and military planning and conduct concepts and procedures.

- Improve the scope and quality of capabilities

The complexity of today's crises requires the EU to equip itself with operational means that are not yet at its disposal: they include intelligence and expertise to tackle organised crime; the development of civil protection or disaster response; and civilian administration resources to support the reconstruction of failed states. Furthermore, qualitative aspects of the civilian and military capabilities need further improvement to enhance the ability of the EU to deploy at short notice well-trained personnel and adequate resources in an interoperable and sustainable manner. To do so, the EU and its Member States should regularly update rosters of civilians and

⁵² See Nicoletta Pirozzi and Sammi Sandawi, *Military and Civilian ESDP Missions: Ever Growing and Effective?*, Documenti IAI 09/29, Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2009, p. 12, available at: <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0929.pdf>.

⁵³ See Nik Hynek, *Consolidating the EU's Crisis Management Structures: Civil-Military Coordination and the Future of the EU OHQ*, cit., pp. 7-8; Luis Simón, *Planning for EU Military Operations*, cit., pp. 15-26.

police officers; create cross-governmental funding pools for civilian deployment; train a cadre of planners in the foreign affairs ministries; and develop a systematic process for training and debriefing deployed staff.⁵⁴ The EU would then be able to cover the full spectrum of complex crisis responses (e.g. SSR, DDR, institution building); implement actions that cover the entire crisis management cycle (rapid reaction, long-term engagement, and exit strategies); and effectively interact with other international, regional and local actors in the field.

⁵⁴ See Daniel Kroski and Richard Gowan, *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States?*, cit., p. 19.

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3. THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)

*Gerrard Quille*¹

The Council established the new European External Action Service (EEAS) in its Decision on 26 July 2010. The EEAS is seen as a key structure in helping the Union meet the expectations of a more visible, coherent and effective EU foreign policy following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. After briefly setting out the external challenges facing the EU over the coming years, the paper will examine the role and functions of the EEAS in the new Lisbon Treaty foreign policy architecture. The paper will also include a discussion on the key characteristics of the EEAS as they emerged during the establishment phase of the service between December 2009 and July 2010. Finally the paper will look at the future challenges and expectations for the EEAS and CSDP and provide some recommendations and guidelines on how the service can play a key role in ensuring that the Union becomes a more visible, coherent and effective actor on the international stage.

1. European (in)Security and Responses to Global Challenges

It is widely held that Europe is standing at a strategic crossroads: presented with the hope and opportunities of the new Lisbon Treaty to

¹ The author writes in a personal capacity and the views and opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the European Parliament.

enhance the EU's global role whilst at the same time having to face numerous security challenges as well as address the global economic and financial crisis.²

In 2003 the EU set out its strategic vision, known as the European Security Strategy (ESS), which placed an emphasis upon addressing threats and challenges through international cooperation, termed *effective multilateralism*, and the *comprehensive* use of its diplomatic, trade, development and crisis management instruments. In 2003 the EU clearly chose to project stability rather than force, with both military and civilian crisis management instruments as key responses in the neighbourhood and further afield. In addition, the EU has also global economic and trade interests which are reflected in its security ambitions.³

Since the ESS was published, the EU Member States and institutions have worked closely on a number of important security dossiers (including negotiations with Iran on behalf of the United Nations Security Council).⁴ In addition the EU's operational activities between 2003 and 2008 have included 25 CSDP missions and operations, the majority of them civilian.⁵

However, most missions have been on a small-scale (in personnel and resources) rule of law missions or the "inherited" legacy of the EU's failure to respond to the Balkan wars in the 1990s (e.g. EUFOR Althea and EULEX Kosovo). The period 2003-2008 was mired by inter-institutional rivalries, which added to a growing feeling that a major reform of the EU's

² See Sven Biscop, "Odd Couple or Dynamic Duo? The EU and Strategy in Times of Crisis", in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2009, pp. 367-384; Gerrard Quille, "The European Security Strategy: a framework for EU security interests?", in *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 1-16.

³ See Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy. A global agenda for positive power*, Egmont Institute, Brussels, 2005; Alyson J. K. Bailes, "EU and US Strategic Concepts: Facing New International Realities", in *The International Spectator*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2004, pp. 19-33; Antonio Missiroli and Gerrard Quille "European Security in Flux", in Fraser Cameron (ed.), *The Future of Europe: integration and enlargement*, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, pp. 114-135; Alyson J. K. Bailes, *The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History*, SIPRI Policy Papers No. 10, Stockholm, February 2005, available at: <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP10.pdf>.

⁴ See Oliver Meier and Gerrard Quille, "Testing Time for Europe's Non-proliferation Strategy", in *Arms Control Today*, May 2005.

⁵ See the CSDP Map project at: <http://www.csdpmap.eu/>; Nicoletta Pirozzi and Sammi Sandawi, "Five years of ESDP in action: operations, trends, shortfalls", in *European Security Review*, No. 39, July 2008, available at: www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_179_esr39-5yrs-esdp.pdf; Marta Martinelli, "Helping Transition. The European Union Police Mission in DRC (EUPOL KINSHASA) in the Context of EU's Policies Towards the Great Lakes", in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, Autumn 2006.

institutional framework in the area of external relations was needed to increase the EU's coherence.⁶

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the foreign policy architecture of the EU was given a boost with a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the support of a new diplomatic service, known as the European External Action Service (EEAS).

2. The Lisbon Treaty's New Foreign Policy Architecture

The Lisbon Treaty has created a new and long-awaited foreign policy architecture for the European Union by introducing three key innovations:

- a double-hatted High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also Vice President of the Commission (thus referred to as HR/VP);
- a permanent President of the European Council;
- a European External Action Service.

2.1 *New Foreign Policy Actors*

2.1.1 The President of the European Council

The new post of President of the European Council sits alongside that of the existing Presidents of the Commission and the European Parliament. The latter essentially represents that institution, whilst the Presidents of the Council and Commission share the role of representing the Union's external relations policies. Whilst President Van Rompuy chairs meetings of European Heads of State in the European Council and President Barroso presides over meetings of the College of Commissioners, the sharing of external representation duties is more uncertain. So far, the President of the Commission has had a leading role on traditional trade matters in the framework of the G8, while the President of the Council, has led on issues related to the global financial and economic crisis, including attending the newly formed G20 as well as representing the Union at President Obama's high-profile Nuclear Security Summit, in Washington in April 2010.

⁶ A sense of the EU adrift was reinforced by the long period of internal uncertainty that lasted from the rejection of the proposed Constitutional Treaty in 2005 to the final ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. See Giovanni Grevi et al. "The EU Foreign Minister: Beyond Double-hatting", in *The International Spectator*, Vol. XL, No. 1, March 2005.

2.1.2 The High Representative

The newly upgraded post of EU High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which is now merged with the position of Vice President (VP) of the Commission, represents an important innovation in the Lisbon Treaty. It is expected that this new double-hatted HR/VP will be able to direct more strategic foreign policy formulation and overcome the divisive “pillar” structure of the European Union that had been perceived to be preventing the emergence of a more coherent and effective foreign policy. Catherine Ashton was appointed by the European Council on 1 December 2009 as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, but she could only take up her other post of Vice President in the Commission once the European Parliament had interviewed all the Commissioners and voted upon their collective appointment. This meant she could take up her double-hatted duties only from February 2010.

The Lisbon Treaty mandates the HR/VP with a number of important tasks to enable her to support a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy, and in particular:

- *ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action* by the Union (article 26.2 TEU);
- *implement the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)* with national and Union resources (article 26.3 TEU);
- a right of *initiative*, when chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, to “contribute through her proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy” (article 27.1 TEU);⁷
- *represent the Union* for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy and *conduct political dialogue* with third parties on behalf of the Union as well as express the Union’s position in international organisations and conferences (article 27.2 TEU);
- support *rapid decision making* to face crises (natural or man-made) by convening an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period (article 30.2 TEU);

⁷ Although unanimity remains the rule in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), there are limited cases for adopting decisions by Qualified Majority Voting (e.g. during the appointment of EU Special Representatives) as well as a mechanism for a group of Member States to put forward a proposal for enhanced cooperation (which will then be voted on by unanimity). In both cases the High Representative has a central role in the procedure (articles 31 TEU and 329.2 TFEU). Similarly, the HR is *consulted* in the procedure for establishing the new Permanent Structured Cooperation for “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions” (article 42.6 TEU).

- *ensure the coordination* (article 43.2 TEU) *of the civilian and military capabilities* for carrying out an expanded range of Petersberg Tasks under the authority of the Council and in contact with the Political and Security Committee;⁸
- *ensure that CFSP receives parliamentary legitimacy* where she has the responsibility to inform the European Parliament and ensure that its views are taken into consideration (article 36 TEU).

Without doubt the Lisbon Treaty upgrades the position of HR: when combined with that of Vice President of the Commission it makes Catherine Ashton the new *linchpin* in CFSP.

In addition, the HR/VP must also manage the political expectations coming from influential quarters including the Member States, across the European institutions and amongst European citizens. This is a considerable demand upon any individual, and indeed the HR/VP had a rocky start. However, many look at the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as an essential structure for providing Catherine Ashton with the support necessary to carry out her heavy workload as well as meet political expectations from her early critics.⁹

2.1.3 Strategic approach to foreign affairs

As well as introducing new actors and a new diplomatic service (i.e. the EEAS), the Lisbon Treaty also provides the basis for a new more strategic approach to foreign policy based upon the European Council “identifying the strategic interests and objectives of the Union” and taking decisions:

“guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and soli-

⁸ Including joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

⁹ This has led to certain criticisms and frustration being levied at the HR/VP for what some perceive as missed opportunities or missteps. She was criticised, in particular, for being slow to achieve an agreement with the European Parliament on the EEAS; failing to prioritise CSDP matters by not attending an informal defence ministers meeting in Majorca on 24 and 25 February 2010; being slow to convene a crisis meeting in response to the earthquake in Haiti; and prioritising a formal visit to China rather than attending an informal dinner to mark the beginning of direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis in Washington. See for example regular articles at the *European Observer*: www.europeanobserver.com.

parity, and the respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter” (article 21 TEU).

Already in June 2010 the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU drew upon this strategic approach and Treaty language when turning to the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the Commission and Council had separate policy frameworks for engaging with Somalia as well as a CSDP naval operation (EU NAVFOR Somalia) protecting humanitarian food supplies and tackling pirates off the coast of Somalia and in the gulf of Aden. The June 2010 Foreign Affairs Council recognised that tackling the root causes of piracy as well as supporting the stability of Somalia required a “comprehensive approach in the region, linking security policy with development, the rule of law, respect for human rights, gender-based aspects and international humanitarian law”.¹⁰ It therefore invited the High Representative “to make proposals for a comprehensive EU strategy for relations with the Horn of Africa as a basis for continued cooperation with regional partners”.¹¹ It is clear that the scale of the problems in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa will require substantial international, as well as EU, coordination and that any evidence of progress will be difficult to assess in the short-term. Nevertheless, the Council conclusions give a first example of a more strategic approach to foreign policy and one where the HR/VP is given a strong mandate to prepare proposals and coordinate European action.

2.2 The New European External Action Service (EEAS): Institutional Negotiations

2.2.1 The Treaty mandate

In contributing to a more strategic approach to foreign policy and in coordinating EU and Member States resources for implementing such an approach the HR/VP is to be assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Lisbon Treaty introduces the EEAS with the simple (article 27.3 TEU) statement that:

“In fulfilling her mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with

¹⁰ See 3023rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 11022/10, Press: 175, Luxembourg, 14 June 2010, p. 9, available at:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/115185.pdf.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 10.

the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission”.

2.2.2 The Process of establishing the EEAS

The HR turned to the issue of the establishment of the EEAS between February and July 2010. She consulted the Member States, as set out in a December 2009 “Report from the Swedish Presidency on the establishment of the EEAS”, and could not ignore a Resolution on the EEAS that the European parliament approved on 22 October 2009.¹² In addition, numerous unofficial pieces of advice (known as non-papers), on different aspects of the EEAS, were put forward by the Member States and the European Parliament.¹³

The key actors in the establishment of the EEAS were Catherine Ashton, who made the proposal for a decision by the Council after *consulting* the European Parliament and receiving the *consent* of the Commission. In addition two regulations (the Staff Regulation and the Financial Regulation) needed to be modified under co-decision (i.e. proposal from the Commission for a decision by the European Parliament and the Council) as well as an incremental adjustment to the EU budget for the EEAS to become operational. By combining its right to be consulted with its co-decision role on the regulations, the European Parliament increased its leverage over the negotiations on the decision to establish the EEAS from consultation to one of “*de facto* co-decision”.¹⁴ This was regarded by observers as a key success

¹² *European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2009 on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service*, 2009/2133(INI), Strasbourg, Thursday, 22 October 2009, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2009-0057&language=EN>.

¹³ See principally an evolving “Non-paper on the EEAS” attributed to the Rapporteurs MEP Elmar Brok, from the Foreign Affairs Committee and MEP Guy Verhofstadt from the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. For an insight into the approach and views of the key Rapporteurs see their interview with Stefani Weiss in “From Global Player to Global Player”, *Spotlight Europe Special*, Bertelsmann Stiftung, July 2010.

¹⁴ This term was coined by MEP Roberto Gualtieri who, along with MEPs Elmar Brok and Guy Verhofstadt, represented the European Parliament in the Quadrilogues.

of the European Parliament's self-assertiveness.¹⁵ The result was a four-way dialogue, termed a Quadrilogue, involving the HR/VP with the Member States, represented by the Spanish Presidency, the European Parliament and the European Commission. The final Quadrilogue took place in Madrid on 21 June and paved the way for a European Parliament resolution on 8 July, adopted in the presence of the HR/VP, and followed by a decision by the Council on 26 July 2010.

2.2.3 Shaping the EEAS

All parties to the Quadrilogue declared they wanted an ambitious vision for the EEAS in order for it to be a modern diplomatic service to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and contribute effectively to the security of Europe's citizens. Ashton set the tone with an initial vision statement saying that the creation of the EEAS was a:

*"once in a generation opportunity to build something new that can make a difference [...] we need a service that provides high-quality analysis, political leadership and mobilises all our resources in support of a political single strategy [...] (and which is necessary to) achieve the core objective - of building an integrated platform to project our values and interests in a fast-changing world - whilst being able to obtain broad support from the relevant institutions and Member States".*¹⁶

Whilst supporting this vision statement the Member States opted for a pragmatic approach by focusing on the nuts and bolts of integrating Commission, Council and Member State representatives in the Service. In particular, they worked to ring-fence the *sui generis* nature of CSDP structures as inter-governmental bodies inside the EEAS and to safeguard them from the interference of the European Parliament and the Commission. They also wanted the HR to "play a leading role" in the strategic decision-making and the programming chain of the instruments for external action, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and the Development Cooperation Instrument. This would contribute both to bridging the previous pillar divide and strengthening the coherence of

¹⁵ See Stephanie Weiss, *The EEAS: much ado about nothing*, Spotlight Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, June 2010, available at:

http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/en/media/xcms_bst_dms_31767_31785_2.pdf.

¹⁶ See the Non-paper attributed to Catherine Ashton and entitled "*The European External Action Service. A step change in external policy for the Union: delivering on the promises of the Lisbon Treaty*", p. 2. This paper has not been published and therefore should be counted as a Non-paper.

external policies but also bringing the Commission closer to the inter-governmental High Representative. Importantly, the Member States also recognised that the Community method would have to be safeguarded and that although “decisions concerning programming will be prepared jointly by the HR and the Commissioner responsible” [...] “the final proposals in this respect will continue to be adopted by the College of Commissioners”.¹⁷ The European Parliament declared itself in favour of an ambitious and strong service to give the European Union greater visibility and effectiveness.¹⁸ The European Parliament insisted on two key claims:

- a) preserving the “community method” as a successful driver of European integration that could be harnessed for strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU; and
- b) ensuring transparency and accountability for the EEAS including granting full budgetary power to the European Parliament, transparent staffing policy and an open working relationship in its daily activities.

These objectives were embedded in the final decision. However, the European Parliament also acknowledged the incremental steps made through the inter-governmental process of constructing the crisis management capabilities under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

When the Commission proposed changes to the staffing regulation and the financial regulation, the Member States and the European Parliament took a similar approach each striving to preserve their interests. The Member States tried to limit the period of time of their staff in the service of the EEAS. The European Parliament called instead for all staff to have an equal status with permanent (civil service) status. The result was a compromise whereby national diplomats could serve two terms of 4 years plus an additional 2 years (i.e. possible 10 years). It was also agreed that the staff from the Commission (and later European Parliament) as permanent civil servants would make up at least 60% of the EEAS staff. The Member States made an attempt to have a

¹⁷ See Council of the European Union, *Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service*, 14930/09, Brussels, 23 October 2009, available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14930.en09.pdf>.

¹⁸ See *European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2009 on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service*, 2009/2133(INI), Strasbourg, Thursday, 22 October 2009, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2009-0057&language=EN>; *European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 July 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service*, 2010/0816(NLE), Strasbourg, Thursday, 8 July 2010, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0280&language=EN>.

distinct “agency” structure, but the financial regulation instead established, as asked by the EP, a distinct budget line of the European Union for the EEAS. The HR has therefore been given a degree of flexibility in managing the budget of the EEAS, but the latter is subject to the full budgetary discharge rights of the European Parliament. The adoption of the Decision on the EEAS has been met with a general sense of satisfaction although much will depend on how the implementation over the coming years. In any case, all sides agreed on the need for a review of the EEAS in 2012. Should new proposals be made following that review, the HR would have the task of submitting them, after consulting the European Parliament, for a Council Decision. During the establishment phase President Barroso sparked a controversy when he arranged the appointment of his former chef de cabinet, the Director-General of DG for External Relations (RELEX), Mr Vale de Almeida as Ambassador of the Union Delegation in Washington. This manoeuvre was apparently carried out without the agreement of the HR/VP, which cast a shadow over Ashton’s role in the eyes of the media and the European Parliament. The latter reacted by getting the HR/VP’s agreement that any future Heads of Delegation or EU Special Representatives appointed would appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) of the European Parliament before taking up their duties. This was a major victory for the European Parliament, which managed to extend its scrutiny over future EU Ambassadors (Heads of EU Delegations) and EU Special Representatives. The Member States also demanded more transparency on the process of appointing Union Ambassadors. A recruitment mechanism has thus been established that includes Member States representatives. This fuelled however the suspicion that they would focus upon securing these future appointments for their own personnel. It was also rumoured that (*ca.*) 80 of the future key delegation posts would be reserved for the EU Member States. President Barroso’s move resulted in concessions being sought from the new HR/VP Ashton and a closer scrutiny by the European Parliament and the Member States on her role in establishing the EEAS.¹⁹

Whilst the European Parliament and the Member States eventually managed to find a compromise solution, the episode contributed to creating an

¹⁹ At the time of writing the European Parliament had put the additional budget for the EEAS for 2011 in a reserve, essentially freezing the budget and any new appointments, until the HR/VP provides additional clarification that she will meet her commitment to send newly appointed Heads of Delegation and EUSRs to the Foreign Affairs Committee before they take up their duties.

atmosphere of mistrust. The participants in the Quadrilogues had to work hard to build confidence and successfully bring the establishment process to a successful end in Madrid in June, which prepared the way for the final Decision on 8 July in the European Parliament and 26 July in the Council. Nevertheless, the European Parliament asked the HR/VP Ashton to present a “Declaration on Political Accountability” (annexed to the European Parliament Resolution on the EEAS) mapping out the main lines of future cooperation between the European Parliament, the High Representative and EEAS.²⁰ The Member States, kept continuously informed by the HR/VP and the Presidency, had defended their position on the *sui generis* nature of the CSDP structures - the EU Military Staff and SitCen - and their seconded staff. The result, still on paper, is an agreement between the institutions that provides a solid ground for inter-institutional cooperation and parliamentary scrutiny but leaves the question open whether the ways in which the inter-governmental structures and the community units have been integrated into the EEAS will actually result in a more coherent and effective external action.

3. Innovations in the Area of CSDP

The essential innovations in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy focus upon consolidating over 10 years of experience of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Lisbon Treaty confirms the Amsterdam commitment to the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy which could lead to a common defence when the European Council so decides, but adding the *caveat* “acting unanimously” (article 42.2 TEU). Other authors in this publication reflect on the details of the innovations in CSDP including, *inter alia*, the extended Petersberg Tasks (article 43 TEU); Permanent Structured Cooperation (article 42.6 TEU and Protocol 10); the new mandate of the European Defence Agency (articles 42.3 and 45 TEU); the clauses on self-defence (article 42.7 TEU) and response to natural disasters and terrorism (article 222 TFEU); as well as

²⁰ See Catherine Ashton, *Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability*, Strasbourg, 8 July 2010, annexed to the *European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 July 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service* (O8029/2010-C7-0090/210-2010/0816(NLE)), Strasbourg, 8 July 2010, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0280+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.

the possibility to have core groups (42.5 TEU) delegated to act on behalf of the Union. However, it is important to note in this article the important role of the High Representative in the area of CSDP.

Whilst the launch of a CSDP mission will be decided by the Council (acting unanimously) and development programmes adopted by the whole College of Commissioners, the Treaty states that it is the High Representative Ashton *“acting under the authority of the Council and in close contact with the Political and Security Committee, [that] shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks”* and *“may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.”* The Lisbon Treaty gives the HR (as the principle coordinator of civilian and military instruments) a more prominent role and a specific mandate to ensure coherence in the use of Member State, CFSP and Commission’s external relations instruments.

4. A New EU Foreign Policy System: Implementing a “Strategic” and “Coherent” Approach to European Foreign and Security Policy

The Lisbon Treaty not only introduces important innovations in the area of CFSP and CSDP, but it creates a “once in a generation opportunity”, to create a new EU foreign and security policy. This system not only includes the upgraded actor of HR/VP and the EEAS; a more strategic approach to foreign policy formulation; a more coherent application of EU instruments (including diplomacy, development, trade and CSDP); but it also strengthens the role of the EU Member States throughout the policy planning, formulation and implementation stages of foreign and security policy.

In addition, the promise of greater transparency and parliamentary (national and European) legitimacy will broaden further the types of actors (parliamentarians, the media, academics, think tanks, interest groups, other civil society organizations and the public) engaging in debate and therefore potentially influencing policy formulation. Whilst many of these actors have already existed, they have tended to concentrate on single policy areas (e.g. development policy, human rights, CSDP etc). A more strategic and coherent approach to EU foreign policy will bring these specialist networks into more regular inter-action as they compete to have their different priorities reflected in EU strategic objectives. This qualitative improvement in the interaction of different EU institutions and actors (including the

Member States) as well as the broader policy community will bring greater visibility, buy-in, and transparency of EU policy formulation inside the EU as well as externally. The Lisbon Treaty therefore provides for the transformation of distinct EU policies (CFSP, CSDP, development, trade etc.) into a more open, transparent and accountable EU foreign and security policy system.

The EEAS will certainly be a key element in this new foreign policy system because it will include actors from across the institutions and the Member States and it will play an important role in policy formulation and implementation. In addition it will also have an important communication role (including a new media service) to explain EU policies and actions to the broader public and media as well as to third countries around the world. Whilst the EEAS will not be operational before 1 December 2010, we can nevertheless look at the debates surrounding its establishment to speculate on how it will play such an important role in developing a more coherent EU foreign and security policy.

4.1 A New EU System of Foreign Policy: Developing a Strategic Approach to Foreign Policy

In the process of creating a new EU foreign and security policy, one of the earliest and most important developments will be a shift to a more strategic definition of foreign and security policy objectives. An early example of a more strategic approach was given above on the June 2010 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions that included a request for the High Representative Ashton to prepare proposals for a new comprehensive strategy for the Horn of Africa in order to tackle the causes of piracy in the region.

The European External Action Service will be instrumental in supporting the HR/VP to develop this strategy by drawing on the geographic expertise (in its Africa Directorate General) with the Common Security and Defence Policy structures in this policy review. Thereby, the EEAS will include actors who previously sat separately in the Commission or in the Council Secretariat or even in EU capitals and who worked on different documents (for the Council, Commission or a Member State) addressing the same region. They will now work together within the EEAS to review the individual (Commission and Council) policy documents as a basis for developing a new comprehensive strategy for the Horn of Africa.

The CSDP structures (in particularly the Crisis Management and Planning

Directorate - CMPD) will also have an important role as they have acquired important expertise in the course of the deployment of the naval operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the more recent military training mission, EUTM Somalia. The process of inter-service consultation between the geographic services and the horizontal ones including the CMPD will also be overseen by a policy coordination mechanism (perhaps to be called a Policy Board and headed by the Executive Secretary General of the EEAS and the senior policy management including the Deputy Secretary General for Policy Planning, the relevant Directors-General and the Head of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate). The exercise of developing proposals for a new strategy will demonstrate how this service will draw upon its component parts to create a comprehensive strategy (i.e. drawing upon Commission, Council and Member States diplomats). The latter will also bring with them the expertise and, where necessary, inputs from their capitals. The Member States will formally be involved in reviewing the proposals prepared by the HR through the Council Working Parties (namely in this case the Africa Working Party known as COAFR and the Political and Security Committee) and they will take a decision in the Council based on the proposals from HR/VP Ashton.

The EEAS machinery and actors will need time to assimilate this new approach to preparing strategic input into Council Decisions. Nevertheless the approach itself has been confirmed by the Member States, such as at the June Foreign Affairs Council, in their commitment to implementing the Lisbon Treaty's strategic approach and to using the new foreign policy architecture as soon as possible and on such a complex issue as tackling Piracy off the Horn of Africa.

The new strategic approach will also affect defence capability development, where in the light of the economic and financial crisis a growing number of Member States are looking for ways to save national resources spent on defence by cooperating or pooling resources at the EU level. Already at the informal meeting of defence ministers in Ghent in September 2010, the Member States asked HR/VP Ashton to come up with proposals for cooperation or pooling of resources for defence capability development. Whilst the EU Military Staff (inside the EEAS) will have an important role to play in defining defence capability needs, it is the specialised European Defence Agency (EDA) that will lead the role in supporting Member States capability development. In this case, the HR/VP Ashton is also Head of the European Defence Agency and chairs its Steering Board (made up of

Member States Defence Ministers) which means that the HR/VP can ensure coherence between the EEAS and EDA and play an important role in the sensitive and strategic area of defence capability definition and development.

4.2. Improving Coherence in Policy Formulation and Implementation

The post-Lisbon approach to foreign policy gives an insight into how the different actors will interact in preparing Council Decisions on strategic objectives of the Union, including to key regions or on key policy areas like defence. Improving coherence in policy formulation and implementation is also intrinsic to this new strategic approach. Indeed the EEAS has been designed to improve such coherence in the following areas.

Horizontal coherence within the CSDP structures (i.e. between civilian and military crisis management instruments). The CSDP structures have been incorporated into the EEAS and during this process have been restructured to reinforce the coherence of policy planning for both civilian and military crisis management. This was done by merging the two directorates (for civilian and for military crisis management) in the Council Secretariat into a unified Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) in the EEAS. Therefore civilian (i.e. police and rule of law) and military strategic planning experts will now sit side by side in one Directorate and thereby facilitating their exchanges on planning in general and on joint planning when the need arises.

Alongside the CMPD, operational planning and the implementation of civilian missions is supported by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Military missions are not managed from Brussels and therefore the day-to-day operational planning and implementation of EU military missions is supported by the EEAS through the secondment of EU Military Staff in Brussels to one of the five EU Member States multinational headquarters or to NATO for the operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One can already see that the EEAS CSDP structure will bring greater coherence by the collocation of the strategic planning (CMPD) and operational planning and implementation (CPCC) of civilian crisis management missions. In addition military strategic planners in Brussels will also be able to provide advice to those civilian missions that have a military advisory role or have to work in close proximity of military authorities.

However, as long as the EU Military Staff (and its Chief) are not given a mandate to oversee the operational planning and implementation of EU military missions there will be criticisms of a lack of coherence between the strategic planning structures (CMPD) and implementation (national multinational headquarters) for military missions. The existence of an EU Operational Headquarters further complicates this picture as an operational planning and implementation structure could be activated at the EU level (although it would have to be substantially restructured and enlarged to manage even the smallest EU military missions). This poses a problem of coherence between the strategic and operational planning of military crisis management operations and their deployment in the field.

Horizontal coherence in Brussels within the EEAS (including CSDP and geographic and horizontal services) and with other Commission Directorates General (in particular enlargement, development, and trade). This essentially requires looking beyond the narrow coherence of civilian and military crisis management instruments and towards ensuring that all relevant diplomatic, development and trade actors feed into the process of defining strategic objectives of the Union towards a particular region or thematic policy area. This approach is essential to ensuring the formulation of strategic proposals for Council Decisions outlined above. More specifically, it requires that CSDP operations and missions are planned, designed, and implemented to support the achievement of Council Decisions on the strategic objectives of the Union. In addition, it requires that the strategic planning, programming, and implementation of other external relations instruments (such as the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, the Development Cooperation Instrument, or the Stability Instruments etc.) take into consideration any existing CSDP missions and thereby support the transition from crisis management towards the longer term strategic objectives of the Union. The EEAS includes the necessary relevant actors (geographical desks) and mechanisms (policy coordination board) to improve coherence between CSDP structures and the strategic planning and programming of the other external relations instruments. Although the implementation of these instruments will remain with the relevant Directorate General of the Commission, the co-ownership (or dual key) of the HR/VP and Commissioner responsible offer additional guarantees for pursuing greater coherence. Even trade policy which will not be handled at any level by the EEAS, should not be excluded

from the issue of pursuing horizontal coherence as Ashton also has a mandate to work with the Trade Commissioner towards coherence of action. Nevertheless, one should be realistic and observe the fact that trade policy has long been criticised for being in conflict with foreign and development policy objectives, which needs to be addressed at the strategic level of the Union. The inconsistency of keeping trade policy outside the framework of pursuing more coherent EU external relations will be the subject of further debate inside and outside the Union.

Vertical coherence between the EEAS in Brussels and the Delegations in implementing key policies or programmes. In addition to ensuring that policies are planned, designed and implemented in a coherent manner in Brussels, coherence also needs to be maintained in the implementation of those policies and actions in the field. Here the delegations are of paramount importance. Under the Lisbon Treaty the European Commission network of delegations become Union Delegations and the Heads of Delegation are delegated by the HR/VP to oversee the implementation of policies and programmes in the field. In some cases the Head of Delegation will also be double-hatted as an EU Special Representative (such as is the case currently for Afghanistan, Macedonia and the African Union). The Head of Delegation will also be responsible for ensuring that trade representatives in his mission are acting in pursuit of the overall EU objectives for a country even if they will receive instructions directly from their Commissioner in Brussels. The decision on the establishment of the EEAS also emphasises the importance of mainstreaming policies such as human rights and peacebuilding in the implementation of policies on the ground. Hence a network of human rights focal points in Union Delegations will be created to reinforce this vertical coherence and mainstreaming.

Vertical coherence between the EEAS and the Member States. It is expected that the Member States will see the advantages of pursuing a more coherent and strategic foreign policy through the European Union, not least because they now have reinforced their presence throughout the EU's policy formulation and implementation phases of external action. They will have (at least) one third of their representatives or seconded personnel in the EEAS and a growing number of Member State Ambassadors will be appointed Heads of EU Delegations and become EU Special Representatives. They will have personnel throughout the EEAS responsible for preparing Council Decisions

and for implementing those decisions, thereby giving them a greater sense of ownership of EU foreign and security policy. In turn, this sense of ownership may improve the confidence of Member States to pursue more multilateral policies through the EU rather than bilateral interests on the ground. Over time EU Delegations may well take on more and more administrative consular services for the Member States as a means of achieving economies of scale. We have yet to see the full implications of the fact that the Union now has legal personality and can, therefore, become a signatory to international treaties or have representation in international organisations such as the United Nations. The EU will still continue to be over-represented in comparison to other regions of the world by its individual Member States in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, rather than opting for a single EU seat. However, we expect to see the HR/VP Ashton continue the trend set by her predecessor and speak on behalf of the EU in international fora, including when necessary in the UN system.

Horizontal coherence in the field between delegations and CSDP missions. With an improvement in horizontal policy formulation in Brussels, further reflection is needed to improve the horizontal coherence in the field between the Union Delegations and CSDP missions and operations. There are numerous models to look at including the United Nations adoption of integrated missions in the field such as in the DRC and elsewhere. The United Nations has one senior political representative of the UN Secretary General in the field and he/she leads and coordinates all the other UN agencies and operations on the ground. The Lisbon Treaty could provide a similar basis for such an integrated approach, especially where a double-hatted Head of Delegation and EU Special Representative brought under his/her authority in the field both the work of the Delegation and that of the Heads of CSDP missions/operations. This should respect the political line of responsibility (to e.g. a double-hatted EUSR/Head of Delegation to Ashton and the Council) and the efficacy of the military chain of command. Whilst this has not been dealt with in the establishment of the EEAS, one can expect that it will soon become a subject of further discussion for the Union.

5. Coherence and Effectiveness of EU External Action: The Relationship between the EEAS and CSDP

Certainly the Lisbon Treaty provides an opportunity to use the new foreign policy architecture, centred on the dynamism of the EEAS, to help the EU become a more coherent, visible and effective foreign policy actor. Nevertheless some key issues in the establishment of the EEAS must be carefully monitored when moving from the “text” of the Lisbon Treaty and EEAS decision to the “context” of implementing a new Common European Foreign and Security Policy. These include, *inter alia* the need:

- to have a ***strategic review of all policies***, especially where there had been overlapping or similar work being done separately in the Commission and Council. The objective would be to ensure we have a single institutional and Member State review of all key policies and present one “strategic objective” on an issue (e.g. Non-proliferation) or geographically (as called for in the April 2010 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa) including priority areas like the Middle East. This would not only present a new strategic objective with Member States and EU institutions contributing but it would also consolidate the different policy statement and programmes initiated under the pre-Lisbon institutional framework;

- to ***revisit the policy areas that attracted attention during the establishment of the EEAS (such as peacebuilding and human rights mainstreaming)***, but that have not been articulated in the form of EU policy statements. This caused a lot of confusion in the discussions on the establishment of the EEAS with respect to what people meant by these terms and whether they should be pursued via mainstreaming them in all external policies or pursued through individual actions. As a part of the policy review and consolidation of pre-Lisbon strategies and policy priorities, the EEAS should be tasked with setting out policy statements for consultation with all EU institutions and Member States on peacebuilding and mainstreaming human rights in EU external relations;

- to ***balance the inter-governmental CSDP structures with the geographic programmes (including development and neighbourhood policy instruments)***. This would serve to ensure, on the one hand, the careful pre-intervention early warning and planning and, on the other hand, post-interven-

tion consistency between short term crisis management responses and longer term sustainable peacebuilding;

- to ***improve and ensure coherence between the external relations instruments inside the EEAS (i.e. CSDP and strategic programming of geographic instruments) with those remaining outside, not least trade.*** One cannot be effective in implementing security and peacebuilding policies in poorer parts of the world without understanding the structural effects of trade agreements. This applies to a number of the EU's foreign policy priorities from the Millennium Development Goals to stability in the Caucuses, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa;

- to ***ensure vertical coherence i.e. between the institutions in Brussels and the Member States policy formulation in the capitals.*** The fact of having (at least one third of) Member States diplomats inside the EEAS is important to strengthen the relations between the EU institutions in Brussels and the Member States in their capitals. The policy dialogue between Brussels and the national capitals at all stages of policy formulation and implementation will be critical for more united, consistent and effective foreign policy as well as contribute to the ESS objective of a European "strategic culture on security and defence";

- to ***review the EEAS in 2012 and carry out a transparent and public consultation with the European Parliament.*** The European Parliament was very effective in engaging in the consultation or "*de facto co-decision*" on the establishment of the EEAS and it could draw upon this experience to extend a role in 2012 to national parliaments. This review should also ensure that the EEAS has achieved its full staffing quota and assess whether the Union has the resources necessary to meet its post Lisbon ambitions in the area of foreign affairs,

- ***for all Member States, institutions and parliaments to make full use of the opportunity provided by the Lisbon Treaty to address the urgent challenges that affect both European citizens and vulnerable societies and individual all around the world.*** The Lisbon Treaty also provides the potential for a new democratic foreign policy architecture to address the challenge clearly set out in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy which states that:

*“Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. **There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home**”.*

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4. THE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CSDP AND THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Michele Comelli

Introduction

Since the European Union has started to take on a role in security and defence, the debate on democratic legitimacy and accountability within the Union has been extended to include these areas. This is especially true since the launch of the first Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in 2003. While the basic features of what is generally referred to as the “democratic deficit” of the EU decision-making processes also apply to the security and defence spheres, these differ in certain characteristics from other areas.

First, the security and defence sectors have traditionally been distinguished by a higher level of secrecy compared with other sectors. Much progress has certainly been made since the United States (US) President Woodrow Wilson, in the first of the 14 points he presented to Congress in 1918, emphasized the need for diplomacy to proceed “in the public view”. It remains the case, however, that foreign, security and defence policies are considerably less open than other policy sectors.

Second, they also require faster decision-making processes, because foreign policy decision-makers often need to react to unexpected events and crises. In addition, for all the changes introduced since the Maastricht Treaty, security and defence policies remain mainly intergovernmental. Most notably, in the absence of a European army, CSDP has to rely on national forces that are deployed by national governments as and when required to serve under

the “EU hat”. Each Member State therefore retains the power to decide whether or not to deploy troops for EU missions. We might be led to conclude, therefore, that the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the CSDP should be ensured mainly at the national level. However, this option entails a number of problems.

First, the powers and *modus operandi* of national parliaments in the individual Member States differ widely. This applies, in particular, to their power to control security and defence policy decisions. Second, there are many political and institutional problems standing in the way of democratic, national control of CSDP. One such problem is that security and defence policies have undergone a transformation and are now focused on the projection of security abroad rather than on territorial defence. Indeed, they have more to do with ensuring the implementation of multilaterally-mandated missions than with ensuring the defence of national territory.

While the decision to authorise the deployment of national troops remains in the hands of Member States, the decision to launch a mission is taken at the EU level. The EP has traditionally had an extremely limited role in overseeing security and defence policies, but the Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of changes that strengthen this role. Moreover, the EP has taken advantage of the debate among the EU institutions on the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to try to gain greater powers of control over both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP. Moreover, the EP has a *vision d'ensemble* of CSDP, that national parliaments cannot have.

This paper starts out by defining the concepts of accountability and democratic legitimacy and then investigates why democratic control of CDSP at the national level alone poses problems. It then goes on to make a case for strengthened powers of control for the European Parliament. In so doing, the paper analyses how the Lisbon Treaty has increased the powers of the EP in this domain. It examines how these powers are likely to be further strengthened as a consequence of new inter-institutional power dynamics in Brussels and the creation of new bodies such as the EEAS. It then takes a brief look at the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, directly and indirectly, to the interparliamentary dimension of democratic accountability. The paper concludes with a number of policy recommendations on the ways and means to reinforce the EP's democratic control over security and defence policy.

1. Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability in CSDP: What They Are and why Bother about Them

The debate over the democratic legitimacy of the European Union intensified following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the first referenda on the Treaty, which took place in Denmark and France. While it initially focused on the “communitarised” sectors, the debate gradually extended to intergovernmental sectors such as Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The launch of EU civilian and military missions, which started in 2003, has given added impetus to that debate.

Before examining why democratic legitimacy and accountability in CSDP matter, it is first necessary to define these concepts, a step that will also help delimit the scope of this paper.

The first question is: according to which version of democracy should we evaluate legitimacy? Since democracy is a contested concept and different versions of it exist in the various EU countries, they need to be combined in a way that avoids incompatibilities and deadlock. Wolfgang Wagner provides a typology of democratic legitimacy:¹ 1) legitimacy as ensured by effective governance (“government for the people” or “output legitimacy”); 2) legitimacy as ensured by participatory procedures (“government by the people” or “input legitimacy”, the latter of which, in turn, may take place at national and/or European level); and 3) compliance with international law. This paper focuses on the second typology, “input legitimacy”, which has become an ever-more important issue in the political and academic debate, especially since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

Linked to the concept of democratic (input) legitimacy is that of accountability, meaning the relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the former has an obligation to explain or justify his/her conduct and the latter may pose questions and pass a judgement. Following this approach, the actor may face the consequences of this judgement.²

¹ See Wolfgang Wagner, *The Democratic Legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy*, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2005 (Occasional Paper No. 57), p. 7, available at: [http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/select_category/22/article/the-democratic-legitimacy-of-european-security-and-defence-policy/?tx_ttnews\[pS\]=1104534000&tx_ttnews\[pL\]=31535999&tx_ttnews\[arc\]=1&cHash=2214e5e50a](http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/select_category/22/article/the-democratic-legitimacy-of-european-security-and-defence-policy/?tx_ttnews[pS]=1104534000&tx_ttnews[pL]=31535999&tx_ttnews[arc]=1&cHash=2214e5e50a).

² See Mark Bovens, *Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability. A Conceptual Framework*, European Governance Papers, No. C-06-01, 2006, available at: <http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-01.pdf>.

Traditionally, it has been up to the parliaments to ensure this kind of accountability. We will therefore examine to what extent parliamentary institutions at the different levels (national and European) exercise scrutiny of decisions taken in the CSDP context.

For a number of reasons, little attention has traditionally been paid to the problem of the democratic legitimacy and accountability of European foreign, security and defence policies. First, these policies have usually been characterised by a higher level of secrecy and by a need for greater responsiveness, rapidity and flexibility than other policies. Expectations of adequate democratic legitimacy and accountability in these domains are therefore lower. In addition, these policies have mainly remained intergovernmental in nature and have not been affected by the trend towards a more supranational profile that has characterised other EU policy sectors.

However, democratic legitimacy and accountability have gained importance in the security and defence fields also. To start with, the armed forces have undergone a transformation process which has unfolded along two lines: they have increasingly moved from territorial defence to an external projection of their role/scope of action; and they have become more engaged in multilaterally-mandated missions, including CSDP ones. The combined impact of these two processes complicates the exercise of control by national parliaments. Moreover, the difficulties they experience have not been compensated by an increased role for the European Parliament. For this reason, some scholars have spoken of a “double democratic deficit” in the CFSP and the CSDP domains. But why should we be bothered by this trend?

First, ensuring the democratic legitimacy and accountability of European foreign, security and defence policy contributes to the credibility of the EU as an international actor. The EU, whose foreign and security policy goals encompass the promotion of democratic practices abroad, including accountability, cannot afford not to ensure democratic control of its own foreign and security policies. Second, as has been argued, by Wolfgang Wagner in particular, the democratic control of security and defence policies is connected to a country’s stance on the use of violence in international relations.³ It constitutes one of the guarantees whereby peaceful and cooperative international relations are maintained. In our analysis we will look at parliamentary bodies (national parliaments, the European

³ See Wolfgang Wagner, *The Democratic Deficit in the EU's Security and Defense Policy – Why Bother?*, RECON Online Working Paper 2007/10, September 2007, p. 1.

Parliament and interparliamentary fora) because parliaments are considered “the central locus of accountability”⁴ for decisions concerning the use of force.

2. The Control of National Parliaments over Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The Common Security and Defence Policy is a multi-level policy: while its decisions are taken in Brussels, at the European Union level, they are implemented nationally, drawing on national capabilities. This multi-level game makes CSDP decisions difficult to control – at both the national and the European level.⁵ CSDP decisions are taken by EU Foreign Ministers gathered in the Foreign Affairs Council, on a unanimity basis. In particular, the Council's decisions to launch a mission are taken through a CFSP Joint Action drafted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC, also known as COPS). This covers the mission mandate, its objectives, scope, duration and chain of command, as well as the resources that the individual Member States will be making available to the EU. While the decision to launch a CSDP mission is taken within an EU framework, the commitment to deploy troops and to finance their mission is national. It is the Member States that place their troops at the EU's disposal, since it does not have its own.

As a consequence, it is still up to national parliaments to scrutinise their government's decisions to deploy troops, even when they take part in multilateral missions led by the EU or by an international organisation. However, national parliaments exert different degrees of control over their governments' decisions. Heiner Hänggi⁶ has identified three factors that combine in determining the effectiveness of parliamentary accountability: 1) authority, i.e., the power, constitutionally enshrined or derived from customary practice, to hold the government accountable; 2) ability,

⁴ See Heiner Hänggi, “The Use of Force under International Auspices: Parliamentary Accountability and ‘Democratic Deficits’”, in Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi (eds.), *The ‘Double Democratic Deficit’. Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International Auspices*, London, Ashgate, 2004, p.11.

⁵ See Suzana-Elena Gavrilesco, “Parliamentary Scrutiny of European Security and Defence Policy: is there Anybody in Charge?”, in *Perspectives/Review of International Affairs*, Issue 22, 2004, p. 75.

⁶ See Heiner Hänggi, “The Use of Force under International Auspices: Parliamentary Accountability and ‘Democratic Deficits’”, cit., p. 11.

i.e., the resources, budget and staff instrumental in exercising parliamentary control; and 3) attitude, i.e., willingness to hold the executive to account. The most important of these factors is certainly authority, which differs widely between individual European countries. However, even in EU countries like Italy and Germany where the parliament is entrusted with considerable authority to keep check on the executive, the situation is far from ideal.

More in general, notwithstanding the differences between one EU country and another, a “democratic deficit” with respect to control over the CSDP exists in all countries of the Union. According to a study conducted by Hans Born et al. for the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF),⁷ four factors account for this.

First, only a few countries are entitled to give their government a clear negotiating mandate prior to the adoption of a Council decision. Second, few national parliaments are empowered to give their formal approval for the deployment of troops in an international operation. In many cases, powers of approval are limited to the deployment of armed forces and do not include, for example, the secondment of national police personnel to police missions. Since most of the CSDP missions launched so far by the EU are civilian and civilian/military rather than purely military, this constitutes a real problem. Third, national parliaments are dependent on their governments as far as the transmission of security and defence-related information is concerned. Furthermore, their powers are mostly limited to the yearly approval of funds for external operations, as part of the overall national defence budget. Fourth, and last, national parliaments are only able to scrutinise their own governments, and therefore lack a *vision d'ensemble* of the whole ESDP decision-making process.⁸ In fact, they are neither jointly associated with this process nor able to exercise a collective scrutiny of the implementation of Council decisions.⁹

⁷ See Hans Born et al., *Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions: The European and National Levels*, Brussels, European Parliament, 2007, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/pe348610_/PE348610_en.pdf.

⁸ See Suzana-Elena Gavrilescu, “Parliamentary Scrutiny of European Security and Defence Policy: is there Anybody in Charge?”, cit., p. 78.

⁹ See Hans Born et al., *Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions: The European and National Levels*, cit., p. 4.

3. The Role of the European Parliament

Unlike most policy sectors, where the European Parliament has progressively acquired more power since the Maastricht Treaty, it has continued to have only a marginal role in the CFSP and CSDP areas. However, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 has given the EP – directly and, above all, indirectly – a growing role in these areas as well. Currently, the EP is neither associated *ex ante* with the CSDP decision-making process nor able to scrutinise the Council’s decisions *ex post*.¹⁰ The minor role played by the EP in these areas is a consequence not just of the fact that CSDP is mainly an intergovernmental policy, but also that one of the primary concerns of the CSDP architects has been its efficiency.¹¹ While many Brussels-based institutions have been built up to make CFSP and the CSDP more effective, no significant new powers have been entrusted to the EP.

The current Lisbon Treaty grants information and consulting powers to the EP on “the main aspects and basic choices” of both CFSP and CSDP (art. 36 of the Treaty on the European Union, TEU). The former article 21 of the TEU (Nice version), on the other hand, referred only to the CFSP, leading some scholars to wonder whether the power of consultation granted to the EP included the CSDP or was limited to CFSP alone. These new powers are actually limited and vague, since the text fails to spell out what the “main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP and CSDP” are. Nor does it specify whether the EP should be consulted *ex ante* or *ex post*. Art. 21 of the Nice Treaty entrusted the rotating EU Presidency with the task of consulting the Parliament. Art. 36 of the Lisbon Treaty assigns this task to the newly created High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), who shall also “ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration”.

¹⁰ See Suzana-Elena Gavrilesu, “Parliamentary Scrutiny of European Security and Defence Policy: is there Anybody in Charge?”, cit., p. 82. *Ex ante* refers to any form of parliamentary oversight from the identification of a crisis to the decision to take action. *Ex ante* instruments may include: prior authorisation of the mission; the issuing of non-binding resolutions or recommendations about an upcoming mission; budget control; the raising of questions; or the organization of (public) hearings. *Ex post* oversight refers to any oversight that takes place after the decision to take action has been adopted and involves the phases of implementation, eventual refocusing of EU action and termination of operation. See Hans Born et al., *Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions: The European and National Levels*, cit., p.5.

¹¹ See Esther Barbé, “The Evolution of CFSP Institutions: Where does Democratic Accountability Stand”, in *The International Spectator*, Vol. 39, No. 2, April–June 2004, pp. 47-60.

Actually, since the new HR/VP role was created, the relationship between the holder of this position and the EP has acquired more importance. Indeed, the HR/VP, together with the President and the other members of the Commission, shall be subject to a vote of consent by the European Parliament. In addition, before the European Parliament approves the new Commission, each candidate for commissioner will be heard before the relevant committee of the European Parliament. She also appears before the Parliament in her position of Commissioner for External Relations (RELEX). The Lisbon Treaty also increased the number of plenary sessions of the European Parliament on CFSP/CSDP issues from one to two a year.

Linked to the right of the EP to be consulted is its right to receive adequate information, a right which is regulated by a number of Inter-institutional agreements (IIA) with the Council and the Commission. Most notably, the IIA of 20 November 2002 provided for limited access by the European Parliament to sensitive information held by the Council in the field of security and defence policy.¹²

The right of access to confidential documents – but not to all secret documents – is not granted to all members of the European Parliament (MEPs), but to a Special Committee composed of five MEPs, or to the EP President. These documents can only be consulted on the Council premises. The Special Committee is presided over by the Chairman of the EP's Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET). Its other four members are appointed by the Conference of Presidents, including the Chairman of the Security and Defence Sub-Committee (SEDE). In addition, Member States and third parties can deny access to the documents if they so decide.

The rules governing the transfer of documents are even more strict. They provide that confidential documents may be transmitted only to the President of the European Parliament, who has a number of options for passing them on to other EP bodies.¹³ In its latest report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and the Common

¹² See European Parliament, Council of the European Union, *Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy*, Official Journal of the European Communities, 298, 30 November 2002, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:298:0001:0003:EN:PDF>.

¹³ See Udo Diedrichs, "The European Parliament in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player?", in *The International Spectator*, Issue 2, 2004, p. 43.

Security and Defence Policy, the EP called for a revision of these rules.¹⁴ The EP's right to be informed has been slightly reinforced by the 2006 Inter-institutional Agreement. This provides that the Presidency of the Council (the HR/VP after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) shall consult the EP each year on a forward-looking Council document to be transmitted by June 15.¹⁵ The document sets out the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Union and an evaluation of the measures launched during the previous year. In addition, the Council Presidency keeps the European Parliament abreast of developments through joint consultation meetings taking place at least five times a year, in the framework of the regular political dialogue on the CFSP. Participants in these meetings include the European Parliament (the bureaux of the two Committees concerned), the Council, represented by the Chairman of the Political and Security Committee, and the Commission.

As mentioned above, the EP has no formal power of authorisation of CSDP missions. However, it has other non-binding instruments to exercise scrutiny over EU missions. *Ex ante*, the EP can issue non-binding resolutions and recommendations before a Joint Action is taken or before a the CSDP mission is launched. These resolutions are normally adopted following statements made by Council and Commission officials before the EP. The Security and Defence Sub-Committee (SEDE) was set up in 2004 as part of the EP's Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee. It has been particularly active in the dialogue with the Council over CSDP missions, including future ones, its main responsibility being to monitor civilian and military CSDP operations. In addition, SEDE has established the practice of inviting the Permanent Representative of the country holding the EU Presidency to

¹⁴ See European Parliament, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and Common Security and Defence Policy*, Committee of Foreign Affairs, A7-0026/2010, 2 March 2010, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2010-0026+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=IT>.

¹⁵ See European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Commission of the European Communities, *Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management*, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 139, 14 June 2006, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:139:0001:0017:EN:PDF>.

provide a briefing on its programme and on CSDP developments.¹⁶ In some cases it is the Foreign Affairs or Defence Minister of the Presidency country who is invited to brief SEDE members.

With regard to *post hoc* oversight of accountability, the powers of the EP are again limited. So far, it has not adopted any *ex-post* resolutions on a CSDP mission. Each year, the EP receives a report from the Council on CFSP and CSDP-related developments, on the basis of which it drafts its own report containing recommendations on the matter. However, the EP report does not have much impact on the Council's strategy. Similarly, the EP may receive written reports from the European Union's Special Representatives (EUSRs). However, the latter are not obliged to send these reports, and in practice they have done so only on some occasions.¹⁷ Instruments such as hearings and evaluations have been used often, especially by the SEDE Sub-Committee. Individual MEPs may also address specific questions to the Council, which is obliged to provide an oral answer directly at question time or a written one at a later date. In addition, members of AFET and SEDE have a right to visit the troops deployed for a mission, with the results of the visit being reported to the Chair of the delegation.

While the European Parliament has limited powers in overseeing CSDP missions, and no power at all in authorising them, it has an important role with regard to budgetary decisions on civilian CSDP missions - which constitute most of the EU missions undertaken so far - but not for military ones.

The rules governing the financing of missions, laid down in the 2001 Commission Communication on the Financing of Civilian Crisis Management Operations, outlines three different types of crisis management missions.¹⁸ These are: 1) "operations under a Community instrument", financed by the Community budget; 2) CFSP operations without

¹⁶ See Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz Surrallés, "The power and practice of the European Parliament in security policies", in Dirk Peters, Wolfgang Wagner and Nicole Deitelhoff (eds.), *The Parliamentary Control of European Security Policy*, ARENA Report No. 7/08 and RECON Report No. 6, Oslo: ARENA, December 2008, pp. 77-107, available at: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/reports/2008/ARENAreport0708_online.pdf.

¹⁷ See Hans Born et al., *Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions: The European and National Levels*, cit., 2007.

¹⁸ See Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Financing of Civilian Crisis Management Operations*, Brussels, 28 November 2001, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0082en01.pdf.

military or defence implications, financed by the CFSP budget; 3) CSDP operations with military implications, financed by Member States (outside the EU budget).

The first category of operations are first-pillar actions over which the EP has powers of scrutiny and co-decision.

The second category of operations (e.g. executive police operations) is decided by a Council Joint Action under the second pillar and is normally charged to the CFSP budget. The EP can place a ceiling on the budget. In addition, every three months the Council must provide the EP with a detailed list of CFSP commitment appropriations, including the costs of civilian CSDP missions. If the Council believes the CFSP budget appropriations for operations to be insufficient, it has to ask the EP for additional funds. The Council must inform the EP every time CFSP expenditure is envisaged and in any case no later than five days after the adoption of a final CFSP decision. Finally, the Joint Consultation Meetings, formally introduced by the 2006 Interinstitutional Agreement with the aim of keeping the EP abreast of CFSP financial planning and spending, take place at least five times a year.

It should be noted, however, that the Council may decide that some costs are to be borne separately by Member States. This normally applies to the costs involved in the secondment of national personnel and those incurred during the preparatory phase of a given operation, e.g. fact-finding missions. As argued by some scholars,¹⁹ the existence of these various types of costs financed through the Member States clearly hinders the Parliament's supervisory tasks.

As far as the financing of CSDP military missions is concerned, the EP has no oversight powers whatsoever. In fact, common administrative costs are financed through the so called Athena mechanism. This refers to a common fund for military missions, where Member States' contributions are made in advance on the basis of a fixed percentage of gross national income (GNI). So-called "operational costs" must be borne by Member States on the basis of the "costs lie where they fall" principle, which is also applied by international organisations such as NATO.

¹⁹ See Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz Surrallés, "The power and practice of the European Parliament in security policies", *cit.*, pp. 77-107.

4. Democratic Accountability of the CSDP and the Negotiations on the European External Action Service

What is even more remarkable is that the European Parliament has succeeded in gaining a stronger role in the control of both CFSP and CSDP. In this, it has taken advantage of the negotiations with the Council and the HR/VP on the arrangements for the European External Action Service (EEAS), the new diplomatic service envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty. The Decision that established the new service on 26 July 2010²⁰ was actually taken by the Council, acting on a proposal made by the HR/VP after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the consent of the Commission. Therefore, the EP had only a consulting role on the Council decisions. It did, however, have power of co-decision, that is, a right of veto, on two regulations - the Staff Regulation and the Financial Regulation - that were essential to put the EEAS in place, and on the budgetary adjustment.

During the negotiations among the EU institutions on the arrangements for the establishment and functioning of the EEAS, the EP succeeded in linking its consultation power on the decision with its power of co-decision on the two regulations mentioned above. It extracted a number of important concessions from the Council and the HR/VP on these arrangements. The main principle the EP tried to foster was that of the political accountability of the HR/VP and the new service vis-à-vis the EP.

An analysis of the concessions that the EP obtained on this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is important to recall here, however, that the HR/VP issued a Declaration on Political Accountability, annexed to the EP Resolution of 8 July 2010 on the EEAS,²¹ where she sets out a number of commitments intended to ensure an adequate degree of accountability of CFSP and CSDP.

The Declaration reaffirms, first, that the HR/VP will seek the views of the EP on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP. All exchanges of views

²⁰ See Council of the European Union, *Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU)*, Official Journal of the European Union, 3 August 2010, L 201/30, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:201:FULL:EN:PDF>.

²¹ See European Parliament, *Legislative resolution of 8 July 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service (08029/2010 – C7-0090/2010 -2010/0816(NLE))*, 8 July 2010, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0280+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.

leading up to the adoption of mandates and strategies in the CFSP sphere must take place in the appropriate format. For example, the practice of holding Joint Consultation Meetings will be enhanced and briefings given at these meetings will focus on missions financed from the EU budget. In addition, the declaration recalls another point on which the EP had been particularly keen during the negotiations on the arrangements for the EEAS. If the HR cannot participate in an EP plenary debate on CFSP/CSDP, her place will be taken by a representative from the rotating Presidency or from the trio Presidencies and the EP will be informed of this replacement.

The provisions of the 2002 IIA concerning the transmission of confidential information on CSDP missions and operations have also been confirmed. However, the HR can also provide other MEPs with access to other CFSP documents on a need-to-know basis at the request of the AFET Chair, and, if needed, the EP President.

Second, the text confirms that the new budgetary procedure introduced by the Lisbon Treaty applies in full to the CFSP budget and that the HR/VP has undertaken to work towards greater transparency on the CSDP budget. This includes the possibility of identifying the major CSDP missions within the budget.

Alongside these measures, the European Parliament also asked to have budgetary control of a possible warehouse to be put at the disposal of EU missions and an EU Institute for peace, both to be created. However, by increasing its demands, the EP may run the risk to be perceived by the other EU institutions, and notably by the Council, as altering the interinstitutional balance in Brussels. Whether or not the EP is to perform a role comparable to that of the US Senate will depend to a large extent on the way in which the relationship between the EP on the one hand, and the HR/VP and the EEAS on the other, evolves.²²

5. The Role of Inter-parliamentary Cooperation

Besides the national and the European levels, there is a third level of control over CFSP and CSDP, exercised by inter-parliamentary bodies. The most important of these has traditionally been the Western European Union's European Security and Defence Assembly (WEU-ESDA).

²² See Antonio Missiroli, *Implementing the Lisbon Treaty: The External Policy Dimension*, Bruges Political Research Papers No. 14/2010, College of Europe, p. 23, available at the website of the College of Europe www.coleuropeu.eu.

Following the transfer of the WEU's operational activities to the EU in 2000, the Assembly's main focus has been twofold. It monitors the implications of the WEU's collective defence commitment under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, as well as cooperation with NATO, and it also scrutinises the CSDP. The Assembly has devoted special attention to issues such as peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa. One of the strengths of the ESDA is that its institutional set-up, including a permanent secretariat and specialised staff, has enabled it to provide a continuous follow-up on security and defence issues at the European level.²³ However, what the Assembly can do is subject to a number of limitations.²⁴

In any case, on 31 March 2010 the Presidency of the WEU Permanent Council issued a statement declaring that ESDA and the remaining WEU bodies had been made redundant by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and specifically by the EU defence clause. They would therefore be disbanded by June 2011.²⁵

The same statement, however, called for the enhancement of the European interparliamentary dialogue in the field of security and defence to make up for the future closure of the Assembly. Immediately afterwards, the President of the WEU-ESDA set up a "steering committee" tasked with creating a substitute body and evaluating suggestions on how to continue interparliamentary control of CSDP.²⁶ In his view, there is a need for a light

²³ See Suzana-Elena Gavrilesco, "Parliamentary Scrutiny of European Security and Defence Policy: is there Anybody in Charge?", cit., p. 89.

²⁴ First, the Assembly is not legally entitled to intervene in the decision-making process, either at national or at the EU level. Rather, it acts as a forum for scrutinising CSDP policies and missions. Second, membership of the Assembly coincides with WEU and not with EU membership, which results in the Assembly including Members of Parliament (MPs) from non-EU countries such as Norway and Turkey. This poses the question: how legitimate is it that an institution that includes representatives from non-EU Member States should scrutinise European security and defence policy? Finally, the national delegations to the WEU-ESDA must be identical to those in the Assembly of the Council of Europe and no criteria for the sphere of competence of appointed members have been set out. It follows that the national delegations are not necessarily made up of a majority of defence committee members.

²⁵ See WEU Permanent Council, *Statement by the Presidency on the termination of the Brussels Treaty*, 31 March 2010, available at: http://www.ena.lu/statement_presidency_permanent_council_termination_brussels_treaty_march_2010-02-37640.

²⁶ See European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of the Western European Union, *CSDP Monitoring by national parliaments and in the European Parliament – reply to the annual report of the Council*, report submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by Marietta Karamanli and Hendrik Daems, Document A/2069, 15 June 2010, p. 6, available at: http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2010/2069.pdf.

but permanent structure, to be jointly financed by the 27 EU national parliaments.²⁷

In addition to the WEU-ESDA, other interparliamentary bodies also exist. These include:

- the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs (COSAC), bringing together parliamentarians from the Community and European Affairs Committees of national parliaments as well as representatives of the EP;
- the Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairpersons (COFACC), bringing together the chairpersons of the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the national parliaments and of the European Parliament;
- the Conference of the Defence Committee, which focuses on defence topics.

So far, however, cooperation within COSAC and COFACC has been narrow in scope. Moreover, given the limited number of meetings, it cannot exercise systematic oversight of CSDP decisions and can only provide limited exchanges of information. However, the importance of this form of inter-parliamentary cooperation is acknowledged by the Lisbon Treaty and, more specifically, by its Protocol No. 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. Art. 10 of the Protocol encourages the conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs to organise inter-parliamentary conferences to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy. With the end of the WEU-ESDA approaching and in view of the Lisbon Treaty provisions, some proposals have been tabled to establish new forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation, including, in particular, the establishment of an inter-parliamentary conference which would bring together the AFET members as well as representatives from the foreign affairs, defence and EU affairs committees of national parliaments.²⁸

²⁷ See Robert Walter, *Preserving Democracy: Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Security and Defence Policy*, Royal United Service Institute, NewsBrief, Vol. 30, No. 3, May 2010, available at: http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/presse/articles/2010/Walter_RUSI_M2010.pdf?PHPSESSID=f3137d60.

²⁸ See, for example, the motion on the creation of an interparliamentary conference on foreign policy, security and defence approved by the Italian Parliament in September 2010. Camera dei Deputati, *Seduta n. 368 di mercoledì 15 settembre 2010, Mozione Cicchitto, Franceschini, Reguzzoni, Casini, Bocchino, Casini, Bocchino, Donadi ed altri. N. 1-00423 concernente iniziative per l'istituzione di una Conferenza interparlamentare per la politica estera, di difesa e sicurezza europea*, available at: http://www.camera.it/417?idSeduta=368&resoconto=allegato_a.mozioni.02¶m=sed0368.allegato_a.mozioni.

Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations

This study has shown that, even though the areas of European security and defence have a number of distinguishing features, they are affected by the problem of the so-called “democratic deficit”. Putting adequate mechanisms in place to ensure the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the CSDP is therefore of paramount importance.

Legally, it is still a competence of the national parliaments to approve the financing of CSDP and the deployment of national troops for its missions. At the same time, the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the CSDP is an EU-wide issue, which cannot be limited to the national level.

Indeed, national troops serve in EU missions under the EU hat, making it important for the European Parliament to increase its power of scrutiny over CSDP. This is even more true since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which created new institutions in the CSFP-CSDP domain, notably the HR/VP and the EEAS. These may not be supranational bodies, but they cannot be regarded as intergovernmental bodies either. It is necessary, therefore, for democratic legitimacy mechanisms to be enforced at the EU level. At the same time, national parliaments have neither a *vision d'ensemble* as enjoyed by the EP nor adequate access to information. Not to mention the fact that too many differences exist between the powers and resources that they possess. In fact, national legislation and practices regarding the control of CSDP, including the authorisation to deploy troops as part of EU missions, widely differ among member countries. This is a major - and ultimately insurmountable - obstacle that prevents national parliaments from exercising effective scrutiny over CSDP.

Finally, the termination of the WEU-ESDA poses the problem of how to continue interparliamentary cooperation on the question of CSDP accountability.

To achieve these objectives, the following measures should be taken:

- While it would be extremely difficult to overcome political, institutional and cultural differences among Member States, it is important for best practices to be made widely known. In addition, those Member States that do not have mechanisms in place to provide for the scrutiny of security and defence policies should make an effort to improve the situation.
- In view of the future termination of the WEU-ESDA, no new interparliamentary body needs to be set up. Rather, existing fora for interparliamentary cooperation, such as COSAC and COFACC, could be strengthened.

- It is important that representatives of national parliaments meet regularly with MEPs, in order to ensure a proper exchange of views and practices on defence issues between the European and the national levels.
- The provisions contained in the HR/VP's Declaration on political accountability should be fully implemented. The period between the Lisbon Treaty entering into force and the EEAS being fully established is a decisive one, since it is a time when practices and precedents are established. It is therefore important that the measures noted in the document be given full effect.
 - A working – and effective – relationship must be established between the HR/VP and the EP, so that the latter is duly informed, in accordance with its prerogatives, of the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP/CSDP, including missions.
 - Access to confidential CSDP documents should be extended to a larger number of MEPs to avoid discrimination among them and, most important, to enable them to exercise their prerogatives in a more informed and effective manner. In particular, MEPs who act as *rapporteurs* on topics regarding CSDP should be given access to these documents, once they are security-cleared.
 - The Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), currently established within the AFET Committee of the EP, has played an important role, although there is the need to establish a more functional division of labour between the AFET Committee and the SEDE Sub-Committee, also in order to avoid damaging institutional turf wars. Some think that a bolder move would be to transform the SEDE into a fully-fledged EP Committee with adequate resources and staff. Such measure, which, they argue, would contribute significantly to enhancing parliamentary scrutiny over CSDP, can be enacted at mid-legislature or at the start of the next legislature. However, some others oppose this move, arguing that security and defence topics should not be decoupled from broader foreign policy topics.
 - An adequate communication effort should be made by MEPs and MPs participating in these meetings to inform the wider public of the goals and instruments of the CSDP. The best way to ensure democratic legitimacy and accountability for CSDP is to establish forms of political control by parliamentary bodies over the executives. However, this should be matched with a parallel effort by parliamentarians, at both the national and the EU levels, to reach out to citizens.

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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

WHAT MODEL FOR EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT? REALITIES AND PROSPECTS IN THE POST-LISBON ERA

Ettore Greco, Nicoletta Pirozzi and Stefano Silvestri

1. EU Crisis Management Today

Over the last decade, the European Union (EU) has shown a growing activism in dealing with both regional and global security challenges. The establishment and subsequent expansion of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now called Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has enabled the Union to acquire new operational and institutional instruments for crisis management. The EU is inspired by a comprehensive concept of security. This includes not only crisis management, but also conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction as well as a wide range of military and civilian activities such as traditional peacekeeping, policing, development aid and institution-building. The European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 confirmed this approach, which has also been reinforced by new provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty.

As underlined in the previous chapters, the EU's actorness in security and defence has acquired an increasingly high profile, thanks to a series of important steps in terms of capability development, operational experience, institutional set-up and policy elaboration. This evolution has interested both the military and the civilian fields, leading to the gradual emergence of an integrated civilian-military approach.

However, the European architecture for crisis management and its operational capabilities still present several shortcomings and fall short of the ambitious goals declared in various official documents. Moreover, the EU's

foreign and security policy suffers from a lack of coherence – both internally and with other external actions such as development cooperation or trade – and from a deficit of democratic accountability.

The aim of this chapter is to summarise the strengths and weaknesses of the EU security and defence system as outlined in the other parts of this study, and to offer a set of policy recommendations for its further development.

1.1 The Military Goes European

The economic crisis may provide a strong incentive for the Europeanisation of defence structures and capabilities. Indeed, a number of Member States are considering with renewed interest the possibility of cooperating and pooling resources at the EU level in the defence sector.

Moreover, EU countries now have at their disposal a number of new structures, instruments and mechanisms, established both within and outside the framework of the Lisbon Treaty. Those willing and able to advance quickly in the development of defence capability can set up a Permanent Structured Cooperation to make a coordinated use of and expand their national capacities.

The European Defence Agency established in 2004 has the potential to become a valuable instrument to promote and combine initiatives in various fields, including equipment and logistics. The Battlegroups – highly trained, battalion-size formations available on call to be deployed within 15 days notice and sustainable for at least one month – offer a tool for regular and intense military cooperation between member States. This allows the Union to intervene in remote and volatile crisis scenarios, possibly in preparation of a larger EU or United Nations mission.

However, current budget cuts could also hamper the participation of Member States in EU security and defence activities and lead them to prefer other forms of cooperation – bilaterally or in other frameworks such as NATO. This tendency is favoured by the current budgetary system for the financing of EU military operations, whereby only 10% of costs are covered by a common mechanism – the so called Athena mechanism – and the rest is paid by contributing countries. The sharing of risks and costs is therefore unequally distributed, to the detriment of bigger States. This is one of the reasons why both Permanent Structured Cooperation and Battlegroups have so far existed only on paper and the EU has often failed to show its flag and make its contribution in a number of conflict theatres.

1.2 The EU as a Civilian Power

The civilian sector has gained increasing importance in the EU's crisis management doctrine and practice. It is the sector in which the EU offers a clear advantage compared with other security actors. Indeed, most EU operations are today of a civilian nature. Since 2003, the EU has deployed 17 civilian (or civilian-military) missions out of 25 CSDP operations, nine of which are still ongoing in such diverse regions as the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

In terms of capability development, the past ten years of civilian CSDP have been characterized by significant achievements. In particular, the elaboration of future intervention scenarios under the two Headline Goals, 2008 and 2010, has enabled the EU to assess the size, type and duration of the civilian responses that might be required. New expertise has been identified accordingly.

The need to intervene in situations of failing State institutions has led to a growing number of multifunctional missions, including policing, the establishment of the rule of law, and justice system reform/rehabilitation. These missions often entail a combination of more traditional tasks such as mentoring, monitoring and advising with executive functions (as in the case of EULEX in Kosovo).

However, the effort to ensure a presence on the ground has not always been coupled with adequate attention to the qualitative aspects of that presence. In general, EU civilian crisis management capabilities remain critically underdeveloped, especially in comparison with their military counterparts, and the sector as a whole needs a higher degree of specialization. More specifically, rapid deployment capability, the sustainability of missions on the ground and the quality of civilian personnel remain the main critical aspects that the EU should address.

1.3 Towards Civilian-Military Coordination

In an effort to implement its "comprehensive approach to security", the EU has progressively developed its own concepts of civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) and civilian-military coordination (CMCO). New structures have been put in place, including a fully operational Operations Centre of the Civ-Mil Cell and a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). Nevertheless, the EU still lacks a comprehensive civilian-military structure

for the planning and conduct of CSDP operations. In fact, such activities as intelligence gathering, early warning, conflict analysis and prevention are not effectively integrated into the decision-making process for crisis management. The new European External Action Service (EEAS) incorporates most of the instruments needed to conduct such activities, but there remains the risk of internal overlapping, competition and fragmentation. On the operational side, civilian-military cooperation is still hampered by different chains of command and budgetary procedures. While civilian missions are directly financed through the collective CFSP-budget, military missions abide by the “costs lie where they fall” principle, with only a small proportion (common expenditures) funded through the Athena mechanism.

1.4 The New European Diplomatic Service

The EEAS is one of the main innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It will consist of a diplomatic corps of about 1,200 personnel (in the first phase of implementation) with the task of assisting the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, in fulfilling her mandate.¹ The goal is to ensure greater coherence in the Union’s external action (from security to development to trade) and with other EU policies. The Service is called to cooperate with other bodies – the General Secretariat of the Council, the services of the Commission, as well as with the diplomatic services of the Member States – to increase the Union’s visibility and effectiveness on the world stage. Integrating representatives of the Commission, the Council and the Member States in the Service is a big challenge. More generally, the intergovernmental drive is not easy to reconcile with EU instances in Brussels.

Nevertheless, the EEAS has the potential to become a key element of a more unified and transparent foreign policy system. The new EU diplomats (coming from different institutions and policy areas) will work together on policy formulation and implementation, and fulfil an important communication role in explaining EU choices to the broad public, the media and third countries throughout the world. Representatives of the EU Member

¹ Article 18 TEU tasks the High Representative with conducting the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, fulfilling within the Commission the responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external relations, and supporting and facilitating cooperation between the Council and Commission in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of external action.

States will make up at least one third of the EEAS, while a number of national Ambassadors will be appointed Heads of EU Delegations and become EU Special Representatives. This significant involvement will also facilitate the emergence of a greater sense of ownership of European foreign and security policy and contribute to expanding multilateral activities conducted by Member States through the EU.

1.5 The Search for Greater Legitimacy

The above-mentioned developments in security and defence matters call for a new institutional balance, and above all for a greater role for parliamentary bodies at both the national and European levels. Foreign and security policies have traditionally been characterised by a low degree of transparency and public scrutiny. Indeed, national governments seek to retain strict control over these policy sectors, which they view as their special prerogatives as they require confidentiality and rapid decision-making.

The Union's growing activism in crisis management has made democratic accountability of CSDP an issue of primary importance. The inadequate parliamentary control over the mounting number of decisions adopted and missions undertaken by the EU in the last decade has created a democratic deficit and highlighted the scarce legitimacy of CSDP. The progressive Europeanisation of the security and defence sector and the proliferation of multilateral missions (civilian, military and civilian-military) have posed the question of a greater role for national parliaments and, above all, for the European Parliament (EP) – the only EU institution whose members are directly elected by the citizens.

The EP and national parliaments should have the opportunity to be informed of and to evaluate and express their views on the deployment of military troops or the decision to engage in Permanent Structured Cooperation in the defence sector. The Lisbon Treaty introduces some important innovations in this respect, opening new opportunities for parliamentary oversight of EU foreign, security and defence activities. Nevertheless, the need remains for a greater involvement of parliamentary bodies in the CSDP decision-making process.

2. Policy Guidelines for a Stronger EU Role in Crisis Management

Twelve years after the establishment of the EU security and defence policy, seven years since the deployment of the first EU missions in the field and the elaboration of a European Security Strategy, and one year from the entry into force of the long-awaited Lisbon Treaty, it is time to take stock of past experiences and look at future scenarios for the EU. The analysis conducted in the previous chapters allows us to identify some policy guidelines for future EU engagement in crisis management. These are set out below.

2.1 *Forging a Comprehensive Security Strategy*

Security aspects cannot be the only parameters for action in conflict scenarios. Rebuilding failing states and stabilising peace require a broad range of instruments, including capacity-building initiatives, development cooperation, human rights promotion, trade agreements etc. The EU should make full use of the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, primarily the creation of the new High Representative role and the External Action Service, to design a more unified foreign and security policy system.

The political dimension of CSDP missions has often been overlooked. In many instances they have not been part of a coherent foreign policy strategy and have remained disconnected from the broader peacebuilding framework. The effectiveness of the Union's approach to security is undeniably compromised by the lack of a unitary stance among Member States on foreign policy priorities and by the tendency to adopt low-key, often minimum-common-denominator approaches in the absence of a shared vision. EULEX Kosovo, confronted with the unresolved status issue, and EUMM Georgia, damaged by the vagaries of EU national governments towards Russia and the Eastern Neighbourhood, are telling cases. As clearly stated in the EU Treaties, CSDP is meant to be developed in the framework and as an integral part of CFSP. Institutional and operational capabilities cannot replace the political dimension in enabling the EU to exercise its leadership as an international security actor.

2.2 *Matching Capabilities with Strategic Aims*

To that end, the EU should draw up a European White Paper on defence, security, crisis management and humanitarian missions. Such a document

would deal with both civilian and military operations and capabilities from a single, integrated perspective. The EU's peculiarity (and comparative advantage) lies in its civilian-military nature. Any plan to improve its effectiveness in crisis management should, therefore, start from this crucial element. A White Paper would require a strategic review of all security policies conducted by both the Commission and the Council, as well as of missions carried out by EU Member States. It would have three main purposes: to spell out the EU's strategic aims, to identify the existing capabilities and shortcomings, and to design the measures to cope with them. Finally, it should help identify and clarify the necessary administrative and political linkages between the CFSP machinery and the other EU institutions, the lines of command and communication, and the financing mechanisms.

2.3 Enhancing Cooperation and the Integration of Military Forces

The idea of establishing a fully-fledged European Army, reviving the old programme of the European Defence Community (abandoned since 1954), is not – at the moment – on the cards. Reviving such a debate now would hardly contribute to the development of CSDP. We suggest, instead, concentrating on more limited initiatives aimed at better organizing the necessary cooperation in the field of defence, increasing the efficiency of the expenditures involved and improving European operational capabilities. This is not an easy task: it involves a number of complex decisions requiring a broad consensus among the major EU Member States, something that cannot be taken for granted.

At the same time, the increasing pressure to cut State budgets has a strong negative impact on the coherence and sustainability of national armed forces as well as on international aid and the financing of international missions. Intensified defence integration through innovative mechanisms is rightly perceived by many governments as a matter of necessity, not of choice. Enhanced cooperation and integration of forces and planning can reduce costs and make it possible to develop capabilities to meet a wide spectrum of operational requirements.

The measures suggested in this report include:

- 1) establishing a formal process to evaluate and take stock of the experience on the ground;

- 2) setting-up an effective planning and command body (an EU Headquarters);
- 3) undertaking common procurement programs (possibly through the EDA);
- 4) creating a system to pool a number of “enabling” resources on a permanent basis (i.e. using the new Permanent Structured Cooperation);
- 5) establishing more effective funding mechanisms for EU missions (by revising, *inter alia*, the Athena mechanism).

2.4 Making the EU a Credible Civilian Actor

The constant evolution – in numbers and nature – of civilian crisis management has posed a number of challenges for the EU. On the basis of the experience gained through the deployment of 17 civilian missions in the past few years, it is possible to sketch out some preliminary lessons learned and best practices developed. First of all, EU civilian crisis management requires structures that are able to give missions the necessary support, particularly as regards administrative and financial matters, logistics, and human resources management. Civilian capabilities need to be constantly developed through improved training and recruitment mechanisms, both at the national and EU levels, to ensure a progressive professionalisation of recruited personnel. There is also the need for greater coherence between CSDP missions and other EU instruments, as well as deeper cooperation with other players – most notably other international organisations, partner states and civil society organisations. Finally, capabilities in the field need to be subjected to regular assessments and reviews to see whether they correspond to both the mandate of missions and the evolving security context in theatre.

Civilian crisis management capabilities could also be enhanced by strengthening the engagement of the EU and its Member States in multilateral initiatives such as the Justice Rapid Response (JRR), whose participants include 48 States, of which 15 are EU members, and a number of international organizations, with the European Commission representing the EU. As a multilateral facility with rapid deployment capacities, JRR makes it possible for the international community to provide much needed support for compliance with and the effective enforcement of international criminal justice, thus helping to make justice an integral and constructive part of conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. By increasing its support for and engagement in JRR, the EU could significantly enhance its

early response capabilities, thereby strengthening its crisis management capabilities as a whole.

2.5 Developing Integrated Civilian-Military Capabilities

Collective efforts and integrated capabilities are the only effective ways for the EU to ensure the security of European citizens and fulfil its commitment to promote international stability and peace. While the instruments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty should be fully implemented, EU Member States should embark on a frank assessment of their national capacities, which should be then translated into an analysis of common problems and the definition of shared aims. This could be done by drawing up an integrated Civilian-Military Headline Goal for 2020, which would define realistic scenarios and identify capability requirements at the EU level.

Concepts and capabilities should be accompanied by an institutional rationalisation of current structures with a view to creating an integrated EU Headquarters in Brussels. This should be capable of coordinating existing civilian and military bodies for the planning and conduct of EU missions. If the EU made full use of existing institutions such as CMPD, CPCC and EUMS, and established a new, integrated staff and operational headquarters for civilian-military planning, this would enhance its comparative advantage. It would facilitate the management of complex stabilization and state-building operations, as well as other kinds of mission. In addition, there is the need to launch new initiatives, such as a European security academy, to provide joint training for civilian and military staff at the European level so as to enable them to work together effectively in theatre.

2.6 Ensuring Democratic Accountability

Reaching out to European citizens and ensuring their involvement in EU decision-making is one of the greatest challenges for the Union. The disaffection of European voters towards the institutions in Brussels was clearly shown by the rejection of new EU Treaties in successive referenda in various Member States, before the final adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, as well as by the low turnout in the latest European Parliament elections. The need to engage the people of Europe is even more evident when security and defence matters are at stake. This is especially true if the EU decides to authorise military deployments in hot spots and/or remote areas

and Member States are called to contribute with national contingents. The main responsibility for winning the hearts and minds of EU citizens rests on their elected representatives, both in the capitals and in Brussels. Therefore, national and European parliamentarians should redouble their efforts to keep abreast of EU decisions in security and defence issues, exercise effective control over the executive bodies, clearly explain European policies to the broad public and take into due account the needs and expectations of their voters.

The political control and accountability of European capabilities and actions have become a very important question. At the institutional level, innovations such as the new information and consultation channels between the High Representative and the European Parliament, the wider access to confidential CSDP documents by MEPs, and the increasing role of the EP Sub-Committee on Security and Defence should be fully exploited and further enhanced. In particular, we suggest that inter-parliamentary cooperation between the European Parliament, national Parliaments and/or other existing parliamentary constituencies should be reinforced.

In particular, an upgraded EP Committee on Security and Defence (with an autonomous status with respect to the Foreign Affairs Committee) could establish a more effective working relationship with analogous committees at the national level. The objection that security and defence topics should not be decoupled from broader foreign policy issues underestimates the importance and complexity of defence and security matters, as well as their specificity.

3. Eight Final Proposals

The preceding analysis has highlighted the opportunities offered by the Lisbon Treaty to enhance the EU's role in crisis management, but also the risk that its main innovations are implemented only partially or inadequately due to political resistance, growing budgetary constraints and technical difficulties. Therefore, finding the most appropriate ways and means to implement the new instruments and mechanisms aimed at closer integration among Member States is key to creating the conditions for a more effective EU action in crisis management. This requires a creative and far-sighted approach aimed at overcoming the structural obstacles that prevent the Union from establishing itself as a credible civilian-military actor on the

international scene. To that end, this study contains a set of concrete policy proposals. We suggest that the EU and its Member States concentrate, in particular, on the following:

- drawing up a *European White Paper on Defence* to spell out, in a comprehensive and systematic way, the needed crisis management capabilities - both military and civilian - and a roadmap to acquire them;
- elaborating an *integrated Civilian-Military Headline Goal for 2020* to reinforce capability generation mechanisms and overcome the dichotomy between their civilian and military components;
- launching new initiatives to increase pooling and sharing of resources with a focus on logistics, including the creation of *common logistical warehouses*;
- setting up an *integrated EU Headquarters in Brussels* capable of coordinating existing civilian and military bodies for the planning and conduct of EU missions;
- increasing the EU's support for and engagement in multilateral endeavours for crisis management based on the principles of international law, such as the *Justice Rapid Response (JRR) initiative* aimed at enforcing international criminal justice;
- introducing *new funding mechanisms for EU missions* to increase the share of expenditures paid for through collective funds in view of ensuring a fairer distribution of costs and promoting greater solidarity among Member States;
- transforming the current Sub-Committee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament into a *fully-fledged EP Committee on Security and Defence* as a way of increasing the EP's capacity to oversee the EU's crisis management action in cooperation with national parliaments;
- creating a *European security academy* to provide joint training for civilian and military staff, with the goal, in particular, of enabling them to work together in theatre.

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Over the last decade, the European Union (EU) has shown a growing activism in dealing with both regional and global security challenges. However, the EU's architecture for crisis management and its capabilities (civilian and military) do not yet meet the needs dictated by current challenges and threats. This publication offers an overview of the progress achieved by the EU – both at the institutional and operational levels – through its Common Security and Defence Policy, and identifies the critical elements and the potential for improvement in the coming years. This study has been conducted by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) for the project Science for Peace promoted by the Fondazione Umberto Veronesi.

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Editorial

Sehr geehrte Leserinnen und Leser,

ein spannendes erstes Halbjahr 2011 ist vorüber. Die politischen Veränderungen und Demokratisierungsbewegungen zahlreicher Länder Nordafrikas und des nahen Ostens verändern auch das Sicherheitsgefüge der gesamten Region und darüber hinaus. Die Situation ist weiterhin in Bewegung, doch bereits jetzt ist absehbar, dass sie sich nachhaltig auf die Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands, der EU und der NATO auswirken wird. Daher versprechen die kommenden Monate ebenso spannend zu werden wie die vergangenen.

Das Projekt BIPS hat sich über die Jahre stetig fortentwickelt und erreicht ein wachsendes internationales Publikum. Dies wird die letzte Ausgabe sein, die ich als Chefredakteur begleite. Leider fehlt mir als Leiter der Research Division des NATO Defense College in Rom die Zeit, meiner Rolle als Chefredakteur in gewohnter Weise und gemäß meines Anspruchs an mich selbst gerecht zu werden. Eine Nachfolgeregelung ist noch nicht gefunden. Ich habe das Engagement des Bonner sicherheitspolitischen Nachwuchses immer mit viel Freude begleitet und wünsche der Redaktion und meinem Nachfolger respektive meiner Nachfolgerin viel Erfolg und viele eingereichte Artikel!

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Im Namen der gesamten Redaktion wünsche ich Ihnen anregendes Lesevergnügen!

Karl-Heinz Kamp

Philipp Müller*

Driving Forces behind Alliance Building in the Middle East

Introduction

Due to the natural lack of strategic leadership of international politics and the imminent chaos emerging out of it, states have ever worried about how to make international relations as peaceful as possible. Over time, diplomacy and international law have emerged as two of many possible tools of how to install a reliable structural organization of world politics.¹ Even though it is very complicated to assess which of the different tools have been the most successful ones – partly due to the fact that they are hardly ever used exclusively on their own but in concert with other instruments – empirical observations reveal that a certain behavioural method to ensure international stability has been practiced for a long time: strategic alliances between two or more states.²

The Middle East is a region where alliance-politics have ever played an important role in states' actions and alliance-building as a means of traditional power politics has long been a key element of Arab foreign and security policy. That holds true for alliances set up between Middle Eastern states and outside powers like the US or the USSR during Cold War times where different states have aligned with one or the other side in order to increase chances to maximize their own interests. Moreover, this specific foreign and security policy behaviour is obvious in the regional environment as well where Arab states have sought to build strategic alliances with states in their immediate or indirect neighbourhood.

In the following alliance-formation in the Middle East since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 is addressed. In light of prominent case studies the driving forces

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¹ These two examples are taken from Hedley Bull who also sees war, great powers and the balance of power politics as meaningful tools to make international relations more organized. See BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World Politics*. (Columbia University Press: 1977).

² Modelski considers alliances a key term in international politics and the famous realist Hans Morgenthau regards alliances as an inevitable tool to make the balance of power in a multi-state system functioning. See Modelski, G. (1963). *The Study of Alliances: A Review*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution Policy*, 7(4).

MORGENTHAU, H. (1959). *Alliances in Theory and Practice*, in ARNOLD, W. (ed.), *Alliance Policy and the Cold War*, (Baltimore: 1959).

behind the decision to form an alliance are examined.

In this essay, an alliance/alignment is regarded in accordance with Stephen M. Walt's definition of 2009 as a "formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or more states", a way of cooperation through which each alliance member seeks to improve its power, security, and/or influence.³

Driving forces are interesting to be looked at as substantial research about how alliances originate and what particular driving forces lay at the heart of states' alignment considerations, is still lacking⁴. The reasons that make the time since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 a period worthwhile to assess are twofold: firstly, the Gulf traditional power triangle consisting of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq was erased and the former player Iraq was replaced by an artificial outside actor, namely the USA, which deployed huge amounts of troops on Arab soil for the very first time on a temporary longer basis.⁵ Secondly, the military intervention in Iraq changed the religious balance of power as it led to a "sea change"⁶ between Sunnis and Shia. Consequently the Iraq war in 2003 changed both the religious-ideational and the military-material balance of power in the fragile state system of the Middle East.

As Masala stresses correctly, the examination of alliances must go hand in hand with the discussion of more general theories of international relations whose respective scholars differ in their explanations on why alliances are formed.⁷ Therefore, in the first section, two contradicting views on what drives the formation of alliances in the Middle East states system are discussed. Stephen Walt, a prominent agent of the neorealist school of thought, has chosen Middle Eastern states' behaviour to approach a general theory of the origins of alliances. Directly referring to Walt's famous book "The Origins of Alliances", Michael Barnett, an advocate of the constructivist school of thought, has challenged Walt's findings in the most concise way and simultaneously offered a counter-argument. Given both authors' findings about how states choose with whom to ally, at the end of this section, selected hypotheses of how Middle Eastern states may have acted in terms of alliance politics following the Iraq invasion will be drawn.

The second section deals with different case studies of alliances that were formed in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion between Middle Eastern states. The motives that led states to ally with others will be identified and subsequently it will be compared with the author's findings, Walt's or Barnett's or even both of them, and tried to worked out as to which of them are better suited for explaining Middle Eastern states alliance patterns.

³ WALT, S. M. (2009). Alliances in a Unipolar World, *World Politics*, 61(1), p.86.

⁴ MASALA. p. 382.

⁵ FÜRTIG, H. (2008). The mechanisms of Power-Balancing in the Persian Gulf: Internal Factors – External Challenges, in Kaim, M. (ed.). *Great Powers and Regional Orders – The United States and the Persian Gulf*, US foreign policy and conflict in the Islamic World, (Asghate: 2008). pp. 121-142.

⁶ ROY, O. (2008). *The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East*, translated by Ros Schwartz, (Columbia University Press: 2008). p. 110.

⁷ The different schools of thought not only see different motives for alliance formation but also do not agree why alliances endure, how they function and why they dissolve. MASALA. p. 382.

Stephen M. Walt: Threats beat power and balancing is more likely than bandwagoning

Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, has provided a famous attempt to create a fundamental theory of alliance formation when he published his book *The Origins of Alliances* in 1987.⁸ The central question Walt's tries to answer is how states do choose their friends in the international arena. In particular, he aims to figure out how states respond to threats, whether states with similar internal characteristics are more likely to ally than states whose domestic orders are different, and whether certain policy instruments such as offering military or economic aid can influence states in their alignment behaviour. The case studies to prove these hypotheses he took from the Middle East region.⁹ Truly, Walt has put considerable effort into his research with bilateral or multilateral alliance commitments being counted thirty-six times and involving eighty-six decisions by national states.¹⁰

Walt concludes firstly that the most correctly-proved hypothesis is that of states choosing allies in order to balance against the most serious threat. Balancing, which is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat,¹¹ is observed as far more common than bandwagoning, a way of acting that refers to aligning with the source of danger.¹² Walt has thus modified the neorealist assumptions of balance-of-power theory by saying that it is not power but threats that states ally against. He concludes that actors do not have to have the power capabilities but need at least to be perceived as threatening other states' interests in order to provoke alliances against them.¹³ Hence he proposes the balance of threat theory as a better alternative to the traditional balance of power theory as it can better explain why states in the Middle East form alliances; threats which are the product of several different sources (aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions) perceived in their immediate environment made Middle Eastern states enter into alliances rather than shifts in the regional or global balance of power.¹⁴

The second conclusion important to mention in this context is that ideology is less powerful than balancing as a motive for alignment.¹⁵ Many apparently ideological alliances are interpreted by Walt as a form of balancing behaviour. His findings show that the importance of ideological distinctions declined as the level of threat increased and that ideological solidarity was most powerful when security was high or when ideological factors and security considerations reinforced each other.

In short, Walt argues that states are inclined to balance rather than to bandwagon

⁸ WALT, S. M (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*, (Cornell University Press: 2008).

⁹ Ibid. p. 11.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ In this respect Walt refers to Kenneth Waltz who introduced the terms in his famous book in 1979. See WALTZ, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley). pp. 126-7.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ WALT. (1987). pp. 21-28.

¹⁴ WALT. (1987). p. 264.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 5.

and that ideology has played an “important but ultimately limited role”¹⁶ in alliance formation. Lastly, Walt summarizes that foreign aid and political as well as economic penetration do play little roles in causing alliance choices by itself but may be supportive to existing interests in case of converging nations’ interests.¹⁷¹⁸

Having given a short overview about which aspects Walt’s findings and assumptions the floor is now given to Michael Barnett’s thesis. He has not consequently only complained about the potential failures of Walt’s book but developed a notable and logical counter-view to Walt.

Michael N. Barnett: It’s identity, stupid!

Michael N. Barnett, professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George Washington University, has aimed to offer an alternative understanding of alliance building procedures by linking identity politics to strategic foreign behaviour. In response to Walt’s book, he has accessed the motives behind alliance formation from a constructivist point of view and argues that it is state identity that plays an eminent role in identifying and constructing threats and thus in choosing alliance partners.¹⁹ In contrast to the logic of anarchy, pro-argued by (neo)realists, politics of identity tend to give better explanations which actors are seen as a potential or immediate threat to a state’s security. According to him, empirical studies suggest the great impact of identity rather than anarchy in alliance formation forces.

Welcoming Walt’s theoretical innovation towards the view that states balance not against power but against threats, Barnett thinks that Walt’s observations and findings can be seen as opposing neorealist assumptions. Rather, they gather strong support for ideational factors driving inter-Arab politics and alliance formation.²⁰

The ideational factor pan-Arabism has posed a severe threat to Arab governments, as it challenged their legitimacy, sovereignty, and internal stability and therefore represented a threat to Arab states’ domestic and international existence that was not to be neglected, as Barnett stresses.²¹ An evidence delivering example for that is seen by Barnett in the Syrian-Egyptian unification in 1958; surrounding states did not fear the aggregate military power of the newly founded two-state republic but felt threatened as Syria and Egypt successfully used pan-Arabism ideas for their

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 203.

¹⁷ Keohane responded that a balance of threat theory requires so much information – about perceptions and objective facts respectively – that constrains the theoretical power of its own. See KEOHANE, R. O. (1988). *Alliances, Threats, and the Use of Neorealism* – Book Review: *The Origins of Alliances* by Stephen M. Walt, *International Security*, 13(1), p. 171.

¹⁸ To Gregory F. Gause, Walt’s book misses the clarification of the process by which states identify the four elements of threats; he has answered to that deficit by means of an article in which he tries to test how states prioritize among the potential threats they might simultaneously face when making alliance decisions. See GAUSE, G. F. III (2003). *Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf*, *Security Studies*, *Security Studies*, 13(2). pp. 273-305.

¹⁹ BARNETT, M. N., (1996) *Identity and Alliances in the Middle East*, in Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: 1996). p. 466.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 403.

²¹ Ibid., p. 404.

own good and obliged other states to follow their course and join the alliance.

Barnett tries to make his argument of identity as a crucial factor in shaping the threat definition and alliance responses easier to follow when he analyses the factors that led to the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). According to him, it was common identity (culture, history and similar forms of government) that determined who was seen as a potential candidate for membership. As a consequence of similar domestic characteristics, they shared the same definition of threats, which was, in their case, the potential unrest of Shi'a minority groups against their Sunni leaders. The external alignment, the GCC, was the logical result emanating from their domestic limitations.²² Despite this example, sharing the same identity does not necessarily lead to cooperation, as neorealist scholars tend to assume: see Barnett.²³

Barnett summarizes his findings reiterating that Arabism was crucial to security relations and alliance politics between Arab states as it had big influence on the identities, interests, and political opportunities possible to be undertaken by Arab leaders. Identity also signals who is a security partner by nature and shows which state(s) to balance against and which to bandwagon with.²⁴ This, as Barnett notes, can be shown in the case of the GCC, which formed an exclusive club encompassing just Gulf Arab states because they were the ones who shared the same history and political profile. In contrast, sharing the same identity needs also to be seen as a potential source of conflict as it can lead to disputes over which norms are most adequate to correctly display their common identity, in other words, which behaviour should result from the common identity.

In more abstract words, Barnett argues that identity, and ideology likewise, is a key element to social and political interactions. With alliance building being a prominent tool of security policy, accordingly, ideational factors have to be examined closely to understand why states form an alliance.

Admittedly, Barnett does not claim to argue for the irrelevance of material factors in comparison with motives driven by ideational considerations to form an alliance. Rather, the constructivist Barnett suggests that both are important explanatory variables in the process of alliance formation²⁵ and admits that theoretical or empirical evidence that would confirm the priority of one over the other is missing.²⁶

What both authors also have in common is that they do not succeed in providing logical statements about how Middle Eastern states prioritize among different kinds of threats. In sum, they both fail to clarify the conditions under which ideational or more material threats gain the upper hand in Arab leader's decision-making procedures.²⁷

²² Ibid., p. 423.

²³ Ibid. p. 447.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ BARNETT. p. 446.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ GAUSE. p. 283.

Necessarily, Walt and Barnett had to draw their conclusions about what are the driving forces behind alignments through examining case studies that have happened in the past. In order to find out if both authors' findings still hold true for the present, it appears to be adequate to formulate hypothesis out of their findings. To induce useful hypotheses from both authors' conclusions that might explain the alliances formed since the Iraq invasion in 2003 a short overview about the fundamental cut in regional politics that was caused by the intervention is given.

The Iraq invasion 2003: a milestone in Middle East history

The invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003 led by the USA and with a coalition of states joining the military intervention demonstrates a deep shift in regional politics. The quick military victory that followed and the resulting occupation have had severe impacts on the fragile regional system of the Middle East:

First and foremost, the traditional power triangle in the Middle East for the last 20 years has been changed by the US-led invasion. Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia had developed a proven method of upholding the fragile triangular system. If one of these states gained too much influence, the other two tried to compensate that changed situation.²⁸ Now, as Iraq has been politically and militarily erased, this balance of power system came into dysfunction. Sunni-dominated Iraq, which was strong enough and motivated enough to balance Shiite Iran, does not play a crucial role anymore, at least not as a nation-state that acts homogeneously in its foreign- and security policy.²⁹ The current status represents an artificial triangle with the two powerful states not being Arab (Iran and USA) that is possibly even hinting for a bilateral system with the US and Saudi Arabia on the one side and Iran on the other.

Secondly, Iraq has been replaced by the US as a powerful external actor that deployed thousands of military troops on the Iraqi soil. True, the US has certainly played an important role in the Persian/Arab Gulf region ever since the first Gulf war. Nonetheless, the vast amount of military forces that has been stationed on the ground was definitely a new step of involvement of external actors and a mighty instrument to influence regional dynamics. Thus, Haass's statement to call the Iraq invasion the beginning of the end of the era of American primacy is to be seen critically.³⁰ At least in reference to the Middle East region, there is no doubt that in terms of military strength, an element of primacy by itself, the US has become the most powerful actor.³¹

²⁸ FÜRTIG, H. (2007). Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy, *Middle East Journal*, 61(4), p. 627

²⁹ Only recently, Stansfield has argued that, after the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2010, the country now has the chance to find its new place in the regional and international community. See STANSFIELD, G. (2010). The reformation of Iraq's foreign relations: new elites and enduring legacies. *International Affairs*, 86(6). pp. 1395-1409.

³⁰ HAASS, R. (2006). The New Middle East, *Foreign Affairs*, 85(6), pp. 4.

³¹ BAUER, M. (2010). Gulf Security: From zero-sum games to regional cooperation?, in *ISPI (Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale)*, No. 202, Milan, 2010, p. 2.

Lastly, invading Iraq and overthrowing the Ba'ath regime and the already installed state structures, has not also changed the material balance of power of the Gulf region. Moreover, the disappearance of Iraq as a regional player has also resulted in a changing power balance of identities. Only a few months ago, the new Iraqi government was finally composed with the Shiite Al-Maliki being elected as the state's prime minister. This is particularly surprising as Iraq has been ruled by a Sunni leadership in recent decades that did not refrain from threatening and limiting the political, social and economic rights of the Shiites. Yet, this is only the latest occasion when Shi'i forces in Iraq have gained the upper hand. Since the invasion in 2003 and with the removal of the suppressing leader Saddam Hussein, the Shiite groups in Iraq have succeeded in gaining the political role previously occupied by the Sunnis³². This is one of the reasons that lead to what Vali Nasr calls an "Shii revival"³³ throughout the whole Middle East. Be it the Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Shii groups in some Gulf states (Bahrain, in particular); all of these groups have gained more self-consciousness and started to assert their power more strongly. Their belief was that if change can happen in Iraq, a country long ruled by Sunnis, then a shift towards Shii dominated systems can occur everywhere.

In short, the US-led invasion of Iraq not only changed the regional balance of power in the Gulf, it also affected the relationship between different identities throughout the whole Middle Eastern region. Occupying Iraq and overthrowing the old regime has led to an inter-state re-emergence of a significant identity-driven group; the Shia community.

Having given an overview about the meaning of the invasion of Iraq to the Gulf region in particular and the Middle East in general, it is now feasible to draw hypotheses from both authors' findings on alliance politics since 2003.

Alliance behaviour of Iran, as the obviously clandestine winner of the Iraq war, Saudi Arabia, the remaining element of the traditional triangle, and Syria, as an important regional actor in the wider Middle East,³⁴ is examined.³⁵

Hypotheses on Saudi Arabia's behaviour

Starting with Walt, Saudi Arabia's alignment policy should have resulted in balancing Iran as this country was seen as the biggest threat to Saudi Arabia through challenging its regional position.³⁶ This is due to two reasons: in terms of Iran's military capabilities that have been increased massively during the 1990s and that become more powerful with the fall of Iraq and the erosion of the traditional balance

³² FÜRTIG, H., (2007). p. 634.

³³ NASR, V. (2006). *The Shia Revival, How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*, (W.W. Norton: 2006).

³⁴ During the presidency of George W. Bush, Syria has been sidelined because it was said to support terrorism. Under Obama, US-Syrian talks have been resumed, but without reaching considerable progress on the Middle East peace process yet.

³⁵ These countries appear to be an adequate selection for a second another reason: with Iran being a strongly Shiite country and Saudi Arabia a predominantly Sunni state, the question of the role of identity within alliance building considerations can be answered more easily.

³⁶ BAUER, p. 5.

of power triangle. Secondly, Iran must have posed a severe threat in the eyes of Saudi Arabia because of the long history of revolutionary Iranian foreign policy.

Interestingly, Barnett's findings predict the same results for Saudi Arabia's alliance policy as do Walt's whereas the motives to pursue that policy differ. With the fall of the Sunni Iraq, Saudi Arabia could not have relied upon the restoration of the Sunni character of Iraq. In contrast, there must have been big fear on the Saudi side that the neighbour state Iraq could turn into a Shii dominated country as well. This would have meant a danger to Saudi Arabia's identity which is marked by a strong Sunni tradition.

Hypotheses on Syria's behaviour

Due to President Bush's declared agenda of democratization in the greater Middle East region, the authoritarian-ruled Syria under Bashar Al-Assad should have seen the US as the actor threatening its interests, like securing regime stability, to the greatest extent.³⁷ Hence Walt's conclusion on Syria's alliance politics to be expected since 2003 would be a policy to balance US influence in the region.

Having a look through Barnett's glasses does, in this case, not reveal a clear statement of what should have happened: Syria could either balance against the Persian/Shia Iran and bandwagon with the Sunni/US forces in the Middle East as it shares some components of its identity with the Sunni actors due to a vast majority of the Syrian population being Sunni and only the ruling regime being part of the Alawit sect. On the other side, it could remember its other features of identity, which is a strong antipathy against the West. It then would have seen Iran as a natural security partner and expanded its already existing strategic ties with Iran.

Hypotheses on Iran's behaviour

If Walt is right, then Iran should have tried to form alliances and balance against the US as this was the actor it perceived as the most threatening. From an Iranian point of view, the US has fulfilled several of Walt's categories of threat: the geographic proximity seems obvious since the US-led Iraq invasion and with hundreds of thousands of troops being deployed only a few miles away, the US also represented an aggregate power to Iran. Moreover, as regime change was an official cause of war against Iraq, the Mullah regime in Iran must have feared aggressive intentions from the US and must have tried everything to avoid becoming a second Iraq.³⁸

On the other side, what follows from Barnett's conclusions for the case of Iranian foreign policy in the aftermath of the Iraq war, is a desire to build alliances against

³⁷Nonnenman identifies domestic considerations like regime security and stability as a one of the driving forces in Middle Eastern states' foreign policy agendas. See NONNEMAN, G. (2005). *Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa: A Conceptual Framework*, in NONNEMAN, G. (ed.). *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, (Routledge: 2005). pp. 6-17.

³⁸For a detailed account of the different sources of threat see WALT (1987). pp. 21-26.

all states and actors that are not Persian or Shia. These two attributes are the most important components of Iranian identity. Thus, Iran must have seen its Persian and Shia identity threatened by the Sunni states surrounding it (e.g. Saudi Arabia) and the US as well. Obviously, Iran is the only Persian country and that makes possible alliance partners difficult to find. Balancing against all actors that are neither Persian nor Shia, however, seems to be impossible. Yet, the second component of the collective Iranian identity, the Shiite confession of Islam, might have been indicating who is a security partner by nature. In short, looking for Shii groups with whom to cooperate should have been Iran's objective, according to Barnett's findings.³⁹

Saudi Arabia's alliance policy

In the months prior to the invasion, the Saudi Arabian cooperation with Washington was on a low level⁴⁰. One reason for this was public opinion in Saudi Arabia with a vast majority of Saudi citizens strongly opposed to an US-led invasion of any Arab country. Another one was Saudi officials' uncertainty of events happening after the fall of Iraq as a Sunni-led, regional power. However, this Saudi reluctance to strengthen its alliance with the US changed immediately with the actual invasion of Iraq. Since then, Saudi Arabia has met nearly every request made by the US in terms of military or logistical support. In particular, allowing gradual expansion of the US Air Force presence in Saudi Arabia⁴¹ is a clear indicator of formal security cooperation and thus represents an ideal example of an alliance, in this case a long-enduring alliance being levelled up.⁴²

On the other side, massive support for Sunni insurgents in Iraq through military and financial funding can be observed to be provided by Saudi Arabia.⁴³ Additionally to that, the Saudi government has not yet succeeded in cutting off the big streams of Sunni radicals that cross the Saudi border to fight in Iraq against the Shia but mainly against the US presence. Clearly, this cannot be in the interest of the US, since a stable, democratic and peaceful Iraq has been declared the US's objective.

Walt's as well as Barnett's findings can explain Saudi Arabia's alliance policy since 2003. The fact that Saudi Arabia did indeed strengthen its alliance with the US is because Riyadh's rulers perceived this alliance the best way to contain Iran's influence in Iraq and the region, which can either be explained by Walt's balance of threat theory or by Barnett's remarks on the primacy of identity within alliance

³⁹ There is full awareness that the number of hypotheses presented here cannot claim to explain all possible alliance constellations that would potentially follow both authors' conclusions and occur after 2003. However, the hypotheses enumerated above follow from the most obvious of both author's findings, and are thus adequate to roughly demonstrate whose arguments are better suited to explain a little excerpt of alliance formation in the Middle East since 2003.

⁴⁰ GAUSE, G. F. III (2007). Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and the Sectarian Question, *Strategic Insights*, 6(2). | In the following passages on all three states, only the most striking and obvious alliances are discussed as noting, explaining and trying to frame all strategic relations since 2003 would certainly outrun the scope of this essay.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 638.

⁴² See above at p. 2.

⁴³ FÜRTIG, H. (2007). p. 639.

building motives.

Though it is not yet a comprehensive alliance, at least not a publicly known one, Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Syria is hard to be explained in terms of Barnett's theory. Syria, a strong ally with Iran for more than twenty years, evidently does not share the same identity with Saudi Arabia. Being anti-Western and pro-Iranian is definitely not one of Saudi Arabia's core identity features. Walt, in contrast, is more able to explain this rapprochement: Saudi Arabia does not only rely on its alliance with the US but takes on the lead itself. Forming an inner-Arab alliance against the Persian Iran would strengthen Saudi Arabia potential to remain a leader within the Arab region.

Syria's alliance policy

When alliance politics are discussed in relation with Syria, its alignment with Iran cannot be neglected even though it was not found in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. Interestingly, both countries have built a strong and enduring alliance since the late 1970s even though they differ enormously in terms of identity: Arab versus Persian and secular versus theocratic.⁴⁴ The strategic alliance had seen good and rather difficult times. In the late 1990s, Iran was only a half-hearted ally of Syria while Syria's relations with Iraq improved as a result of the sanctions imposed on Iraq.⁴⁵ For the time since 2003, the Iran-Syria alliance deepened significantly. Both countries signed a mutual defence pact in June 2006 and an additional military agreement for further cooperation in 2007. Iran sold missiles to Syria and strengthened its intelligence exchange.⁴⁶

From 2003 to 2008, Syria has strengthened its ties to NATO member Turkey⁴⁷ and, despite the thorny issues that emerged in the aftermath of the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Saudi king Abdullah received Bashar al-Assad with full state protocol as an official guest in Riyadh.

Syria's policy of maintaining and deepening its alliance with Iran can be explained with Walt and Barnett. Assad might have regarded an alliance with Iran as a possible means to balance against US influence in the Middle East. Likewise, the sharing of strong anti-Western feelings might have served as a driving force behind the Syria-Iran alliance. However, entering the first steps of building new alliances with, in that case, Saudi Arabia and Turkey is difficult to explain with either Walt or Barnett. The country does not share the same ideational beliefs and characteristics with Saudi Arabia or Turkey; nonetheless, it has improved its relations with both states. These policies are rather to be seen as an indication of its wish to play a constructive role

⁴⁴ YACOUBIAN, M. Syria's Alliance with Iran, *United States Institute for Peace* (ed.), USIPeace Briefing, May 2007.

⁴⁵ PODEH, E. (2005). Between Stagnation and Renovation: The Arab System in the Aftermath of the Iraq War, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 9(3), p. 54.

⁴⁶ YACOUBIAN.

⁴⁷ COBBAN, H. (2010). Syria's new alliances, Middle East Channel, *Foreign Policy*, June 21, 2010. Online available at http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/21/syrias_new_alliances. [Accessed 10 January 2010].

within the conflicts of the Middle East no matter what kind of identity the respective alliance partner might have. Re-entering the regional and international arena has, after the forcefully isolation during the Bush years, become a desirable objective of Bashar Al-Assad. Building trustful relations with neighbouring countries might probably be seen as a first step towards that aim.

Iran's alliance policy

The Mullah regime that, at first sight, seems to appear as the lucky winner of the US-led invasion has in recent years tried to strengthen its position towards primacy in the Gulf and the Middle East. Fostering already-existing alliances appeared to the Iranian leadership as a possible tool to challenge the US and their Sunni ally Saudi Arabia and strengthening its own influence.

The mutually-pushed deepening of the alliance with Syria has already been examined. Moreover, the former super power Russia has been called upon to deepen relations in the field of defence and security policy. Russia did not hesitate to respond to that Iranian demand and it provided Iran with necessary instruments to further develop its nuclear programme. With reference to conventional power capabilities like traditional rockets or missile systems Russia was also at Iran's disposal when providing the demanded weapons.

Alliance partner do not necessarily have to be state actors but may also consist of non-state actors. The policy of using a proxy actor to pursue its own interests has been undertaken by Iran very heavily since the Iraq invasion. Since 2006, in particular, Iran, with the help of Syria has provided the non-state yet powerful actor Hizbullah with an arsenal of more than 50,000 missiles and rockets. This marks an extraordinary change within their long-enduring alliance.⁴⁸

Clearly, balancing against the US is a difficult matter and Iran therefore balances against Saudi Arabia as the US's closest ally and immediate neighbour to Iran. The fact that the alliance with Syria is still in place and has further deepened shows that Barnett's findings about identity as a driving force behind states' motives to ally with others still holds true.

Conclusion: 'Business as usual' in the Middle East

A striking result of the remarks made above is that alliance building in the Middle East did not change fundamentally since the Iraq invasion. This is even more surprising given the US-led invasion in 2003 that can doubtless be seen as a major shift in regional and international politics. It did not go, as could be shown, hand in hand with a striking change in alliance politics. Rather, as empirical data has revealed, alliances that existed prior to 2003 were intensified instead of being cut off or replaced by other partnerships, developments possible to be imagined at least. On

⁴⁸THE ECONOMIST (ed.), *The United States, Israel and the Arabs - Please, not again - Without boldness from Barack Obama there is a real risk of war in the Middle East*, December 29, 2010. Online available at <http://www.economist.com/node/17800151/print>, [Accessed 10 January 2010].

the part of Iran, the country did uphold its alliance with Syria and indeed further deepened it. The Saudi Arabian rulers kept on relying on their strategic partnership with the US and, as an expressive act of cooperation in the security policy, signed an arms contract with the US only recently. The same holds true for the case of Syria.

Another conclusion that follows from the remarks made above is the insight that assessing alliance policy is a highly complicated project in general. I would argue that it is nearly impossible for scholars to analyse alliance policy appropriately and sufficiently. This is due to the fact that an alliance – according to Walt’s definition outlined earlier – can also consist of informal security cooperation measures. Such cases could not be examined here. In order to find out if such informal, secret and confidentially-agreed upon ties actually exist between state actors, it is essential to have deep insights into actual political negotiations and agreements. Therefore it will be policy makers and diplomats, rather than scholars, who might be better able to give interesting information on what drives state leaders to form alliances.

However – probably most important – assessing alliance politics in the Middle East since 2003 shows not only what motives drive state leaders to form and maintain alliances. By proving both Walt’s and Barnett’s findings to be accurate in certain cases, reliable statements about more general theories of international relations can be made. As has been shown, transnational identities – sectarian groups such as Sunni and Shia – and ideational factors like pan-Arabism or anti-Western sentiments do matter in Middle Eastern states’ behaviour in the regional and international environment. Constructivist theories can thus help explain the interstate dynamics in the Middle East region. Yet traditional (neo)realist balance-of-power/balance-of-threat assumptions remain crucial to explain state leaders’ considerations. Both theories’ findings need to be kept in mind if interstate relations in the Middle East are tried to be explained sufficiently. ♦

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A European Army in 2030?

Institutional Changes for a Genuine European Army

1 Introduction

“The long term goal is the establishment of a European army under full parliamentary control”, stated German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle at the Munich Security Conference in February 2010.¹ Advocating the idea of common European Forces, Westerwelle finds himself in good company along with other European politicians such as Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini or Polish MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski.² Notwithstanding the general objections by several EU-countries – most prominently the UK – to such proposals, one cannot deny that the discussion on the build-up of a European army has been revived in recent times. A European Parliament security blueprint of 2008 to set up “Synchronised Armed Forces in Europe” for instance can be justifiably assessed as an indication for the aliveness of the idea.³

However, the vision of a European Army is not a new one. The first popular motion in that direction has already been undertaken in 1950, when French Prime Minister René Pleven proposed the “European Defence Community” (EDC). Ironically enough, the proposal finally failed in a voting of the French Assemblée Nationale on 30 August 1954, which was labelled a “black day for Europe”⁴ by that time German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. By all means, the course of the EDC negotiations in the 1950ies made it obvious that the highly ambitious project of a European Army is to be evaluated only in combination with crucial institutional questions.⁵ How

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¹ German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle at the Munich Security Conference on 6 February 2010, quoted at Mahony, Honor: Germany speaks out in favour of European army, available under <http://euobserver.com/9/29426?print=1>, on 1 May 2011.

² See Kramnik; Ilya: Joint European Army Of Tomorrow: A New Perspective, available under <http://europdialogue.org/energy-security/Joint-European-Army-Of-Tomorrow-A-New-Perspective>, on 2 May 2011.

³ See Fröhling, Hans-Günter: Gemeinsame europäische Streitkräfte: Schritte zum „Europäischen Staatsbürger in Uniform“?, in: Bald, Detlef (ed.)/Fröhling, Hans-Günter (ed.)/Groß, Jürgen (ed.)/Meyer, Berthold (ed.)/ von Rosen, Claus (ed.): Demokratie und Militär – Demokratie und Frieden, Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik 154, Hamburg 2011, pp. 16-24, p. 16.

⁴ Adenauer, Konrad: Erinnerungen 1953-1955, 5. edition, Stuttgart 1994, p. 289f.

⁵ For detailed information see ib., further Adenauer, Konrad: Erinnerungen 1945-1953, Frankfurt a. M. 1967, pp. 427-447, and Kielmansegg, Peter Graf: Das geteilte Land. Deutsche Geschichte

is a European Army best implemented? Is there a need for a European Defence Minister? And how is the nature of planning, command and control of European missions to be designed?

The essay addresses these issues and aims to answer the question, which major institutional changes within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU would be necessary to create a credible European Army.

In doing so, the essay firstly outlines major necessary institutional challenges in the overall structure of CSDP, especially regarding the shape of the decision-making sphere. Thereafter, it evaluates the role of some of the manifold CSDP-committees before addressing the rather operational level, explicitly planning, command and control of prospective CSDP-mission. Finally, the elaborated results will be summarized in the conclusion.

One general notion needs to be prepeded in order to avoid misunderstandings of the analysis to follow. The paper focuses – at least partially – on quite radical institutional revolutions, whose implementation is to be considered as unlikely in the immediate years to come due to political constraints of the Member States. However, in the light of the per se very ambitious idea of a European Army it makes sense to evaluate not only the most likely institutional changes but rather to consider the most appropriate ones.

2 The Policy Level – The Need for Autonomy

Currently, CSDP's institutional framework consists of a complicated system of polity bodies, which interact on manifold tiers. Breaking the complex structure down to a more handy level, one may generally distinguish between the European Council, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) plus the High Representative and several Brussels based intergovernmental committees of mainly advisory character.⁶ This provides for a structure, which ensures that the crucial say for European security and defence affairs stays with the Member States, thereby more or less neglecting the supranational institutions of the Union. While the European Commission at least serves as an assisting body with administrative competences over the budget, the European Parliament finds itself being limited to the mere "prerogatives of consultation and information".⁷

Based on the strategic guidelines set up by the European Council, GAERC is the top decision-making authority with regard to the planning and launch of military operations, which takes its decisions unanimously.⁸ GAERC is also responsible to identify certain crises via its EU Situation Centre (SITCEN), which is always the

1945-1990, München 2007, pp. 143-146.

⁶ See Grevi, Giovanni: ESDP institutions, in: Grevi, Giovanni (ed.)/Helly, Damien (ed.)/Keohane, David (ed.): European Security and Defence Policy. The First 10 Years (1999 – 2009), Publication of the EUISS, Paris 2009, pp. 19-69, p. 21.

⁷ *Ib.*, p. 24.

⁸ *Ib.*, p. 26.

first element to launch the planning of a crisis response mission.⁹ Therefore, the identification of what actually may be assessed as a crisis and a challenge for the EU's security policy is ultimately subject to negotiations on the intergovernmental level.

These institutional structures clearly show the dominant perception that security and defence matters are tightly linked to the idea of the nation-state. To initiate a mission and to define its actual size and shape, the consensus among all 27 Member States is necessary whose number will be even larger in 2030. In the light of the history of ESDP/CSDP evolution it is highly questionable whether this mindset is likely to be switched in the years to come. However, such a development would be a precondition for a credible European Army to become reality. Like national armies, a European one would have to be deployable due to an integrated European order, which would have to show a sufficient degree of autonomy from the mere national level instead of being subject to tension-filled deliberations within the Council. It is common among the European armies that they all stand under the supreme command of a single authority, for instance a Minister of Defence.¹⁰ A similar scheme would also be needed for a European Army to create an appropriate and clear-cut level of military competence to the Union, namely by a single political authority.¹¹ The establishment of a European Defence Ministry under the direction of a European Minister of Defence in this context is certainly highly visionary. However, a single European Defence Authority would be a logical consequence of conferring military power via a European Army to the Union-level. It is legitimate to assume, that it would be the most appropriate way to enable the EU to set up a coherent military strategy and to identify common European defence challenges without being lamed by interest-divergences among the several EU-Member States. The concrete shape of the proposed single authority on the technical level is thereby flexible as long as some key conditions would be fulfilled as outlined in the following.

2.1 Institutional Necessities – A European Minister of Defence?

The described detachment of the military sector of CSDP from the Council to a single authority suggests the creation of a genuine new office, which is to be called “Minister of Defence” in the following. Such a European Defence Minister would need to be equipped with a sufficient legal basis ensuring autonomy from the Member States' political quarrels and must therefore be a clearly supranational institution. This does not imply complete independency from other EU-institutions but rather suggests the exercise of parliamentary control instead of the exclusive interlinkage to the Council, as one may describe the current structures. Every mission-mandate elaborated by the Ministry would have to be parliamentary confirmed in order to “improve the democratic control of the military instruments at the disposal of the

⁹ See Simón, Luis: Command and control? Planning for EU military operations, EUISS Occasional Paper 81, Paris 2010, p. 12.

¹⁰ See Poretschkin, Alexander: Europäische Verteidigungskräfte – (k)eine Vision?, in: Europäische Sicherheit (1/54), 2005, pp. 31-33, p. 31f.

¹¹ See Bentégeat, Henri: What aspirations for European Defence?, in: de Vasconceles, Álvaro (ed.): What ambitions for European defence in 2020?, publication of the EUISS, Paris 2009, pp. 97-107, p. 98.

EU.”¹² In the European Union, the degree of parliamentary influence on the deployment of the military varies quite strongly among the Member States. In Germany, Italy, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Baltic States, Hungary, Luxemburg and Slovenia, the national parliaments enjoy comprehensive rights including the ex-ante confirmation of military missions. In contrast, in France and the UK, the parliament has a rather deficient say, which excludes both a consultation ex ante as well as ex post.¹³ While one may find a relative majority of Member States providing for quite a high degree of parliamentary competences, the two most capable states regarding the military miss to confer likewise authorities upon their parliaments.¹⁴ This shows a discrepancy among the Member States and raises the question, which would be the best scheme to apply to a European Army. Once again the highly ambitious character of the project becomes obvious. It is to be considered unrealistic that France and the UK would support any moves towards the broadening of the European Parliament’s rights over the military having in mind that they neglect those rights even for their own houses. However, parliamentary control by the European Parliament remains the most adequate solution if one seeks on the one hand to ease the strictly intergovernmental nature of the issue and on the other hand to embody a European Army into the institutional framework of the EU.

Another condition, which would have to be fulfilled, is the embedment of the Minister’s office into an administrative body similar to a Ministry of Defence, which would encompass all the relevant committees under its direction. It is worth to mention that both – the Minister as well as the Ministry – would have to be new institutions, which neglects the mere widening of the tasks of the High Representative or the External Action Service. The proposed structure of decision making-authority and administration implies the detachment of defence issues from the competence of GAERC. The High Representative however chairs GAERC meetings and is in addition to that obliged with numerous other tasks which would not allow him to perform as a liable Defence Minister.¹⁵ Furthermore, a rotating mechanism for the cast of the Minister of Defence like the rotating Council Presidency would be inappropriate since it could obtain what actually is to be avoided: A Defence Minister being subject to orders from his capital. An alternative would be the application of the election pattern of the Commission President who is agreed upon in the European Council and confirmed by the European Parliament.

A final remark concerns the very competences of the Minister and his office, which regards the general separation of the portfolios of defence and foreign affairs. For sure, it would not be within the discretion of a European Minister of Defence to identify the security challenges of the Union and the occasions on which action is to

¹²Teixeira, Nuno Severiano: European defence: a future challenge, in: de Vasconceles, Álvaro (ed.): What ambitions for European defence in 2020?, publication of the EUISS, Paris 2009, pp. 143-151, p. 147.

¹³See, Meyer, Berthold: Eine europäische Armee unter parlamentarischer Kontrolle – Vision oder Illusion? in: Bald, Detlef (ed.)/Fröhling, Hans-Günter (ed.)/Groß, Jürgen (ed.)/ Meyer, Berthold (ed.)/ von Rosen, Claus (ed.): Demokratie und Militär – Demokratie und Frieden, Hamburger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik 154, Hamburg 2011, pp. 7-16, p. 13.

¹⁴See ib., p. 14.

¹⁵For the manifold tasks of the High Representative see Art. 18 and 27 of the TEU. For a further description and assessment of the office of a High Representative see Grevi, sic. loc., pp. 59-61.

be taken autonomously. Moreover, this remains a task still to be divided between the instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), especially the High Representative and GAERC, and the strategic level of the European Council. However, it would be expedient to oblige both institutions to consult the Defence Minister for his opinion. If the deployment of soldiers for a certain mission has finally been decided upon, it would thereafter be up to the Ministry of Defence to determine the apt scope, size, shape and the means of that mission. To do so in an adequate way, the Ministry would have to be equipped with an own budget to set up the design of military missions, what would require a change of the current budgetary system of CSDP. Since 2004, the so-called „ATHENA-procedure“ is in place, which foresees that those Member States participating on a military mission pay for these costs only, which occur to them. Only genuine common costs for example for Headquarters on the ground or transport-costs are divided into equal parts between the participating Member States.¹⁶ This mechanism for financing military missions is highly inappropriate if one aims to achieve a certain degree of autonomy from the Member States' influence. A budget at the exclusive disposal of the European Ministry of Defence would require all Member States – even those not participating on military operations – to increase their financial commitment to the CSDP. A conceivable mechanism for this to become reality would be a binding commitment by all national governments to transfer an agreed percentage of their national annual defence budgets to the EU. However, in the light of the frequent struggles related to budgetary issues between the European institutions themselves or just between the Member States over the complete history of European integration, it seems to be unlikely that such a step could be taken in the years to come.¹⁷ In addition, constantly shrinking defence households of the EU-Member States also suggest that binding contributions of the proposed shape would be too far reaching to be confirmed upon.

2.2 Integrating Committees – PSC and EUMC

As outlined above the emplacement of a European Ministry of Defence would also affect the character and institutional status of the manifold committees currently being part of CSDP. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), which is composed of the national Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) or their deputies respectively, is currently the highest military body on the committee-side.¹⁸ It is to be perceived as an intergovernmental institution in which three-star generals deliberate on the basis of the instructions of their capitals and exercise the direction to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). EUMC reports to the PSC, which is responsible for the political and strategic direction of all EU crisis management operations.¹⁹

¹⁶ See Zusammenfassung der EU-Gesetzgebung: Mechanismus zur Finanzierung gemeinsamer Militäroperationen (Athena), available under: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/133281_de.htm, on 5 May 2011.

¹⁷ For an example of a political quarrel on the budget see for instance the „Empty Chair Crisis“, described at: Kühnhardt, Ludger: *European Union – The Second Founding. The Changing Rationale of European Integration*, 2. revised edition, Baden-Baden 2010, p. 130-135.

¹⁸ Davis Cross, Mai'a K.: *Cooperation by Committee: The EU Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management*, EUISS Occasional Paper 82, Paris 2010, p. 11.

¹⁹ See *ib.*, p. 7.

Actually, the EUMC provides for almost everything being required from a leading military advisory staff of a European Army. Mai'a K. Davis Cross points out that its members shall be considered as military experts who share a common knowledge, culture and the desire to come to pragmatic military solutions. Furthermore, their meetings take place on a frequent and regular basis and provide for formal as well as informal communication platforms.²⁰ However, there remains one crucial obstacle, which needs to be overcome if the institution shall have an appropriate function in a CSDP with an own army. EUMC representatives are to a sensitive degree constrained by the different political mandates of their capitals, which construe a heavy burden for military officers, hampering their ability to find practical and sound solutions.²¹ If it really is to fulfil the task of a liable staff of a European Army, EUMC needs to become more independent of political bargaining. It would rather deliberate on the basis of one European instead of several national mandates and would have to become a direct advisory body of the European Defence Ministry instead of being interposed between the PSC, GAERC and the High Representative.

Additionally, the institutional standing of the PSC would have to be altered as well and embedded into the structure of the European Defence Ministry. Parallel to the rise of ESDP/CSDP, the PSC has defined "its own niche and has been consistently expanding it" within the committee family of CSDP.²² The core competence of the PSC is the examination and assessment of crises and the drafting of proposals on a recommended course of action to the Council.²³ Furthermore, once a CSDP mission has been launched, the PSC is entrusted with the political control and strategic direction of the operation under the responsibility of the Council.²⁴ Similar to the EUMC, the mere consistence of the PSC per se would not have to be changed. According to Giovanni Grevi, it has developed "a distinctive working style and club atmosphere" what is to be perceived as a strong indicator for efficiency.²⁵ However, the PSC would have to be accountable to the Minister of Defence instead of the Council and would have to be a regular department of the Ministry to make the separation between the competences of the Council and the command over the European Army credible.

2.3 Institutionalized Armament Policy

„We all know that when you compare European defence spending with that of the United States, to use one well known example, European defence spending in the aggregate is about 60% that of the US. However, I do not believe anyone would argue today that Europe's capability is equal to 60% of U.S. capability.“²⁶

This statement by NATO-Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment Robert

²⁰ See *ib.*, pp. 16-21.

²¹ See *ib.*, p. 37.

²² Grevi, *sic. loc.*, p. 29.

²³ See *ib.*

²⁴ See *ib.*, p. 30.

²⁵ *Ib.*

²⁶ Speech by NATO-Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment Robert G. Bell, hold at the European Defence R&D in Brussels on 24 January 2002, available under: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020124b.htm>, on 4 May 20011.

G. Bell very highlights the crux of the European armament policy. While the US Army can rely on a genuine national defence household and one single set of matched armament programmes, the national forces made available to the CSDP are subject to 27 different households and accordingly different armament programmes.²⁷ In 2007 for instance, the EU-Member States spent in total about €23 billion for military equipment of which only €6 billion were estimated for common projects.²⁸ A striking example for this inefficiency can be drawn by reference to the European airplanes. Until 2009, Eurofighter, Gripen and Rafale, the three major European tactical fighter types, cost the European defence households research and development (R&D) costs of cumulated €29.93 billion, with 1,118 units in final production. The US however spent nearly the same amount of money (€31 billion) for 3,000 units of an even more advanced airplane, the Joint-Strike-Fighter.²⁹ This example shows that there is currently no genuine cross-border market for European defence spending but rather national protectionist industries. „Military R&D (...) is closely tied to the idea of the nation-state.“³⁰ This causes not only a lack of competition and therefore quality-shortcomings of the final products but also a loss of real money. The economist Keith Hartley calculated, that a common European armament market would save up to 20 % of the national procurement costs.³¹

Moreover, the European armament conduct is not only harmful in terms of financial efficiency but also endangers the interoperability among the European forces. The different nature of the several weapon- and communication-systems hinders a proper cooperation among the European troops, since it is to be expected that most soldiers are only capable to handle their own national material.³²

Though the EU has already discovered these problems, all institutional trials to resolve the problem have been unsuccessful yet.³³ The most recent and also most ambitious step into the direction of a coordinated armament policy is the European Defence Agency (EDA), which inter alia aims to harmonise European defence procurement and to establish joint European R&D-programmes. The EDA might have a crucial advantage in comparison to former trials through its fixed institutionalised standing within CSDP. The embodiment into the institutional framework of CSDP potentially could provide for something like a „top-down impetus to force coordination and capability improvement“.³⁴ However, due to political disagreements,

²⁷ See Sprungala, Tanja: Rüstungspolitik in Europa und die Entwicklung der ESVP, in: Rotte, Ralph (ed.)/Sprungala, Tanja (ed.): Probleme und Perspektiven der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Münster 2004, pp. 119-145, p. 121.

²⁸ Grevi, Giovanni/Keohane, Daniel: ESDP resources, in: Grevi, Giovanni (ed.)/Helly, Damien (ed.)/Keohane, David (ed.): European Security and Defence Policy. The First 10 Years (1999 – 2009), publication of the EUISS, Paris 2009, pp. 69-105, p. 80.

²⁹ See ib., p. 82.

³⁰ Guay, Terrence: The European Defense Industry: Prospects for Consolidation, Discussion Paper des UNISCI Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation, Madrid 2005, p. 23.

³¹ See Hartley, Keith: The future of European defence policy: an economic perspective, in: Defence and Peace Economics (14/2), 2003, pp. 107-115, pp. 110ff.

³² See Sprungala, sic. loc., p. 129.

³³ See Schmitt, Burkard: Rüstungszusammenarbeit in Europa: Zeit für Reformen, in: Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (ed.)/Schmitt, Burkard (ed.): Die Sicherheitspolitik der EU im Werden. Bedrohungen, Aktivitäten, Fähigkeiten, Baden-Baden 2004, pp. 214-230, pp. 217-219.

³⁴ EU Crisis Resonse Capability Revisited (2005), S. 25, quoted at Lang, sic. loc., p. 167.

especially between the UK and France, the EDA remains without any binding force and suffers from the voluntary-membership status.³⁵ For a European Army the mere promotion of a code of conduct is however by far too weak to ensure financial efficiency and interoperability. Currently, armament cooperation among the EU 27 is highly dependent on the political goodwill of the Member States, which is inadequate for a properly working European Army. Like national armies, a European one would have to be able to rely on coordinated and pragmatically oriented procurement programmes without being a victim of the politically motivated protectionism of the Member States. Therefore, in order to really reach a genuine standard of European military material, which every soldier of the standing troops could back on, the EDA would need to become binding force and should be integrated in the European Ministry of Defence. This would ensure the comprehensiveness of the Ministry as well as a truly European armament policy, at least as long as the EDA would not be too prone to lobbying originating in the Member States.

3 The Operational Level – A European OHQ?

Beside the policy level, a genuine army demands clear-cut structures as well as the resources necessary on the operational level to identify a working network of command and control (C 2). For this purpose, the capability of C2 would have to be based on a concrete common doctrine and moreover be able to rely on an institutionalised permanent military-strategic level of a European command.³⁶ Yet, the current institutional scheme of C2 is highly determined by political divergences among the Big Three of CSDP (United Kingdom, France and Germany) and reflects therefore a political compromise, which provides only for a limited C2 capability being too lax for a fully operational European Army. Foremost due to German reluctance and British opposition, which is caused by the concern to duplicate NATO-structures, CSDP currently misses an own European Operational Headquarter (OHQ), which would be able to fulfil planning- and C2-tasks sufficiently.³⁷ Instead, the status quo agreement foresees the provision of national OHQs by five EU-countries (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Greece and Italy) for the implementation of C2-tasks in respective CSDP missions.³⁸ This approach is to be traced back to the *framework nation* concept, which was introduced with the “European Capabilities Action Plan” (ECAP) in 2002.³⁹ Hence, the planning-, command- and control-procedures of CSDP are strongly dependent on the willingness of the Member States and the capacities set free by the framework nation. The EUMS as the actual European military planning component however is completely excluded from advance planning or C2 and finds itself being restricted to early warning and situation assessment.⁴⁰

³⁵ See Lang, Sybille: Bestimmungsfaktoren und Handlungsfähigkeit der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Frankfurt a. M. 2007, p.168, and see Grevi/Keohane, sic. loc., p. 87.

³⁶ See Simón, sic. loc., pp. 15-18.

³⁷ See ib., p. 20 and see Lang, sic. Loc., p. 130.

³⁸ See Simón, sic. loc., p.15.

³⁹ See Lindley-French, Julian: Plugging the Expanded Petersberg Tasks Gap? Europe’s Capabilities and the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), in: Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (ed.)/Schmitt, Burkard (ed.): Die Sicherheitspolitik der EU im Werden. Bedrohungen, Aktivitäten, Fähigkeiten, Baden-Baden 2004, pp. 201-214, p. 204.

⁴⁰ See Simón, sic. loc., p. 20.

An alternative to the reliance on the framework nation concept offers the *Berlin Plus Agreement*, which allows the EU access to NATO capabilities for the implementation of a mission if the NATO as a whole itself is not involved.⁴¹ To ensure the respect for the principle of non-duplication to NATO-structures the Berlin Plus Agreement also neglects the build-up of a genuine European OHQ not at least due to British political pressure.⁴² All reforms and trials into the direction of a permanently installed OHQ under the direction of the EUMC/EUMS, such as the proposals of the so-called “Chocolate Summit” of 2003, ended in unsatisfactory compromises, were of minor importance or just failed.⁴³

Neither framework nation nor Berlin Plus can provide for a constant and cohesive planning or C2 capacity since both lack of permanent operational expertise.⁴⁴ A European Army however could not afford to deny the latter and would be required to show a certain degree of autonomy in terms of planning, command and control. Therefore, a main institutional change on the operational level would be the establishment of a permanent European OHQ under the direction of the EUMS. Such an OHQ could be build up in Brussels and orient itself on NATO-structures.

In comparison to the challenges on the policy level, the introduction of a European OHQ might show a higher degree of implementation feasibility, since there have already been explicit attempts towards such an institution especially by France. This does however not mean that it would be a project of minor ambition. The development of this debate has made it clear that it remains a politicized discussion reflecting diverse quarrels including the sensitive topic of EU-NATO relations.

4 Military Training, Education and a Common Language

Last but no least, some final words are to be dropped on the necessity to also alter the military training and education of European soldiers in order to enable them to work with a sufficient degree of interoperability. Although these issues cannot be discussed exhaustively at this point, at least the two most general requirements, namely the instalment of a European Military Academy and the introduction of a fixed language, are to be mentioned briefly.

“European forces demand European soldiers and officers as well as European operational principles.”⁴⁵ Therefore, a European Army would have to include an institution providing of a Europeanised education and training of its soldiers. The creation of a European Military Academy as proposed by Johannes Varwick would probably be the best way to achieve this.

⁴¹ See Varwick, Johannes: *Vom Partner zum Rivalen? Die Zukunft der transatlantischen Sicherheitsbeziehungen*, in: Ehrhardt, Hans-Georg (ed.)/Schmitt, Burkard (ed.): *Die Sicherheitspolitik der EU im Werden. Bedrohungen, Aktivitäten, Fähigkeiten*, Baden-Baden 2004, pp. 146-160., p. 154.

⁴² See Lang, sic. loc., p. 141.

⁴³ See ib.

⁴⁴ See Simón, sic. loc., p. 40.

⁴⁵ See Varwick, sic. loc., p. 49.

Furthermore, a common language for all European soldiers – even for the rank and file – is a crucial necessity for installing working joint forces. A European Army suffering miscommunications due to different spoken languages would be highly handicapped in terms of interoperability. It is therefore necessary, that a European Army would be based on adjusted military education providing not only for mere operational training but also for language courses in English.⁴⁶ “We can’t speak so many languages. If you are on the battlefield and everyone is speaking seventeen different languages nothing can work” stated a General of EUMC stressing the need for a genuine communications culture based on one common language.⁴⁷

5 Conclusion

The creation of a European Army would demand major institutional changes, partially of truly revolutionary character. As outlined in the first part, if a European Army shall become a striking tool of CSDP, it would need to be separated from the control of the Council and become subject to supranational decision-making processes. A logical consequence of integrating a European Army into the institutional framework of the EU would accordingly be the installation of a European Ministry of Defence with a genuine Defence Minister as its head. Such a ministry would need to encompass all relevant committees as well as the EDA – which would provide for binding force in this scenario – under its authority. Furthermore, the operational structure would have to be altered, including the establishment of a European Operational Headquarter and a European supreme command.

All these steps aim to establish a sensitively high degree of autonomy at the EU-level for handling military issues and operations and would thereby imply a far-reaching conferral of classical national rights to the Union. However, exactly herein lies the crux of the whole project. Despite the trials to install a European Constitution and also the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, CFSP and CSDP are still not part of the Community-method of the EU and remain highly intergovernmentally. In the light of all the numerous political struggles concerning competences in the scope of CSDP and the different strategic interests among the Member States, the concept of a European Army seems to be too visionary to become reality in the years to come and is even questionable in the long run. ♦

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⁴⁶ See Price, Robert, sic. loc.

⁴⁷ An EUMC General, quoted at Davis Cross, sic. loc., p. 20.

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Sven Horak & Katja Restel*

Perspektiven einer Demokratisierung in Nordkorea nach arabischen Vorbild

1. Information und Vernetzung als Einflussfaktoren politischen Wandels

Vor dem Hintergrund der sich derzeit vollziehenden Demokratiebewegung in der arabischen Welt, ist für viele Kommentatoren der Einfluss sozialer Netzwerke wie Facebook und Twitter von besonderer Bedeutung. Der vielzitierte Begriff „Facebook-Revolution“ wird dabei eher als neues Instrument der Massenmobilisierung verstanden, mit Hilfe dessen sich besonders die junge Generation in Ägypten und Tunesien mobilisierte. Dies ist ein neues Phänomen¹ von politischem Gewicht welches die Machthaber in Ägypten unterschätzten.² Während sich die Analytiker einig sind, dass eine Vielzahl von Anzeichen, wie z.B. ein hohes Maß an Korruption, zweifelhafte Rechtsstaatlichkeit, das Ignorieren von Menschenrechten und besonders die Perspektivenlosigkeit der gebildeten Jugend, schon lange vorher auf eine großflächige Unzufriedenheit schließen ließ, wurde dennoch die Macht der Mobilisierung durch die sozialen Netzwerke spät erkannt und sorgte für Erstaunen bei den internationalen Beobachtern. Nach Perthes hat die junge rebellierende Generation gar das Potential einen vergleichbaren Einfluss auf die arabische Welt auszuüben, wie die 68er Generation auf Amerika und Europa.³

Andere Autoren sind allerdings der Ansicht, dass die Rolle der sozialen Netzwerke überschätzt wird, bzw. deren Wirkung differenzierter betrachtet werden sollte. Steinschaden argumentiert, dass Facebook höchstens in der Anfangsphase der Proteste in Ägypten eine entscheidende Rolle spielte. In deren weiteren Verlauf, d.h. mit dem zunehmenden Wachsen der Protestteilnehmeranzahl, spielten jedoch Mobiltelefone zur Koordination der Aktionen eine wichtigere Rolle. Ebenso bildeten sich in der arabischen Welt Meinungen in den Moscheen. Es wird von Imamen in Ägypten

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¹ Über die erfolgreiche politisch motivierte Mobilisierung über das Internet berichtet Lee (2004) am Beispiel der Präsidentschaftswahlen in Südkorea bereits im Jahr 2002. Hierbei handelte es sich um die Relativierung von Informationen die die größten koreanischen Tageszeitungen kurz vor der Wahl verbreiteten um einen konservativen Präsidentschaftskandidaten zu unterstützen. Beobachter sind der Meinung, dass Roh Moo Hyun die Präsidentschaftswahl letztendlich aufgrund der Internetaktivisten gewinnen konnte.

² vgl. Perthes 2011

³ Ebenda

berichtet, die sich explizit für einen Einsatz für die Demokratie aussprachen.⁴

Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die Frage, ob eine Mobilisierung der Massen in Nordkorea ebenso wie in der arabischen Welt möglich ist, die das Potential hat, die Regierung zu erschüttern und eine Demokratisierungsbewegung auszulösen. Zumindest kurzfristig wird dies sehr wahrscheinlich nicht der Fall sein. Zum Einen existiert in Nordkorea keine Zivilgesellschaft, aus der heraus sich eine kritische Protestbewegung formieren könnte. Erste Anzeichen einer solchen Entwicklung würden sehr wahrscheinlich sofort gewaltsam im Keim erstickt werden. Zum Anderen ist das Risiko einer Todesstrafe oder einem langen Aufenthalt in einem *Gulag*⁵ für einzelne, der Elite des Landes angehöriger Personen, zu groß und die Anreize für realistische Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten zu gering.⁶ Hinzukommt, dass die Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten per Telefon und Internet in Nordkorea um ein Vielfaches eingeschränkter und kontrollierter sind als dies in Ägypten der Fall ist. Während, laut dem Informationsdienst internetworldstats.com (2010), ca. 21% der Ägypter über einen Internetzugang verfügen, ist die Zahl der Nutzer in Nordkorea unbekannt.⁷ Es kann aber angenommen werden, dass diese sehr gering ausfällt. Demgegenüber gibt es ca. 300.000 Mobiltelefone in Nordkorea⁸, was einer Nutzerrate von ca. 1-1,5% der Bevölkerung entspricht, verglichen mit ca. 60% in Ägypten.^{9 10}

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Fakten erscheinen eine koordinierte Vernetzung und ein möglichst ungehinderter Informationstransfer in Nordkorea in keinsten Weise gegeben. Allerdings besteht die Gefahr einer voreiligen Meinungsbildung, denn die ersten Anzeichen sich ändernder Rahmenbedingungen können schnell übersehen werden. So konstatiert z.B. Seliger (2010) eine steigende Beliebtheit der Mobiltelefonnutzung, mit dem Hinweis, dass sich durch die vereinfachte Kommunikation „*one important precondition of pressure for change, namely knowledge of the actual situation in the country*“ ableitet, denn „*lack of information is one of the most important reasons for lack of pressure for change (...)*.“ Auch Oh (2011) ist der Meinung, dass es aktuell in Nordkorea bereits eine Gegenbewegung gibt, die innerhalb vergleichbarer Rahmenbedingungen agiert: „*In North Korea, revolutionary influences are already emerging. Like the Egyptian people, most North Koreans are poor and dissatisfied with their economic and political situation. Also like the Egyptians, they are gaining knowledge about their rulers and about the outside world through new communication technology. By a strange coincidence, it is an Egyptian company that is building North Korea's cell phone network, enabling over 300,000 North Koreans to communicate with each other.*“ Oh führt als Fakt die sich, in der Vergangenheit zahlreich entwickelten Schwarzmärkte an, die belegen, dass sich der Einfluss der Regierung relativiert. Er prognostiziert, dass „*a time will come when this power will express*

⁴ vgl. Steinschaden 2011, Frefel 2011

⁵ Der Begriff wird als Synonym für die Arbeitslager der Sowjetunion genutzt und findet auch für die nordkoreanischen Arbeits-, Straf- und Gefangenenlager Anwendung.

⁶ vgl. Abrahamian 2011

⁷ Hierbei ist zu beachten, dass das Internet in Nordkorea eher einem „nationalen Intranet“ gleichkommt. An späterer Stelle wird hierauf detaillierter eingegangen.

⁸ Oh 2011

⁹ Die in diesem Artikel im Zusammenhang mit Nordkorea genannten Zahlen sind eher als Schätzung anzusehen, da die Angaben je nach Quelle schwanken und somit schwer verifizierbar sind.

¹⁰ vgl. Steinschaden 2011

itself not just as a rejection of their government but as a force to push it aside.”

Dieser Artikel fasst ausgewählte Indizien zusammen, die darauf hindeuten, dass sich Rahmenbedingungen entwickeln, die eine Vernetzung und Mobilisierung begünstigen können. Im Vordergrund stehen daher in erster Linie die steigende Verbreitung moderner Kommunikationsmittel, die Rückwirkung von Flüchtlingen und Überläufern, sowie die Ausbreitung des christlichen Glaubens. Auf Faktoren die diesen entgegenwirken wird ebenfalls eingegangen, wenn auch in dieser Abhandlung nur kurz.¹¹

2. Medien, Kommunikation und die Mini-IT-Revolution

Das japanische Rimjingang Magazin¹² veröffentlicht vierteljährlich Informationen über Nordkorea. Die Artikel werden unter Pseudonym von nordkoreanischen Journalisten verfasst. Ihre Artikel werden durch Mittelsmänner, die häufig zwischen Nordkorea und China reisen, aus dem Land geschmuggelt. Die Motivation des japanischen Herausgebers ist, das Ausland über die Situation in Nordkorea zu informieren und dabei den Journalismus in Nordkorea zu entwickeln.

Internationale Medien wie die New York Times oder die Washington Post greifen besonders auf Nachrichten des, in Seoul ansässigen, online Portals Daily NK zurück.¹³ Auch dieses Medium rekrutiert und trainiert nordkoreanische Reporter und ist somit in der Lage Informationen aus Nordkorea einer breiten internationalen Öffentlichkeit zu präsentieren. Zwar ist das Herausschmuggeln von Informationen aus Nordkorea illegal und daher sehr heikel für die Reporter, allerdings werden durch Schmiergeldzahlungen Verstöße dieser Art oft nicht weiter verfolgt, solange weder Südkorea noch religiöses Material involviert sind.¹⁴

Das Radio bleibt das Hauptmedium, mit welchem das Regime mit den Bürgern kommuniziert. Jeder Haushalt und Betrieb ist mit einem, auf den Regierungskanal voreingestellten, Sender ausgestattet. Das Ändern der Frequenz ist illegal. Laut den Flüchtlingsberichten ist es in Nordkorea möglich, ausländische Radiosender zu empfangen. Hierzu gehören die Sender Voice of America (VOA) und Radio Free Asia, die US-finanziert sind. Gesendet werden u.a. Interviews mit Überläufern und Kommentare über aktuelle Vorgänge in Nordkorea.¹⁵ Das finanzielle Budget der Sender wurde in 2008 von 4 Millionen USD auf 8.1 Millionen USD erhöht, was eine Sendezeit von bis zu 10 Stunden täglich ermöglicht.¹⁶ Aber auch private, durch Spenden finanzierte, südkoreanische Sender existieren. Open Radio North Korea (ORNK), ansässig in Südkorea, kann in Nordkorea empfangen werden und wird oft von internationalen Medien zitiert. Informationen sammelt der Sender u.a. von Nordkoreanern, die nahe der chinesischen Grenze arbeiten und dem Sender Informationen per Mobiltelefon

¹¹ Für eine umfangreiche Analyse der Stabilitätsfaktoren vgl. Byman/ Lind 2010.

¹² Herausgeber: Asia Press International Co., www.asiapress.org/rimjingang/

¹³ Nicht nur die populären Medien auch der südkoreanische Geheimdienst wählt Daily NK als Ansprechpartner aufgrund des exzellenten Netzwerks in Nordkorea.

¹⁴ Boynton 2011

¹⁵ Margesson 2007: 16ff.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State 2009

zuspielen.¹⁷

Neben den Radios sind auch die Fernsehgeräte voreingestellt. Diese werden aber von der Bevölkerung häufig modifiziert, so dass ausländische Sender empfangen werden können. Sehr beliebt ist südkoreanische Musik und besonders Soap-Operas, die einen Einblick in das Leben in Südkorea ermöglichen und besonders geschätzt werden, weil sie frei von politischer Propaganda sind. In Nordkorea können auch DVD Abspielgeräte illegal mit ausländischer Währung erworben werden. Somit ist das Abspielen von, auf Schwarzmärkten erworbenen, DVDs möglich, wenn auch verboten und daher gefährlich.¹⁸

Besonders der Verbreitung und Nutzung von Mobiltelefonen wird Potential zur Beeinflussung der Regimestabilität unterstellt: „*Cell phones are the most powerful and surest way to change the North Korean regime*“, bemerkt der Herausgeber von Daily NK.¹⁹

Gegen Ende 2008 wurden Mobiltelefone wiederholt eingeführt, nachdem sie 2004 der Allgemeinheit entzogen wurden. Es gab Spekulationen, dass mit Hilfe von Mobiltelefonen ein Anschlag auf Kim Jong Il geplant wurde. Das Netz wird von dem ägyptischen Unternehmen Orascom Telecom gestellt, welches dafür ca. 400 Millionen USD investierte. Unklar ist, wer Mobiltelefone letztendlich benutzen darf. Es ist aber sehr wahrscheinlich, dass Parteimitglieder, Regierungsfunktionäre, das Militär und Geschäftsleute begünstigt werden.

Es wird für die nordkoreanische Regierung schwierig werden, Mobiltelefone der Allgemeinheit vorzuenthalten, da sie ein sehr beliebter Schwarzmarktartikel sind und dort zusammen mit chinesischen *pre-paid* Telefonkarten verkauft werden. Die Mobilfunknetze aus dem benachbarten China sind so stark, dass sie relativ unproblematisch in Nordkorea genutzt werden können, besonders in den Grenzregionen. Somit wird Kommunikation zwischen den Flüchtlingen in Südkorea und den Hinterbliebenen in Nordkorea möglich.²⁰

Für ein Land, in dem für dessen Einwohner selbst das Reisen im Land, auch nur von einer Stadt in die andere, verboten ist, stellen Mobiltelefone ein hohes Risiko dar.²¹ Es stellt sich die Frage, warum sie in Nordkorea nicht generell verboten werden. MacKinnon (2007) nennt drei Faktoren die eine Rolle für die Wiedereinführung von Mobiltelefonen in Nordkorea spielten, und somit einen freieren Informationsfluss riskierten. Zum Einen spielt besonders die Expansion chinesischer

¹⁷ Lim 2010, Boynton 2011

¹⁸ Radio Free Asia 2007

¹⁹ Lim 2010

²⁰ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2006

²¹ Obwohl die nordkoreanische Konstitution Reisefreiheit garantiert, müssen Bürger für Reisen innerhalb des Landes einen Reisepass beantragen. Reisen in Zusammenhang mit offiziellen Angelegenheiten werden in der Regel genehmigt. Private Reisen werden höchstens zu Hochzeiten und Beerdigungen genehmigt. Die Bewerbung für einen Reisepass und die Antragstellung für Reisen innerhalb Nordkoreas ist kompliziert und zeitaufwendig (vgl. Kawashima, 2008). Die Vereinten Nationen berichten darüber hinaus von häufigen erzwungenen Umsiedelungen (vgl. UN Refugee Agency, 2008).

Telekommunikationsunternehmen eine Rolle im Rahmen des generell stark wachsenden chinesisch-nordkoreanischen Grenzhandels. Ebenso wird den Versuchen von ökonomischen Reformen in Nordkorea eine gewisse Rolle zugesprochen. Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen China und Nordkorea hat ein sehr beachtliches Wachstum, besonders in den letzten fünf Jahren, gezeigt. Seit dem ersten chinesisch-nordkoreanischen Joint Venture, im Jahre 1989, stieg deren Anzahl kontinuierlich. Eine Fabrik für Dünger wurde 1997 gegründet, und 2001 resultierte eine Partnerschaft mit einer nordkoreanischen Bank in dem Angebot von Internetdienstleistungen in der Hauptstadt Pjöngjang. 2002 gab es insgesamt drei Joint Ventures die Elektronikprodukte und Computer produzierten (u.a. Nanjing Panda Electronics Company). Die Produktionsmenge von Computern liegt bei ca. 10,000 Einheiten pro Jahr. Weitere Einheiten werden für den Export produziert. Schätzungen gehen von einer Gesamtproduktion von bis zu 20,000 Einheiten aus. Allerdings werden die Computer weniger für den privaten Gebrauch genutzt, als vorrangig für den industriellen Einsatz, beim Militär, oder für öffentliche Einrichtungen. Zwischen 2005 und 2008 stieg die Anzahl der neu gegründeten chinesisch-nordkoreanischen Joint Ventures stark an. Insgesamt wurden in diesem Zeitraum 94 Gemeinschaftsunternehmen gegründet.²²

Landesintern stellt die nordkoreanische Elite die treibende Kraft für die mobile Kommunikation dar. Diese benötigt Mobiltelefone, um den Handel mit Nahrung und Konsumprodukten mit chinesischen Kaufleuten in der Grenzregion zu koordinieren. Die Eindämmung der Schwarzmärkte gelang der Regierung bislang nicht.²³ Paradoxerweise ist es nun die Elite, die das vorherige Mobiltelefonverbot aushebelt und kapitalistischen Handelsaktivitäten nachgeht. Es ist dieselbe Elite, die die Regierung von Kim Jong Il stützt. Angenommen wird, dass 2004 der Handel mit China ein Volumen von 1 Milliarden USD erreichte, welches, im Vergleich zum Vorjahr, einen Anstieg von 40% impliziert.²⁴

Seit 2000 ist bekannt, dass Nordkorea über Zugang zum Internet verfügt.²⁵ Allerdings kann das Internet in Nordkorea eher als ein „nationales Intranet“ charakterisiert werden, da ausländische Inhalte blockiert werden. Inhalte beschränken sich hauptsächlich auf nordkoreanische Musik, Literaturinformationen, Kunst und Chat-Funktionen.

Es gibt aber sehr wahrscheinlich Ausnahmen. Einen freien Zugang zum Internet werden höchstens ausgewählte Mitglieder der Elite haben. Allerdings wurde 2010, anlässlich des 65. Jahrestages der Arbeiterpartei, ausländischen Journalisten in Nordkorea ein freier Internetzugang gewährt. Sie konnten in Pjöngjang Facebook, Twitter und Skype nutzen.

Seit 2009 existiert zudem mobiles Internet in Nordkorea, womit sich, mit entsprechenden Endgeräten, mobile Inhalte herunterladen lassen. Der Besitz dieser Geräte

²²Thompson 2011: 50, Boynton 2011, Lankov 2007

²³In 2010 hat die nordkoreanische Regierung erneut die privaten Märkte verboten. Angestrebt wird eine schrittweise Schließung der Märkte bei gleichzeitiger Angebotserhöhung durch staatseigene Anbieter (Joong Ang Daily 2010).

²⁴MacKinnon 2007

²⁵Stillich 2004, Financial Times Deutschland 2010

beschränkt sich vermutlich auf den Personenkreis, der sich für den Besitz für Mobiltelefone qualifiziert. Hinzu kommen möglicherweise die, die sich das nötige Equipment über den Schwarzmarkt verschaffen.²⁶

Allerdings ist das Netz geographisch auf die Hauptstadt Pjöngjang und daran angrenzende Provinzen beschränkt.²⁷ Ferner sind nicht nur der Zugang sondern auch die Inhalte des mobilen Internets limitiert. Der Service erlaubt nordkoreanischen Nutzern lediglich den Zugang zu staatlich kontrollierten Inhalten.²⁸ Über Zahlungsmodalitäten (pre-paid, Vertrag) ist nichts Genaueres bekannt.

3. Informationstransfer und Rückwirkung durch Flüchtlinge und Überläufer

In den letzten Jahren hat die Zahl der Menschen, die aus Nordkorea fliehen, drastisch zugenommen. Seit 2006 kommen jährlich mehr als 2.000 Flüchtlinge über China, Laos, Kambodscha oder Thailand nach Südkorea.²⁹ Einige von den Überläufern waren vormals in hohen Positionen in Nordkorea oder in der Öffentlichkeit prominent. Ihre Flucht bedeutet nicht nur ein Verlust für Nordkorea, sondern hat auch eine moralische Rückwirkung. Unter den Überläufern befinden sich z. B. Hwang Jang Yop³⁰. Der frühere Sekretär der Arbeiterpartei Nordkoreas gilt bislang als der hochrangigste Überläufer, der durch sein damaliges Amt wertvolle Insider-Informationen besaß. Seinen Schätzungen zufolge operieren in Nordkorea ca. zehn regierungsfeindliche Organisationen im Untergrund.³¹ Jeong Choon Shil, die in 2008 floh, war ebenfalls eine ranghohe Funktionärin und zudem durch sozialistische Propagandakampagnen landesweit bekannt. Der letzte hochrangige Überläufer, Seo Kyung Shik, war der erste Sekretär des sozialistischen Jugendbundes. Er bestach tagsüber die Grenzposten und floh über den Yalu Fluss nach China.

Basierend auf den Informationen von Flüchtlingen und Überläufern über die Wahrscheinlichkeit zur demokratischen Wende schließt Becker, dass *“anyone who succeeded in launching an uprising could have counted on widespread support”*³². Diese Vermutung deckt sich mit den Berichten von Flüchtlingen über Parolen wie *“Down with Kim Jong Il”* auf Häuserwänden oder an Zügen.³³

Unter den Überläufern befinden sich einige vorherige Militärfunktionäre. Sie hal-

²⁶ Weitere Details zu dem mobilen Internet in Nordkorea sind schwierig ausfindig zu machen und bleiben größtenteils spekulativ. Ein Großteil der zur Verfügung stehenden Informationen findet sich in verschiedenen Onlinemedien. So berichtet die Internetseite North Korean Economy Watch, die sich auf das staatliche Internetportal Uriminzokkiri (<http://uriminzokkiri.com/>) bezieht, dass der mobile Internetzugang über ein staatliches Netz möglich ist, welches mit Hilfe einer ägyptischen Telekommunikationsfirma (Orascom Telecom) aufgebaut wurde. Vgl. North Korean Economy Watch, New Zealand Herald 2009

²⁷ Sung 2010

²⁸ The China Post 2009

²⁹ KBS World 2010

³⁰ In 2010 eines natürlichen Todes gestorben.

³¹ Becker 2005a

³² Becker 2005b: 200

³³ Ebenda

ten den Kontakt zu den Kollegen und geben Empfehlungen zu Reformmaßnahmen. Mittlerweile befinden sich 15,000 Flüchtlinge in Südkorea, die ebenfalls Kontakt zu ihren Familienangehörigen in Nordkorea halten und diese mit Informationen versorgen.³⁴

Auf diesem Weg gelangen Informationsmedien wie CDs, USB Sticks, Ebooks und Mobiltelefone in das Land. Der Nordkorea-Flüchtling und Gründer der Organisation North Korea Intellectual Solidarity (NKIS) hat z.B. einen USB Stick entwickelt, auf dem ein multimediales Ebook gespeichert ist, welches Informationen über Südkorea und anderen Ländern der Welt enthält. Wird der USB Stick mit einem Computer verbunden, wird er zunächst als leer gekennzeichnet. Somit kann der Inhalt nicht erkannt werden. Nur wenn das Logo angeklickt wird, installiert sich ein Programm. Damit können die Daten von Zollbeamten nicht entdeckt werden. Sollte dies doch vorkommen, kann der Beschuldigte angeben von der falschen Annahme ausgegangen zu sein, einen leeren USB Stick bekommen zu haben. Zusätzlich hat der USB Stick einen „Selbstlöschungsmodus“, welcher nach einem Monat aktiv wird oder nach mehreren Downloads.

Eine aktive Widerstandshaltung nordkoreanischer Bürger lässt sich, unter den gegebenen Umständen wenig überraschend, nicht ausfindig machen. In einer Studie untersuchen Haggard und Noland die politische Einstellung von nordkoreanischen Flüchtlingen. Sie erkennen hierbei eine Art von Widerstand, den sie „Alltagswiderstand“ nennen (engl. „*everyday forms of resistance*“) welcher weit verbreitet ist. Dazu gehören u.a. die Nutzung illegaler ausländischer Medien und illegale wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten. Nicht verwunderlich unter den befragten Flüchtlingen ist die Präferenz nicht nach schrittweisen Reformen sondern nach radikalen Reformen, d.h. eine Wiedervereinigung mit dem Süden.³⁵ Von besonderem Interesse ist allerdings, dass privilegierte Gruppen, also die, die für die Regierung, die Partei oder das Militär arbeiten, ihr Missfallen an der Regierung ausdrücken, da gerade diese Gruppen ausschlaggebend für die Regimestabilität sind: „*To the extent that even relatively privileged groups are expressing discontent, it suggests that either the regime may not be as stable as is often thought or that slide perturbations could push future leaders in a more reformist direction*“³⁶.

4. Die Ausbreitung christlicher Religion

Religion hat in der Bürgerrechtsbewegung der DDR eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt. Ebenso berichten Medien, dass in den ägyptischen Moscheen die Demokratiebestrebungen der Bevölkerung thematisiert und gut geheißen wurden. In der Vergangenheit haben kommunistische Regime Religion oft als Gefahr wahrgenommen, dies ist auch in Nordkorea der Fall. Eher unbekannt ist, dass Nordkorea auf eine ausgeprägte christliche Tradition zurückblickt³⁷. Vor dem Korea-Krieg betrug die

³⁴Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2006

³⁵Die Autoren unterstreichen, dass die Ergebnisse gerade in dieser Gruppe nicht überraschend sind (*selection bias*) und postulieren sie nicht als repräsentativ.

³⁶Haggard/ Noland 2010: 24

³⁷Durch die wirtschaftliche und soziale Hilfe der USA, insbesondere nach der japanischen Besetzung, wurde die Missionspolitik des Christentums in Korea nachhaltig unterstützt (An 2002).

Anzahl der Christen in Pyongyang 30%, welches ihr den Namen „Jerusalem des Ostens“ einbrachte.³⁸

Allerdings breitet sich der christliche Glaube derzeit im Untergrund aus. Da die Grenze zu China stellenweise ziemlich durchlässig ist, kommen Nordkoreaner, besonders in der Grenzregion, mit Missionaren in Kontakt. Viele unterstützen darauf folgend in Nordkorea die Verbreitung des Christentums.³⁹ Die Missionare sind teilweise sehr kreativ. Es wurde berichtet, dass an Ballons gebundene Bibeln über die Grenze geflogen wurden oder in Reissäcken versteckt eingeschmuggelt wurden.

Das Leben als Christ ist in Nordkorea gefährlich. Der Christenverfolgungsindex 2010, herausgegeben von der Organisation Open Doors, listet Nordkorea seit sieben Jahren in Folge auf den ersten Platz.⁴⁰ Neben dem „gott-ähnlichen“ Status, der Kim Il Sung zu kommt, welcher ein zentrales Element der vorherrschenden *Juch'e*⁴¹ Ideologie ist, ist ein Glaube an eine andere Beschützerfigur als Kim Il Sung und dessen Sohn Kim Jong Il, unerwünscht. Dies wird als Gefahr für die Stabilität des Regimes wahrgenommen.

Die nordkoreanische Regierung verfolgt massiv die im Untergrund operierenden Kirchen, sowie Menschen, die sich zum Christentum bekennen. Werden sie aufgedeckt, drohen Arrest, Folter oder Exekution.⁴² Berichten zufolge existieren bereits ungefähr 1000 Untergrundkirchen in Nordkorea und 135.000 Menschen christlichen Glaubens. Es wird behauptet, dass die nordkoreanische Regierung mehr Wert auf die Verfolgung von Christen legt, als auf die von Spionen.⁴³

5. Entgegenwirkende Stabilitätsfaktoren

Im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs besteht ein weitläufiger Konsens, dass die Chance hoch ist, während z. B. einer Rezession, einer Krise oder politischen Reformen Kräfte zu mobilisieren, die zu einer Regimeänderung führen.⁴⁴ Es wird angenommen, dass wirtschaftliches Versagen die staatliche Legitimität untergräbt, zu Pluralismus führt und somit der Demokratisierung Aufwind verleiht. Dies wurde in einigen südamerikanischen Staaten beobachtet⁴⁵, in denen während wirtschaftlicher Krisenzeit die Zivilbevölkerung aktiv wurde und sich Oppositionsbewegungen bildeten.⁴⁶

³⁸ Vu 2005

³⁹ Open Doors Germany 2009a/b

⁴⁰ Welt 2010

⁴¹ *Juch'e* bezeichnet eine Ideologie, die durch den Staatsgründer Kim Il Sung entwickelt, und von seinem Sohn Kim Jong Il interpretiert und weiterentwickelt wurde. In einer sehr vereinfachten Definition kann sie als von der kommunistischen Lehre inspiriert bezeichnet werden, die die Autarkie von Nordkorea in den Vordergrund stellt.

⁴² Zwar ist durch die nordkoreanische Konstitution Religionsfreiheit garantiert, aber sie existiert nicht in der Praxis. Die wenigen Kirchen, die in Pyongyang existieren, haben lediglich Symbolcharakter und stehen unter staatlicher Kontrolle. Massive ideologische Indoktrinationen verhindern jegliche Ausübung eines religiösen Glaubens (vgl. UN Refugee Agency, 2008).

⁴³ Kim 2007

⁴⁴ Park 2009: 25, Acemoglu/ Robinson 2001: 939

⁴⁵ Z. B. in Argentinien, Bolivien und Peru, sowie in asiatischen Staaten, wie den Philippinen,

⁴⁶ Acemoglu/ Robinson 2001: 939

Vor dem Hintergrund der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse der vergangenen Jahre über Demokratisierungsprozesse, scheint Nordkorea eine Anomalie darzustellen. Das Regime hat es, trotz einer Reihe von Faktoren, welche allgemein mit demokratischer Transition assoziiert werden, geschafft, seine totalitäre Politik weiterzuführen. Ungeachtet der wirtschaftlichen Krisen sowie Hungersnöte, zeigen sich Nordkorea und sein Regime weiterhin nahezu immun gegen diese Umstände.⁴⁷

Dies kann teilweise dadurch erklärt werden, dass es Kim Jong Il offenbar gelingt finanzielle Mittel zu akquirieren mit deren Hilfe er die Elite an sich bindet und seinen Militärapparat finanziert. Aufgrund der großen Unsicherheit, bezüglich der Resultate eines Regimewechsels, begnügt sich die Elite damit, ihren relativen Anteil an Gewinn des existierenden Systems zu sichern anstatt einen Systemwechsel voranzutreiben.⁴⁸

Das Regime wird durch einige weitere wichtige Faktoren aufrecht erhalten. Byman und Lind (2010) thematisieren diese in ihrem Artikel über Nordkoreas Überlebensstrategie. Nordkorea bedient sich demnach den üblichen Instrumenten diktatorischer Herrschaften, die da wären: restriktive soziale Methoden, die Manipulation von Ideen und Informationen, die Verwendung von Gewalt, Kooption, die Manipulation von ausländischen Regierungen sowie Putsch-sichere Institutionen.

So verhindert das Regime von Kim Jong Il das Aufkeimen einer Zivilgesellschaft unter anderem dadurch, dass nahezu alle Organisationen von der Arbeiterpartei gegründet, geleitet und überwacht werden. Des Weiteren verwendet es gezielte Repressions-Techniken, welche die Oppositionsbildung verhindern.

Die Manipulation von Ideen, Geisteshaltungen und Informationen erfolgt durch den starken Personenkult um Kim Il Sung und seinen Nachfolger Kim Jong Il welcher nicht nur Legitimität schafft, sondern auch die Position anderer, potentiell konkurrierender, Eliten schwächt. Des Weiteren trägt die *Juch'e* Ideologie, welche jeglichen Aspekt des nordkoreanischen Lebens beeinflusst, erheblich zur Stabilisierung des Systems bei. Sie verordnet den Bürgern, ihre Kreativität und Unabhängigkeit für eine gedeihende Gesellschaft einzusetzen, damit sich Nordkorea gegen seine kapitalistischen Feinde behaupten kann. Ferner verträgt sich die Verehrung des obersten Staatsoberhauptes als Vaterfigur sehr gut mit den traditionell verankerten koreanischen Grundwerten sowie dem Konfuzianismus, bei denen sowohl der Respekt gegenüber Eltern, als auch Loyalität im Vordergrund stehen.⁴⁹ Beim Einsatz dieser ideologischen Werkzeuge, ist die absolute Kontrolle des Informationsumfelds von höchster Wichtigkeit.

Wenn Informations-Kampagnen fehlschlagen und sich unabhängige soziale Milieus bilden, stellt die konsequente Anwendung von brutaler Gewalt für Verstöße jeglicher Art einen weiteren hemmenden Faktor dar. Für Diktatoren ist dies ein wichtiges und effektives Werkzeug um an der Macht zu bleiben. Gewalt macht Widerstand teuer. Effektive Repression kann Individuen davor zurückschrecken lassen, Aufstand zu

⁴⁷Cho 2005

⁴⁸Cha 2004

⁴⁹Martin 2004: 123

unterstützen, selbst wenn sie mit der Regime-feindlichen Agenda sympathisieren.⁵⁰

Ein weiterer Faktor, der die Regimestabilität in Nordkorea begünstigt ist die Koooption von Eliten, welche essentiell wichtig für die politische Stabilität sind. Das Regime verteilt wirtschaftliche Belohnungen nicht an das ganze Volk, sondern an politisch wichtige Auserwählte. Allerdings hat diese Strategie auch ein Manko, denn sie strebt nur die Ruhigstellung der Opposition an und nicht ihre Beseitigung. Ferner ist Koooption auch ein eher unstabiles Werkzeug, da sich die Eliten im Falle eines besseren Angebots einem rivalisierenden Führer anschließen könnten. Die Akquise von Atomwaffen ist ein weiteres Werkzeug, sich die Unterstützung des Militärs zu sichern.

Um die Eliten und das Militär durch monetäre Anreize an das Regime binden zu können, ist die Manipulation von ausländischen Regierungen ebenfalls ein wirksames Instrument. Ausländische Regierungen wurden in der Vergangenheit häufig als Quelle für Devisen benutzt. Das beste Beispiel hierfür ist Nordkoreas Atomwaffenprogramm, welches dem Regime seit den späten 90ern rund sechs Milliarden Dollar Hilfszahlungen (auch in Form von Nahrungsspenden) aus Südkorea, den USA, China und Japan einbrachte.⁵¹ Während der 6-Parteien-Gespräche mit Südkorea, den USA, Russland, Japan und China gelang es Nordkorea des Öfteren, die anderen Teilnehmerstaaten durch das Versprechen der Einstellung des Atomwaffenprogramms zu Nahrungsmittelsendungen und oder finanziellen Subventionen zu bewegen.⁵²

Um die Institutionen Putsch-sicher zu gestalten, bedient sich das Regime Methoden, um den Preis für einen möglichen Aufstand kostspielig und riskant zu gestalten. Zum Einen sind Regierungs- und Militärinstitutionen so gestaltet, dass Aktivitäten gegen das Regime innerhalb der Eliten schnell verhindert und entdeckt werden können. Zum Anderen sichert Kim Jong Il sich durch die konsequente Besetzung von Spitzenpositionen mit Verwandten und mit Hilfe von Militärs ab, die schon seinen Vater im Kampf in der Manchurai unterstützte und als sehr loyal gilt.⁵³

Die hier genannten Umstände stellen die Hauptfaktoren dar, die die Stabilität des Regimes absichern und somit einer Demokratisierung entscheidend entgegen wirken.

6. Schlussfolgerung

Der Sondergesandte der USA für Menschenrechte, Jay Lefkowitz, erkennt Änderungen in Nordkorea, die er wie folgt beurteilt: “[They] indicate that North Korea might be entering the final stages of its Stalinist era, after which the government is no longer able or willing to control all elements of daily life”⁵⁴. Südkoreas Minister für Wiedervereinigung attestiert Nordkorea eine soziale Instabilität.⁵⁵ Nichtsdestotrotz bleibt das tägliche Leben in Nordkorea streng reglementiert. Offiziell ist keine

⁵⁰ Byman; Lind 2010

⁵¹ Ebenda

⁵² Cha 2009

⁵³ Ebenda

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State 2009

⁵⁵ Handelsblatt 2009

Liberalisierung im öffentlichen Leben zu erkennen. Aber es scheinen sich in der Gesellschaft, besonders in den Bereichen, die in diesem Artikel genannt wurden Aktivitäten zu entwickeln, welche ein Fundament für mögliche zukünftige Änderungen darstellen. Jay Lefkowitz bezeichnet diese Änderungstendenzen als *“faint indications of change”*⁵⁶.

Überläufer und Flüchtlinge stoßen nicht nur moralische Überlegungen bei den Menschen in Nordkorea an, sie sind gleichzeitig auch eine wichtige Informationsquelle für die restliche Welt, um die Vorgänge und die Situation in Nordkorea besser verstehen und einschätzen zu können. Es gibt keine vergleichbare Quelle, die für Informationen dieser Art zur Verfügung steht. Je mehr sich das Christentum in Nordkorea ausbreitet, desto weniger fühlen sich die Menschen in Nordkorea mit dem System verbunden, solange die Regierung keine Religionsfreiheit zulässt und sie stattdessen unterdrückt und verfolgt. Nach Aussagen der Überläufer sind Oppositionsgruppen existent. Allerdings kann auf Basis der öffentlich erhältlichen Informationen keine Aussage getroffen werden, wie diese Organisationen aufgebaut sind und welche Ziele sie verfolgen. Positiv allerdings sollten sich für sie die seit kurzem bestehenden Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten auswirken. Die Nutzung von Mobiltelefonen hat sicherlich das größte Potential Menschen in Nordkorea zu verbinden, die gegenseitig Informationen austauschen wollen. Die hier erwähnten Stabilitätsfaktoren wirken aber einer weiteren Stufe der Mobilisierung, stark entgegen. Zum aktuellen Zeitpunkt und auf Basis der vagen Informationslage, kann von keiner Vernetzung per Internet in Nordkorea ausgegangen werden. ♦

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Die Entwicklung der außenpolitischen Strategie „Strategic Depth“ in der Türkei.

Stellt diese neue Konzeption eine Gefahr für die traditionell pro-westliche Außenpolitik der Türkei dar?

Einleitung

Die türkische Außenpolitik befand sich vor eineinhalb Jahrzehnten in einer schwierigen Position:¹ Anrainerstaaten wie Griechenland oder Syrien verhielten sich gegenüber der Türkei offen feindselig. Die Beziehungen zur Europäischen Union (EU) auf der einen und zu Russland auf der anderen Seite waren limitiert. Zusätzlich litt die türkische Außenpolitik unter der fehlenden inneren Stabilität der Türkei, insbesondere durch den Konflikt mit den dort lebenden Kurden.

Mit Blick auf diese Vergangenheit ist zu konzedieren, dass sich die Situation der türkischen Außenpolitik der Gegenwart stark gewandelt hat. Dieser Aufsatz argumentiert, dass Teile dieses Wandels der von der Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (AKP) verfolgten Außenpolitik selbst zugeschrieben werden können. Die entscheidenden Gründe, die diesen ermöglichten, liegen jedoch in der jüngeren türkischen Geschichte nach Ende des Kalten Krieges. Heutzutage verfolgt die Türkei eine außenpolitische Strategie, die mit dem Begriff „Strategic Depth“ bezeichnet wird.² Danach soll die Türkei innerhalb der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft als ein eigenes, regionales Zentrum etabliert werden. Dies wirft die Frage auf, inwieweit eine solche Strategie eine Gefahr für die traditionelle pro-westliche³ Haltung der Türkei aufweist?

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¹ vgl. Kirisci, Kemal: Turkey's Foreign Policy in turbulent times, Chaillot Paper No. 92, September 2006, S. 7, auf: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf>

² vgl. Ulgen, Sinan: A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey's New Foreign Policy, Carnegie Papers, Number 1 December 2010, S. 5, auf: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/turkey_new_foreign_policy.pdf

³ Aufgrund der Begrenztheit des Aufsatzes ist es nicht möglich der Frage divergierender Definitionen von pro-westlich nachzugehen. Der Einfachheit halber wird deshalb die Folgende verwendet: Pro-westlich bedeutet im politischen Denken und Handeln den westlichen Ländern zugeneigt zu sein. Vgl. Enzyklo: Online Enzyklopädie, auf: <http://www.enzyklo.de/Begriff/prowestlich>

Es ist das Ziel des Aufsatzes diese Frage zu beantworten. Um Beliebigkeit und Oberflächlichkeit zu vermeiden, liegt der Fokus auf den Ergebnissen türkischer Außenpolitik und der „Strategic Depth“ Strategie. Aus diesem Grund gibt das folgende Kapitel einen Überblick über die Entwicklung der türkischen Außenpolitik seit Ende des Kalten Krieges bis zu der Regierungsübernahme der AKP im Jahr 2002. Dies bildet einen Rahmen, in dem dann die unter der AKP verfolgte „Strategic Depth“ Konzeption nachvollzogen und evaluiert werden kann. In einem letzten Teil wird die Frage beantwortet, ob eine solche Strategie eine Gefährdung der traditionellen pro-westlichen Haltung der Türkei darstellt oder nicht.

Türkische Außenpolitik seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges bis 2002

Die Außenpolitik eines Staates ist immer von seiner geographischen Situation mit beeinflusst.⁴ Die Türkei liegt zwischen Europa, Asien und der arabischen Halbinsel. Dies bedeutet, dass die türkische Außenpolitik mit Bezug auf diese drei Räume agieren muss. Jedoch war dies während des Kalten Krieges nur eingeschränkt möglich. Die Türkei war Partner an der Seite der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (USA) und ihrer Alliierten. Aus dieser Zeit rührt die türkische pro-westliche Haltung her. Überaus bedeutsam war und ist die Verankerung der Türkei in der „North Atlantic Treaty Organization“ (NATO) seit 1952. Dieser Fixpunkt limitierte zugleich die Möglichkeiten, sich außerhalb des westlichen Bündnisses außenpolitisch zu engagieren. Das Ende des Kalten Krieges und die Auflösung der Sowjetunion änderte das internationale Staatensystem auf radikale Weise.⁵ Die NATO überstand diesen Wandel und behielt aufgrund ihrer militärischen Stärke ihre Bedeutung für die türkische Außenpolitik. Dies zeigt zugleich die auf diesem Sicherheitsinstrument fußende spezielle Verbindung zwischen den USA als Garantiemacht derselben und der Türkei.

Das Ende des Kalten Krieges änderte jedoch die türkische geopolitische Situation. Staaten wie Georgien, die vormals Teil der Sowjetunion waren, wurden unabhängig und verfolgten eine eigene Außenpolitik. Eine wichtige Konsequenz dessen war ein ansteigendes Sicherheitsdefizit gegenüber und zwischen diesen Staaten. Zur selben Zeit verstärkten sich die wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und den vormals unter sowjetischem Einfluss stehenden Regionen. Die türkische Außenpolitik musste auf diesen Wandel reagieren und erneut mit der sie umgebenden europäischen, asiatischen und arabischen Region interagieren. Dies impliziert nicht notwendigerweise ein Engagement innerhalb dieser Räume, aber die

⁴ vgl. Kaplan, Robert D.: *The Revenge of Geography*, Foreign Policy, May/June 2009, auf: http://www.colorado.edu/geography/class_homepages/geog_4712_sum09/materials/Kaplan2009RevengeofGeography.pdf

⁵ vgl. Nye, Joseph S.: *Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History*, Sixth Edition, New York 2007, S. 138. Es sollte jedoch nicht vergessen werden, dass es keine „Stunde Null“ gibt. Türkische Außenpolitik hat sich fortlaufend an Veränderungen angepasst. Besonders seit den 1980er Jahren unter dem Premierminister und späteren Präsidenten Turgut Özal kam es zu einer verstärkten wirtschaftlichen Öffnung der Türkei. Der Fokus dieses Aufsatzes liegt aber auf der jüngeren türkischen Geschichte seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges.

Türkei musste zumindest diese neu entstandene Situation in ihre Politikformulierung mit einbeziehen.

Im Hinblick auf die europäische Region war es der Zusammenbruch Jugoslawiens, der nach Ende des Kalten Krieges, neben dem Zypernkonflikt, eine erste akute Herausforderung für die türkische Außenpolitik darstellte. Die Türkei engagierte sich bei der Lösung des Konflikts, da größere türkische Minderheiten in Teilen der Region leben.⁶ Ankara bemühte sich zudem darum, die religiösen und ethnischen Aspekte des Konflikts herunterzuspielen, um diesen zu entschärfen. Eine noch größere Herausforderung für die türkische Außenpolitik der 1990er Jahre waren die schwierigen Beziehungen zu Griechenland. Beispielhaft hierfür ist die so genannte „Imia/Kardak-Krise“ 1996, bei der beide Staaten wegen des Streits über einige unbewohnte kleine Inseln an den Rand eines Krieges gelangten.⁷ Innerhalb dieser bilateralen Beziehungen spielt zudem auch der Zypernkonflikt eine maßgebliche Rolle. So nahm die EU mit Zypern Beitrittsverhandlungen auf Drängen Griechenlands hin auf, nachdem dieses seinen Widerstand gegen eine Zollunion zwischen der Union und der Türkei 1995 aufgegeben hatten. Der türkische Staat, der sich als traditionelle Schutzmacht Nordzyperns sieht, empfand dies als einen bedeutenden Rückschlag der eigenen Zypernpolitik.⁸ Die Beziehung zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei verbesserte sich in der Folge, insbesondere nach den griechischen Hilfen im Zuge des Erdbebens in der Türkei 1999, jedoch in sehr kleinen Schritten.

Innerhalb der asiatischen Peripherie der Türkei, der kaukasischen und zentralasiatischen Region, fand sich Ankara nach Ende des Kalten Krieges einer neu etablierten Staatenordnung gegenüber. Deshalb versuchte die türkische Außenpolitik zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre ihren Einfluss in diesem Raum auszudehnen. Hierfür griff sie auf kulturelle und insbesondere sprachliche Gemeinsamkeiten mit dortigen Staaten, wie zum Beispiel Aserbaidschan, oder Turkmenistan, zurück.⁹ Die türkischen Aspirationen auf einen vermehrten Einfluss trafen jedoch auf russische Versuche, den eigenen, sich verkleinernden Einflussbereich aufrechtzuerhalten. Abseits dieses Einflusswettbewerbs verfolgten beide Staaten eine pragmatisch geprägte Politik gegenüber einander und unterzeichneten zum Beispiel 2001 einen „Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia“.¹⁰

Gegenüber der an die Türkei angrenzenden arabischen Region war es insbesondere das Verhältnis zu Syrien, welches lange Zeit problematisch war. Dies lag vor allem an der kontinuierlichen Unterstützung, die der syrische Staat der „Arbeiterpartei

⁶ vgl. Steinbach, Udo: Entwicklungslinien der Außenpolitik, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, auf: <http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/M6O8DG,5,0>

⁷ vgl. Cadena, Lucas: Greek-Turkish Tensions, Princeton Journal of Foreign Affairs Winter 1998, auf: <http://www.princeton.edu/~foreigna/winter1998/turkey.html>

⁸ Für eine detaillierte Übersicht über den Zypern-Konflikt vgl.: The Cyprus Conflict, auf: <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/>

⁹ So hat es zum Beispiel ein erstes Gipfeltreffen turksprachiger Staaten in Ankara 1992 gegeben. Vgl.: Stier, Martin: OSCE Turkish March, European Dialogue December 2010, auf: <http://www.eurodialogue.org/OSCE-Turkish-March>

¹⁰ vgl. Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Turkey's Political Relations with Russian Federation, auf: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa

Kurdistans“ (PKK) zukommen ließ.¹¹ Dies zeigt die enge Verzahnung türkischer Innen- und Außenpolitik, bei der der Kurdenkonflikt innerhalb der Türkei ein spezifisches Verhalten der türkischen Außenpolitik gegenüber Drittstaaten determinierte.

Die türkischen Beziehungen gegenüber dem Iran waren in den 1990er Jahren durchgehend pragmatisch bestimmt. Jedoch gibt es einen fundamentalen Antagonismus: Während die Türkei der sunnitisch geprägte Nachfolger des Osmanischen Reichs ist, ist der Iran der schiitisch dominierte Erbe des Safavid Reichs.¹² In dieser Region ist zudem das Fehlen eines funktionierenden regionalen Sicherheitsmechanismus oder eines akzeptierten Hegemons von Bedeutung für die Politikformulierung und -gestaltung. Sicherheitsbedenken spielen dort eine weitaus größere Rolle als beispielsweise in Westeuropa. Diese Bedenken führten zu einer engen sicherheitspolitischen Partnerschaft zwischen der Türkei und Israel. 1996 unterzeichneten beide Staaten ein militärisches Kooperationsabkommen. Dies hatte jedoch auch den Effekt, vorhandene Spannungen zwischen der Türkei und arabischen Staaten, wie Syrien, weiter zu vertiefen.¹³

Über die regionale Politik hinaus sind für die türkische Außenpolitik insbesondere zwei weitere Beziehungsgeflechte von herausragender Bedeutung. Dies ist zum einen die bereits beschriebene Beziehung Türkei-USA. Die Verankerung innerhalb der NATO und deren Bedeutung als globale Sicherheitsallianz erschwert eine Politikgestaltung gegen die USA. Zum anderen ist dies die Beziehung Türkei-Europäische Union. 1999 bekam der türkische Staat von der EU den Status eines offiziellen Beitrittskandidaten.¹⁴ Diese Aufnahmeperspektive führte in der Folge zu tiefgreifenden Reformen im türkischen politischen und rechtlichen System. Im Kern ist es die Bedeutung des gegenseitigen Handels und ideologische Erwägungen, die Türkei sieht sich insbesondere in der Tradition Atatürks als Teil des „Westens“, weswegen ein EU-Beitritt während der letzten Dekaden wiederholt auf der politischen Agenda stand.

Mit der Regierungsübernahme durch die AKP Partei im Jahr 2002 mit ihrem Premierminister Recep Erdogan modifizierte die Türkei ihre Außenpolitik erneut.¹⁵ Diese Modifizierung ist jedoch keine grundsätzliche Änderung. Die vorliegende kurze Übersicht über türkisches außenpolitisches Handeln seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges sollte klar gestellt haben, dass Modifizierungen und Anpassungen wiederkehrend durchgeführt wurden. Der Aufstieg der AKP änderte zwei Faktoren: Der Erste be-

¹¹ vgl. Grigoriadis, Ioannis N.: The Davutoglu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Working Paper No 8/2010, April 2010, S. 6, auf: <http://www.eliamep.gr>

¹² vgl. Fradkin, Hillel / Libby, Lewis: Power Play: Turkey's Bid to Trump Iran, World Affairs Journal January/February 2011, auf: <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2011-JanFeb/full-Libby-JF-2011.html>

¹³ vgl. Kibaroglu, Mustafa: Turkey and Israel Strategize, The Middle East Quarterly, Volume IX, Number 1 Winter 2002, S. 61-65, auf: <http://www.meforum.org/128/turkey-and-israel-strategize>

¹⁴ vgl. Kirisci, Kemal, S. 22, auf: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf>

¹⁵ 1998 wurde Erdogan mit einem lebenslangen Politikverbot belegt. Nachdem die AKP die Parlamentswahlen 2002 gewonnen hatte, wurde eine Verfassungsänderung durchgeführt, die es Erdogan erlaubte den Posten des Premierministers von März 2003 an anzutreten. Vgl.: Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, Fischer Weltalmanach: Biographien, auf: http://www.bpb.de/wissen/MFFYBI,0,Erdogan_Recep_Tayyip.html

trifft primär die türkische Innenpolitik. Es war die AKP, der es gelang, die Macht des Militärs in der Türkei einzuschränken und durch eine zivile zu ersetzen. Zusammen mit der Durchführung liberaler wirtschaftlicher Reformen führte dies zu einem anhaltenden Gewinn an innerer Stabilität des Landes. Militärische Macht rückte, relativ gesehen, in den Hintergrund. Dies ist ein bedeutender Unterschied zu der Situation in den 1990er Jahren und führte zu einer Abänderung der Außenpolitik, die unter den Begriff „de-securitization“ subsumiert werden kann.¹⁶ Zum zweiten, und aus dem ersten Faktor hervorgehend, kann die Außenpolitik unter der AKP-Regierung als proaktiver und kooperativer bezeichnet werden. Beide diese Faktoren erlauben es der Türkei, eine kohärente außenpolitische Langzeitstrategie zu verfolgen, die unter dem Namen „Strategic Depth“ bekannt ist und mit der sich das folgende Kapitel beschäftigt.

3) „Strategic Depth“ und die türkische Außenpolitik seit 2002

Der Wandel der türkischen Außenpolitik seit 2002 ist eng mit der Person Ahmet Davutoglu verbunden. Dieser war zunächst außenpolitischer Berater von Ministerpräsident Recep Erdogan, bevor er im Jahr 2009 zum türkischen Außenminister ernannt wurde.¹⁷ Er prägte die „Strategic Depth“ Strategie, die zum Kernbestandteil türkischer Außenpolitikformulierung geworden ist.¹⁸ Diese Strategie verweist auf ein „comprehensive historic-cultural reading of Turkey’s position in international politics“.¹⁹ Sie stützt sich auf das Argument, dass der Wert einer Nation in den internationalen Beziehungen durch hauptsächlich zwei Elemente bestimmt ist: die geostrategische Position und die so genannte „historische Tiefe“.²⁰ Die Türkei hat als Schnittpunkt der europäischen, asiatischen und arabischen Region, eine exzeptionelle geostrategische Position. Sie hat Zugang zur See und kontrolliert den Bosphorus. Das zweite konstitutive Element der Theorie, „historische Tiefe“ ist auf den ersten Blick weniger offensichtlich. Es stellt die Geschichte und Kultur eines Staates in einen Kontext mit der gegenwärtigen Situation. Dies lässt die Schlussfolgerung zu, dass die „historische Tiefe“ von Staat zu Staat und in verschiedenen Zeitperioden ein unterschiedliches Ausmaß annimmt. Für die Türkei bedeutet dies eine Verbindung gegenwärtiger Politik mit der türkischen osmanischen und kemalistischen Vergangenheit. Aus der Geschichte und Kultur heraus kann die Türkei als ein regionales Gravitationszentrum gesehen werden. Beide Komponenten dieser außenpolitischen Konzeption sind grundverschieden. Das erste Element ist ein realistisches, geopolitisches Argument, welches zu Politikwissenschaftlern wie Spykman zurückverfolgt werden

¹⁶ vgl. Kramer, Heinz: AKP’s new foreign policy between vision and pragmatism, SWP Working Paper, FG2, June 2010, S. 9, auf: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Krm_WP_Neu_ks.pdf

¹⁷ vgl. Ulgen, Sinan, S. 5, auf: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/turkey_new_foreign_policy.pdf

¹⁸ Dies bedeutet nicht, dass diese Strategie jede Bewegung türkischer Außenpolitik dominiert. Dies ist aufgrund der Komplexität und der vielen unterschiedlichen Akteure unmöglich. Anstelle die Außenpolitik der Türkei zu diktieren gibt die Strategie eher einen Rahmen vor, in dem außenpolitische Politikformulierung und -durchführung betrieben werden kann.

¹⁹ vgl. Kramer, Heinz, S. 4, auf: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Krm_WP_Neu_ks.pdf

²⁰ vgl. Walker, Joshua W.: Architect of Power, The Journal of International Security Affairs, Number 18 Spring 2010, auf: <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/18/walker.php>

kann.²¹ Das zweite Element ist im Vergleich eher eine Anleitung für zukünftige Handlungen. Es analysiert die Geschichte und Kultur eines Staates, um Bezugspunkte zu vergangenen Positionen und Handlungen zu erhalten und aus diesen gegenwärtige und möglicherweise sogar zukünftige abzuleiten. Damit ist es eher eine Art Vision für ein kohärentes Verhalten eines Staates zwischen seiner Vergangenheit und seiner Gegenwart.

Damit die Türkei auf zukünftig ein regionales Gravitationszentrum ist, verfolgt die türkische Außenpolitik eine Reihe von Zielen, von denen zwei herausgehoben werden können. Zum einen fördert und verlässt sich Ankara vermehrt auf “soft power“²². Dies ist insbesondere deshalb möglich, da sich Bestandteile der eigenen Kultur und türkische Minoritäten in vielen Staaten der türkischen Peripherie finden lassen. Dies heißt jedoch nicht, dass die Türkei auf “hard power“ verzichtet. Es ist vielmehr das Ziel türkischer Außenpolitik beide Elemente zu kombinieren, wie es Außenminister Davutoglu selbst ausgeführt hat.²³ Dies bedeutet, dass die türkische Politik ein Konzept anzuwenden versucht, dass der amerikanische Politikwissenschaftler Joseph Nye als “smart power” bezeichnet.²⁴ In dieser Hinsicht dehnt die Türkei ihren Einfluss nicht nur durch Zwang oder finanzielle Leistungen aus. Allein der Fakt, dass die Türkei ein Modell eines modernen muslimischen, aber demokratischen Staats mit reicher Tradition und Kultur ist, verstärkt ihre Anziehungskraft. Zum anderen verfolgt die türkische Außenpolitik eine Politik der “zero problems“ gegenüber ihren Nachbarstaaten. Diese zielt auf dauerhafte, konfliktlose bilaterale Beziehungen ab. Dies schließt die Lösung bestehender Konflikte, wie die Zypernfrage, mit ein. Ein solches Ziel aber impliziert ein proaktives diplomatisches Verhalten um neue Probleme gar nicht erst entstehen zu lassen. Gleichzeitig bedeutet eine solche Konzeption ein konstantes Aushandeln der Interessen verschiedener Staaten.

Die Analyse der Anwendung der “Strategic Depth“ Strategie in der türkischen Außenpolitik zeigt mehrheitlich Erfolge. Die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei auf der einen und Syrien, sowie dem Iran auf der anderen Seite, verbesserten sich von 2002 an dauerhaft und gewannen an Stabilität. Im Jahr 2004 besuchte Premierminister Erdogan Teheran und schloss in der Folge ein Abkommen über Sicherheitskooperation.²⁵ Im Jahr 2008 unterzeichneten beide Staaten ein Memorandum über Erdgasproduktion und Export.²⁶ Mit Syrien entwickelte die Türkei verbesserte Beziehungen, insbesondere im Bereich der regionalen Sicherheit. Im Jahr 2009 hiel-

²¹ vgl. Spykman, Nicholas J.: *Geography and Foreign Policy*, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 32, No. 1 Februar 1938, S. 28-50, auf: <http://www.jstor.org/pss/1949029>

²² vgl. Nye, Joseph S.: *Get smart. Combining hard and soft power*, *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2009, auf: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart>

²³ vgl. Davutoglu, Ahmet: *Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy*, May 2010, auf: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=0,0

²⁴ vgl. Nye, Joseph S.: *Get smart. Combining hard and soft power*, *Foreign Affairs* July/August 2009, auf: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart>

²⁵ vgl. Larrabee, Stephen: *Turkey’s New Geopolitics*, in: *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Volume 52, Issue 2 2010, S. 164.

²⁶ vgl. Kinnander, Elin: *The Turkish-Iranian Gas Relationship: Politically Successful, Commercially Problematic*, *Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*, NG 38 January 2010, S. 11, auf: <http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG38.pdf>

ten beide Staaten gemeinsame Militärübungen ab.²⁷ Noch bedeutsamer ist die Abschaffung von VISA-Bedingungen seit September 2009 zwischen beiden Staaten. Dies verbessert die Möglichkeiten beidseitigen Handels und einer politischen Annäherung. Gleichzeitig enthält ein solcher Schritt jedoch auch ein Spannungspotential zwischen den USA und der EU auf der einen und der Türkei auf der anderen Seite. Dieses Beispiel zeigt ein Hauptproblem der türkischen außenpolitischen Konzeption. Das Ausbalancieren der Interessen verschiedener Staaten ist nicht immer möglich. Insbesondere Israel hat dies in jüngster Vergangenheit erfahren müssen. Im selben Maß, in dem sich die türkischen Beziehungen zu Syrien und dem Iran verbesserten, verschlechterten sie sich gegenüber dem israelischen Staat. Ein zusätzlicher Grund hierfür ist die vermehrte Unterstützung, die Premierminister Erdogan den Palästinensern, und insbesondere der Hamas, zukommen lässt.²⁸

Aber nicht nur die Beziehungen zu einer Vielzahl arabischer Staaten verbesserten sich. Auch das Verhältnis zu Russland gewann an Breite und Tiefe. Hierfür gibt es zwei Ursachen. Zunächst die Vertiefung der gegenseitigen wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen. Russland ist der größte Lieferant von Erdgas an die Türkei, während zum Beispiel allein die türkische Bauwirtschaft im russischen Staat 2008 über 20 Milliarden Dollar umsetzte.²⁹ Neben den wirtschaftlichen gibt es auch politische Erwägungen, die zu den verbesserten Beziehungen beitragen. Beide Staaten kooperieren verstärkt miteinander, um ihre Interessen gemeinsam gegenüber Drittstaaten in der kaukasischen und zentralasiatischen Region, sowie gegenüber weiteren internationalen Akteuren auszubalancieren. Ausdruck dessen war der Besuch des damaligen Präsidenten Putin in der Türkei im Jahr 2004 als erstes russisches Staatsoberhaupt seit 32 Jahren.³⁰ Obwohl die Kooperation jedoch deutlich zugenommen hat, gibt es noch immer einen strategischen Wettbewerb um den Einfluss beider Staaten in den genannten Regionen.

Zusätzlich zu diesen vertieften Beziehungen zu Russland versucht die Türkei auch eine diplomatische Annäherung an Armenien. Dies ist deshalb bedeutsam, da sich die türkische Außenpolitik dort bei der Beilegung eines in der türkischen und armenischen Gesellschaft tief verankerten Konflikts engagiert.³¹ So besuchte der türkische Präsident Gül ein Fußballspiel in der armenischen Hauptstadt im Jahr 2008.³² Die neugestarteten Beziehungen entwickelten sich weiter. Im Jahr 2009 unterzeichneten beide Staaten ein Protokoll, welches die Wiederherstellung diplomatischer Beziehun-

²⁷ vgl. Saab, Bilal Y.: Syria and Turkey deepen bilateral relations, Brookings, March 28, 2010, auf: http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/0506_syria_turkey_saab.aspx

²⁸ vgl. Avineri, Shlomo: Turkey's frontline foreign policy, Project Syndicate, auf: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/avineri37/English>

²⁹ vgl. Larrabee, Stephen, S. 168.

³⁰ vgl. Özdal, Habibe: Turkey & Russia: Old Rivals, Strategic Partners, International Strategic Research Organization January 2010, auf: <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=1314>

³¹ Für eine detaillierte Übersicht über den Konflikt zwischen der Türkei und Armenien vgl.: International Crisis Group: Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders, Europe Report N199 April 2009, auf: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/199_turkey_and_armenia___opening_minds_opening_borders_2.ashx

³² vgl. Arsu, Sebnem: Turkey's President makes historic visit to Armenia, New York Times September 2008, auf: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/world/europe/07turkey.html>

gen beinhaltet.³³ Die Analyse der türkisch-armenischen Beziehungen zeigt jedoch auch, dass sich durch die Wiederannäherung das Verhältnis der Türkei zu Aserbaidschan verschlechterte. Dieses sieht den türkischen Staat als seine traditionelle Schutzmacht gerade im Hinblick auf potentielle Konflikte mit Armenien an.

Hinsichtlich eines Engagements türkischer Außenpolitik gegenüber den Balkanstaaten waren in den Folgejahren nach der Bildung der AKP-Regierung im Jahr 2002 kaum Initiativen erkennbar.³⁴ Solche, insbesondere auf einem höheren politischen Level, existieren erst seit 2009. Dies ist zu einem Teil deshalb der Fall, da die osmanische Vergangenheit der Türkei negativ in den Staaten des Balkans wahrgenommen wird. Dies vermindert die Möglichkeiten, eine Strategie der „Strategic Depth“ dort erfolgreich anzuwenden.

Werden die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und der EU seit 2002 betrachtet, so ist das Resultat ambivalent. Für Ankara ist ein türkischer Beitritt zur Union noch immer offizielles politisches Ziel. Im Jahr 2004 entschied sich die Europäische Union dazu, Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei zu eröffnen.³⁵ Aber zugleich scheint dieser Moment der Klimax der beidseitigen Annäherung gewesen zu sein. Seitdem nimmt insbesondere die öffentliche Unterstützung für einen türkischen Beitritt zur EU innerhalb der Union, aber auch innerhalb der Türkei ab. Hierfür können verschiedene Gründe, wirtschaftlicher, politischer und kultureller Art verantwortlich gemacht werden. Bedeutsam ist die Beidseitigkeit der wachsenden gegenseitigen Ablehnung einer türkischen Aufnahme in die Europäische Union.

Neben dieser sich verändernden Situation, rückt die Türkei auch von einer engen, von den USA dominierten Kooperation, mit denselben, ab. Dies kann anhand der Beziehungen der Türkei gegenüber dem Iran und seiner nuklearen Politik aufgezeigt werden. So versuchten Brasilien und die Türkei gemeinsam im Mai 2010 ein Arrangement mit dem Iran zu finden, um den Konflikt um das iranische Atomprogramm zu beenden, ohne dass die USA in die Details des Abkommens eingeweiht waren.³⁶ Ein weiteres Beispiel ist die Haltung, insbesondere des türkischen Premierministers, gegenüber dem Präsidenten des Sudans, al-Baschir.³⁷ Dieser ist angeklagt, genozidale Aktivitäten gegenüber den Nicht-Muslimen seines Landes unterstützt zu haben, wird aber von Recep Erdogan unterstützt. Beide Beispiele zeigen ein Auseinanderlaufen zwischen den außenpolitischen Zielen der USA und der Türkei.

³³ vgl. Larrabee, Stephen F.: Turkey's Eurasian Agenda, The Washington Quarterly Winter 2011, S. 108, auf: http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Larrabee.pdf

³⁴ vgl. Kramer, Heinz, S. 26, auf: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Krm_WP_Neu_ks.pdf

³⁵ vgl. EurActiv: EU-Turkey relations, Oktober 2010, auf: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations-linksossier-188294>

³⁶ vgl. Kramer, Heinz, S. 16, auf: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Krm_WP_Neu_ks.pdf

³⁷ vgl. Ebd., S. 28, auf: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Krm_WP_Neu_ks.pdf

Schlussbetrachtung: Stellt die „Strategic Depth“ Strategie eine Gefahr für die traditionell pro-westliche Außenpolitik der Türkei dar?

Dieser Aufsatz stellt heraus, dass sich die türkische Außenpolitik nach Ende des Kalten Krieges auf neue Entwicklungen eingestellt hat. Die veränderte internationale Situation machte es für die Türkei notwendig, ein neues Beziehungsgeflecht zu umliegenden Drittstaaten zu entwickeln und alte Beziehungen neu zu strukturieren. Seit die AKP die Regierungsverantwortung im Jahr 2002 übernommen hat, wechselte abermals die Art und Weise der Formulierung und Durchführung der Außenpolitik. Bedingt durch eine vermehrte innere Stabilität und gestützt durch anhaltend starkes Wirtschaftswachstum ist es der Türkei möglich, eine Strategie der „Strategic Depth“ zu verfolgen. Dies bedeutet, die Türkei ist in der Lage, ihren Einfluss in den sie umgebenden Regionen auszubauen und ihre Beziehungen zu insbesondere vormals rivalisierenden Staaten zu verbessern. Anstelle einer Außenpolitik, die auf dem Einsatz von „hard power“ fußt, wird die türkische „soft power“ bei der Politikformulierung und –durchführung stärker gewichtet. Insbesondere wird versucht, die Interessen der türkischen regionalen Nachbarn auszubalancieren und sich selbst in eine Position der „zero problems“ gegenüber diesen zu versetzen.

Diese Strategie der „Strategic Depth“ scheint bislang positive Resultate zu erbringen. Zwar gab es auch Rückschläge, zum Beispiel die Verschlechterung der türkischen Beziehungen zu Israel. Aber die gewonnene regionale Stabilität durch die Verbesserung der Beziehungen zu hauptsächlich Iran, Syrien, Russland und Armenien kompensiert dies.

Gleichwohl enthält die türkische außenpolitische Strategie auch inhärente Probleme. Zum Einen hängt das Ausmaß dieser Politik von den verfügbaren Ressourcen ab. Das wirtschaftliche Wachstum der Türkei ist direkt mit dem Erfolg dieses Konzepts verknüpft. Zum anderen ist eine Strategie der „zero problems“ nur möglich, wenn die anderen Akteure die grundlegenden türkischen Werte akzeptieren. Dies ist auch von Außenminister Davutoglu selbst so formuliert worden.³⁸ Das Problem, dass mit dieser Vorbedingung einhergeht ist, dass, trotz der gegenwärtigen Ereignisse zum Beispiel in Ägypten, die türkischen Werte von denen der meisten anderen Staaten in der asiatischen und arabischen Peripherie der Türkei abweichen. Die Türkei ist ein moderner und demokratischer Staat. Die meisten der sie umgebenden Staaten in ihrer südlichen und östlichen Peripherie sind weder das eine noch das andere. Dies kann ein Auslöser für Spannungen sein. Je mehr der türkische Einfluss in diesen Regionen ansteigt, desto öfter wird die Türkei eine Position beziehen müssen. Diese Positionen sind bestimmt durch die türkischen Interessen, die aber auf einem gegebenen Wertekanon beruhen. Dies bedeutet, dass es hierbei zu Konflikten mit Interessen anderer Staaten kommen kann, die sich auf andere Werte berufen.

Aber ist die „Strategic Depth“ Strategie eine Gefahr für die traditionelle pro-westliche Politik der Türkei? Wie herausgestellt wurde, ist es das übergeordnete Ziel der Konzeption, die Türkei als ein regionales Zentrum der internationalen Staatenge-

³⁸ vgl. Foreign Policy: Ahmet Davutoglu, December 2010, S. 45/46.

meinschaft zu positionieren. Hierfür sollen Interessen anderer Staaten ausbalanciert werden. In dieser Hinsicht führt „Strategic Depth“ relativ gesehen zu einer Abwertung einer pro-westlichen türkischen Außenpolitik und einer parallelen Aufwertung bilateraler Beziehungen zu nicht-westlichen Akteuren. Aus dieser Erkenntnis lässt sich jedoch kein Schluss ziehen, inwieweit eine Abwertung einer Gefährdung der traditionellen pro-westlichen Außenpolitik der Türkei gleichkommt. Die Kurzdarstellung türkischer Außenpolitik seit Ende des Kalten Krieges und insbesondere seit 2002 zeigt: Es hat tatsächlich eine Neuorientierung türkischer Außenpolitik zugunsten der asiatischen und arabischen Peripherie der Türkei gegeben. Aber dies muss in Verbindung mit dem Wandel der internationalen Beziehungen nach Ende des Kalten Krieges gesehen werden. Diese Interpretation kommt deshalb zum Schluss, dass die Veränderung der türkischen Außenpolitik nichts mit einer genuinen Ablehnung pro-westlicher Politikgestaltung zu tun hat und daher auch keine absolute Gefahr gegenüber der traditionellen pro-westlichen Ausrichtung der türkischen Außenpolitik darstellt. Es ist einfach so, dass in der gegenwärtigen Situation weder die USA, noch die EU das außenpolitische Verhalten der Türkei in dem Maße beeinflussen können, wie es noch vor einiger Zeit möglich war. ♦

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DIFESA EUROPEA: LA CRISI È L'ULTIMA OCCASIONE


di Vincenzo CAMPORINI

I tagli ai bilanci militari nazionali dovrebbero spingere gli Stati dell'Ue a integrare maggiormente le rispettive Forze armate. Invece, ognuno sembra preoccupato solo di difendere il proprio orto. Come la Libia dimostra, così si diventa irrilevanti. L'alternativa possibile.

1.  PAESI EUROPEI HANNO GODUTO DEL PIÙ lungo periodo di assenza di conflitti da quando si può parlare di storia. Anche la guerra fredda, da questo punto di vista, può essere considerata come un quarantennio di pace sostanziale, in cui lo scontro finale non era subliminalmente considerato come una reale possibilità. La scomparsa della minaccia sovietica ha poi definitivamente spazzato via dal nostro limitato orizzonte qualsiasi ipotesi di conflitto armato. Anche le operazioni in cui la Nato e, in forma assai più blanda, l'Unione Europea si sono impegnate – nei Balcani come in Medio Oriente o nell'Asia centrale o nel Nordafrica – sono state considerate non operazioni di guerra, bensì di polizia internazionale. Effettuate dunque non per motivi di interesse nazionale, ma in forza di un dovere di interferenza umanitaria, per un preteso obbligo morale di proteggere popolazioni in pericolo. Tanto che, a ragione, tra i contributi forniti dall'Italia a tali missioni hanno ottenuto uno straordinario apprezzamento i nostri carabinieri, per la loro peculiare capacità di coniugare la militarità con la garanzia dell'ordine pubblico. Mentre l'impiego – che pure c'è stato e spesso in modo massiccio e determinante – di Esercito, Marina e Aeronautica ha avuto una risonanza minore, spesso per motivi di politica interna.

In questa temperie di psicologia collettiva, di fronte all'ineludibile necessità di garantire il mantenimento della qualità di vita e di benessere, la gravissima finanziaria ha fatto sì che nei bilanci pubblici europei le prime voci a essere falciate senza pietà fossero quelle riguardanti le difese nazionali. Qui si è attinto a larghe mani nel tentativo di recuperare quei parametri di Maastricht che ormai vengono considerati alla stregua dei dieci comandamenti scolpiti nel granito.

Vediamo quali sono le conseguenze e che cosa si può, o meglio si deve fare per mitigarle.



2. Con buona pace di Londra e Parigi, oggi nessun paese europeo conserva una reale capacità di intervento in un teatro operativo che presenti un minimo di complessità. Il governo britannico ha ridotto le proprie forze operative dagli anni Novanta ad oggi di almeno un terzo. In qualche settore cruciale ha annullato le proprie capacità: basti pensare che durante la crisi libica non ha potuto schierare portaerei, cui ha per ora rinunciato, in attesa dell'entrata in servizio (tra dieci anni?) delle/della prossima unità, e l'aviazione britannica è potuta intervenire solo per la graziosa concessione delle nostre basi aeree. Nella stessa crisi libica è emersa in tutta la sua drammaticità l'assenza da parte europea di una reale capacità nel settore della ricognizione e dell'intelligence. Senza il pieno coinvolgimento in questo campo delle forze statunitensi non sarebbe stato possibile neppure identificare gli obiettivi da battere, né verificarne lo stato dopo le missioni di attacco. In buona sostanza le nostre forze aerotattiche, che pure esistono e dispongono di un livello tecnologico all'altezza delle esigenze, sono sostanzialmente cieche. I sistemi di sorveglianza, aerei e satellitari, sono ancora a livello embrionale e del tutto non integrati (il Satcen, centro satellitare dell'Unione Europea di Torrejón, acquista il 95% delle immagini satellitari da fonti commerciali Usa).

Per parte italiana, il ruolo che stiamo giocando è finora riuscito a mascherare di fronte all'opinione pubblica il crescente decadimento delle capacità operative. Lo spettro delle missioni in cui siamo stati impegnati ha mascherato il crescente stato di sofferenza del nostro strumento militare, che vede più di due terzi del proprio bilancio (senza contare la quota per l'Arma dei carabinieri) impegnati per pagare gli stipendi. Il resto copre le spese di investimento, che non possono essere rimodulate, stanti i contratti pluriennali già sottoscritti, lasciando qualche briciola per l'addestramento e la manutenzione. In sintesi i mezzi di cui disponiamo, peraltro di buona qualità e di adeguato livello tecnologico, rimangono troppo a lungo nelle rimesse, ai moli e sui piazzali. Le attività addestrative si concentrano sulle unità impiegabili nell'attuale tipologia di operazioni, tenendo a dieta stretta le altre. Peraltro il personale è inamovibile, i contratti sono vincolanti, quindi i tagli si possono concentrare solo sulle spese di esercizio.

Considerazioni analoghe si possono fare per gli altri principali paesi dell'Unione Europea, anche se in alcuni, come la Gran Bretagna, esistono regole assai meno garantiste in tema di mantenimento in servizio di personale in esubero. Un ufficiale generale britannico che non trova un incarico coerente con il grado rivestito viene cortesemente congedato, con i ringraziamenti di Sua Maestà.

Una prima conclusione che si può trarre è che i processi nazionali di riduzione/razionalizzazione delle singole Forze armate, se potranno migliorare l'efficienza della spesa, non potranno in alcun modo ovviare alla diminuzione della massa di lavoro, che in alcuni casi potrà scendere sotto il livello di massa critica minimo necessario per rendere lo strumento militare utilizzabile, anche se impiegato in coalizione.

Dato per scontato che un'inversione di tendenza sia impossibile – sia per oggettiva indisponibilità delle risorse sia per improponibilità politica – si rende ne-

cessario individuare modalità innovative di approntamento delle capacità militari. Ciò sia a livello di integrazione interforze, sia soprattutto nel quadro più ampio dei paesi «*willing and capable*», come dice il Trattato di Lisbona, facenti parte dell'Unione Europea. Si tratta di dare attuazione al concetto di «cooperazione strutturata permanente», che costituisce uno degli elementi più innovativi del Trattato e che finora, al di là di dichiarazioni di facciata francamente un po' ipocrite, non ha sollevato alcun entusiasmo negli Stati membri. La situazione è per certi versi paradossale: in un periodo di crisi seria, destinata a durare per un lungo periodo (Angela Merkel ha parlato di un decennio), quando ogni elemento oggettivo induce a cercare nella collaborazione sempre più stretta la strada per minimizzare le difficoltà che tutti i paesi dell'Unione devono affrontare, le politiche di difesa, invece di convergere e di cercare livelli di integrazione organica sempre più stretti, tendono invece verso forme di rinazionalizzazione. Esse potranno soddisfare forse qualche sussulto di malposto orgoglio nazionale, potranno non frustrare le aspettative di carriera dei quadri delle singole Forze armate, potranno salvare per qualche mese i bilanci di industrie nazionali prive di un mercato di dimensioni sostenibili, ma metteranno l'Unione, o una qualunque coalizione da questa espressa, in situazione di sostanziale incapacità operativa. Così l'Ue sarà assolutamente irrilevante nella gestione delle crisi che il futuro certamente ci presenterà.

Eppure le idee non mancano: l'Agenzia europea della difesa (Eda) sta lavorando da tempo sul tema *Pooling and Sharing* (P&S), cercando aree dove i singoli paesi siano disponibili a condividere, integrandole, le rispettive capacità militari. Così accettando il principio che in alcuni settori è necessario che alcune funzioni vengano assicurate da altri, nella piena fiducia che, in caso di necessità, queste non verranno negate. Tale un modello, adottato nella sua integralità, presuppone l'adesione incondizionata a una politica estera e di sicurezza comune, senza *caveat* nazionali di sorta e senza riserve mentali. Il che al momento, vista la qualità delle leadership europee, ciascuna così gelosa delle proprie prerogative, sembra francamente al di là dell'orizzonte visibile.

Tuttavia, per alcune funzioni, in particolare nel settore addestrativo e in quello logistico, alcune misure sono perseguibili fin d'ora, a patto di superare alcune gelosie e di ragionare con concretezza circa un'accettabile distribuzione di oneri e benefici. Nel campo dell'addestramento al volo, ad esempio si potrebbe negoziare l'adozione di un velivolo avanzato italiano di Aermacchi/Alenia, accettando che la scuola di volo sia in un altro paese, così come del pacchetto potrebbe far parte la scelta di un elicottero scuola di Eurocopter, con la relativa base addestrativa in un quarto paese e così via. Si tratterebbe di un negoziato certamente laborioso, ma che, portato a buon fine, consentirebbe non solo di realizzare sostanziali economie, ma soprattutto di formare equipaggi di volo perfettamente standardizzati, capaci di operare insieme, fianco a fianco, senza badare alla nazionalità d'origine.

180 | Ciò vale anche per la stragrande maggioranza delle funzioni logistiche di base, come quelle relative ai materiali di consumo e agli approvvigionamenti di

munizionamento e di ricambi per equipaggiamenti comuni. Più complessa la prospettiva quando si voglia guardare alle capacità industriali, in particolare alla cantieristica e alla produzione di mezzi di superficie, oggi polverizzata fra miriadi di installazioni e produttori nei singoli paesi, la cui razionalizzazione implica problemi di ordine sociale che al momento difficilmente un qualsiasi leader politico che voglia avere un futuro si sentirebbe di affrontare.

Il concetto P&S, desiderabile in settori come quelli sopra illustrati – dove l'integrazione di ciò di cui gli Stati membri dispongono permetterebbe significativi risparmi – diventa l'unica scelta per determinate capacità indispensabili per avviare con prospettive di successo una qualsiasi operazione sia di tipo puramente militare sia civile/militare. Tali capacità richiedono investimenti massicci che nessun paese europeo è oggi in grado di affrontare singolarmente: intendiamo le capacità che permettono di conseguire un'adeguata «consapevolezza situazionale», che consenta al decisore un affidabile apprezzamento dinamico della realtà sul terreno e il conseguente impiego ottimale delle risorse a sua disposizione, al fine di raggiungere gli scopi prefissi. Si sono qui utilizzati termini assolutamente neutri per evidenziare che si tratta di un'esigenza ineludibile in qualsiasi circostanza che richieda un intervento tempestivo, militare e/o civile. La crisi libica ha dato piena e inequivocabile evidenza dell'assoluta insufficienza delle capacità di questa natura che possono essere messe in campo da parte dei paesi dell'Unione, sia singolarmente sia collettivamente.

Il sistema da costruire è dunque composto da una serie complessa di sottosistemi, che vanno da costellazioni di satelliti dotati di sensori multispettrali in orbita medio-bassa, a mezzi d'osservazione su velivoli a pilotaggio remoto e a lunga autonomia, a ricognitori pilotati aerotattici, che possono assicurare un'elevata prontezza e flessibilità di risposta. Il tutto in modo che un'area di interesse possa essere adeguatamente monitorizzata, con continuità e in tempo reale. Ma questo complesso di sensori deve disporre di mezzi di trasmissione affidabili, con considerevole ampiezza di banda, per poter raccogliere a terra le immagini registrate, che vanno poi inoltrate nei centri di analisi, i quali possono ricavarne in tempo utile le informazioni necessarie alla gestione delle attività. In Europa qualche paese ha qualche pezzo di questo sistema di sistemi, ma il prodotto che se ne può ricavare si è rivelato del tutto insufficiente alla condotta efficace delle operazioni in Libia. Di qui la necessità di un progetto ideale per conseguire capacità adeguate, in tempi di disponibilità finanziarie ridotte per i bilanci – non solo della difesa – dei paesi dell'Unione, mettendo a fattor comune le risorse disponibili.

3. La crisi finanziaria e i conseguenti tagli per le Forze armate si possono dunque rivelare un potente motore per fare un salto quantico in tema di integrazione europea. La creazione di un sistema comune quale quello appena descritto presuppone che venga affrontato con successo un tema che finora è stato un insuperabile tabù: quello della condivisione senza riserve almeno di una parte del-

le risorse di intelligence. Risorse la cui proprietà è stata finora gelosamente conservata dalle singole capitali.

Altro nodo che le ridotte disponibilità possono consentire di affrontare con occhio nuovo è quello della base industriale e del mantenimento di un adeguato margine di vantaggio tecnologico, fondamentale per la difesa così come per tutto il sistema economico. Finora i paesi che erano in possesso di una qualsiasi capacità produttiva l'hanno difesa strenuamente, anche in situazioni palesemente antieconomiche. Sicché ogni tentativo di integrazione non ha trovato il minimo sostegno politico, né la dirigenza industriale ha mai mostrato un qualche reale interesse a misure di razionalizzazione e di consolidamento.

Peraltro la contrattualistica pluriennale di un qualsiasi programma per lo sviluppo e la produzione di un moderno sistema d'arma ha finora messo le quote destinate all'investimento al sicuro dai tagli annuali che, a partire dal 2004, si sono abbattuti sui bilanci della difesa. Ma se tale protezione ha funzionato per i programmi in atto, salvaguardando i rendiconti di fine anno anche delle imprese maggiori, ciò è potuto avvenire anche perché si è ritardato e, a volte, cancellato l'avvio di nuovi programmi, con il risultato di mortificare il settore più avanzato della ricerca. Ma ormai le riserve del passato sono all'esaurimento. La produzione dell'Eurofighter, a meno di possibili ma imprevedibili successi dell'export, si avvia al termine, così come i lotti per la costruzione delle fregate Fremm, dopo che saranno ultimate le sei al momento sotto contratto.

Né la situazione appare più rosea negli altri paesi europei dotati di significative capacità produttive. Così quello che finora si è rivelato politicamente impossibile diventerà presto inevitabile dal punto di vista puramente economico. Si dovrà procedere a operazioni di consolidamento e fusione, che avverranno però non in base a un disegno razionale, bensì in forza di movimenti del mercato, il che non dà garanzie né in tema di protezione degli interessi nazionali, né tantomeno in tema di occupazione e in generale per gli aspetti sociali. Escludendo pertanto che ci possa essere un'inversione di tendenza del quadro finanziario, se non si vuole essere travolti dagli eventi si rende necessario fin d'ora non solo avviare una riflessione sul complessivo quadro delle industrie della difesa dei paesi europei, ma procedere ad accordi intergovernativi, ovviamente con il coinvolgimento dei vertici delle principali imprese, per definire in modo razionale ed equo un piano che conduca all'eliminazione delle duplicazioni inutili (senza tuttavia sacrificare un minimo di sana concorrenza, unica garanzia per mantenere adeguati livelli qualitativi). Ciò attraverso riqualificazioni e programmi di reimpiego i cui costi non potranno ricadere sui singoli paesi, ma dovranno essere affrontati dall'Unione con gli strumenti più opportuni – esistenti, oppure da creare.

La crisi che l'Occidente e in particolare i paesi europei stanno attraversando è destinata ad avere sostanziali conseguenze anche sulla sicurezza internazionale. Gli strumenti militari, anche quelli con le tradizioni più radicate e con le capacità operative più avanzate, sono destinati a subire progressive riduzioni di tali capacità. Già ora essi non sono sufficienti ad affrontare un significativo sforzo

prolungato: divengono così rilevanti, con la conseguenza di rendere irrilevante l'Unione Europea in tutta la propria azione esterna.

Le reazioni a questo tipo di evoluzione non sono al momento confortanti. Ciascun paese sembra voler risolvere da solo i propri problemi, senza considerare che oggi in Europa nessuno dispone della massa critica necessaria per invertire le tendenze.

Pure, la situazione può e deve essere vista come una straordinaria opportunità. Costretti a cooperare, gli Stati membri dovranno saper rinunciare a un'autonomia strategica che oggi esiste solo sulla carta, e ragionare in termini di sovranità non più meramente nazionale, ma collettiva. Solo con questa mutazione politico-culturale si potrà procedere all'ormai ineludibile integrazione degli strumenti militari, che costerà lacrime e sangue (si pensi all'eliminazione di tutte le strutture di comando nazionali, così come alla razionalizzazione delle capacità produttive del complesso delle industrie della difesa), ma che non ha alternative. Serve una rinnovata leadership, sostenuta dalla consapevolezza che le altre strade non hanno sbocco.



CENTRO MILITARE DI STUDI STRATEGICI



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<http://www.cemiss.difesa.it/>

LA SFIDA DEL "POOLING & SHARING" PER LA DIFESA EUROPEA

Da molti anni il dibattito sulla difesa europea si svolge su una sorta di "doppio binario" diviso fra ipotesi e realtà. Questa discrasia fa sì che se da un lato fioriscono dichiarazioni di intenti ed esortazioni per una difesa comune, o, quantomeno, per una maggiore cooperazione, dall'altra, invece, la logica delle scelte politiche e la realtà dei bilanci offre un quadro ben diverso. Così a vent'anni dalla fine della Guerra fredda il dibattito sull'integrazione della difesa europea continua ad essere oggetto di molte proposte teoriche ma di scarse implicazioni pratiche. La crisi finanziaria e la guerra di Libia, però, hanno messo di fronte alla dura realtà gli strumenti militari europei: senza il ruolo degli Stati Uniti, per quanto ausiliario, l'Unione Europea non avrebbe potuto svolgere molte delle attività militari. Questo spiega come mai negli scorsi mesi sia ritornato di grande attualità il tema del "pooling and sharing", recentemente trattato dai Ministri della Difesa dei paesi membri.

Il pooling and sharing nel contesto della difesa europea

Basta scorrere velocemente gli ultimi interventi in materia di difesa europea per scoprire come i termini *pooling and sharing* (P&S) stiano diventando onnipresenti nelle dichiarazioni ministeriali, nei comunicati stampa dell'EDA, negli articoli di giornale e nei documenti di ricerca. Viene quindi da chiedersi: cosa significa *pooling and sharing*? Letteralmente i due verbi inglesi *to pool* e *to share* significano, rispettivamente, "mettere in comune" e "condividere", e in ambito militare si riferiscono a una nuova modalità più cooperativa di utilizzo delle risorse militari. Questo nuovo approccio, recen-

temente diventato la parola d'ordine dell'EDA e dei vertici europei, è motivato dalla necessità di rendere gli strumenti militari del Vecchio continente più efficienti, agili, flessibili, e capaci di rispondere alle minacce in modo *joint* e *combined*, ovvero interforze e multinazionale. Nella mancanza di una definizione *standard* del *pooling and sharing* si può forse far riferimento, almeno per il *pooling*, a quanto riportato dal *Dictionary of military and associated terms*, (edizione 2012) del *Department of Defense* statunitense: «scopo primario della messa in comune [*pool*] è di favorire la massima efficienza nell'uso delle risorse e/o del personale [*pooled*]». In altri termini, quindi, il P&S altro non è che una risposta alla crescente domanda di maggior efficienza che da anni decisori militari e politici rinfacciano alla difesa europea, e che è diventata ancora più drammatica man mano che la crisi economica ha eroso i bilanci degli stati membri e gli Stati Uniti hanno cominciato a guardare all'Oceano Pacifico. Così gli argomenti che da vent'anni almeno erano di esclusivo appannaggio di teorici e studiosi oggi sembrano divenuti gli unici imperativi per impedire la paralisi degli strumenti militari dei paesi membri. Va ricordato che quando si discute di P&S in ambito europeo non ci si riferisce solo alle attività in teatro, ovvero alla collaborazione fra unità militari nelle operazioni *combat*, ma anche ai momenti prodromici all'impiego operativo delle unità. Fasi come il *procurement*, l'addestramento ed altre capacità tipiche del *combat support* e del *combat service support* sono quindi potenziali campi di applicazione del P&S. Questo concetto non va nemmeno confuso con il vagheggiato "Esercito Europeo": la stessa direttrice

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dell'EDA lo ha chiaramente affermato a gennaio 2012, sostenendo che «il P&S non è l'inizio di un Esercito Europeo».

Il P&S non è quindi una dottrina o un'esigenza astratta, ma piuttosto si inserisce in un contesto storico e politico ben definito: in sostanza, rappresenta una delle possibili risposte all'attuale contingenza in cui si trova l'Europa. Dai primi anni '90 ad oggi alla tradizionale presenza dell'Alleanza Atlantica sul suolo europeo si è affiancato un serrato dibattito sulla necessità di una difesa europea, capace di dialogare almeno "da pari" con quella della NATO. Ciò ha portato all'adozione di molti documenti più o meno rilevanti, alla creazione di strutture sopranazionali votate alla cooperazione in campo militare (come l'EDA o l'OCCAR) e infine ad innumerevoli esortazioni ad una maggiore "cooperazione militare" europea. Gli stessi trattati di Lisbona (2009) hanno cercato di aprire ulteriori margini per la difesa europea, seppur fra molte cautele e rimarcando il ruolo della NATO nella difesa comune. Fino a ieri, però, i buoni propositi venivano spesso infranti dalla realtà della politica di difesa dei singoli stati, tendenzialmente poco propensa a cooperare se non nelle missioni internazionali. Ciò ha fatto sì che a vent'anni dalla Guerra fredda e a circa una decina dalla creazione dell'EDA i passi avanti fatti in direzione di una difesa comune europea siano stati, in sostanza, molto limitati.

La contingenza odierna ha fatto riemergere l'argomento del P&S, rendendolo quasi improcrastinabile per una serie di importanti motivi. Il primo è lo spostamento dell'attenzione americana dall'Europa all'Asia Pacifica, come detto più volte da Obama nonché dalla *Defense Strategic Guidance* statunitense di gennaio 2012¹.

Il secondo problema riguarda la sostanziale contrazione dei *budget* della difesa, che ha riguardato praticamente tutti gli stati europei.

Questo significa, soprattutto per le forze armate dei paesi meno estesi, che con la diminuzione di fondi si potranno perdere o ridurre fortemente delle capacità anche strategiche per le forze armate. Ammettendo quindi che la situazione finanziaria rimanga tale, ciò pone uno strumento militare di fronte a un bivio: perdere *in toto* la capacità perché economicamente non più sostenibile o provare a dividerne i costi con uno o più *partner* in modo da poterla utilizzare, seppur non da esclusivo proprietario. Questo interrogativo è il punto cruciale che ha riaperto il dibattito del P&S: se non si condividono certe capacità militari, queste andranno perse, o scenderanno sotto una tale soglia di efficienza da essere inutili o irrilevanti. Se quindi si vogliono mantenere tali capacità, occorre mettersi d'accordo con altri stati e dividerne insieme l'onere. Il terzo ordine di problemi sono i crescenti costi dei sistemi militari, e in particolare quelli di elevata tecnologia. Sistemi navali, satellitari ed aerei sono sempre meno delle singole prerogative nazionali, perché solo una divisione dei costi fra stati può permettere un effettivo sviluppo di questi assetti e una successiva acquisizione. La guerra di Libia ha messo gli stati europei di fronte a una cruda verità: senza la "mano" statunitense, le operazioni militari non sarebbero state sostenibili. Se le difese europee vogliono mantenere delle capacità operative idonee ad affrontare con strumenti all'avanguardia l'attuale contesto geopolitico (*peace-keeping*, operazioni in teatri anche lontani, guerra asimmetrica, capacità *expeditionary* e via discorrendo) devono ricorrere al *pooling and sharing* di capacità, o condannarsi a mantenere un ruolo secondario e meramente locale.

Gli ambiti di cooperazione

La scelta del *pooling and sharing* sembra quindi l'unica soluzione per mantenere l'efficienza di fronte a minori investimenti, o, per

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citare la direttrice dell'EDA Claude-France Arnauld, il modo di <<essere insieme più efficienti, essere interoperabili ed essere capaci di agire insieme>>. A novembre 2011 l'EDA ha annunciato alcuni ambiti del possibile P&S fra stati europei, e i recenti incontri di marzo ed aprile non hanno fatto altro che insistere su questo tema. Di particolare importanza è stato l'ultimo incontro informale dei ministri della difesa europei, tenutosi a Bruxelles il 19 aprile, e presieduto da Catherine Ashton. L'incontro, che sarà l'ultimo a livello UE prima del Summit NATO che si terrà a Chicago nel maggio 2012, ha rimarcato i <<significativi sviluppi>> del P&S per le capacità militari, citando addirittura due volte il concetto nel breve comunicato stampa successivo all'incontro².

Le aree individuate per il P&S europeo rappresentano alcune capacità essenziali per uno strumento militare contemporaneo, e sono state recentemente delineate nelle Conclusioni del Consiglio "Affari Esteri" del 22-23 marzo. Il primo settore è il rifornimento in volo o *Air-to-Air Refuelling* o AAR, uno degli assetti chiave che ha permesso l'offensiva aerea in Libia. Il tema è talmente scottante che è stato oggetto di una *Political Declaration on AAR*, votata dallo *Steering board* dell'EDA il 22 marzo 2012, e ripresa poi nel corso dell'incontro del 19 aprile. Un'altra capacità rilevante è rappresentata dalle *Multinational Modular Medical Units*, oggetto di una *Declaration of Intent* e che riguarderà settori quali la rianimazione, il pronto soccorso

o la chirurgia. Altri settori rilevanti per il P&S sono stati individuati nella *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance* (ISR), nelle "munizioni intelligenti" (*smart munitions*), nella logistica navale e, in generale, nella branca dell'addestramento.

Come evidente, il P&S non rappresenta la panacea per ogni settore della difesa europea: sarebbe infatti difficile ipotizzare l'utilizzo di questo concetto in settori strategici o di estrema rilevanza per la sicurezza degli stati. La strategia europea, pur cominciando da settori meno "politicamente compromettenti", ha però sulla sua via molti ostacoli non facili da risolvere. Il protezionismo nazionale in materia militare, la mancanza di un vero mercato della difesa europea, i diversi modelli e prospettive di difesa presenti in ogni stato, la disparità nelle singole capacità militari e le diverse percezioni della sicurezza nazionale, per non parlare dei paesi "neutralisti" (come Irlanda e Austria, e in futuro l'Islanda) sono solo alcune delle sfide che le istituzioni europee dovranno affrontare. Viene comunque da chiedersi quanto queste spinte europee al P&S siano spontanee o quanto rappresentino un riflesso condizionato del *disengagement* americano; ad ogni modo è sotto gli occhi di tutti che senza qualche forma di cooperazione europea sarà ancora più difficile presentare l'Unione come un *partner* militare credibile alla NATO, agli Stati Uniti e al mondo.

PLAYING WITH FIRE : THE EU'S DEFENCE POLICY

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Anand MENON

PLAYING WITH FIRE: THE EU'S DEFENCE POLICY

The European Union has, since 1999, continued doggedly in its attempts to equip itself with a defence policy. Whatever the outcome of these efforts, the progress made recently towards that end has been impressive. However, this article questions some of the prevalent claims and assumptions about the European Union's security and defence policy, arguing that the implications of ESDP threatens to weaken rather than strengthen Europe's ability to confront threats to its security.

Despite the impact of September 11th, the European Union has, since that date, continued doggedly in its attempts to equip itself with a defence policy. Whatever the outcome of these efforts, the progress made recently towards that end has been impressive. No longer can critics (the current author included) simply dismiss the stated ambitions of Europeans to do more in the military sphere as mere rhetoric. Space constraints preclude a description of the process of negotiation and bargaining that led from a northern French coastal resort to a southern one, and which has been examined in some detail elsewhere (Howorth, 2000) Between the Anglo-French summit at St Malo in December 1998 and the European Council meeting at Nice in December 2000, a series of practical steps were taken to equip the European Union with the structures and military capacities to implement a defence policy of its own. The organisation now incorporates structures specifically designed to take decisions relating to defence. Uniformed officers now stroll through the corridors of the Council building, and provide military advice to decision makers occupied with the EU's defence dimension. In addition, the member states have committed themselves to creating, by 2003, a European intervention force of at least 60000 men.

Yet all is not as rosy as the above may suggest. This article questions some of the prevalent claims and assumptions about the European Union's security and defence policy, arguing that the implications of ESDP are far from benign. It highlights in particular the many ways in which ESDP threatens to weaken rather than strengthen Europe's ability to confront threats to its security. More specifically, at least four potential problems can be identified as inherent in the ESDP undertaking: the risk it poses to transatlantic relations; the possibility that the EU will not manage to act effectively in the defence sphere and, even if it does, that its new competence will slow institutional reactions to security crises; the fear that ESDP

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represents a dangerous politically inspired initiative that might serve to divert attention from the central question of military resources; and, finally, the real danger that the development of ESDP represents something of a threat to the development of a effective, functioning partnership between NATO and the EU.

Financial Considerations

The first criticism that can be levelled at the ESDP concerns money and, more particularly, the inability, or, rather unwillingness, of the member states adequately to fund their European defence ambitions. In November 2000, the so-called capabilities conference produced a 'Headline Goal', which committed EU leaders to creating an intervention force of 60000 troops deployable within a month for up to a year. The creation of this rapid reaction force in fact remains the major military capability of the EU.

On one reading, such an ambition is hardly excessive, in that the numbers involved are not dissimilar to those announced by President Chirac for France alone (Yost, 2001). Yet arming and equipping such a force would not be cheap. The harsh reality is that European defence budgets have been in decline for some time, and there seems little prospect of significant short-term increases. A truly 'autonomous' ESDP – that is to say one that is not reliant on American military hardware – would necessitate the West Europeans equipping themselves not only with the requisite forces, but also with the means to transport them and provide them with accurate intelligence. A RAND study carried out in 1993 estimated that a force of 50000 would cost between 18 and 49 billion dollars to equip over twenty five years, with an additional bill of 9 to 25 billion dollars for the creation of a satellite intelligence capability (Berman & Carter, 1993 ; Gordon, 1997-98 ; O'Hanlon, 1997).

ESDP has been portrayed by its supporters as a way of increasing the military preparedness of West European states. There are some for whom this involves more effective use of existing resources (Heisbourg, 2000). For most proponents of ESDP, however, its real appeal lies in its alleged potential for legitimising higher defence spending. Their argument is simple: ESDP will finally put to rest the long-running debate about burden sharing within NATO because it will impel the Europeans to contribute more to transatlantic security by legitimising, under the cloak of European integration, higher levels of defence spending in Europe.¹

Such arguments proved effective in leading to perhaps one of the most striking aspects of ESDP to date – the apparent conversion of traditionally highly conservative defence ministries, wedded for over fifty years to the

¹ Interviews, Brussels, June 2000, July 2001.

principle of the primacy of NATO, into EU enthusiasts. However, there are several reasons to be sceptical about the claim that ESDP will prove as effective in convincing the general public of the need for higher defence budgets. First, with fears of recession growing, with serious fiscal problems affecting both the provision of public services and the payment of pension debts in Europe, and with defence simply not being a high political priority given the absence of any clear threat to West European territories, it is hard to see, in political terms, how such increases can be achieved. More specifically, the validity of the argument that the need for an EU defence capability will help to legitimise increased defence expenditure is highly contingent on national circumstance. Whilst such reasoning may work in more pro-EU states such as Italy, the notion that the EU will make defence more sellable than NATO already does in Britain is, at best, open to doubt. Moreover, given both rising signs of French euro scepticism and the increasing sensitivity of the question of contributions to the EU budget in Berlin and elsewhere, there seems little reason to suppose that national politicians will be anxious to ask electorates to pay more in the way of taxes to support the Union's defence policy ambitions.

Transatlantic Relations

There has always been anxiety in Washington when the Europeans show a desire to increase their own autonomy, or institutional capacities, in the defence sphere (Sloan, 2000). Some of this is unavoidable. There are those both within and outside the US administration who, almost instinctively, shy away from the notion of Europe as an equal partner of (and therefore, as they see it, a threat to) the United States. They will never be reconciled to the idea that a strong Europe would be a better ally of the United States than a weak one. If Europeans aspire, as they should, to become stronger, they can do little to win the approval of such people.

The real problems for transatlantic relations that may result from the ESDP lie elsewhere. First, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, and dating from dissatisfaction within the Pentagon about the constraints imposed by NATO upon American military strategy in the Balkans, Washington has been reassessing its attitude towards NATO. A fundamental question is whether ESDP will stymie or reinforce such trends. On the one hand, attempts to create alternative structures to perform – apparently – very similar tasks, might encourage opponents of NATO in Washington to feel that, if even the Europeans do not value that institution, it really has no purpose. On the other, in the (unlikely) event that ESDP serves as a means of increasing European contribution to the collective western defence effort, this might have the consequence of reassuring those in Washington who see the transatlantic relationship as a form of European exploitation of American military spending.

Macedonia will represent an interesting test case as to how the Americans will react to the practical – as opposed to notional – idea of ESDP. The Balkans is increasingly seen as a sideshow by a Bush administration preoccupied, not to say obsessed, by the ‘war on (Islamic) terrorism’. Should the EU manage to implement its objective of taking over the leading role within Macedonia from the US, it will become much clearer as to whether ESDP is merely serving to hasten American disengagement or, by illustrating greater European commitment to contributing directly to western security, simply facilitating a more equitable division of responsibilities within the western alliance which, in turn, will serve to strengthen American commitment to it.

Here the financial doubts about ESDP come together with concerns about its implications for transatlantic relations. Unlike previous instances when European have revitalised their own collaborative security efforts – such as the non-event that was the supposed relaunch of the West European Union in 1984 – the development of the ESDP has been taken seriously in Washington. Having raised expectations so high with their ambitious rhetoric, and at a time when the Americans are, more than ever, looking for military support from their partners and allies, European leaders risk spawning tremendous dissatisfaction across the Atlantic should they fail to deliver, strengthening the hand of those who see the Europeans as selfish, self interested free riders on American military might. Ironically, therefore, the real danger of ESDP is that it threatens to antagonise and disillusion even those American officials who are generally supportive of European efforts to develop into an effective partner of America, and who have attempted to convince sceptical colleagues that this time Europe really means business.

Defence Decision Making and the EU

Quite apart from whether the EU will manage to fund the ESDP, or whether its defence policies will improve or further strain relations with the United States, is the fundamental issue as to whether the Union will manage to take defence decision effectively. There are at least three good reasons to suspect that it will prove unable to take defence decisions effectively.

The Member States

Process

The member states dominate the decision-making structures created for the ESDP. In contrast to the first pillar of the EU, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament enjoy no formal prerogatives over defence. Not only do member states predominate, but decision making between them is based on a system of unanimity, ensuring that each of the fifteen enjoys a veto. Clearly, this is hardly a recipe for decision-making efficiency. Procedural problems,

moreover, are compounded by significant and cross cutting differences of opinion between the member states over matters of substantive importance.

Substantive Issues

EU-NATO relations

France and Britain, the two states who have been at the heart of the drive to create the ESDP, appear to have significantly different ideas on the crucial question of the appropriate relationship between NATO and the EU. Some of these concern only the longer term – the French are keen to see Europe develop one day into a global player that can rival the United States. However even as far as the short term is concerned, French officials are prone to stress the notion of European autonomy more than their British counterparts, and to argue in favour of the EU being able to carry out missions independently of NATO. London, in contrast, emphasises the need for the EU to work with NATO in the security sphere. The French went to great lengths to stress the separation between the two institutions during their Presidency at the end of last year, insisting that meetings between the EU and NATO be carried out on a ‘fifteen plus nine’ basis, rather than at twenty three in order to stress the institutional separation between the two. Such divergences of opinion are not of course limited to France and Britain but, rather, permeate the EU, with the various member states allying – implicitly or explicitly – with either camp. Moreover the fact that divergences still exist over the single most important institutional question in the area of European defence hardly inspires confidence about the ability of the member states to arrive at consensual opinions concerning the most appropriate form for the EU-NATO relationship.

Defence policy.

A further cleavage dividing the member states stems from they have very different ideas about what defence policy is actually for. The fifteen have historically adopted very different attitudes towards the concept of defence, ranging from neutrality (Sweden fought its last war in 1813), to an acceptance of military engagement, often far from home, as an integral part of a nation’s ‘mission’. Differences of emphasis characterise discussions over, for instance, whether a putative ESDP should be a tool to stabilise Europe’s periphery or, rather, something used globally as a means of increasing Europe’s political weight. Similarly, there seems to be no consensus over whether priority should be placed on the ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ end of the Petersberg spectrum. Thus, on the one hand, Sweden has insisted on greater priority being given to including a significant police element in any EU reaction force, while Finland will not participate in peace enforcement missions. On the other, Britain and France have focussed on the ‘harder’, more military end of the Petersberg spectrum. Such differences will almost certainly complicate future bargaining, not least because the rotation of the

Presidency of the Council of Ministers every six months allows different states to set the agenda of the institution as they see fit.

Continued, lack of consensus over core issues related to the ESDP, along with the unanimity requirement in the Council, do not bode well for the ability of the EU to take defence decisions effectively. More worrying still, the EU, when discussing defence policy, lacks either of the other core elements of any effective decision making system.

Leadership

Hegemonic leadership

Whilst one should not exaggerate the influence of the US, the fact remains that it is, within NATO, the first among equals. This enables it to push decisions through in the face of reluctance, or even opposition from member states which all, on paper at least, enjoy a right of veto. Debates about enlargement or the strategy to be used in the Kosovo conflict are cases in point.

Having a clear leader is clearly one obvious way to overcome potential problems associated with a decision-making system characterised by reliance upon unanimity. Unlike NATO, the EU contains no single leader. Moreover, the problem of achieving an appropriate balance between the relative weight in decision-making terms between the large and small member states has become particularly acute in recent times. The area of defence policy is one of the most sensitive in this regard, not least because officials from the three largest EU member states – Britain Germany and France – have on occasion implied that there is a need for them to enjoy special decision making privileges in the defence sphere given their overriding military superiority over their smaller partners.

The arguments put forward by the larger EU member states for some kind of reweighting of formal influence in their favour are intuitively reasonable: how can Luxembourg, for instance, be allowed to veto decisions about military operations in which it may not even participate? However, unlike NATO, the EU is a law-based system founded upon the principle of equality between its members. The Commission, absent from ESDP, has traditionally been seen as defender of the rights of the small member states who, consequently, feel all the more exposed in this sector because of its absence. And insofar as voting rules do not accurately reflect size, they have traditionally erred on the side of giving undue weight to the smaller states. The smalls are wedded to the notion of formal equality in voting situations based on unanimity. It is hard to see a way in which they can be persuaded to go along with what would, in effect represent the creation of some kind of formal or informal directorate within the Union to manage defence policy.

Unlike within NATO, the logic of hegemony is simply not acceptable to them in the context of the EU.

All this raises a stark question: if formal equality is demanded by the smaller member states, whilst rejected as impractical and unacceptable by the larger ones, and if unanimity is required for any decision to alter current arrangements, is a workable compromise possible? If not, we face the real possibility of deadlock in the Council - particularly as the EU member states remain profoundly divided over the ultimate goals and purpose of the ESDP.

Institutional leadership

Within pillar one of the European Union, the European Commission plays a crucial role not only in its exclusive spheres of competence (such as competition policy), but also via its ability to foster agreement and compromise between the member states, or, in other words, to act as an honest broker and agenda setter. The Commission, however, enjoys no such role in matters pertaining to the ESDP. All ESDP related negotiations take place between the member states, with the Commission confined to observer status.

In contrast, NATO possesses, in the form of its civilian and military staff, and the office of the Secretary General, important organisational resources able to provide neutral expertise, promote consensus between allies and steer discussions of potentially divisive subjects towards successful conclusions. Their role is in some ways similar to that of the European Commission in traditional areas of EC competence; indeed in some respects it even surpasses that of the Commission, in that the Secretary General is responsible for chairing NATO meetings – as task performed in the EU by the Presidency.

In so far as leadership exists over the overall direction of the ESDP, it is exercised by the member state holding the Presidency of the Council. This, however causes three problems – of weight, consistency and expertise. By weight what is meant here is simply the ability of particular states to assume the mantle of leader of the external policies of the EU. Officials in Brussels acknowledge that it was hardly a source of profound international influence that the EU was led by Belgium at the time of the attacks on the United States.

In terms of consistency, the fact that the Presidency rotates every six months is a cause of profound instability. It is no surprise that, in its dealings with the external world, the EU flits effortlessly from pursuing a northern dimension (Finnish presidency) to agonising about a Mediterranean strategy (several French presidencies). In defence policy per se, similar inconsistencies are obvious, with the Swedes prioritising conflict prevention, whilst the French were more interested in their own hobbyhorse of ensuring a strict

separation between NATO and the EU. There is a real possibility that the consistency question will be addressed during the forthcoming IGC. The large member states in particular have expressed dissatisfaction with the six monthly rotating mandate. British officials proposing elected head of European Council to provide real strategic direction.

No such solutions are forthcoming however for the final problem – that of expertise. Problems here take two forms. First, some member states have a tendency to rely almost exclusively on national administrative resources when running the Presidency. The case of Britain is the most marked in this respect. Commenting on one British Presidency, Ludlow remarks that:

A self-sufficient [UK] bureaucracy prepared their ministers as meticulously as ever in an entirely British environment, and on the basis of exclusively British advice about what would or would not work. As a result, the tendency to parochialism and inflexibility to which many ministers were already too prone was actually exacerbated by the efficiency of the British civil service. As one well-placed player put it...we all sing out of tune from time to time. The trouble with the British is that when they sing out of tune, they do so with such conviction and authority that the dissonance reverberates around the Community.

London, therefore eschewed drawing upon the resources of the Council secretariat, therefore potentially undermining coherence and consistency in EU action. The flip side of this is that smaller member states find that they lack the resources effectively to run the Presidency. France and Britain submitted papers to the Finnish Presidency which it submitted in its own name, because the Finns lacked the necessary expertise. Within NATO, by contrast, papers for discussion in NATO meetings are drafted by the international secretariat.

Cultures of Decision Making

Formal decision-making structures aside, there is a third reason to believe that the EU will struggle to take rapid decisions. NATO members have traditionally shared a common belief in the enduring utility of the organisation and all are agreed that it provides the only effective tool for carrying out territorial defence functions. This is crucial in that it impels member states to seek consensus in order to preserve an organisation whose value none of them questions. The EU, in contrast, does not possess the 'glue' that, in NATO, is provided by common recognition of the residual importance of the territorial defence function enshrined in Article 5. Indeed, European opinions are divided as to exactly how worthwhile an undertaking the ESDP really is (the traditionally highly Atlanticist Dutch, to take but one example, have gone along with it only reluctantly). In NATO, there is a

sense that, when difficult issues are on the table, compromises must be made as the continued efficiency of the institution – and particularly the continued engagement of the Americans - takes precedence over virtually all other considerations. The fate of the ESDP is simply not considered as fundamentally important, and hence member states will prove more reluctant to compromise.

The Problems of Institutional Complexity

Moreover, even should EU prove more effective than the above suggests, the very existence of a further institutional layer could serve to slow responses to security crises. The fact that both NATO and the EU may need to consider the nature and appropriate response to security challenges is hardly a move towards more efficient decision making. And it raises the question, as to whether the EU and NATO decisions-making systems can be effectively and neatly meshed. This problem is made all the more acute by the fact that the two institutions have different memberships. The inclusion of neutral states in the EU will certainly have some influence over its ability to take defence-related decisions.

Less esoterically, the development of ESDP may well either divert attention from, or fail to address, the question of the military capabilities of the West. European construction has involved more than its fair share of semantic, quasi theological disputes on matters of post structure and substance. The danger is that discussions about security will fall prey to similar tendencies. And this has already occurred. During the latter part of 2000, capabilities took a back seat in discussions of western security. Debates have focussed on the institutional structures that are most appropriate for guaranteeing that security. At one stage, during the French Presidency of the EU at the end of last year, the situation became almost farcical, with bitter disputes separating the allies on questions as crucial to our security as whether the EU and NATO could meet as 23 states, or should, rather meet as 15 plus 19 and, in the event of this being decided, where the NATO and EU chairmen should sit in relation to each other. This represents a serious distraction from the crucial issue of how to improve the capacities of NATO and the EU to deal with military crises.

It should, however, come as no surprise. For some people at least, ESDP is not primarily about enhancing the defensive military capabilities of Western Europe but, rather, about building a European Political Union. Indeed, the Commander-in-Chief of Europe's putative rapid intervention force commented that ESDP is as much a part of creating a European political identity as EMU or the EU flag. More recently, the heated political debates over possible EU intervention in Macedonia have illustrated the

curious, and debilitating inversion of priorities that leads at least some European leaders to focus their attention on how best to ensure the ESDP at least looks successful, rather than the optimal way of ensuring security.

Given these extraneous political agendas, it is easy to understand why the rather mundane issue of military capabilities may be forgotten.

Relations with Nato

This brings us to perhaps the most important and simultaneously confusing questions of all: what is the ESDP meant to be, and what will be its relationship with NATO? There are two aspects to this issue: structures, and tasks.

As far as the former is concerned, the institutional relationship between NATO and the EU is clearly of utmost importance given that both aspire to play a role in defence policy. A series of working groups was created to discuss specific aspects of the NATO-EU relationship and discussion within these has been on going. A close relationship is increasingly being created between the two institutions – not least because of close and amicable working relationship between George Robertson and Javier Solana. Some tricky institutional problems have also been resolved – thus during the Swedish Presidency, Sweden was represented on the North Atlantic Council by Belgium.

However major stumbling blocks remain because of a lack of clarity concerning division of labour between two institutions – their tasks. For those interested in seeing ESDP as a way of enhancing the overall defensive capabilities of the West, it is not an undertaking that should lead to the Europeans duplicating military competence that NATO (or the Americans) already possess. This seems to be very much the British view, but there are those - including the French – who see ESDP as a way of giving Europe a political and military clout independent of NATO.

Broadly speaking, three kinds of military mission are foreseen by European policy makers. First, normal NATO missions; second, so-called Berlin plus missions, or those undertaken by Europeans in the way foreseen by the Berlin summit, using NATO assets and command structures; finally, European-only missions, separate from NATO and not drawing on any NATO assets. The fundamental uncertainty enshrouding ESDP concerns what kinds of tasks fit into each of the above categories. For those who view ESDP as a way of allowing Europeans to act independently of NATO, the third category will include missions that are now handled solely by NATO and, if some French rhetoric is to be believed, far more ambitious undertakings than the minor peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that

most member states see as appropriate tasks for the EU. Interviews in the French defence ministry, for instance, revealed a strong belief that the European Union should not be content to deal solely with low intensity conflict, whilst leave 'sexier', high tech tasks to NATO.²

Yet the more that the EU, pushed by proponents of European 'autonomy', goes down the road towards creating its own planning capabilities, thereby circumventing the need for reliance on NATO, the more the idea of the European pillar of NATO is being sacrificed, and the more immediate the danger of duplication. As the ESDP process takes on a momentum of its own, states like Britain, which had promoted it as something to reinforce rather than compete with NATO, seem increasingly to be being led down a path they did not and do not wish to tread. The situation in Macedonia is indicative of this. British officials are more than ever convinced that the EU simply lacks the wherewithal to intervene even in this modest conflict. The logical solution would be to allow NATO to stay and indeed London has increasingly sought to delay a decision about EU involvement in the country. But the foreign office has insisted that, if EU were to take over responsibility in Macedonia, it is imperative, for political reasons, for UK to participate even if it has reservations about security of its forces. Not only is this strange way to plan military intervention, but it also, in the event that something goes wrong, is not a method calculated to endear ESDP to European publics.³

An EU that competes with NATO is not merely harmful in terms of the duplication and unnecessary competition it implies. It also risks undermining what could have been a highly effective institutional partnership and division of responsibilities between the two institutions. Whatever its shortcoming as a defence institution, the European Union is actually pretty well adapted to carrying out 'soft' security tasks such as crisis prevention and management. It possesses both economic and diplomatic resources and expertise, and has a proven track record of undertaking tasks such as post-crisis rebuilding and policing. NATO has no expertise in such matters, (despite the obvious attraction of such a role for the US, keen to see NATO, and hence their own influence, extend into areas where, amongst other things, lucrative rebuilding and reconstruction contracts may be on offer). Moreover, one can well imagine areas - such as the former Soviet Union - where an EU role would be politically more palatable than NATO involvement.

In contrast, NATO, despite its obvious flaws, is a relatively effective military organisation. It is hard to envisage a purely European force managing the military dimension of the Kosovo affair as effectively as did NATO, not only because the enormous majority of the hardware was

² Interviews, French Ministry of Defence, October 2001.

³ Interviews, FCO, April 2002

American (as were the enabling assets underlying the tangible military effort), but because NATO has systems and procedures in place to deal effectively with crisis situations. A clear division of responsibilities between 'hard' and 'soft' security between the EU and NATO, therefore, seems an eminently sensible one. It was seen in action in December 2000 when George Robertson wrote to Javier Solana requesting that the EU take action to deal with border skirmishes on the Serbian-Kosovan border with which KFOR was simply not equipped to cope. The problem now is that, as the EU comes to focus more and more of its attention on developing a military role, not only might the relationship between the two institutions possibly deteriorate, but the EU will fail to devote sufficient time and resources to developing those aspects of its security policy where it enjoys real competence and a real comparative advantage.

Conclusion

Ill-judged and insensitive leadership wielded on one side of the Atlantic has therefore spawned an ill-thought out, precipitative initiative on the other. Indeed, the speed at which ESDP has been developed is no coincidence. The more ambitious European states are coming to realise that, once EU enlargement takes place, the development of ESDP will be made infinitely more difficult as a result of the inclusion of states such as Poland that value NATO above all else.

Whatever the explanation for its rapid development, ESDP carries within it the potential to undermine the ability of the west to respond to security threats. It threatens to cause disillusionment with the EU in the US, to encumber the EU with a defence capability it may never manage to use effectively, to distract attention away from the crucial issue of western military capabilities, and possibly to foster competition rather than mutually beneficial collaboration between NATO and the EU. It therefore represents a highly risky undertaking.

The EU's defence policy has placed both the US and Europeans in difficult situations. On the one hand, there is a genuine need for Europeans to be able to do more for themselves in the security sphere. Not only will this help reduce the burden on the United States, but there are areas in which Europeans can (because they must) be more effective and act more decisively than the US – witness the Balkan conflicts. Moreover, a European counterweight to American global predominance is desirable not only to act as a check on excessive American power and influence, but also to reduce the burden that leadership clearly places on American shoulders. Increasing the political and military weight of Europe is, therefore, a commendable objective. On the other hand, no-one doubts the crucial role of NATO not only for Article Five purposes but also as the obvious institution to carry out

more militarily intensive operations. This being the case, effective cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic remains crucial, and the question of transatlantic military capabilities remains every bit as important – if not more so – than that of European aspirations in the defence sphere. Therefore, European attempts to increase their own potential must take place within a cooperative, transatlantic framework.

The most obvious way of mitigating the potential problems that ESDP will pose is to attempt to incorporate it as completely as possible within NATO, thereby effectively foreclosing the possibility of European only missions except in cases of very low intensity conflict where NATO is not involved. This would both minimise the risk of unnecessary duplication of military competence, and allow the two institutions to play complementary rather than competing roles. As far as the implications for American policy are concerned, Washington must ensure that NATO is as generous as possible with its European members in order to reduce the incentives they face to go it alone. There are signs that the Americans have finally come to understand this. Since the late spring of 2000 Washington has agreed that Europe's Deputy SACEUR can be double-hatted with the approval of the North Atlantic Council and that the Europeans can enjoy assured access to NATO's operational planning capabilities (something which, of course, could have been achieved immediately after Berlin, without the complication of an EU decision-making role). A softening of the American stance on any kind of European caucusing within NATO would also act as a further incentive for its European allies to concentrate on the Berlin plus agenda as the means of implementing their defence ambitions. In practical terms, the Europeans must ensure that their new intervention force – potentially a highly laudable development if it actually increases western military capabilities - be closely tied to NATO, and, if possible, developed in such a way as to complement existing NATO capabilities. By contributing more, they would only be strengthening the case for the Americans to accede to a greater European role within the Alliance. In addition, EU member states should not, in their desperation to gain a military capability, forget other, non-military aspects of security. In particular, the expertise of the Commission should be fostered in areas such as crisis management and confidence building. The EU should be encouraged to find a role that complements the purely military capacities of NATO.

Nor should Europeans see this course of action as an admission of defeat. The fact is that they are now in a far stronger bargaining position than they were at Berlin in 1996. The Americans believed at the time that what happened at Berlin was the stuff of nightmares. They have subsequently realised that the EU alternative is even worse. Washington, therefore, is more than willing to negotiate on issues it refused to discuss openly in 1996, and to be more forthcoming on ensuring an effective European pillar within NATO. Moreover, having had the experience of the last few years, the

Americans are highly unlikely to attempt to block the launching of European missions from within NATO for fear of undermining the European pillar once again and causing Europe to look elsewhere for an institutional basis for their military aspirations. ESDP has at least made it clear to the Americans that Berlin was a far more desirable outcome than they thought at the time. In this sense at least, it provides an opportunity for Europe to assert itself in the defence sphere. The EU may, paradoxically, provide the key to Europeanising NATO.

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L'EUROPE DE LA DÉFENSE ET LA TRANSFORMATION DES IDENTITÉS MILITAIRES : QUELLE EUROPÉANISATION ?

Le cas des acteurs militaires britannique, allemand et français.

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L'EUROPE DE LA DEFENSE ET LA TRANSFORMATION DES IDENTITES MILITAIRES : QUELLE EUROPEANISATION ? LE CAS DES ACTEURS MILITAIRES BRITANNIQUE, ALLEMAND ET FRANÇAIS.

La construction d'une Europe de la défense par la mise en commun des outils militaires nationaux semble devoir relever d'une logique d'intégration par le haut. Cet article a pour objet de montrer pourtant que l'étude par le bas des mécanismes d'europeanisation dans ce domaine peut se révéler particulièrement riche. Les développements seront consacrés aux seuls acteurs militaires allemand, britannique et français. Une première partie tentera de caractériser les identités militaires respectives, pour mettre ensuite en lumière les processus d'europeanisation auxquels sont soumis ces acteurs de la construction d'une Europe de la défense.

Le projet français d'une armée européenne dans le cadre de la CED relevait d'un souci de préservations des "intérêts" nationaux, et l'échec de ce projet a ses racines dans l'impossibilité de les faire respecter. Cette expérience a cependant pu révéler l'apparition d'une « conscience européenne » des élites militaires de la IV^{ème} République. Le sentiment européen de "l'armée" au sens large s'est ainsi édifié sur « un enchevêtrement de logiques diverses, parfois contradictoires, où logiques corporatistes se combinent avec l'intérêt national, où une certaine Europe peut apparaître comme un vecteur de modernité plus accessible que le modèle américain, et où l'engagement atlantique est souvent incompatible avec une tradition impériale encore garante du statut de grande puissance, que s'édifie le sentiment européen de "l'armée" au sens large. Mais toutes ces logiques s'inscrivent sur un fond commun de guerres, passées et présentes, qui pèse lourd, lui aussi, dans la perception des enjeux européens par les communautés militaires » (Vial, 1998, 102). L'analyse historique de Philippe Vial, actuel directeur du service historique de la Marine, tend à souligner que l'abandon politique de la CED n'a pas constitué un point d'arrêt de la construction européenne, mais au contraire peut être présenté comme la première fois où elle devient une solution politique plausible. Cette approche suscite alors logiquement des interrogations sur l'état de cette perception au sein des hiérarchies militaires européennes au cours de la décennie écoulée.

Or, parce qu'elle est intergouvernementale, et en tant qu'objet de science politique, la défense européenne relèverait d'une analyse « verticale », cherchant à évaluer l'impact des décisions politiques sur les différentes structures et organisations militaires nationales, en mettant en avant

éventuellement les négociations autour des intérêts manifestes ou latents des gouvernements. Dans le champ de l'analyse des politiques de défense, ce choix a pour conséquence de surestimer le pouvoir civil par rapport au militaire, et d'évacuer le poids que peut prendre l'expertise des professionnels dans ce processus de décision.

L'objet de cet article est, au travers d'une première synthèse, de démontrer moins l'intérêt que peut avoir une « approche par le bas » (*bottom-up research*) de la construction européenne - d'autres travaux l'ont souligné (Pasquier, 2002) - que de relever sa possible application à la construction européenne de la défense. A cette fin, en utilisant les propositions méthodologiques de Claudio M. Radaelli, il s'agira d'examiner un domaine d'eupéanisation¹ circonscrit, les hiérarchies militaires européennes (dans cet article, celles de l'Allemagne, de la France, et du Royaume Uni), dans une perspective « horizontale ».

Cette référence méthodologique centrale appelle trois remarques qui structureront les prochains développements. Premièrement, il convient de s'interroger sur la définition de l'objet, une politique européenne et/ou un domaine d'eupéanisation, pour justifier ensuite la méthode adoptée. Dans un deuxième temps, à partir d'un recueil de données empiriques, seront mis en évidence des convergences entre les identités militaires des trois acteurs étudiés. Ces convergences, si elles ne peuvent être identifiées à des processus d'eupéanisation (Radaelli, 2002, 113) peuvent être considérées comme soulignant l'eupéanisation (Pasquier, 2002, 177). Enfin, la dernière partie de notre démonstration s'attachera à mettre en avant des mécanismes d'eupéanisation, soit les processus de production de normes, parfois non formelles, partagées par les acteurs de l'intégration tels qu'il ont pu être mis en évidence dans le champ économique (Cowles, 2001a ; Cowles, 2001b).

L'approche cognitive et les moyens de sa mise en œuvre au service de l'analyse de l'eupéanisation de la défense

Définition de l'objet et méthode d'analyse adoptée.

Envisager l'hypothèse d'une eupéanisation de la défense inscrit automatiquement cette réflexion dans le domaine de l'analyse des politiques publiques européennes et impose une double précision. D'une part, il faut définir la forme d'action publique dont nous proposons d'étudier l'eupéanisation. L'activité des différents ministères de la défense comporte trois principales dimensions qui peuvent être rassemblées sous l'appellation « politiques militaires » (Genieys, Joana, Smith, 2000, 12) : politique de

¹ Le concept d'eupéanisation employé ici est celui défini par C. Radaelli. *Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures 2003 public policies* (Radaelli, 2001, 110).

défense (dimension stratégique), politique de l'armée (dimension professionnelle), politique de l'armement (dimension industrielle). Cette dernière dimension est celle qui a fait l'objet des plus nombreuses investigations (Hamel, 2000). Notre approche se limitera à la politique de défense et à la politique de l'armée. D'autre part, en tant que politiques publiques "européennes", la construction de l'objet détermine le choix des outils d'analyse. En l'occurrence, la troisième modalité de construction de cet objet évoquée par P. Hassenteufel et Y. Surel conduit à « considérer [les politiques publiques européennes] comme des politiques coproduites par des acteurs multiples situés à des niveaux différents (supra-national, national, infra-national) » (Hassenteufel, Surel, 2000, 11).

Cette définition de l'objet, comme le fait que la construction d'une défense européenne ne s'appuie pas sur l'adaptation au sein des différents champs nationaux d'un modèle imposé, justifie le recours à une approche cognitive des mécanismes d'européanisation de la défense, en s'attachant aux processus de socialisation, processus horizontaux, qu'accompagnent les échanges entre les acteurs concernés.

La démarche cognitive, qui semble alors logiquement s'imposer à l'objet de cet article, doit être à présent ici examinée. Le courant cognitif de l'analyse des politiques publiques même s'il relève seulement d'un constructivisme modéré (Muller, 2000, 204) pose que l'action politique renvoie d'abord à une mise en sens du réel (Goldstein, Keohane, 1993 ; Vennesson, 1995 ; Hassner, 2000), et a pour rôle de fournir un modèle explicatif. Pour Y. Surel, « Plus que l'agrégation des connaissances ou la mise à jour d'échanges d'informations plus ou moins institutionnalisés, ce qui compte ici, c'est l'apparition de matrices cognitives et normatives qui vont conduire à des définitions partagées des problèmes et des politiques communautaires sur la base de ces croyances et représentations communes ... L'intégration européenne a été synonyme de la création de matrices communes » (Surel, 2000, 244).

Appliqué à notre acteur militaire² et en adaptant le mode d'analyse des cultures d'entreprise d'E.H. Schein, il est possible de distinguer trois niveaux (Schein, 1995) au sein desquels on peut observer la mise en œuvre de la matrice dont nous supposons l'existence : les « valeurs déclarées » de la culture organisationnelle des différentes armées considérées que l'on découvre dans les documents à vocation stratégique et de doctrines, le niveau intermédiaire, les « artefacts », éléments concrets (structures et procédures standardisées), et enfin les « prémisses fondamentales » (aspects inconscients, évidences, perceptions, sentiments). L'approche cognitive de

² L'emploi de la notion de hiérarchie militaire, ou parfois d'acteur militaire, renvoie à un groupe constitué par les officiers généraux et une grande partie des officiers supérieurs (soit les officiers à partir du grade de commandant). Bien qu'il faille se méfier de tout nominalisme parce qu'il existe des nuances en terme de gestion des carrières, ces groupes sont comparables du point de vue du statut, des compétences et des responsabilités en Allemagne, en France et au Royaume Uni.

ces trois niveaux ainsi que de leur articulation devrait permettre de mettre en évidence les logiques intellectuelles qui président aux décisions des acteurs dans le cadre d'une construction européenne de la défense. La démarche comparative³ a et aurait pour but de valider, une fois les matrices nationales caractérisées, l'hypothèse de l'existence d'une matrice commune européenne par le constat de convergences (Hassenteufel, 2000).

Précautions méthodologiques

Même si l'on ne cherche pas dans le cadre de cet article à définir le « référentiel global » (Muller, 2000) des acteurs militaires, projet ambitieux qui soulève d'importants problèmes de mise en œuvre empirique, les critiques faites à l'approche cognitive (Hassenteufel, Smith, 2002, 61) doivent être évoquées et conduire à plus de modestie et de rigueur.

D'une part, la valeur explicative accordée aux « idées » des acteurs militaires impose une certaine modestie. Bien que nous écartions tout rationalisme constructif absolu, l'approche cognitive accorde un rôle aux idées dans la détermination de l'action publique. Toutefois, « variables parmi d'autres » (institutions, intérêts, idées), elles ne doivent pas être plus valorisées pour expliquer les changements intervenues dans la construction d'une Europe de la défense, telle l'interaction/intervention d'un acteur tiers de l'UE par exemple (on pense aux Etats-Unis). De plus, le dogme du primat du civil sur le militaire, ne peut que conduire à relativiser le poids final de l'acteur militaire dans la prise de décision.

Rigueur d'autre part, en s'attachant à l'examen du rôle d'un acteur en précisant son identité, sa situation dans l'espace politique national (en l'occurrence les relations avec les autorités civiles, politiques ou administratives) et international (partenaires qualifiés de « bons » ou de « mauvais » professionnels, enfin la représentation de son propre rôle. Cette approche nécessite un travail empirique, et un recueil de données que l'institution militaire, rétive à l'approche sociologique, ne facilite naturellement pas. Le travail sur les livres blancs et publications à large diffusion, ainsi que sur toute une littérature « grise », rapports ou documents internes à l'institution militaire, (quoique l'accès et l'exploitation de cette dernière puissent poser des problèmes de confidentialité) ne soulève pas de réels problèmes méthodologiques. Il n'en est pas de même pour les deux autres dimensions évoquées plus haut : les mécanismes de production des artefacts (organisation et normes) et les prémisses fondamentaux. Or, si c'est

³ Le choix de l'Allemagne, de la France et du Royaume Uni se justifie à la fois par des éléments communs (appartenance aux mêmes organisations militaires internationales, même format de l'outil de défense, participation à des missions extérieures en commun) et de fortes distinctions (ancienne et récente professionnalisation des forces armées au Royaume Uni, maintien de la conscription en Allemagne fédérale ; forte intégration au sein de l'OTAN du Royaume Uni et de l'Allemagne fédérale, relations houleuses avec la France).

bien là que se situe l'intérêt principal d'une approche par le bas, les difficultés du travail empirique y sont également les plus aigües⁴ (Bruneteaux, 1995).

Les recherches effectuées en sociologie militaire constituent une autre source utile. Celles-ci doivent être considérées toutefois avec prudence. Les enquêtes quantitatives, même effectuées par des chercheurs civils, n'ont pu être réalisées qu'avec le soutien et l'accord, souvent pointilleux, de l'administration militaire. Cette censure quasi-ontologique, intériorisée par les militaires, peut avoir des répercussions même dans le cadre de l'administration de questionnaires anonymes. Les entretiens, formels ou informels, laissent percevoir les mêmes limites, le souci de ne pas voir s'échapper vers « l'extérieur », c'est-à-dire le monde civil, des éléments qui pourraient toujours servir la critique d'une institution qui se ressent comme « mal aimée » par la population. Du point de vue du chercheur, au-delà de l'empathie qu'il peut éprouver pour les individus, voire l'institution, la prise de distance à l'égard de son objet peut avoir des conséquences importantes pour la production de la recherche en cours (en particulier si elle est commanditée par cette même institution) ou d'enquêtes futures.

Eléments de convergence : définition des identités militaires nationales.

Dans ces premiers développements, nous nous limiterons à la mise en évidence de convergences, symptômes de l'eupéanisation de la défense. Cependant, en élargissant le champ, les travaux sur l'identité et l'apparition d'une citoyenneté européenne (sous l'angle constructiviste), représentent déjà une part importante de l'analyse de l'intégration européenne (Checkel, 1999 ; 2001), dont il ne faudrait pas oublier les apports dans le cadre de l'analyse de l'acteur militaire. De plus, et c'est l'un des résultats auxquels devrait aboutir la recherche que nous ne faisons qu'esquisser ici, il s'agirait de cerner l'identité commune de ces "nouveaux" fonctionnaires de l'Europe

⁴ Cet article s'appuie sur une double observation participante. L'une s'est déroulée dans le cadre de ma thèse sous la forme d'un séjour de deux ans (1997-1998) à l'Institut des Sciences sociales de la Bundeswehr (*Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr*), organisme dépendant du ministère fédéral de la défense allemand, intégré géographiquement dans une enceinte militaire, celle de la *Logistik Brigad 4*, j'y étais assimilé à un personnel civil de la défense. Outre des contacts réguliers et informels, j'ai réalisé treize entretiens avec des officiers allemands, ayant tous participé à des missions multinationales. L'autre s'est effectuée lors de mon service militaire (2000) pendant lequel j'ai occupé la fonction d'officier traitant au Bureau Relations Internationales de l'Etat-major de l'armée de Terre, section relations franco-allemandes / coopération européenne. En période de rédaction de thèse, mes collègues et mes supérieurs connaissaient mon statut de chercheur.

(Dimier, 2002), et d'enrichir par là la sociologie des acteurs de la construction de l'Union européenne (Georgakakis, 2002).

Pour l'instant, il ne s'agit que de caractériser d'abord les identités militaires nationales⁵, pour ensuite, distinguer des éléments de convergence.

Les identités militaires nationales

Les productions institutionnelles tels les *Livres Blancs* produisent des interprétations divergentes, articulées plus ou moins nettement, de la place et des objectifs des acteurs militaires nationaux respectifs. Souvent justifiés par la prise en considération d'évolutions majeures de la scène militaire, ils marquent des étapes annonçant réformes ou adaptation. Les interactions de ces systèmes idéels, couche intermédiaire, avec les « prémisses fondamentales », couche la plus profonde de la culture organisationnelle doivent être même considérées comme majorées dans ce cercle. En effet, mythes⁶, croyances, idées et affect jouent classiquement un rôle essentiel dans la définition des identités militaires nationales (Thiéblemont, 1999).

Cette notion n'est toutefois pas homogène. Traversée par des stratégies individuelles (Thomas, 1994), l'identité militaire nationale peut connaître des différences notables selon l'appartenance à un groupe de grades (distinction hiérarchique et verticale : militaires du rang, sous-officiers, officiers), à une armée (distinction horizontale : Marine, armée de l'Air, armée de Terre), voire à une arme (Troupes de marine, Génie, Transmission, etc). Les conflits dans l'attribution des ressources qui peuvent naître en particulier entre l'armée de l'Air, la Marine et l'armée de terre sont révélateurs de ces différences. Le concept d'identité militaire nationale est donc à considérer, dans un cadre comparatif, de manière archétypale.

Le concept d'europanisation postule un changement. Or par l'évolution des missions (C2SD, 2000 ; Collmer, 2000), de la société et des technologies (Venesson, 2000), l'idée que les militaires européens se font de leur rôle a et est elle-même encore en train d'évoluer. De la défense d'un territoire et d'un Etat-nation au contour flou à la désignation d'un ennemi essentiellement diffus, maintenant souvent appelé "risques", leurs repères se sont brouillés. Si l'emploi des notions d'identité militaire ou de valeurs militaires sert souvent les analyses du positionnement du "militaire" au sein de la société globale et des rapports civilo-militaires, les enquêtes axiologiques (Abrahamsson, 1972 ; Soeter, 1997) à dimension comparative⁷ menées parmi

⁵ La notion d'identité militaire employée dans cet article renvoie à celle développée par l'école fonctionnaliste et appliquée à la profession d'officier (Dubar, 1995).

⁶ Peut-être plus encore que dans le domaine de la politique étrangère (Snyder, 1991).

⁷ Ces enquêtes parfois commanditées par les différentes institutions militaires nationales et à usage interne visent aujourd'hui aussi, le plus souvent, à fournir des solutions à des situations identifiées comme productrices de dysfonctionnement lors des opérations multinationales : voir par exemple Tardy, 1999.

les officiers (le plus souvent occidentaux) offrent une première caractérisation.

Selon l'étude de Giuseppe Caforio de 1994 (Caforio, Nuciari, 1994), si les attitudes des officiers britanniques s'orientent majoritairement vers un « professionnalisme radical » (servir son pays, respect d'une tradition familiale militaire, intérêt pour l'armée, émulation des héros militaires), les raisons qui poussent les officiers allemands à s'engager traduisent le caractère « banalisé » de leur perception de l'activité militaire, c'est-à-dire proche de n'importe quel métier civil (rémunération, technologie et formation). Les officiers français relèveraient d'un modèle mixte.

L'utilisation des travaux de Geert Hofstede (Hofstede, 1992) et l'emploi du *Value Survey Module* afin de qualifier d'institutionnelle ou d'industrielle/banalisée les cultures militaires comparées confirment l'existence de différences entre les trois pays étudiés. « La culture militaire d'un pays est répertoriée comme « institutionnelle » quand s'exprime une faible propension à l'individualisme (importance du temps de loisir et de la vie de famille) et un faible intérêt matériel (croissance du revenu, etc.). On la qualifie au contraire de « banalisée » quand les personnes interrogées ont montré une orientation individualiste relativement marquée et une tendance à la valorisation des avantages matériels » (Soeter, 1998, 275-277). Dans cette enquête également, les acteurs militaires allemand, français et britannique illustrent des modèles distincts. Ces enquêtes prévoient cependant une convergence des cultures organisationnelles vers un modèle commun de banalisation de l'activité militaire. Un rapprochement asymptotique civil/militaire conduirait pour l'objet de cet article à la disparition d'un filtre pour ne plus conserver que la comparaison des identités nationales. Cependant, il ne s'agit encore que d'un pronostic, et des convergences des identités militaires peuvent être dégagées au-delà de la culture organisationnelle.

Points de convergences des identités militaires européennes : du nationalisme au patriotisme ?

Les identités militaires, l'organisation du recrutement ou de la formation (Cailleteau, Bonnardot, 1998) participent à l'émergence de différences entre ces cultures nationales. Ces dernières s'intégreraient tout particulièrement dans la définition du "sentiment patriotique", soit « un sentiment d'engagement envers une collectivité, qui peut aller jusqu'au sacrifice suprême » (Vennesson, 1998, 292). Fonctionnant partiellement sur une opposition "nous/eux", le sentiment patriotique devrait inciter le militaire à se percevoir culturellement comme plus proche de son compatriote civil. Or, il arrive souvent aux différents officiers européens de s'avouer plus proches de leurs homologues étrangers que de nationaux civils. La frontière relèverait alors de la culture professionnelle et non plus nationale (Tardy, 1999, 13).

Pourcentages d'opinions positives chez les officiers français, allemands, et britanniques au regard des missions des forces armées et classement des principales fonctions de ces dernières (Kuhlman, 1994).

	Allemagne	France	Royaume Uni
Les forces armées existent afin de défendre le territoire de l'Etat.	2 ⁹⁴	1 ⁹⁵	1 ⁹⁶
Mon pays joue un rôle significatif dans la défense, et ce pour des raisons géopolitiques, des intérêts du monde occidental.	4 ⁶⁶	2 ⁹²	3 ⁸³
Les forces armées représentent des outils permanents de gestion des crises qui ne peuvent être gérées par d'autres moyens (catastrophes naturelles, aide technique, etc.)	5 ⁶⁰	5 ⁷⁸	5 ⁷⁰
Les forces armées sont des instruments nécessaires de la politique étrangère de mon pays.	6 ⁵²	4 ⁸¹	2 ⁸⁷
Les forces armées sont l'ultime garantie de la paix mondiale	3 ⁶⁹	3 ⁸⁸	7 ⁵⁹
Les forces armées fournissent l'ultime garantie du maintien de l'ordre public interne.	7 ¹⁷	6 ⁶⁸	6 ⁶⁷
La sécurité extérieure de mon pays est mieux assurée par sa participation à des organisations militaires	1 ⁹⁵	7 ⁵⁶	4 ⁷²

Cette affirmation non vérifiée nous permet toutefois d'intégrer à la fois les convergences des identités militaires et leur inscription dans un projet "libéral" de la citoyenneté européenne. Ainsi officiers allemands et français sont proches lorsqu'il leur est demandé de déterminer les fonctions prioritaires des forces armées⁸. Les trois corps d'officiers partagent l'opinion

⁸ Pour les officiers allemands, le sondage effectué en 1991/1992 doit être particulièrement relativisé (Pajon, 2001a, 312); pour les officiers britanniques (Boëne, Dandeker, Ross, 2001); pour les officiers français (Lebaude, 2001).

selon laquelle la première d'entre elles est la défense de l'intégrité du territoire national. Cette défense est cependant intimement liée pour les Allemands comme pour les Français à la garantie du bon fonctionnement des institutions démocratiques. Les actions en faveur du maintien de la paix dans un cadre ONU ou ayant pour finalité le respect du droit international appartiennent aussi, pour les trois élites militaires, aux missions premières des forces armées nationales. Il est à relever une réticence très nette chez les officiers allemands à l'emploi des forces armées dans le cadre du maintien de la sécurité intérieure, ainsi qu'une plus grande acceptation par ces derniers de l'action humanitaire. Bien que cette comparaison mériterait d'être réactualisée, elle nous permet de souligner une convergence dans la notion de défense de valeurs communes, non plus seulement "d'intérêts" matériellement définis. C'est ce que souhaite ainsi prendre en compte la réforme doctrinale des armées françaises, puisque « la notion d'intérêts paraît très insuffisante pour comprendre la trajectoire dans laquelle s'inscrit la France contemporaine, fidèle à ses engagements humanistes et universalistes : plus qu'au réalisme froid d'une seule logique d'intérêts, la France tient à obéir à une logique de valeurs » (Delanghe, 2000, 14).


Au-delà des références à un passé commun, un héritage chrétien et le respect du principe du primat du politique, les convergences évoquées autour de la défense de valeurs partagées semblent permettre de discerner peut-être, par delà le cadre national, le socle d'une identité militaire européenne. Ce constat mériterait d'être rapproché de la notion de patriotisme développé par Jürgen Habermas pour qui « une culture politique libérale n'est que le dénominateur commun d'un patriotisme *constitutionnel* qui aiguise en même temps le sens de la diversité et de l'intégrité des différentes formes de vie qui coexistent dans une société multiculturelle. Dans un futur Etat fédéral européen aussi, les *mêmes* principes juridiques devront être interprétés, du point de vue de traditions nationales *différentes* et d'histoires nationales différentes. La tradition à laquelle on appartient doit chaque fois être appropriée d'un point de vue, relativisé par les points de vue des autres, afin qu'il soit possible de l'intégrer à une culture constitutionnelle partagée au niveau supranational » (Habermas, 1998). Faudrait-il encore que ce concept soit opératoire hors du seul cadre de la République fédérale ? (Canovan, 2000)

Une convergence vécue ?

L'enquête (Haltiner, 1994) menée parmi les officiers de huit pays européens, dont ceux de l'Allemagne, de la France et du Royaume Uni, visait à savoir s'il existait une identité européenne de défense commune dans ce groupe. Cette approche l'a conduit à construire une typologie des attitudes des officiers considérés à l'égard de la construction de forces armées européennes. Il distingua à partir de *clusters* trois principaux groupes :

- les officiers euro-progressifs : imprégnés d'une certaine culture des relations internationales, ils approuvent l'unification européenne. Le dépassement des particularités nationales constitue pour eux un prérequis au maintien de la stabilité et de la paix en Europe.
- Les officiers pragmatiques euro-sceptiques : on retrouve dans cette catégorie les officiers développant une attitude pessimiste quant aux chances d'unification européennes. Bien qu'ils croient en une poursuite du désarmement, ils ne croient pas en l'abandon de la souveraineté nationale.
- Les officiers nationaux-conservateurs : ces derniers ne sont pas prêts à l'abandon de la souveraineté nationale au profit de l'Union européenne. Bien que moins pessimistes que les précédents dans le succès de la construction européenne, la stabilité et la paix ne peuvent être pour eux que le résultat d'un armement et d'une dissuasion conçus sur une base nationale.

Typologie des attitudes des officiers britanniques, français et allemands à l'égard de l'intégration européenne.



Ces résultats recouvrent des divergences entre les "valeurs déclarées" que mettrait également en évidence la comparaison des textes officiels : des officiers allemands nettement favorables à la construction européenne, des officiers français partagés et des Britanniques plus réticents. Il est également à noter que les clivages au sein des corps d'officiers de nationalités différentes sont transversaux en ce qu'ils sont quasi-identiques selon l'appartenance à l'une ou l'autre des composantes des forces armées (armée de l'Air, armée de Terre, Marine), l'âge ou le grade. La référence et l'appartenance à une communauté nationale sont les plus pertinentes puisque les attitudes des officiers correspondent de manière grossière à l'état de leur opinion publique nationale à l'encontre de forces armées européennes (Haltiner, 1994, 80). Il serait évidemment là aussi nécessaire de réactualiser l'enquête.

Cependant, la large approbation des officiers allemands en faveur de la construction d'une armée européenne a été encore confirmée en 1997 lors d'une étude sur le corps germano-néerlandais (Klein, Huber Rosendahl, Frantz, 1999, 104 et suiv.). Plus de la moitié des officiers interrogés estimaient positive ou très positive l'idée d'une armée européenne. Il n'y a pas de données chiffrées plus récentes concernant le Royaume Uni, seule ces appréciations extraites d'une recherche publiée en 2002 fournissent quelques éléments : « L'opinion des officiers concernant l'Europe est souvent plus proche de celle des élites que celle du public britannique dans son ensemble. Il y a dans l'armée moins d'anti-européens que dans d'autres groupes de la société. Ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'elle soit foncièrement pro-européenne... »

La souveraineté nationale, bien qu'affaiblie, est toujours considérée comme vitale » (Boëne, Dandeker, Ross, 2001, 103-104).

Même si ces derniers éléments peuvent sembler contradictoires avec le postulat d'une convergence, le scepticisme des officiers britanniques et français à l'égard de l'Europe de la Défense ne signifie nullement qu'ils ne partagent pas déjà des croyances, des manières de faire, des normes, avec leurs partenaires européens. Il serait nécessaire de procéder à des développements plus longs à partir des travaux existants ou en cours (l'enquête actuellement menée sur "L'officier européen" financée par le Centre d'études en sciences sociales de la défense, ainsi que l'actualisation des travaux de K. Haltner). L'étape suivante serait évidemment l'administration de questionnaires ou d'entretiens visant à évaluer l'impact de la construction d'une Europe de la défense sur ces convergences.

En effet, les variables indépendantes évoquées au début de ce paragraphe pour expliquer ces convergences ne relèvent pas de l'intégration européenne et pourraient même expliquer en partie pourquoi ce choix politique en matière de défense peut s'imposer rationnellement aux acteurs militaires comme réponse à des problèmes techniques. Mais, l'ensemble de ces évolutions ne permettent pas selon nous d'expliquer toutes les transformations que peuvent subir aujourd'hui les identités militaires européennes, ce que peut faire l'analyse des mécanismes d'europanisation.

Les mécanismes horizontaux de l'europanisation de l'acteur militaire : le cas de la coopération multinationale.

Une enquête sur les mécanismes horizontaux d'europanisation des acteurs s'impose en l'absence de pression verticale, par exemple des directives européennes impliquant une adaptation. En l'espèce, l'europanisation passe par des processus de socialisation et d'échanges au sein d'instances plus ou moins formelles. Ces phénomènes doivent conduire à l'adoption de normes au sens très larges, utilisables au niveau européen, mais ensuite réemployées au niveau national.

Ce paragraphe aura seulement pour objet de mettre en valeur certains processus de socialisation qui peuvent aboutir à la production de « manière de faire » ou de « croyances partagées » au plan européen, sans chercher à en mesurer pour l'instant de manière précise leur traduction dans la production politique interne, dernier segment du mécanisme d'europanisation.

Dynamique institutionnelle et réseaux

Les forums ou autres instances internationales de coopération militaire sont les lieux privilégiés d'échanges mais aussi d'interaction entre les experts que représentent les officiers supérieurs et généraux. Dans le domaine de la défense européenne, il est impossible de ne pas évoquer l'Otan. Quelque

forme que puisse prendre l'avenir de la défense de l'Europe, l'Organisation de l'Atlantique Nord a favorisé la production de normes organisationnelles, procédurales et techniques partagées par ses membres. Les influences les plus notables sont évidemment celles qui se traduisent par des productions stratégiques. L'une des fonctions de l'Otan, explicitement admise par les défenseurs américains du maintien de cette organisation n'est-elle pas de "socialiser" les militaires européens et de leur faire intérioriser le cadre d'interprétation global produit par les Etats-Unis ? (Duffield, 1994-1995, 775).

D'une manière plus technique, le renforcement de l'investissement français dans la coopération européenne ces dernières années a eu pour conséquence le constat d'un déficit de « culture Otan » parmi ses officiers supérieurs. Au-delà de la simple pratique d'un anglais de travail, il s'agissait de l'apprentissage d'une terminologie (concernant à la fois les structures mais aussi les procédures) déjà maîtrisée par les partenaires européens, tels les Britanniques, impliqués au sein de l'Otan. Paradoxalement, les négociations européennes quant à la construction d'unités multinationales strictement européennes se font à partir de normes « otaniennes ». Il peut s'agir ainsi d'être particulièrement précis sur la compétence d'un bureau dont la responsabilité sera attribuée à un pays partenaire. L'attribution de ce poste à l'une ou l'autre des nations engagées sera alors déterminée par son poids relatifs au sein de l'alliance (participation financière, matérielle - en hommes et logistique -, et ses compétences supposées dans un domaine).

On comprend alors la nécessité de bien maîtriser ces normes pour participer de manière efficace aux négociations. La situation peut cependant varier selon l'armée en question (armée de l'Air, armée de Terre et Marine), en raison d'une coopération internationale plus ou moins développée.

La création au sein de l'Union européenne à partir de la Déclaration d'Helsinki en 1999 d'organes (Comité politique et de sécurité, COPS ; Comité militaire, CM ; Etat-major européen, EME) d'abord qualifiés d'"intérimaires", puis institutionnalisés au cours de l'année 2001, mais aussi d'une force de réaction rapide, a fait l'objet de nombreuses négociations. Il serait intéressant de savoir, si les normes organisationnelles otaniennes ont été reprises sans adaptation. Cette situation n'est toutefois pas aussi paradoxale, si l'on admet que l'Otan devrait rester un partenaire privilégié (Dumez, Jeunemaitre, 2002). Il est cependant évident que ces nouvelles instances de la coopération militaire européenne seront un laboratoire de production de nouvelles normes techniques et peut-être d'un processus de transnationalisation des valeurs (Haine, 2001, 83).

D'autres institutions de coopération non plus multilatérales, mais bilatérales et plus anciennes offrent également un cadre à la production de normes communes. L'expérience franco-allemande est, à ce titre, à nouveau exemplaire par la création du GFACM (Groupe franco-allemand de coopération militaire) dépendant du CFADS (Conseil franco-allemand de défense et de sécurité) créé en 1988. Divisé en trois sous-groupes

(Terre/Air/Mer), il s'organise autour de cellules d'experts qui ont pour rôle au travers d'échanges de documents et de réunions fréquentes des membres concernés des états-majors respectifs, de définir les problèmes et d'y apporter des solutions. Elles peuvent avoir pour conséquence non pas encore la production de textes réglementaires communs, mais de solutions *ad hoc*, sur la base de la conciliation (par exemple, organisation de la sécurité d'une emprise militaire, règles d'ouverture du feu des sentinelles sur le territoire de l'Etat partenaire, subordination, règles pour les transports de troupes sur les routes des deux pays)⁹. La négociation qui n'adopte alors plus la voie hiérarchique conduit à l'application sur le plan interne de normes communes.

Il faut également évoquer, toujours dans le cadre bilatéral, la collaboration franco-britannique concrétisée lors du sommet de Chartres (1994) dans le domaine maritime (équipages mixtes, partage de zones de surveillance) et aérien par la création du Groupe aérien européen franco-britannique (GAEFB), sorte de cellule de planification de douze officiers d'état-major installée près du quartier général de la RAF. On ne peut que constater la faiblesse de la coopération bilatérale franco-britannique et germano-britannique, bien qu'elle ait vécu un renouveau depuis 1995 (Schnapper, 2001). Largement informelle jusqu'à cette date, les relations étroites que l'armée britannique entretient avec ses deux principaux partenaires ont encore le plus souvent pour cadre l'Otan. Cependant, il ne s'agit pas ici d'effectuer une liste exhaustive de ces instances qui se sont particulièrement développées au cours des années 1990, mais de souligner l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à étudier leur fonctionnement, comme commence à l'être celui de l'administration de la Commission européenne, alors que les travaux existants se sont particulièrement intéressés à la mise en évidence des confrontations de modèles normatifs distincts (Robert, 1992).

Plus anciens encore, existent des "réseaux" militaires européens liés à la présence d'attachés de défense, d'officiers de liaison, ou d'officiers d'échange, ce à quoi il faut ajouter les échanges de stagiaires européens dans le cadre de différentes formations. Ces derniers se réalisent au niveau le plus élevé pour les officiers supérieurs entre le Collège Interarmées de Défense français (CID) et ses équivalents allemand et britannique¹⁰. Cette dynamique va aujourd'hui plus loin avec la création d'une Ecole franco-allemande installée au Luc dans laquelle seront formés ensemble les futurs pilotes du nouvel hélicoptère de combat Tigre¹¹. Ce dernier exemple relève toutefois de la particulière intensité de la coopération militaire franco-allemande (Pajon,

⁹ Cette institution a également une fonction prospective, le GFACM a aussi pour mission d'étudier la possibilité de nouvelles coopérations. L'extension de ces domaines de compétence (*Spill-over effect*) est officiellement admise.

¹⁰ Le Collège interarmées de défense français offre ainsi chaque année un tiers de ses places (soit environ une centaine de places) à des stagiaires militaires étrangers, d'ailleurs pas uniquement européens (Cazeneuve, 2001).

¹¹ *Terre Magazine*, novembre 2000. 220

2000b). Les échanges personnels et professionnels ont pu ou peuvent conduire à la création/renforcement de « croyances partagées » chez les militaires français, allemands et britanniques. Il est possible d'en dénombrer plusieurs origines : une gestion rendue difficile par des budgets de la défense réduits, la dégradation des conditions de vie des militaires liée à la multiplicité des interventions extérieures, l'usure d'un équipement ancien et non renouvelé. L'ensemble de ces facteurs conduit les militaires britanniques, allemands et français à exprimer une lassitude et à faire le constat public d'une « suractivité » ou d'une « surchauffe » (Marion, 2002 ; Isnard, 2002), en particulier chez les membres des armées de terre, premiers concernées par les OPEX (opérations extérieures). L'analyse de discours (CDES, 2001 ; Marill, 2001 ; Boëne, Dandeker, Ross, 2001) permet déjà de dégager une logique commune aux trois acteurs militaires européens vis-à-vis de l'intégration européenne : une "rationalisation" et une "mutualisation" des ressources communes afin de diminuer les charges de travail nationales respectives, aussi bien en termes économique qu'humain. Ces analyses communes ont été renforcées par des expériences favorisant à la fois la confrontation de techniques de travail, mais aussi de manière plus informelle, l'expression de doléances communes à l'occasion des opérations multinationales qui se sont multipliées au cours des années 1990.

Le "récit" d'un nécessaire renforcement de la coopération militaire européenne.

Au sein des hiérarchies militaires, les années écoulées depuis la fin de la guerre froide constituent d'après nous un processus dynamique, un récit : « la notion de *narrative* permet en effet de montrer que les connaissances des acteurs concernés sont identifiables par l'analyse des discours et récits produits dans le cadre d'une politique publique donnée. L'existence d'un stock cognitif plus ou moins stabilisé et partagé semble pouvoir déboucher sur des analyses relativement partagées des problèmes à traiter et des alternatives envisageables pour l'action publique » (Surel, 2000, 243 ; Radaelli, 2000). Pour les trois acteurs militaires considérés, la disparition du bloc soviétique a représenté une « crise des fondements » (Poirier, 1995). Les années écoulées depuis le début des années 90 représentent, pour les trois acteurs, des récits synchroniques. Ils sont parfois parallèles, et marqués alors par des ruptures propres à chacune des institutions. La *Bundeswehr* a dû surmonter le processus de réunification (et l'intégration-dissolution de la *Nationale Volksarmee*), cette armée d'une Allemagne à nouveau pleinement souveraine fut autorisée en juillet 1994 par la Cour constitutionnelle à intervenir à l'extérieur. Elle subit de multiples réformes structurelles (Klein, Pajon, 2000 ; Meiers, 2001). La France décide de la professionnalisation de ses forces armées en 1996. Le Royaume-Uni effectue un « revirement historique » en faveur des institutions de défense européenne lors du sommet franco-britannique de Saint-Malo en 1998, pour des motifs

largement nationaux et n'ayant pas directement trait à la défense (Mechoulan, 1999 ; Gonzales, 2001).

Ainsi, par sa durée et le nombre de militaires qui y furent envoyés en OPEX, les crises balkaniques des années 1990 peuvent être comparées, en terme de socialisation générationnelle, à l'expérience de la guerre d'Algérie, alors vécue seulement par l'armée française.

Chronologie des principales évolutions géostratégiques vécues par les acteurs militaires allemand, britannique et français.

1989 :	Chute du mur de Berlin et effondrement de l'empire soviétique
1990 :	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Réunification allemande • Invasion du Koweït par l'Irak et début de la guerre du Golfe
1992 :	Mise en place de la FORPRONU en Yougoslavie (l'Allemagne n'y envoie pas de contingent)
1993 :	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intervention de la <i>Bundeswehr</i> dans le cadre de l'ONUSOM II (Somalie) • Création du Corps européen
1994 :	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livre Blanc français et allemand sur la défense ; maintien de la conscription • Décision du Tribunal constitutionnel allemand autorisant les troupes allemandes à participer à des opérations militaires ou humanitaires dans la zone hors-Otan sous direction ONU ou OTAN.
1995 :	Intervention des Etats-Unis et de l'Otan dans le conflit yougoslave (participation française, britannique et allemande)
1996 :	Décision du passage à une armée professionnelle en France
1998 :	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Début de la crise du Kosovo • <i>White Paper</i> présenté par le ministère britannique de la défense (juin). • Sommet franco-britannique de Saint-Malo (décembre) : revirement "historique" britannique à l'égard de la construction d'une Europe de la défense.
1999 :	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intervention de l'Otan au Kosovo sans aval de l'ONU (mars-mai) • Conseils européens de Cologne (juin) et d'Helsinki (décembre) : décision de la mise en œuvre d'une politique européenne de défense et de sécurité.

La deuxième rupture que représente la crise du Kosovo (la première étant la fin de la confrontation Est-Ouest) est particulièrement importante car elle peut être considérée comme fondatrice. Elle transforme le projet de

construction d'une défense européenne en nécessité commune aux trois acteurs militaires. Nous ne signifions évidemment pas par là que les acteurs militaires sont à l'origine des initiatives politiques qui à partir de 1998 ont conduit à la mise sur pied de la PESD et de ses organes. D'autres indices de la construction d'un cadre d'interprétation commun au cours des années 90 peuvent être ainsi relevés dans la trame des restructurations des outils militaires, particulièrement français et allemand. S'y affirme notamment une option stratégique considérée comme majeure : la projection de forces. La Bundeswehr a ainsi réduit son format, reconstitué un commandement national opérationnel (Boyer, 2000), créé une distinction entre Forces de défense principales (*Hauptverteidigungskräfte*, HVK) et Forces de réaction de crise (*Krisenreaktionkräfte*, KRK), ces dernières étant quasi-totalement professionnalisées. De manière parallèle, la professionnalisation de l'armée française et la réduction de ses effectifs se sont accompagnées d'une réorganisation de la structure et du commandement pour répondre à une inversion des priorités stratégiques (Irondele, 2000). L'abandon dans l'armée de terre française de la "division" au profit de la "brigade" en tant que grande formation servant de base à l'organisation des forces marque également un rapprochement vers le modèle britannique. Aux « nouvelles contraintes stratégiques » assimilées à des problèmes, les acteurs militaires nationaux ont apporté des solutions proches, qu'ils se sont parfois "empruntés". L'analyse de la construction européenne par les acteurs militaires, et la valeur explicative qu'accordent ces derniers à certains événements, mériteraient une enquête et des développements plus approfondis.

La multinationalité en tant que laboratoire et mécanisme d'europanisation de la défense.

Les instances de coopération militaire ont été précédemment évoquées, ainsi que les autres formes institutionnelles d'échanges pouvant favoriser des processus de socialisation et de diffusion de normes européennes. La multinationalisation des unités militaires, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles sont institutionnalisées peut être également analysée sous cet angle.

Cependant, ce mode d'organisation peut être considéré en lui-même comme le premier produit du processus d'europanisation. Il s'agit en effet d'y défendre au niveau européen des modèles d'intégration nationale, pour adapter par la suite, éventuellement, les structures nationales.

Or, force est alors de constater qu'en terme quantitatif, la bi- ou multinationalité semble devenir la règle. Ainsi, dans l'armée de terre allemande, à l'exception du IV^{ème} corps (Potsdam), l'ensemble des unités est intégré à des formations otaniennes et/ou européennes. Il est vrai qu'historiquement, la multinationalité est la règle pour la *Bundeswehr* et devrait même constituer son avenir (Klein, 2000). C'est en tout cas en terme de « modernité » qu'elle présente le modèle d'armée « postnationale » (Klein, 1998).

Le tableau suivant semble alors traduire le multilatéralisme européen des Allemands, l'atlantisme des Britanniques, et l'euro-pragmatisme des Français. En effet, toutes les armées européennes ne sont pas égales devant la multinationalité. Sa perception et son intégration dans les doctrines militaires sont d'ailleurs souvent un bon indicateur de l'intériorisation chez les élites militaires de la construction de la défense européenne.

Participation des forces terrestres de l'Allemagne, de la France et du Royaume à des formations bi- ou multinationale

	Allemagne	France	Royaume Uni
Au niveau du corps d'armée	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corps germano-américain - Otan • Corps américano-germain - Otan • ARRC¹² (<i>Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps</i>) -Otan • Corps germano-néerlandais - Otan/UEO • Corps multinational Nord Est¹³ - Otan/UEO • Corps européen¹⁴ - Otan/UEO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corps européen • Eurofor¹⁵ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARRC • Corps amphibie Pays-Bas/Royaume Uni
Au niveau de la division/ brigade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brigade franco-allemande (rattachée au Corps européen) • <i>Multinational Division Central</i> (MND C)¹⁶ - Otan • <i>Allied Command Europe Mobile Force</i> (AMF)¹⁷ - Otan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brigade franco-allemande 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MND C

¹² Belgique, Canada, Royaume Uni, Allemagne, Grèce, Italie, Pays-Bas, Norvège, Portugal, Espagne, Turquie, Etats-Unis

¹³ Allemagne, Danemark, Pologne.

¹⁴ Allemagne, Belgique, Espagne, France, Luxembourg.

¹⁵ Espagne, France, Italie, Portugal.

¹⁶ Allemagne, Belgique, Pays-Bas, Royaume Uni.

¹⁷ Allemagne, Belgique, Canada, Danemark, Grèce, Italie, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas.

L'étude et la théorisation de multinationalité participe en France d'un processus déclaré de renouvellement doctrinal. Cette nouvelle organisation de l'action militaire apparaît dans la réflexion militaire contemporaine comme l'aboutissement d'une chaîne logique. Les nouvelles formes de conflits « complexe et multiforme » (Soubirou, 2001, 12) imposent des solutions politiques concertées et internationales. A cette contrainte politique de l'action multilatérale est adjointe le principe d'une « légitimité politique » dont serait forcément revêtue l'action militaire multinationale.

La conception française de la participation à une formation multinationale ne reconnaît que de manière secondaire la justification matérielle de la mise en commun des moyens, pourtant largement admise par ailleurs. « Le continuum des conflits impose des contraintes que les forces armées d'une nation peuvent difficilement assumer seules » (Soubirou, 2001, 12). Cependant, la légitimation d'une action militaire multinationale au niveau occidental, voire seulement européen, par le partage de « valeurs ou d'intérêt commun » n'est pas exprimé. Il ne s'agit pas d'un motif de coopération, mais seulement un contexte ou un arrière plan favorable.

Aux "apports" de la multinationalité qui correspondent chez les Français à des problèmes qu'il faut dépasser, les Allemands répondent par l'assurance des avantages et de la valeur ajoutée de l'intégration militaire. La coopération multinationale semble pour les Français ne devoir exister en terme de capacité militaire et de planification qu'au niveau des états-majors, ou au niveau de la Brigade, au maximum du bataillon et sûrement pas de la compagnie (Soubirou, 2001, 34). La multinationalité à un niveau inférieur ne peut être qu'accidentelle lors d'opérations ou de la vie domestique relevant de la proximité des casernements. Cette vision diffère de celle des Britanniques qui envisagent, certes de manière ponctuelle, la coopération au niveau de la compagnie (Soubirou, 2001, 26). Mais, les Allemands, les Britanniques comme les Français s'accordent sur le fait que l'intégration ne peut se faire en dessous du niveau de la Brigade lors d'un combat de haute intensité.

Il faudrait cependant dépasser le simple aspect quantitatif ou même celui du niveau de coopération (corps/division/brigade) pour s'intéresser à la réalité de la coopération multinationale et au degré de l'intégration (Keller, 1999).

De symboles¹⁸ voire gadgets, les unités multinationales européennes n'ayant pas pour origine l'Otan (Brigade franco-allemande, Corps européen, Eurofor, Euromarfor, Groupe aérien européen) ont été réinvesties d'une nouvelle légitimité depuis Helsinki. Le caractère symbolique et politique accordé au Corps européen (dans les faits, un état-major multinational permanent auquel sont rattachées « sur le papier » différentes formations nationales) comme à la Brigade franco-allemande, suscitaient un certain

¹⁸ « Symbole d'une Allemagne européenne », « rapprocher la France de l'OTAN » (Haïne, 2001, 10).

scepticisme des officiers impliqués quant à leur caractère opérationnel, c'est-à-dire à leur efficacité dans une mission réelle. Ces perceptions ont commencé à évoluer avec l'envoi de ces formations sur le théâtre de l'ex-Yougoslavie et, particulièrement au Kosovo. Cette nouvelle "crédibilité", certes largement pondérée par des moyens offerts par l'Otan¹⁹, et donc les Etats-Unis, n'a toutefois pas transformé visiblement l'intensité de l'engagement formel de l'acteur militaire pour une construction européenne de la défense.

Un officier supérieur interrogé au cours de l'année 2000 sur son implication personnelle dans le processus européen répondit à l'auteur sous forme de boutade : « Si l'on me dit que la girafe est bleue, je la repeins en bleu ». Il n'est pas ici pour nous question de mesurer la profondeur de ces engagements : pragmatisme, convictions raisonnée ou émotionnelle, ils s'appuient tous, pour affirmer la nécessité de la "multinationalisation" de la défense, sur une intériorisation des modifications du cadre interprétatif, soit de la vision stratégique²⁰.

Instances multinationales, coopération lors des missions extérieures, échanges et formations communes sont autant de pistes de recherche ouvertes. Nous les avons identifiées comme des processus d'eupéanisation. Il serait nécessaire d'évaluer leur rôle dans les convergences des identités militaires.

Conclusion

La mise en œuvre d'une politique européenne de défense commune s'appuie de manière logique sur l'action des différents acteurs militaires engagés et ceci à toutes les étapes et tous les niveaux du processus. L'initiative a été politique. Mais comme a tenté de le souligner parfois cet article, les formes qu'a déjà pu prendre la construction d'une défense commune a relevé de la confrontation de modèles organisationnels nationaux différents, de perceptions des missions distinctes, etc.

L'analyse par le bas dans une perspective cognitive ne fournit pas les moyens d'expliquer totalement le processus de construction. En revanche, elle offre les premiers instruments nécessaires à l'évaluation de l'eupéanisation de quelques acteurs militaires.

¹⁹ A propos du Corps européen au Kosovo, un officier scandinave avouait ainsi lors d'un entretien avec l'auteur en 2000 : « L'Etat-major européen était comparable à un pianiste se mettant devant son instrument, et le piano, l'infrastructure, c'était l'Otan. C'était une forme de "bluff" ».

²⁰ Dans le cas français, l'appel au renouveau doctrinal est net ; Isnard J., « La révolution doctrinale de l'armée française », *Le Monde*, 6 juin 2000 ; voir aussi parmi les productions du Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Enseignement militaire Supérieur de l'Armée de Terre (CDES), les actes du forum du 15 juin 2001, *Vers une vision européenne d'emploi des forces terrestres* 226

Ceux-ci (malgré des données à réactualiser) n'expriment pas des opinions sur la construction d'une Europe de la défense qui permettent de les qualifier de farouchement pro-européens. Cependant, nous avons pu mettre en évidence la multiplication d'un certain nombre de processus (institutionnels ou non), qui favorisent la production et la diffusion de croyances, de normes, de savoir-faire commun. Un approfondissement de cette approche devrait permettre :

- de mesurer quelle part de l'identité militaire reste irréductiblement nationale (phénomène symbolisé par un curseur se déplaçant entre un pôle national et un pôle européen)
- d'évaluer quelle est la part d'innovation dans la production de normes, *lato sensu*, professionnelles apparaissant au terme de la confrontation des expériences nationale (mais aussi multinationales).

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The EU as a Global- Regional Actor in Security and Peace

The willingness, capability
and acceptance of the EU as a
global-regional security actor



The EU-GRASP Final Integrative Report





EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-Regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP for short, is a European Union (EU) funded project under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7). EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the articulation of the present and future role of the EU as a global and regional actor in security and peace. Thus, EU-GRASP is aimed at studying the processes, means and opportunities for the EU to achieve effective multilateralism despite myriad challenges.

PARTNERS

EU-GRASP is composed by a consortium of nine partners. While the project is coordinated by the United Nations University institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), Bruges, Belgium, its other partners are drawn from across the globe. These are, viz: University of Warwick (UK), University of Gothenburg (Sweden), Florence Forum on the Problems of Peace and War (Italy), KULeuven (Belgium), Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada), Peking University (China), Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel).

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**“A more capable Europe
is within our grasp”**

**European Security
Strategy, 2003**

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This report is a final product of a research project, called EU-GRASP that aimed at a better understanding of the EU's role in regional and global peace and security issues. Undertaking this was a fascinating and challenging task, especially as the subject matter was, for various reasons, a real moving target.

First, between the time of submitting the research proposal in 2007 and the completion of the project beginning 2012, the geopolitical world changed dramatically. Not only did the world become more multipolar than ever before, the gravity of economic power shifted considerably from the West to the East. This has major consequences for the European security strategy that always had a strong Atlantic component. But today the US seems more and more to be looking to the Pacific, as demonstrated for instance by Hillary Clinton's article 'America's Pacific Century' (*Foreign Affairs*, November 2011).

Secondly, the growing interconnectedness of states and people continues to bring with it new and often-unforeseen security threats. As a result, the security agenda is constantly changing and so are people's perception of threats and insecurity.

Thirdly, throughout the duration of the project, the EU's internal organisation as a security actor was in constant transformation. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the new structures of the 'European External Action Service' began to be implemented.

Together, these elements contributed towards influencing the EU's security agenda. Yet, such transformation also brought to the fore the fact that security governance at a European level needed to be multilateral. The present report therefore aims to bring together some of the main findings from the case studies undertaken in the course of the EU-GRASP project. These studies demonstrate that one cannot speak of a single form of European security governance. Indeed, there are several types of security challenges, which all call for different approaches and various 'coalitions' of actors.

There is a need for fluidity in the architecture of global and regional solutions according to the specific security issues encountered. Effective multilateralism, which presupposes working more closely and efficiently with others, is more and more also a matter of networked multilateralism, with an emphasis on the coordinated management and regulation of security issues by different kinds of actors.

With the present report, the reader is presented with some of the complexities of how the EU deals with peace and security, and with a first translation into policy recommendations regarding the future of the EU as a security actor.



Luk Van Langenhove
EU-GRASP Coordinator
& UNU-CRIS Director

Introducing EU-GRASP

What is EU-GRASP?

EU-GRASP was conceived to contribute towards the understanding and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a challenged multilateral environment. The project examined the notion and practice of multilateralism and security in order to provide an adequate theoretical background for assessing the EU's current security activities at different levels of cooperation, ranging from bilateralism to inter-regionalism and multilateralism, and their inter-linkages. EU-GRASP was a 3-year project that started in February 2009 and ended in January 2012.

The project work plan consisted of the following components:

An **analysis** of the evolving concepts of multilateralism and security, and the EU's role as a security actor;

Case studies of the EU's approach to a number of specific security issues: regional conflict, terrorism, WMD proliferation, migration, energy and climate change, and severe violations of human rights;

A **transversal comparative analysis** applying and integrating the case-study findings;

A **foresight study**, which builds on the project's findings and proposes scenarios for future EU policy directions towards external security relations and multilateral approaches to threats and challenges.

Overall, EU-GRASP examined the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the EU's current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

Who funds EU-GRASP?

EU-GRASP was funded by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Research & Innovation, Seventh Framework Programme, Socio-Economic Sciences and the Humanities.

Project officer: Dr. Angela Liberatore (European Commission, Directorate-General for Research & Innovation)

Who coordinated the project?

The coordination of EU-GRASP was done by the United Nations University institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS).

Who was involved in the project?

Consortium partners of EU-GRASP are: University of Warwick (UK), University of Gothenburg (Sweden), Florence Forum on the Problems of Peace and War (Italy), KULeuven (Belgium), Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada), Peking University (China), Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel).

The EU-GRASP International Advisory Board

Louise Fawcett (Oxford University), Nicola Harrington-Buhay (UNDP Brussels, EU-UN Liaison Office), Karen Fogg (former European Commission official, associate research fellow Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies), Ole Waever (Copenhagen University), Alain Délétréz (International Crisis Group), Alvaro de Vasconcelos (EUISS), and the two academic coordinators of sister FP7-projects MERCURY (Mark Aspinwall, Edinburgh University) and EU4SEAS (Jordi Vaquer i Fanes, CIDOB).

What were the project objectives?

Strengthen the understanding of multilateralism, and its relation with other concepts such as multipolarity and interregionalism;

Understanding the changes within the field of security and their effect on the governance

structures namely in the approach to security cooperation and multilateralism;

Better understanding of the evolving nature of the EU as a global actor within the field of security and EU's current role in global security governance;

Understanding and developing the changing role of the EU towards other regional integration processes in the peace and security field;

Better understanding of the relationship between external and internal dimensions of the above mentioned policy domains, namely the legal aspects of EU's involvement in security at regional and global levels;

Suggesting future roles to the EU on the world stage within the field of security;

Advancing state-of-the art theories on multilateralism, by integrating the contemporary agenda of international security, multilateral security governance and the overall role of the EU within these fields;

Advancing policy-making - Increasing awareness and information, and improving the contribution to the formulation and implementation of European cooperation initiatives at the global and interregional level.

The research approach

EU-GRASP is aimed at studying the role of the EU as a global-regional actor in security and peace. This remit implies research that is committed to studying not only the present role of the EU in a multilateral environment, but which also inquires into the EU's anticipated role in the emerging global order.

Attempting such a study enumerated above presents, at the best of times, a multi-layered challenge to a researcher. It is even more so in the environment of challenged multilateralism in which the EU currently finds itself. Not only is the topic somewhat intractable in its various and varied dimensions, but also, undertaking such a research is fraught with such pedagogic challenges such as what is the best 'entry point', what methodological strategies should be adopted, and, more importantly, how best to present the findings.

At the preliminary stage, we undertook an assessment and refinement of concepts that would be used in the course of the project, and which are relevant to study and understand the role of the EU as an actor in peace and security. This inceptional endeavour focused principally on clarifying theories of security, especially those relating to the so-called non-traditional security studies, in order to link such theories to empirical research. Additionally, our rudimentary research also focused on the concept of 'security

governance' and its applicability to EU's practice. In the final analysis, these two research components were brought together with the aim of bridging the existing gap between the literature on security theory and those on security governance, using the results deriving therefrom to interrogate the EU as a global-regional actor in peace and security.

The central argument of the first conceptual research is that there is need to develop a specific theoretical framework for analysing the EU as a peace and security actor. Whilst the EU/European security governance literature certainly provides a flexible analytical prism for this purpose, it falls short, in our view, of the optimal analytical tool in that its application is limited to the conceptual notion of security and therefore remains pre-theoretical. We propose that it is by utilising the security studies literature that we can provide a flexible framework and a comparative methodology, which transcends the traditional notion of security - a notion that is essentially defined in terms of threats to states. This suggested approach, in turn, would engender a more sophisticated and comprehensive understanding of how the EU does and speaks security.

The second major theme we investigated concerns the levels of transversal cooperation the EU is involved in (bilateral, regional, interregional and global). The mapping of *bilateral cooperation*

focused on EU's interaction with some specific states including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Israel, etc. Similarly, the mapping of *interregional relations* offered an overview of the current cooperation with Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean. With regard to cooperation at the *global level* we focused mainly on the relation between the EU and the UN, taking into cognisance other multilateral frameworks that have a global reach. Finally, the mapping of the EU as a *regional actor* highlights the EU's institutional and policy outputs through an investigation of its coherence and its current level of accountability and legitimacy.

The deepening of theoretical and conceptual knowledge about the various issues elucidated above, inspired a more robust and comprehensive research of the twenty-three (23) **case studies** in the **six security issues** selected by EU-GRASP. The landscape of security studies is over the last years completely changed by the debate between traditional and non-traditional security issues. EU-GRASP takes stock of this and includes the in-depth study of six security issues: **regional conflict, terrorism, WMD proliferation, energy security and climate change, severe human rights violations and migration.**

EU-GRASP case studies (see table)

Against the background of its analytical work and the results of the case studies and transversal reports, EU-GRASP has designed a **foresight exercise** to project the consequences of its findings into the near future. The idea of foresight is to explore the possible future of EU policies regarding different security issues, and according to the different forms of multilateral cooperation as a variation of key policy choices.

The foresight exercise is divided into two phases. The first concerns the definition of future "scenarios" based on EU-GRASP's findings and with additional inputs from a group of experts, scholars and practitioners. The second phase builds on the various scenarios to identify policy implications through a participatory workshop with EU policy makers. Interaction with target-public is key for this project: EU-GRASP desires that its work of three years will be relevant for EU's decision-making and role in multilateral security governance, whether in relation to EU's daily undertakings or those of its member states.

Regional conflict	Terrorism	WMD proliferation	Energy security & climate change	Migration	Severe human rights violations
Israeli-Palestinian regional security complex	Israeli-Palestinian regional security complex	Iran	Central Asia	Lybia	Israeli-Palestinian regional security complex
Great Lakes (DRC)	Egypt	Pakistan-India	China	Transatlantic focus	Darfur/Sudan
Horn of Africa	Turkey	North Korea	Russia	South-East gate	Zimbabwe
Chad-Sudan-Central African Republic	Afghanistan			Mediterranean	Lebanon
	Russia				

Understanding Multilateralism

Towards the study of multilateralism 2.0.

Multilateralism was created as a form of cooperation among states that institutionalises intergovernmental cooperation and substitutes anarchy. The starting point for most scholars who study multilateralism is the definition by Keohane and its expansion by Ruggie. 'I limit multilateralism to arrangements involving states' says Keohane (1990: 732) and that is a core issue of most of the academic thinking on the issue. Multilateral arrangements are institutions defined by Keohane as 'persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations and prescribe roles' (Keohane 1988: 384) in a purely institutional (rather than normative) manner. Ruggie however, presents a definition that is not only institutional but also normative, including behaviour. For Ruggie (1993: 11), multilateralism is an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct (...) which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard for the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence. A common feature of these and other contemporary viewpoints is the centrality of states: they are regarded as the constitutive elements of the multilateral system and it is their interrelations that determine the form and content of multilateralism. This implies, as noted by Schweller (2010: 149), that international politics is regarded as a closed system in at least two ways: it spans the whole world and there are huge barriers to entering

the system. Indeed, the world is today almost fully carved up in sovereign states and this affords little or no room for the creation of new states. Things are much different today than in 1648, – seen as the birth of the Westphalian world order – when the chunkiest parts of the world were not composed by sovereign states, thus affording great opportunities for state creation. Consequently, there was an *open* international system for a long time. However, over the years the whole globe became partitioned into sovereign states.

Multilateralism is clearly under challenge in the 21st century and has been so since the end of the Cold War. More than a reflection of the failure of the concept, this crisis is the sign of a changing international context, which has rendered anachronistic the traditional intergovernmental multilateralism of the immediate post-World War II era. In today's reality, states play a relatively declining role as protagonists in the security system, as threats have acquired a system-wide significance. In order to overcome this crisis, multilateral institutions, such as the UN, need to adapt to this change, reinventing themselves according to the new context. Thus, as the world is changing, so must the concept of governance, namely its reflection in the multilateral system.

The emergence of truly global problems, such as climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and many others, have indeed

led to an increasing paradox of governance: 'the policy authority for tackling global problems still belongs to the states, while the sources of the problems and potential solutions are situated at transnational, regional or global level' (Thakur & Van Langenhove 2006). As such the building blocks of multilateralism, the states, seem to be less and less capable of dealing with the challenges of globalisation. But because the multilateral world order is so dependent on the input of states, multilateralism itself is not functioning well. The drama according to Weiss (2008) is that the UN would never had emerged at all, if it was not configured as an instrument of state interests.

In sum, there seems to be sufficient reasons to claim that 'the values and institutions of multilateralism as *currently constituted* (...) are arguably under serious challenge' (Newman & Thakur 2006: 531). But, as suggested by the same authors, the fundamental *principle* of multilateralism is not in crisis! What is needed is an update of the organisational issues in order to be in tune with today's reality.

Multilateralism is thus both a normative concept (it is an ideal to promote) and a practice (it refers to a set of existing practices and institutions). At both levels it is subject to change and one can think of how an updated global multilateral governance system could look like. Such a vision could be called 'Multilateralism 2.0.' This is a metaphor as it refers to a jargon used in the ICT world. As all metaphors, it has its limitations. But metaphors in science can also serve the purpose of viewing things from new perspectives (Harré 1976). The core of the metaphor advanced here is an implicit reference to what is now called 'Web 2.0.', a concept currently used to be described as the second phase in the development of the World Wide Web. It

describes the change from a 'web' consisting out of individual websites to a full platform of interactive web applications to the end users on the World Wide Web. The Multilateralism 2.0. metaphor tries to grasp how the ideals and practices of multilateralism are currently undergoing a similar transformation. It is partially a descriptive metaphor as it tries to capture what is going on. But it is also a normative metaphor that points to what is possible and desirable.

The essence of introducing the 'Web 2.0' metaphor in international relations lies in stressing the emergence of network thinking and practices in international relations and in the transformation of multilateralism from a closed to an open system. In Multilateralism 1.0 the principal agents in the interstate space of international relations are states. National governments are the 'star players'. Intergovernmental organisations are only dependent agents whose degrees of freedom only go as far as the states allow them. The primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of international relations. In Multilateralism 2.0, there are players other than sovereign states that play a role and some of these players challenge the notion of sovereignty and that makes the system much more open. The trend towards multipolarity is more than just a redistribution of power at the global level. It is also about a change in who the players are and how the playing field is organised.

It is symptomatic of this trend that the *Harvard Business Review* chose as one of its 'breakthrough ideas' for 2010 the concept of 'independent diplomacy' (Ross 2010). In that article the question was raised: why should we pretend that only nation-states shape international affairs? There are signs that Multilateralism 2.0 already partially exists. But of course there are also strong forces to

continue with Multilateralism 1.0. As such it is not even sure that a fully-fledged multilateral system version 2.0 will ever emerge.

The first characteristic of Multilateralism 2.0 is the *diversification of multilateral organisations*. In recent years there has been a dramatic rise of all kinds of international organisations and regimes. According to Schiavone (2001), the number of intergovernmental organisations has grown from 37 to well over 400 in the period between 1990 and 2000 (see also Higgott 2006). While mostly operating on an inter-governmental basis, some of these organisations have acquired some autonomy in the exercise of their competences and even have a 'legal personality' just as states (Ip 2010). Increasingly these organisations look more to networks than to formal (bureaucratic) organisations. In line with a 'trans-nationalisation of policies' (Stone 2004) one can state that Multilateralism 2.0. implies the rise of transnational policy networks (Djelic & Quach 2003, Stone 2008).

Secondly, there is a growing *importance of non state actors* at the regional rather than global level. States have by now created a large number of global and regional institutions that have themselves become players in the international order. Some of these new players, although not states, do resemble states in their behaviour. Such an institution as the EU exemplifies this trend (one can point for instance to its presence as observer in the UN, its coordination strategy at the International Monetary Fund, its membership at the G20, etc.). Other regional organisations are – although not to the same extent as the EU – following suit. As a result, one can say that we are currently witnessing a transition from a world of states to a world of states (including the BRICS as new global powers) and regions (Van Langenhove 2007, 2008). This trend is further reinforced

by the phenomenon of devolution whereby national powers are in some states transferred to subnational regions. Some of these subnational regional entities even have the ambition to be present at the international stage as well. In Europe, Flanders has perhaps more autonomy in Belgium than Luxembourg in the EU. Yet, Luxembourg is considered to be a sovereign state, while Flanders is not. In that article the question was raised: why to pretend that only nation-states shape international affairs?

Thirdly, next to the increased relations between 'vertical' levels of governance, there is a growing *interconnectivity* between policy domains horizontally. Finance cannot be divorced from trade, security, climate, etc. A distinctive characteristic of Multilateralism 2.0. is thus that the boundaries between policy domains (and the organisations dealing with them) are becoming more and more permeable. Instead of clear separated areas of policy concern treated within separate institutions, there are now communities of different actors and layers that form together a global agora of multiple publics and plural institutions (Stone 2008).

Finally, under Multilateralism 1.0 the *involvement of citizens* is largely limited to democratic representation at the state level. The supranational governance layer does not foresee direct involvement of the civil society or of any other non-governmental actors. In Multilateralism 2.0. there is an increased room for non-governmental actors at all levels. This is perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of Multilateralism 2.0. but also the most difficult to organise. This is related to the state centric and institutional focus of classical multilateral organisations. In such a closed system there is hardly any room for open debate, let alone for the involvement of citizens. But as Klabbers (2005) argued, there is evidence

that an alternative is emerging, that of multilateral institutions functioning not so much as an *organisation* but rather as an *agora*, that is 'a public realm in which institutional issues can be debated and perhaps, be decided' (Klabbers 2005: 382).

In sum, the signs are there that multilateralism is moving from a 1.0. mode to a 2.0. mode. But, as mentioned above, states have been the architects of Multilateralism 1.0. and they crafted a form of multilateralism that is in tune with state interests. The big challenge today is whether non state actors will have the power and the degrees of liberty to be involved in crafting Multilateralism 2.0. Regional organisations could be in a position to contribute to such a new regionalised world order. Bull (1977: 261) already imagined such a 'more regionalised world systems'. More recently, Katzenstein (2005: 1) stated that 'ours is a world of regions'. And Slaughter (2004) described a 'disaggregated world order' where the model is in many ways the EU, that has indeed the ambition to be involved in such an operation. By embracing the principle of 'effective multilateralism', the EU has clearly indicated the willingness to contribute to reforming multilateralism. But the paradox might be that its own member states with their own 1.0. form of diplomacy are perhaps not ready yet for such a move.

Further readings

George Christou (2011), Multilateralism, Conflict Prevention and the Eastern Partnership, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16(2), pp.207-225.

George Christou & Seamus Simpson (2011), The European Union, Multilateralism and the Global Governance of Internet, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(2), pp. 241-257.

Luk Van Langenhove (2010) The EU as a Global Actor in a Multipolar World and Multilateral 2.0. Environment, *Egmont Paper*, Egmont Royal Institute for International Affairs, nr. 36.

Luk Van Langenhove, (2010) The Transformation of Multilateralism. Mode 1.0. to Mode 2.0. *Global Policy*, 1(3): 263-270. (Global Policy is published by Wiley-Blackwell/London School of Economics)

Jan Wouters, Sijbren de Jong, and Philippe De Man (2010) „The EU's Commitment to Effective Multilateralism in the Field of Security: Theory and Practice, *Yearbook of European Law*, vol: 29, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 164-189.



Understanding security governance

The loose concept of governance seemed to be apt in capturing the idea of a variegated environment characterised by a multiplicity of actors and levels. This was especially the case with the EU given the multifaceted nature of its policy-making milieu. Webber et. al. (2004) began with some important definitional points, and in particular, focussed the analysis on security governance in Europe. That is, the concept was considered in part to be European specific, in part a socially constructed product of the societies and structures dominant on the continent, has taken these issues forward, and asks the important evaluative question, as to the way in which the concept of security governance can be seen to lead to offer significant advances on other means of thinking about the security of Europe.

In Kirchner's words, security governance is an 'intentional system of rule that involves the coordination, management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, interventions by both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements and purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes' (Kirchner 2007a: 3). A 'governance approach' should help understand vertical and horizontal interactions among different actors, serving as an organisational framework (Schroeder 2006: 5), analysing how security is produced (Webber et al. 2004) and ultimately

representing an observable trend (Britz & Ojanen 2009). According to Krahmman, security structures or a coalition's fluidity and flexibility represent a distinctive characteristic of security governance, so that security coordination takes on different shapes (Krahmann 2001: 5).

Of particular relevance for Kirchner is, instead, the working and coordinating mechanisms of security governance within and across issue areas. In this regard, co-ordination, management and regulation are the three components of governance and also the three tools used to empirically test it. Specifically, co-ordination concerns the way in which actors interact and who, among them, leads the policy-making process, implementation and control. Management relates to risk assessment duties, monitoring, negotiations, mediations and resource allocation, while regulation is conceived as the policy result, its intended objective, its fostering motivation, its effective impact and the institutional setting created (Kirchner 2007b: 24).

A significant part of the literature on security governance deals with the EU and its role therein. This is not surprising: Europe's 'post-Westphalian traits' seem to be the ideal-type of a governance structure for several concerns, security included. The interdependencies that resulted from the internal economic project and the loss of some sovereign prerogatives related to that objective,

suggested that a certain degree of multilateral coordination at more levels and among different actors was necessary to face ongoing risks (Kirchner and Sperling 2007a & b). Indeed, the idea that global solutions to security problems can better be achieved through the existence and the practices of post-Westphalian states (Kirchner & Sperling 2007 a & b) spurred debates on the exportation of *the* European system of governance. According to this reasoning, this exportation could overcome some of the heterogeneity in the international system and set the basis for institutional and normative regulation of security challenges. However, threats can also be perceived and assessed differently; some actors prefer unilateral strategies rather than multilateral solutions and opt for hard tools to solve security matters. This is so, the argument goes, because some Westphalian states exist in the international context and characterise different systems of security governance from the European one: this ends up overburdening and complicating the achievement of global security (Sperling 2003, Hallenberg, Sperling & Wagnsson 2009).

As already stated, the literature on security governance is problematic in that it focuses predominantly on the dynamics of 'governance', on the multiplicity of actors, tools and instruments rather than the complexity of security and the implications varied meanings of security have for our understanding of the EU as a security actor. As acknowledged by its proponents, security governance 'is a heuristic device for recasting the problem of security management in order to accommodate the different patterns of interstate interaction, the rising number of non-state security actors, the expansion of the security agenda and conflict regulation or resolution'

(Kirchner and Sperling 2007b: 18). Thus, the security governance approach, although possessing 'the virtue of conceptual accommodation' by its own admission, is 'pre-theoretical' (Ibid), and thus lacks nuance in terms of how the EU constructs its understanding of security and engages in security practice. Our argument, therefore, is that the security governance literature would benefit from incorporating a *theoretical* approach to security: this will provide a more complex understanding of the way in which security comes to be understood and intersubjectively defined, which in turn has implications for the relevant actors involved, governance strategies, processes of engagement, and finally, policy practice and outcome.

Another potential shortcoming of the security governance literature is its predominantly Euro-centric contextual focus. Our argument here is that in order to understand the EU as an actor in security governance structures, a more global outlook is required to incorporate other dimensions and influences in the framing of EU/European security issues and practices, and on how they are constructed, managed and regulated. On this point, a significant step has been taken by Sperling (2003, 2009). He envisages the possible existence of different systems of security governance characterised by the following features which include: the regulator, considering the mechanisms adopted to face security problems and resolve conflicts; the normative framework, identifying the role that norms play in determining interests and behaviours; sovereign prerogatives, investigating the degree of hierarchical interactions; and the security referent, defining the nature of the state, the interaction between identity and interests and the usefulness of force, and the interaction context, investigating the strength of the security dilemma (Sperling 2009).

In our view, this is a productive way forward which aims at overcoming the strict European focus of current research, whilst simultaneously dealing with the EU's role in different security structures, and adding a comparative perspective to the analysis of EU security governance.

In this context, our contribution would not only be in acknowledging that overlapping systems of security governance have implications for the EU, but also in laying down the methodological foundations to investigate how and why the EU can interact within them, and contribute to the sustainability, transformation or dissolution of such arrangements. Moreover, it moves beyond a pre-theoretical, functional aggregation of factors and characteristics of systems of security governance (and states within them) to ask critical questions of how they were constructed in the first place, and how this impacts on the way in which the EU can speak and do security. In summary then, whilst there is an acknowledgment in the latest European security governance literature of the security referent, the role of norms and the context of interaction – which is also of interest within our approach – there remains limited discussion on what is meant by security per se, or how it can be understood theoretically and explored methodologically in the context of the EU and Europe.

How then, do we propose to take security governance forward and move it from a pre-theoretical to theoretical framework of analysis? To reiterate, our argument is that we must move beyond characterisations and typologies towards a clear theoretical and methodological foundation. More specifically, we contend that there is a need to take the constructivist turn in security studies

seriously in order to allow us to move beyond security as an objective phenomenon that is 'out there' and can be measured or analysed through a linear or deductive methodology. We also argue in this context that a more obvious synergy with the security studies literature will enhance the analytical sophistication of the security governance literature.

Whilst the EU/European security governance literature certainly provides a plastic or flexible frame for this purpose, it falls short in our eyes, as it does not move beyond a conceptual notion of security (it is pre-theoretical). The suggestion here, therefore, is that through utilising the security studies literature, we can provide a flexible framework and a comparative methodology, which moves beyond traditional notions of security as the activity of states; a notion that is fixed or defined simply as a threat, and provides a more complex understanding of how the EU does and speaks security. We recognise that for many such a comparative or eclectic approach is problematic on a philosophical and intellectual level, but our position merely suggests that there is much to connect such theories (although not to collapse them into one theoretical approach, see Floyd 2007) – and that, whilst not compatible in terms of the methodological minutiae can at an intuitive and comparative level illuminate the problems in each, whilst also providing a platform for dialogue and theory building.

Thus, it is not the assertion here that security governance is not a fruitful avenue for research. Indeed, we very much concur with the conceptualisation of security governance provided in this literature and its notion of European security as part of broader regional and

global security governance structures. However, we do believe that it lacks a more complex understanding of the variegated meaning of security and security logics in the context of the EU/Europe. Our approach, therefore, almost takes a step backwards in its conversation with this literature – in that it seeks first to analyse the discursive construction of ‘security’ in different policy areas, whilst also not losing sight of the connection between construction, governance/ governmentality, policy practice and outcome. Overall, we suggest this is a more nuanced approach which allows the analyst to probe the dynamics of EU security action, and indeed, the implications and consequences of such action in terms of policy governance, effectiveness and its own identity.

Further readings

EU-GRASP researchers George Christou and Stuart Croft edited a special issue on European ‘security’ governance with the Taylor and Francis journal “*European Security*”. This collection contains ten contributions on a wide range of security governance issues.

In 2012, this special issue of *European Security* will also be published as a book by Routledge under the title of *European ‘security’ governance* (edited by George Christou and Stuart Croft).

In 2012, Routledge will also publish a volume in their *Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science Series* on the topic of *The EU and Multilateral Security Governance*. The volume will be edited by Luk Van Langenhove, Sonia Lucarelli and Jan Wouters.

Levels of cooperation

Developments characterising the rapidly evolving global environment are reflected in the 'Multilateralism 2.0.' concept. The latter emphasises the diversification of multilateral actors and the ensuing diversification of multilateral playing fields. The concept accounts for a complex network of actors that perform and interact in a multipolar environment, where openness and flexibility are the keywords. The EU is a part of this multipolar environment where it plays a role not as a state but as a regional organisation operating in a complex international environment comprising states, multilateral and regional organisations. The EU itself, in its relations with other actors, is characterised by its multi-faceted appearances as one can distinguish elements of bilateral, regional, interregional and global actorship. As such, the EU contributes to establishing a fluid architecture of global, regional and national solutions to security threats that embody different actors at multiple levels according to the challenges that need to be addressed. Within such a fluid architecture, there are no fixed roles or positions for any actor - hence the growing need for coordination, management and regulation. Not surprisingly then, there emerged the new concept of 'security governance', which focuses on how multiple actors in a web of power and responsibility coordinate, manage and regulate their actions. The concept of security governance is therefore useful to overcome the conundrum of state-centrism while at the same

time allowing for the inclusion of a larger definition of security and the means put in place by a variety of actors to address various security issues. In this framework, security governance can therefore help to understand the proliferation of transnational cooperation amongst both state and non-state actors in the post-Cold War era, where new security threats are challenging the ability of sovereign states to ensure the security of their citizens.

To evaluate the successes and failures of the EU as a global actor in security and peace requires an analysis of EU action at multiple levels of security governance. Instructively, it should be noted that the EU is not a single state. Consequently, the EU can be understood as a geographical "region" and/or an integrated set of institutions that create a multilevel and multilocational foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 8-34). This creates two significant problems for understanding bilateral relations. Firstly, as the EU is itself a region, bilateral relations constitute "regional-state relations". This has led to Heiner Hänggi going beyond the term bilateralism, and referring to EU bilateral interactions with single powers as 'hybrid interregionalism' (2000: 7). "Hybrid interregionalism" refers to a framework where one organised region negotiates with a group of countries from another (unorganised or dispersed) region. For instance, in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) the Mediterranean countries negotiate individually

with the EU. Similarly, referring specifically to commercial relations, Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004) take the Lomé Agreement as an example of hybrid interregionalism, whereby the EU is unified and has trade relations with a set of countries that are not grouped within their own customs union or free trade agreement. Hänggi goes beyond formal frameworks and refers to hybrid interregionalism, in which a region, such as the EU, interacts bilaterally with single powers. Formally, this can be thought of as a “region-to-state” (or “region-to-country”) relationship.

In its broader sense, interregionalism refers to the process whereby two specified regions interact as regions, that is, region-to-region relations. The most institutionalised form of interregionalism, so-called “pure interregionalism”, develops between two clearly identifiable regions within an institutional framework (for instance the EU and the African Union). Pure interregionalism captures, however, only a limited part of present-day interregional cooperation. This is because many “regions” are dispersed and porous, without clearly identifiable borders, and demonstrate only a low level of regional agency. In other words, regional organisations are not discrete actors, which can be isolated from classical intergovernmental cooperation between nation-states (i.e. classical bilateralism). It is widely contested among scholars even to what extent the EU (sophisticated as it is) should be considered a discrete actor. Although interregionalism is not explicitly mentioned as an objective in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), it is deeply rooted in the European Commission’s and the EU’s foreign policies and external relations. There is a long history of a rather loose form of interregionalism between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and this interregional policy

has been partly revised under the new Cotonou Agreement and other frameworks. Since the 1990s interregional cooperation has been further developed as a key feature of the EU’s foreign policies with other counterpart regions, at least in official declarations. Indeed, we are witnessing a trend whereby the European Commission and other European policymakers seek to promote interregional relations and partnerships with the Global South, albeit not always with a consistent formulation (Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010).

Our analysis of the EU’s interregional cooperation with Africa, Latin America and Asia reveals that the EU uses a variety of instruments and models of engagement to foster relations with countries and regional partners. As we have seen, EU-driven interregional cooperation tends to be multifaceted, with different issues and themes receiving different emphasis in different counterpart regions and in different security issues. Interregional policy is, therefore, not a fixed set of guidelines but rather is subject to adaptation. A comparative assessment suggests a variation in the way that the EU conducts its foreign policies towards different regions (Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010).

This implies that the EU does not appear to have a specific preference for one particular model of cooperation. It is evident that the EU tends to be pragmatic in its various relationships with the rest of the world. In this regard, the EU increasingly behaves as an actor on a variety of levels in world affairs — having “a global strategy” (Farrell 2010, Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010). Far from being locked into a specific foreign policy doctrine (such as interregionalism), the EU uses any type of policy that it has at its disposal and which appears to be most suited to a given objective.

It is useful to distinguish between security issues and other types of (non-security) issues, such as trade, aid and development. Needless to say, security and development may affect one another. Together forming the much-talked about security-development nexus. Yet, it is also relevant to point out that generally speaking interregional cooperation is quite often more developed in the field of trade, aid and development compared to security.

A general characteristic of interregional cooperation (both in the security and non-security sphere) is that issues are often dealt with through multi-country dialogues, summits and policy declarations. Interregionalism may therefore be criticised as rhetorical, symbolic and sweeping. In contrast, however, there is also evidence that interregionalism may provide a useful forum for dialogue and framework for enhancing cooperation at lower levels. In this way, interregionalism may reinforce bilateral collaboration, or may be a stepping-stone to multilateral cooperation. As a result it is not useful to analyse interregional cooperation in isolation from other forms of cooperation. There is a tendency that interregionalism sometimes is important even if it is not so well-developed or intense.

Our research result reveal that it is misleading to only concentrate on pure interregionalism, that is, institutionalised cooperation between two regional organisations. The more complex and pluralistic processes of transregionalism and hybrid interregionalism reveal that especially the counterpart regional organisations are more open-ended and ambiguous, implying that policies of regional organisations interact with policies of states/governments. Taken together, this leads to the possibility of an increasing number of (interacting) forms of collaboration on different

“levels” (hence the relevance of transversal cooperation as an analytical device).

The interregional model is perhaps most developed in the EU’s relationship with Africa, at least in the sense that interregional cooperation and partnerships exist in most issue-areas and with Africa as well as all sub-regional organisations. Yet, it is very evident that EU-Africa interregional cooperation is dominated by the EU and to quite a large extent it depends on the EU’s interests and agenda. This is however not equivalent to saying that asymmetric interregionalism is necessarily detrimental. And it is not simply that EU dictates the agenda. For example, many observers would say that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is African-driven and EU-Africa interregional cooperation is to a large extent designed in order to strengthen APSA and African management of its own security crises.

EU-Asia collaboration is at least partly different in terms of the degree of institutionalisation as well as the nature of the issues covered. For instance, terrorism and WMD are greater concerns in Asia than in Africa and Latin America, whereas Africa is heavily affected by a large number of regional conflicts. But interregionalism in Asia is clearly affected by the fact that ASEAN is more or less the only viable regional organisation. But the EU is not necessarily advocating in favour of increased pure interregionalism. On the contrary, while in the past the EU has combined pure interregionalism with forms of hybrid interregionalism, there is today a growing preference for hybrid interregionalism and more flexible solutions. “This may be explained in part by the difficulty of negotiating over very complex and politically contentious issues with disparate groups of countries. The EU has found that the difficulty of completing such negotiations, and the subsequent problems in implementation

and compliance, make different forms of region-state treaties a more effective instrument for economic cooperation” (Farrell 2010). Hence, despite the many official declarations about the EU’s preference for interregional relations, a closer empirical review reveals a complex pattern of intersecting, complementing and at times competing models of external relations - resulting in a mixture of bilateral, multilateral and interregional policies in a world with external and internal obstacles.

Previous research suggests that the EU’s policy mix depends very much on who the counterpart is (Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010). We argue that this variation in interregional relations is often linked to questions of relevance and power. The EU cannot deny the contemporary relevance and power of key East Asian states which results in partnerships that are symmetric in nature. This contrasts sharply with the EU-Africa relationship, which, although officially designated as an equal partnership, for now at least clearly remains asymmetrical (CEC 2004: 9). Compared to the more flexible and pluralistic approach to Asia, the EU tends to emphasise the interregional and regional model much more strongly in the African context.

A similar asymmetry, although not as one-sided, can also be detected in the EU’s relationship with Latin America. This suggests that, while much of the EU’s interregional relations are conducted under the pretext of mutual benefit,

the distribution of these benefits appears to be a function of the power position of the EU relative to its counterparts. That is, the stronger the counterpart (in terms of power and relevance), the more concessions are made by the EU. With weaker “partners”, the EU seem to dictate far more of the conditions for interregional cooperation. The relatively stronger East Asian region benefits from access to European markets and Asian countries are generally invited to participate in equal or symmetric partnerships with the EU. There is little conditionality attached to East Asian cooperation, which reflects the EU’s response to an increasingly powerful region. Indeed, security issues, such as human rights are sensitive for many Asian countries and the EU has chosen to maintain a rather low profile on these issues instead of pressurising for political changes. However, the EU attaches economic, trade and political conditionalities in its dealings with Africa. The EU’s dealings with Latin America appear to lie somewhere between these extremes.

Further reading

In 2012, Springer Verlag will publish a volume edited by Fredrik Söderbaum, Tiziana Scaramagli and Francis Baert that goes deeper into the notion of interregionalism and the interaction between the different levels of transversal cooperation as researched in EU-GRASP: bilateralism, regionalism, interregionalism and multilateralism. This volume will be published in the *United Nations University series on Regionalism*.

European structure and policies

Since the creation of Europe, security and defence concerns have been both of primary importance and highly controversial. Early attempts to set up a defence union were largely unsuccessful. The emergence of new security threats at the end of the Cold War provoked a renewed interest in security and defence-related issues. In parallel, the setting into place of the basis of the EU's foreign policy dates back to the early 1990s. At the time, the mutations of the European institutions, and the world they were evolving in, called for a profound review of the way the European foreign policy should be organised. As such, the Maastricht Treaty represents an important milestone with the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Title V of the Treaty which established the CFSP as one of the three pillars of the European Union represents a turning point for the European integration process since it calls for an institutionalisation of cooperation of the member states' foreign policies. The CFSP essentially marks the attempt by the member states to resolve their lack of coordination when faced with a crisis situation. The conflict ensuing from the breakdown of Yugoslavia clearly showed the need for an institutional framework to guide the various European foreign policies and favour common positions rather than disaggregated responses to similar crises. The Amsterdam Treaty further reinforced the CFSP by creating the position of a High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Initially the position

was established in order to better coordinate the implementation and conduct of the CFSP but gradually has expanded to encompass additional functions including the post of Secretary General of the Council of the European Union.

It is in his position of High Representative/ Secretary General (HR/SG) that Javier Solana was tasked by EU foreign ministers to draft a 'European strategic concept'. The result was the publication of the document "A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy" in 2003 and its adoption by the European Council during its meeting in December of the same year. The ESS represents the document leading the way for what European foreign policy *should* be like. In other words, "it outlines the long-term policy objectives and the instruments that can be applied to achieve them" and therefore "it could indeed serve as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making, defining also the legitimacy of actions and leading the development of capabilities within the EU" (Biscop & Drieskens 2006: 271). Among the various elements contained in the document it is noteworthy to stress the call it makes for increasing collaboration with international organisations and cooperation with major actors of the international scene. Within the part dedicated to the Strategic Objectives of the ESS special attention is thus given to multilateralism by calling for 'An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism'. The 2008 review of

the European Security Strategy also clearly underscores the fact that the EU has to work in favour of multilateralism and in collaboration with international institutions. The Review states that “At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system.” It also adds that the EU finds itself at “a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with [its] partners around the world.”

The signing of the Lisbon Treaty marks yet another important step in the integration of Europe, as with its adoption the EU aims to improve coherence in its external actions and, at the same time, enhance its accountability towards European citizens. The most relevant innovations related to the Union’s global actorness concern, first, the appointment of a President of the European Council, to give more visibility and consistency to both ‘the work of the European Council’ and ‘the external representation of the union on the CFSP issues’ (Article 9B paragraph 6, Treaty of Lisbon). Second, the creation of a ‘High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ – called the ‘EU Minister of Foreign Affairs’ – who is also Vice-President of the Commission, and thus responsible for the coordination between the Council and the Commission. Third, the introduction of a European External Action Service (EEAS) to assist the HR and streamline the EU’s external services by representing the Union in non-EU countries on all matters of foreign policy. Fourth, by conferring legal personality onto the EU (Article 46A), the Lisbon Treaty enables the Union to sign treaties or international agreements falling under the competences transferred to the EU by its member states. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty also streamlines decision-making procedures by extending the use of Qualified Majority Votes for matters pertaining to the Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP), thus demonstrating the EU’s willingness to facilitate decision-making among the 27 member states. Although these innovations do not challenge CFSP’s intergovernmental nature at its core, they nevertheless affirm the EU’s commitment in improving its efficiency and coherence at the international level.

The EU has therefore continuously strengthened its organisational structures with the Lisbon Treaty only representing one of the latest stage – albeit a major one – that installed some major changes and innovations, while at the same time stepping up its global presence. This has also been witnessed very practically as since 2003 more than 22 civilian and military missions have been carried out by the EU in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Therefore, in terms of civilian and military capacity, these missions deployed under the ESDP demonstrated a certain EU potential. However, military capability, be it human or material, is still generally insufficient. Despite the absence of an EU standing army, standby battlegroups have been settled as well-trained and -equipped forces that can be deployed on short notice. Further, the Permanent Structured Cooperation constitutes a remarkable attempt aimed at tackling the capability deficit. But an issue that remains to be dealt with is the absence of a common operational structure for coordinating efforts and deployments on the ground.

Despite this demonstrated ability, we cannot forget that the EU is not a state but a regional organisation that operates in a complex international environment comprising states, multilateral organisations as well as other regional organisations. The willingness of the EU to involve itself in international peace and security and address the threats it is faced with has thus been translated in the structure

and policies it has adopted to respond to these threats. Of course, the structures and policies are not uniform and largely depend on the threat they are meant to tackle. Nevertheless, some common features can be identified and most importantly is the EU's readiness to engage with other international actors and act in favor of an effective multilateralism. Secondly, the EU also shows elements of bilateral, regional, interregional and global actorhood. As such, the EU contributes to establishing a fluid architecture of security governance spanning from the global, the regional and the national levels and that embodies different actors at multiple levels according to the problems that need to be faced.

For example, in what concern energy security, international energy network projects serving the EU's security of energy supply necessarily involve the agreement of third country governments as internal developments in the EU energy markets cannot be considered in isolation from external matters, namely the EU's existing arrangements with supplier states (Benford 2006: 41). It is therefore important that the EU's international cooperation framework encourages the development of projects with third country

governments. In this field of external relations the EU currently holds Memoranda of Understanding on energy with a number of third countries, as well as so-called 'Energy Dialogues'. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue takes on a particularly important role in this regard given the strong mutual interest and interdependence in the energy field between the EU and Russia, in particular regarding the supply of natural gas and (to a lesser degree) with respect to oil. The EU offers the largest consumer market for Russian gas and Russia not only oversees the largest natural gas reserves but also exercises full control over the key pipelines that provide the main access to these reserves. The EU's broad challenge thus becomes managing this interdependence with a view to gaining maximum control over outcomes, namely ensuring security of supply (Benford 2006: 42).

Further reading

Wouters, Jan, Bijlmaekers, Stephanie & Meuwissen, Katrien (2012) *The EU as an Multilateral Security Actor after Lisbon: Constitutional and Institutional Aspects*. In: Lucarelli, Sonia, Van Langenhove, Luk and Wouters, Jan (eds.) *The EU and Multilateral Security Governance*. London: Routledge.

8

Impact and acceptance

Any meaningful assessment of the impact and acceptance of EU's role as a global-regional actor in security and peace must begin with an identification of the EU's goals and the underlying assumptions of the EU's involvement in a particular intervention (i.e. the EU's construction of the conflict). The next step is to distinguish between output, outcome and impact. As mentioned in the section on security governance, there is an abundance of literature on the intervention strategy and processes of implementation in a rather narrow sense. Indeed, literature in the field is heavily geared towards 'output' (e.g. training of soldiers in human rights) and 'outcome' (e.g. soldiers are respecting human rights in their activities) of interventions, rather than whether any peacebuilding impact on the society in a broader sense can be detected.

The societal impact is particularly relevant for assessing more comprehensive interventions (even if some evaluators and researchers claim that only output and outcome should be assessed, not impact). However, as pointed out by Woodrow and Chigas (2008), impact needs not be elusive and unreachable, too long-term or impossible to assess, but can be identifiable in everyday occurrences. Such understanding is also consistent with the OECD-DAC's definition of impact as including: 'the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended,

immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting efforts of the effort' (quoted in Woodrow & Chigas, 2008, 19). Importantly, 'if projects are not accountable for how their interventions contribute to the broader peace, one runs the risk of investing a lot of time, resources, and effort in programmes with excellent outcomes, but that make no measurable difference to the conflict' (ibid).

Impact assessment is a difficult task. Research has shown that in terms of actually measuring the results and impact of peacebuilding some of the most important (methodological) weaknesses include: the general lack of planning (i.e. a conflict analysis was often missing as a foundation to develop and implement the intervention); often there is a weak connection between the conflict analysis and intervention itself (and in some cases the conflict analysis is completely missing); the goals of intervention are often so general and vague ('contribution to peace') that they are not measurable, and it is very difficult to evaluate their impact (Spurk 2008, Woodrow & Chigas 2008). Hence, a proper impact assessment requires planning and conflict analysis (including the extent of regionalisation of conflict). The intervention thus needs to be planned and designed before it is implemented (it is at least very difficult to get solid answers about impact when such assessments are carried out in retrospect). Furthermore, impact assessment requires understanding of causality,

or at least ‘a convincing estimate of causal relationship’ (Svensson & Brattberg 2008: 24), and this requires ‘a theory of change’, which is able to explain how and why a particular intervention will contribute to broader peace and security. Impact is frequently expressed in terms of the success or failure of an intervention. There is however no consensus among academics, policy makers or recipients of intervention as to what constitutes or explains successful intervention; assessments are subject to bias and politicisation. Our framework seeks to problematise the way the EU defines the success or failure of its engagements. We need to acknowledge a general weakness of the way success and failure is defined and how impact is assessed. The first general weakness is that interventions are often predicated upon very sweeping definitions of ‘successful’ outcomes, and are justified with morally charged and normative propositions by interveners, such as human rights, human security and the responsibility to protect. The strategies adopted by interveners are justified on the basis that they lead to greater security, stability and development of the targets of intervention and/or of the global community. Such rhetoric usually emerges from a western philosophical tradition (Der Derian 1995) that clothes raw economic and political interest. Notions of success are thus deeply embedded in cultural values and politico-economic interests; they are always ambiguous, meaning one thing for those loyal to the values of a global ‘outsider’ community, and another for those who identify themselves as ‘insiders’ (Rubinstein 2005). Notably, the values and understandings of those for whom the impact of intervention is experienced as largely excluded from interveners’ definitions and measures of success.

This behaviour can be explained by the fact that it is politically expedient for interveners to claim that their initiative has been successful, regardless of its real effects. Many broad-based international interventions arise from the assumptions of the ‘liberal peace’ model – that democratisation, human rights, liberal market economics and the integration of societies into the global community bring peace and stability (MacMillan 1998). Success then tends to be measured according to how closely these objectives have been achieved, rather than according to how intervention has impacted upon the everyday worlds of the targets of intervention – particularly the less visible. By paying attention to actors that are usually invisible in the formulation of success and failure, we seek to problematise prevailing conceptualisations and discourses of success and the frameworks of analysis, design and evaluation that sustain them. Finally, impact assessment then needs to be related to the effect on the EU’s identity and projection as a peace and security actor. Thereby, we are able to identify both sides of the coin: one that identifies the actual output, outcome and impact in terms of increased peace and security in the regional conflict itself, and the other that identifies the status of the EU’s capacity and identity as a global peace and security actor.

The case of the EU as a defender of human rights has also been affected by the unexpected outcomes of some of its own policies most notably in its handling of migration. The prevalent security approach undertaken by the EU and Member states presents weaknesses on many fronts. First of all, some of the EU’s practices regarding the removal of irregular refugees are often found to breach human rights conventions. EU’s practice of relying on third states and authoritarian regimes

to help establish a more effective migration control regime often tends to conflict with such international law principles as *non refoulement*. In several cases, guarantees given by such states and regimes have proved not to be worth the paper on which they are written.

While the view is widely held that there is need to strengthen capacities in refugee-generating countries, the process which the EU has adopted has so far not yielded desired results. Collaborative activities between the EU and USA (such as data-sharing, screening and profiling etc.) arguably geared towards a more robust migration control often lead to allegations of “fortress Europe-USA”. In some instances, such practices have been perceived as encouraging discriminatory practices.

The EU’s strategy for handling its anti terrorism campaign has not fared well either. Quite naturally, the EU’s strong subscription to democratic values means that it eschews the use of violence to canvass political views. Consequently, the EU discountenances entities such as Hamas, the PKK given their propensity to adopting violent means to press home their demands. However, the drawback of this strategy is that what some might regard as the legitimate democratic claims (and one might say, gains) of such entities Hamas, for instance, its winning a democratic election, are perfunctorily ignored or rebuffed by the EU which prefers to deal with the entity from a security premises.

The EU-standards begin to unravel. However, when one considers its approach to entities that seemingly fall into the same cauldron as Hamas. A case in point here will be the manner in which the EU often responds to the Russian/Chechen

crisis, especially regarding terrorist attacks by one on another. When a terrorist attack on the Chechen Parliament occurred in October 2010, the EU’s appeal for a greater cooperation with Russia in fighting international terrorism fell on deaf ears in Moscow: the Russian leadership believed that the EU favoured Chechen campaign against Russia’s stability.

That said, one should not underestimate some of the immediate impacts that the EU’s involvement has had. This is particularly so in its direct engagement on the ground either through its delivering of humanitarian aid (as was the case in the Gaza strip for example) or through the deployment of fully fledged ESDP missions (as was the case with the deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR). With these instruments the EU has effectively been able to address some of the security problems even though it has been at a very local level and usually within a limited time-span linked to the duration of the mission itself. Focusing on the EU missions deployed under the Common Security and Defence Policy, those being designed as short-term interventions can be assessed positively. Both the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission and Artemis in the DRC had very limited mandates focusing mainly on the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in a geographically confined area within a short-time period. However, those missions seen within a rather long-term perspective and broader mandate are considered to be less efficient and successful.

For the European Union to establish itself as a globally recognised leader, its acceptance by external actors and international organisations is essential. Effectiveness and consistency are highly

relevant in this context, as bad performance will cast doubts about the capacity and willingness of the EU.

In terms of cooperation with regional organisations, the situation in the Horn of Africa highlights that although the AU and the IGAD generally welcome the cooperation with the EU, there are difficulties to cope both with the EU's demands and expectations. Furthermore, approaches followed by the EU do not necessarily conform to the position held by the AU or IGAD as the example of Omar al-Bashir's indictment by the ICC highlights. While the EU supports his indictment, the AU's and IGAD's position is that this has made negotiations on the conflict in Darfur more difficult and problematic. In addition, Sudan has become even less willing to cooperate with the EU, for example withdrawing from the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. In contrast to the African cases, the impact of EU's security governance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict manifests itself in the way the EU is understood by the core parties of the conflict. Thus, the Israelis believe that the EU is supporting the Palestinian Authority while the Palestinian Authority in turn believes that the EU supports Israel. In other words, the impact can be understood as distrust for the EU by both core parties to the conflict.

Furthermore, any success in outcome, output or impact is diminished by bureaucratic ineffectiveness resulting from the complex and demanding institutional set-up of the EU. Although the EU tries to be present on the ground not least through its Commission Delegations, inadequate exchange of information

between the Delegations hampers effective policy implementation. Also increasing the ineffectiveness of EU's security governance are the hierarchical and complicated relationships between Brussels and the field level due to the multitude of actors, an overlap of bilateral and EU policies and top-down approaches from Brussels. All this is further exacerbated by weak staff competence which implies that there are mainly inexperienced junior employees deployed to the most difficult settings where senior experts avoid to be deployed due to the difficult working and living conditions.

While the EU is resolute in its fight against terrorism and commitment to democratic governance, the Union has not been able to translate these ideals into support for those who desire them most. Rather, its machinery for social and political transformation continues to target elitist networks of government officials. Activists in Egypt and across the Mediterranean have been attempting to fill in this void through the flourishing of an independent civil society and other social networks: In the case of Egypt, bloggers have been quite efficient in this regard.

Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan formed the Agadir Initiative in 2002 to provide for free trade between these four countries, with the European Commission providing technical support for its implementation. Underlying such an initiative is however the flawed assumption that somehow economic development will automatically lead to political change, stability and security in the Mediterranean. This has been the 'European talk' and message that Arab regimes have been only too happy to oblige and transmit to their societies.

With regard to human rights violations, the EU's handling of human rights issue reveals inconsistencies and double standards in its actual policies for the promotion of human rights, especially in the haphazard use of CFSP instruments (2001). On a number of occasions, analysts have demonstrated how the widely heralded goal of human rights' protection and promotion has been sidelined due to other (more compelling) interests, such as economic advantages, commercial gains and security (Olsen 2000, Youngs 2001, Balfour 2006). Not surprisingly, the EU has traditionally shown a

greater zeal in resorting to punitive measures for violations of human rights in those regions of the world where it has 'the upper hand', particularly in the 'poor, marginal countries' of sub-Saharan Africa (Smith 2001: 193). In spite of differences and contradictions, the EU's discourse appears to have been coherent at least in so far as it has lived up to the 'people first' principle underlying the human security doctrine. However, when it comes to criticising and holding human rights abusers accountable, the EU's double standards manifest more conspicuously, thus undermining its credibility as a human right defender.

The EU and multilateralism: nine recommendations

In July 2007, the European Commission issued a call for proposals, on the theme of EU and multilateralism, within the Social Sciences and the Humanities of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research & Innovation. Three proposals were selected, each of them bringing together an international partnership of research institutions. Each team worked differently, adopting different approaches and methods. At the end of the three years, the projects known as Mercury, EU-GRASP and EU4Seas, jointly hosted the “Global Europe Conference on Multilateralism” held in Brussels on 7 October 2011. This final conference was an opportunity to share, discuss and converge ideas, and to present the projects’ findings to practitioners and stakeholders. The conference adopted a joint Policy Brief entitled “*The EU and Multilateralism: Nine Recommendations*” which articulated some nine policy recommendations:

1. THE EU MUST ADAPT TO CHANGING GLOBAL MULTILATERALISM.

The redistribution of power on a global scale and in wider Europe, pushed by the emergence of new centres of power and the urgency of global challenges (the financial crisis, climate change, maritime security, to name a few), highlights the need for more robust forms of multilateralism that deliver global public goods and contain emerging rivalries. But the main assumptions about global multilateralism need to change: the

new multilateralism will no longer be the exclusive preserve of states, nor will it be hierarchically organised in highly institutionalised organisations. The proliferation of multilateral regimes in the last two decades is shaping a ‘Multilateralism Mode 2.0’ characterised by the diversification of both the multilateral playing fields and multilateral actors. This more open multilateral system brings with it more opportunities for the EU. To take advantage of them, however, it needs to first come to grips with a new situation where asymmetries, variable geometries and oneofakind agreements will be the rule, rather than the exception. The EU must be steady in its promotion of multilateralism as an ideal, but extremely flexible in its multilateral practice, and find ways – for which EU governance seems particularly well fitted compared to the traditional diplomacies – to engage with legitimate subnational, multinational and transnational nonstate actors and their networks. At the same time, it must find innovative ways to address the problems of absent, competing, obsolete or ineffective multilateral structures that exist both at the regional and global level.

2. DEALING WITH A MULTIPOLAR WORLD OF REGIONS.

When engaging with regional organisations the dream of a ‘world of regions’ modeled on the image of the EU often results in a fixation on institutional questions, as a consequence, when institutions are absent or fail, a lack of strategic vision. The

kind of institutional support that has benefitted both small subregional organisations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and much larger ones, such as the African Union, are investments that should not be lightly abandoned. But the EU institutions must be flexible enough to work with other institutional structures or simply to create alliances with groups of countries that are promoting multilateral solutions in their regions and on the global scale, such as those of Latin America and of Africa. The parallel between the EU and other regional organisations, however, should not be replaced with a tendency to see the EU in constant comparison with the USA and the emerging powers, trying to act as their mirror image, or adopting their behaviour and, even less, their interpretation of power. The sui generis character of the EU is a strength in global multilateralism, and should not be abandoned lightly.

3. INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING DETERMINES THE ABILITY TO SUCCEED IN MULTILATERALISM.

The close compatibility between European Integration and multilateralism does not mean that the EU will automatically succeed as a multilateral player; indeed, the complex internal negotiations to reach a common position can make it much harder to play a decisive role in global multilateralism. Of the many reasons that explain the difficulties the EU has in global multilateral settings, the one which stands out is its lack of internal cohesion. The stark contrast between the EU's ability to play a role in trade negotiations in the WTO compared to the fiasco at the 2009 Copenhagen UN Climate Change Conference, for example, illustrates the point. If it wants to become a successful multilateral player, the EU must expend more effort using the combined

capabilities of the EU institutions and of EU national diplomacies to convince third parties, and less time negotiating amongst EU member states.

4. SINGLE VOICE, SINGLE CHAIR.

The EU is more successful in global multilateralism when it has a unified voice; the best way of ensuring this simple voice is often, but not always, to occupy a single, EU chair. This could be particularly important in the UN Security Council, as well as the IMF, the World Bank, the Contact Group for the Balkans, the G20, the P5+1 negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme, the Minsk Group and numerous other multilateral fora. This issue is extremely sensitive for member states, as illustrated by the efforts of some EU member states to sit at the G20 table when it was activated. However, it is no longer acceptable to consider membership in international organisations and in smaller multilateral fora (such as contact groups) a crucial issue of sovereignty when so many decisions that affect both citizens' lives and national politics are already highly integrated. Monetary policy is, given the current situation, the most blatant example. The EU is needed to solve many global issues, and a normative argument in favour of a single strong voice should be made to politicians and citizens to circumvent the monopolies that national diplomatic services guard at an unacceptable cost in terms of both increasing European influence and solving urgent global challenges.

5. MULTILATERALISM IS A STRATEGIC CHOICE WHICH SERVES EU INTEREST.

Success in multilateralism must not be judged only from a purely normative perspective – multilateralism as an objective per se – but also for its effectiveness, or lack thereof, in the production of public goods and the advancement

of EU goals. But EU interests must not be too narrowly defined. Contradiction between values and material interest is a common concern for EU policymakers and analysts. When the value at stake is the promotion of multilateralism, however, this contradiction is often more apparent than real. When seen in wider perspective, both of time and of issues, promoting multilateral frameworks at the expense of some immediate material interests is rational. Normbased contexts which produce multilateral policies constitute a better environment for the EU than crude power politics, which test its cohesion and almost invariably put the EU at a disadvantage. This is one lesson that EU member states have learned from their own engagement in European integration and that the EU as a whole must not forget: strengthening the system is sometimes worth the loss of an immediate negotiating goal.

6. COHERENCE IN VALUES DOES NOT CONFER A HIGHER MORAL GROUND.

Being flexible in the forms and modalities of multilateralism to circumvent the rigidities of an exceedingly institutional approach opens the possibility that the EU be accused of applying double standards. Coherence is a crucial value for success in the mid to long term, and the best way to ensure it is to apply uniformly the principles and values of the EU. But neither this normative approach, nor the success of European integration itself, confer a higher moral ground to the EU in its relations with individual countries or with less cohesive and integrated groups of states. Despite all its efforts to promote regionalism across the planet, the EU has alienated other regional groups by stressing its unique level of integration and demanding special treatment. Nowhere is this more obvious than at the UN, when the EU lost a first vote to upgrade its status

and could only win it after backtracking. Smaller subregional agreements on the peripheries of the EU, for example in the Black Sea, have shown that EU policies can make it considerably harder to maintain, let alone strengthen, looser forms of integration as the EU privileges its own strategies (enlargement, neighbourhood) over genuine multilateral cooperation.

7. THE UNION MUST MAKE SPACE FOR OTHER ORGANISATIONS IN EUROPE.

Multilateralism is also changing in Europe. The EU is the most advanced and most successful expression of multilateralism, but it is not the only game in town, and it should not behave that way. Despite the enlargement and neighbourhood rhetoric, the EU external border has become the strongest dividing element on the Continent. The EU needs to rethink its policies in order to open some space to wider (OSCE, NATO, Council of Europe) and narrower forms of multilateralism. This rethink is needed not just to uphold the EU's own commitment to multilateral solutions, but also to avoid a new polarisation on the Continent (the so-called 'spectre of a multipolar Europe') and the alienation of key players in its immediate neighbourhood. Even fragile and imperfect forms of regionalism, such as the ones found around the Baltic and the Black Sea, can act as steps towards an EU-style permanent peace. The usefulness of such weaker forms should not be judged, as the European Commission tends to do, by whether their norms and practices are formally compatible with the EU's own, but rather by whether they are helping to produce the changes in behaviour, attitudes and sense of identity that will provide the foundation for nonviolent problem solving and ultimately, a deeperreaching integration. Some of the organisations that are not purely regional but play a role have been overlooked by the EU because

they do not conform to categories of EU foreign relations: for example, GUAM has been overlooked in the postSoviet space, and the EU has stressed the cooperation that would be 'desirable' (for example, in the Southern Caucasus) rather than supporting the one emanating from the countries of the region.

8. THE EU HAS POWER, BUT ITS FRAGMENTATION MUST BE OVERCOME.

The normative drive to promote multilateralism can only be meaningfully satisfied when the EU develops the required capabilities. 'Market Power Europe' has been used to describe a powerful set of capabilities in economic issues, in particular those related to trade. But in other areas, this power is mostly fragmented and diffuse. The EEAS should provide a new arm to the EU's activity in regional and global multilateral forums; nonetheless, its impact will remain limited for as long as the member states' diplomatic services continue to keep substantial parts of their own multilateral engagement disconnected from the EEAS and from other EU institutions. From intelligence to public diplomacy to military force, the EU's multilateral involvement is limited by not having its own capabilities. In the case of peace missions, member states not only have to contribute the capabilities, but even to fund their own participation. Further development of CSDP, including a common mechanism for financing missions and further joint military and civil capabilities will be crucial

to increase the preparedness and effectiveness of EU action. The good news is that the indispensable (and most expensive) capabilities exist already at the hands of the member states, and they just need to be made operational in a joint manner, as ESDP/CSDP missions have shown in places like the Balkans, Africa and the Indian Ocean.

9. THE EU MUST LOOK OUTWARD AND BE PREPARED TO LISTEN AND TO LEAD.

There is growing demand for multilateral policies in the global and regional arenas for an increasing number of issues, from the fight against climate change to disease control. The USA has shown awareness that unilateralism is seldom the way to go, and the emerging powers still prefer systems that will constrain the West. There is, therefore, demand for more multilateralism and, arguably, demand for a larger European role. One thing the Euro crisis proves, for instance, is that the whole world wants a strong Euro and a strong EU in international monetary affairs. This stronger European role can only be played in a substantial way that is consistent across a broad spectrum of issues if the EU acts as a cohesive actor. In this most challenging hour of European integration, when the main achievements of the EU are under unprecedented tension, the Union can not afford to look exclusively inwards. Nor can it delegate its role in shaping global multilateralism to unpredictable combinations of the larger EU member states.

Conclusion: the EU as a focused, flexible and fast actor in peace and security

10

As would have been noted from the foregoing sections of this report, there is no doubt that the EU earnestly desires to play a critical and important role in global and regional peace and security in an environment of multilateralism. It is beyond controversy today that multilateralism is the way forward in dealing with some of the most daunting challenges and threats to human security. The benefit of effective multilateralism to states is as assuring as the dividends of democratic and security governance are to a world of multipolarity.

Certainly, effective multilateralism will necessarily require the diminishing and downscaling of the much-cherished principle of state sovereignty: each state that desires to be a partner in an effective multilateral system unavoidably accepts the relaxing of its grip on some of the traditional frontiers of sovereignty. Collapsing individual states' will and predilections under a regional or international organisation in the name of multilateralism implies a high level of trust that such an organisation shall deliver what the states ask of it through its constitutive instrument or state practice.

Together, there are three determinants that shape the role and influence of the EU as a global-regional actor in peace and security: willingness,

capacity and acceptance. Willingness relates to the power that member states entrust upon the EU. Whatever the ambitions of the EU are, the need to be in tune with the positions of its member states is crucial. Capacity refers to the organisational capacity and operational experiences. This implies not only resources but also sophistication of command structures. Acceptance relates to the place of the EU in the geopolitical reality and the multilateral playing field. This includes the institutional collaboration with the UN but also its relations with the different powers of today's multipolar world.

The EU has proved to be a formidable aspirant to effective multilateralism. In several aspects, it has adopted legal regimes and installed mechanisms towards ensuring that it continues to play a critical role in global and regional peace and security and continue to guarantee the trust placed in it by its member states. Nonetheless, the EU has not always got it right. And much remains to be done. In order to continue to be relevant and effective, the EU must be more ambitious and daring in its approach; it must step out of its comfort zone and embrace new prospects. In doing so, the EU needs to be purposeful and expedient. In short, it will serve the EU a great deal of purpose if it stays *focused*, remains *flexible*, and acts and reacts *fast* whenever situations arise. This approach is

what the EU-GRASP project refers to as the ‘triple F’ approach: *Flexible*, *Focused* and *Fast*, which concepts are articulated below *in seriatim*.

FLEXIBLE

One major criticism that has been levelled against the EU is that it often fails to take into account the individual dynamics and particular contexts of the partners it engages with. Instead, the tendency is for the EU to adopt a one-size-fits-all strategy, which is more often counterproductive. ‘Rigidity’ would frequently be injurious to dynamism in a multilateral environment, just as unbridled fluidity could equally threaten cohesion and undermine solidity. What the EU requires, is to temper its often-stifling obstinacy with some flexibility. This will not only enable the organisation to constantly evolve and adapt its strategies in consonance with developments around the world, such a process will also inspire confidence and increase trust among its partners.

As a regional organisation, the EU has had a tendency to emphasise inter-regional dialogue. This has brought forth some achievements and should be continued. However, the EU should endow itself with strategic approaches that would allow it to enter into interactions with a much wider variety of actors that make up the international environment. The focus should be on groups of states with multilateral ambitions, as well as on international organisations, especially the UN system.

FOCUSED

As would have been noted from the case studies covered in this project, the EU clearly aspires to be an ubiquitous player in the field of peace and security. This is commendable. However, the EU

does not have unlimited human and financial resources. Therefore, rather than risk becoming something of a jack of many trades and master of none, the EU should be more selective in its choices. While one may not prescribe for the EU exactly the thematic areas it should focus on - as an organisation the EU certainly knows where its strengths lies – we are of the opinion that the EU should be guided by various considerations in coming to decisions as to what and what not to include in its docket. However, ‘focusing’, as proposed by EU-GRASP, should not be mistaken for tepidity, or that the EU should stay condemned to those issues where it is always guaranteed some level of success even with minimal efforts.

FAST

Finally, the enlargement of the EU to its present strength of 27 members definitely bodes well for the organisation at least, as far as ventilating the ideas of the EU across Europe is concerned. As the aphorism goes, the more the merrier, and certainly even more so for Europe. However, the more is not necessarily the merrier for the EU-decision making process. Multilateral institutions are often propelled by national rather than collective interests of member states. The complex nature of CFSP decision-making process in the EU system does not help the matter. Debates are often endless resulting in either actions not being taken in time, taken at all, or taken outside the CSFP framework. It is tempting to suggest that core decision-making in the EU should be left to a group of states. While such a surrogate process will certainly reveal the lack of internal cohesion within the EU, it may in the short-term help to prevent stalemates and impasses. Were this option to be adopted, it will enhance EU’s decision-making processes and will mean that decisions are reached much faster.

It will be naïve to assume that ‘fast’ is an easy, ready-made option. To start with, the process for determining which group of states can competently take decisions on behalf of the whole EU should be expected to be as vitriolically controversial as possible. Nonetheless, it is possible that with increased promotion of common values by EU institutions, increased information exchanges, dialogue and coordination among member states, the EU decision-making process

becomes more expedient. Thus, for now, what the EU should focus on is developing mechanisms that can help it achieve a faster turn-around time in decision-making. A good start might be for the organisation to rid itself of the notorious, procedural complexities that characterise its systems. The institutional transformations resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, if made fully effective, have the potential to enable the Union to act in more timely and coherent way.

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VERS UN LIVRE BLANC EUROPÉEN DE LA SÉCURITÉ ET DE LA DÉFENSE : ENTRE « OBJET NON IDENTIFIÉ » ET FENÊTRE D'OPPORTUNITÉ

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Vers un Livre blanc
européen de la sécurité et
de la défense : entre « objet
non identifié » et fenêtre
d'opportunité.

Il est devenu nécessaire de rédiger un Livre blanc européen de la sécurité et de la défense. Malgré les obstacles et les réticences autour de cette idée à la longue histoire, il s'agit de donner une assise opératoire, doctrinale et militaro-technologique à la Stratégie européenne de sécurité. Le Livre blanc devra également servir à engager une refonte des instruments de défense par harmonisation des calendriers et rapprochement des politiques nationales de défense. Une fenêtre d'opportunité s'ouvre aujourd'hui car l'environnement économique et les contraintes budgétaires imposent synergies, mutualisations et coopérations renforcées et la rédaction de ce document hautement utile.

Toward a European Union
Security and Defence
White Paper : between
"non-Identified Object" and
Window of Opportunity.

It has become a necessity to draft a White Paper for European Union Security and Defence. Despite a long history of obstacles and hesitation around the subject, an operational, doctrinal and military-technological base for the European Security Strategy is very much needed. The White Paper will also be used to initiate a change of defence instruments with harmonisation of schedules and national defence policies. The economic environment has provided a window of opportunity with budget constraints requiring synergy, sharing and enhanced cooperation. It has also enabled the drafting of this useful document.

Vers un Livre blanc européen de la sécurité et de la défense : entre « objet non identifié » et fenêtre d'opportunité

André Dumoulin

La Stratégie européenne de sécurité (SES) mise à jour en 2008¹ devrait nous interpellier. En effet, nous pouvons nous attendre à y trouver quelques pistes à propos d'un « dictionnaire », un mode d'emploi réunissant lecture stratégique, concept de sécurité, définition de l'outillage collectif et planifications budgétaires communes. Il y a bien aujourd'hui, à travers la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC), des objectifs de capacité, des missions dites de Petersberg, des unités mises à la disposition de l'UE sur appel (*Headline goal*; *Battlegroups*), des déclarations politiques solennelles, des programmes autour de l'Agence européenne de défense; mais il n'y a pas encore de modèle de défense partagé. Si le premier cadre a vu le jour par une actualisation de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité, le second champ d'investigation est plus délicat et doit être défriché.

1. Cf. Sven Biscop et Jan Joel Anderson, *The EU and the European Security Strategy*, Routledge, 2007; Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010; André Dumoulin, « La sémantique de la "stratégie" européenne de sécurité. Lignes de forces et lectures idéologiques d'un préconcept », dans *Annuaire français de relations internationales* 2005, Centre Thucydide, Université de Paris 2, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005.

En effet, derrière lui se dissimule la notion de « Livre blanc » européen de la sécurité et de la défense. François Géré définit le « Livre blanc de défense » comme un document officiel, de périodicité variable, dressant un bilan de la situation géostratégique, faisant état des ressources – disponibles et en développement – et indiquant les missions des forces armées, s’accompagnant parfois d’indications sur les axes de développement pour l’avenir, intégrant quelquefois les buts stratégiques, la conception du rôle des forces armées en jouant même parfois le rôle d’un manifeste déclaratoire de la doctrine stratégique. Le Livre blanc est bien entendu aussi une construction sociale de la réalité politique. En tant qu’énoncé de sécurité, il est, en effet, un acte de langage émis par les autorités, afin de signaler à l’opinion, les menaces perçues contre ses intérêts vitaux (Ole Waever).

En sorte que le Livre blanc européen devrait avoir pour objet de préciser comment et avec quels moyens la SES doit être mise en œuvre.

En vérité, introduire un Livre blanc européen apporterait bien des avantages, à savoir :

- garantir une mise en œuvre satisfaisante de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité;
- aider à la réalisation d’éléments spécifiques : doctrine européenne intégrée, définition politique de la dissuasion, stratégie des moyens...
- informer l’opinion publique, les assemblées parlementaires et les parlements extérieurs à l’UE, pour leur expliquer les objectifs généraux de la PESD;
- constituer une source d’inspiration utile pour les États membres qui envisagent de poursuivre l’adaptation de leurs forces armées;
- interagir avec les programmations militaires pluriannuelles et les programmes R&D et R&T de l’Agence européenne de défense;
- renforcer les politiques de mutualisation dans le domaine de la défense et des opérations de gestion de crise;
- aider les industriels à déterminer les lignes de forces en matière d’équipements dans le cadre collectif;
- accroître la coopération, la cohérence et l’efficacité au plan européen par la définition collective de priorités et de visions partagées, la formation des Européens à une culture commune;
- stimuler le dialogue de coopération avec les États partenaires et surtout avec les alliés nord-américains et le Congrès de Washington.

Ballons d'essai anciens

L'idée de Livre blanc européen n'est cependant pas nouvelle¹. Lancée en 1994 en France par Pierre Lellouche, au nom de la délégation de l'Assemblée nationale pour les Communautés européennes dans un rapport sur l'Europe et sa sécurité², l'idée fut reprise par le Premier ministre Édouard Balladur en septembre de la même année en insistant sur la nécessité d'élaborer un Livre blanc sur la sécurité européenne qui puisse définir les lignes directrices de l'Union européenne dans ce domaine, en coopération avec l'Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO) et l'OTAN. Nous pourrions y ajouter les différentes déclarations de l'UEO dans les années 1980 et 1990 et, les propositions du Groupe à Haut niveau sur la PESC de la Commission européenne en novembre 1995 mais aussi de la proposition des pays fondateurs³ de la CEE. Certaines personnalités nationales prirent également le relais avec leurs propres propositions⁴.

Il faudra attendre le retour d'expérience de la guerre du Kosovo puis les effets du 11-Septembre pour savoir si les Européens peuvent continuer à avancer en matière militaire dans le cadre de l'Union européenne s'ils omettent de faire reposer cette montée en puissance relative et modeste sur un cadre normatif et descriptif public où chacun peut se situer, et auquel chacun peut se référer et s'identifier. Cela amena d'autres acteurs à mettre en avant l'importance de rédiger ce document (Lamberto Dini; Institut Clingendael; Fondation pour la recherche stratégique; Catherine Lalumière⁵; Paul Quilès). Gerhard Schröder, en tant que membre du SPD, imagina même un concept global de sécurité prenant en compte les éléments politiques, militaires, économiques, sociaux et écologiques⁶, alors que l'Institut d'études de sécurité (IES) de l'UEO consacrait, le 2 avril 2001, une réflexion sur ce concept.

C'est dans cet esprit à la fois prudent et pragmatique que s'inscrivirent les initiatives de la présidence belge au Conseil de l'UE au second semestre 2001. Faisant suite à des ballons d'essai lancés lors d'un colloque sous l'ancien ministre

1. Cf. André Dumoulin, « Analyse comparative des Livres blancs nationaux : vers une convergence européenne des politiques de défense vis-à-vis des États-Unis et de l'OTAN ? », in Yves Jeanclous (dir.), *La sécurité de l'Europe et les relations transatlantiques au seuil du XXI^e siècle*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2003, p. 259 - 267; André Dumoulin, *L'identité européenne de sécurité et de défense. Des coopérations militaires croisées au Livre blanc européen*, Bruxelles, Presses interuniversitaires européennes/Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 1999, p. 165-219

2. Pierre Lellouche, *L'Europe et sa sécurité*, Assemblée nationale, Paris, 31 mai 1994.

3. Avec l'Espagne mais sans les Pays-Bas, président à ce moment-là le Conseil de l'Union européenne.

4. À savoir le député allemand SPD Hartmut Soell, le député espagnol José Luis Lopez Henares, le ministre belge Jean-Pol Poncelet, le parlementaire grec Constantinos Vrettos, l'eurodéputé belge Leo Tindemans; le député belge Armand De Decker.

5. Catherine Lalumière, *Rapport sur l'établissement d'une politique européenne commune en matière de sécurité et de défense après Cologne et Helsinki*, 30 novembre 2000.

6. *Bulletin quotidien Europe*, n° 7961, Agence Europe, Bruxelles, 10 mai 2001, p. 3.

de la Défense Jean-Pol Poncelet en novembre 1997, le cabinet du ministre belge de la Défense¹, pour la première fois dans l'histoire du pays, proposait directement au Centre d'études de défense (CED) de l'Institut royal supérieur de défense de lancer une étude sur le concept de Livre blanc. Par prudence, l'objet de la recherche² fut limité à une « Introduction à l'étude comparative des Livres blancs, documents officiels et notes de politique générale relatifs à la politique de sécurité et de défense des quinze États membres de l'Union européenne »³.

Cette étude, qui insistait sur les difficultés méthodologiques de ce simple exercice de comparaison de documents uniquement officiels, permit d'entrevoir certains éléments de convergence sans cohérence globale pouvant aboutir,

Le Livre blanc devra également servir à engager une refonte des appareils de défense par harmonisation des calendriers et rapprochement des politiques nationales de défense

à terme, à une réflexion ultérieure sur la nécessité de réaliser un « Livre blanc » européen de la sécurité et de la défense.

En vérité, la thématique du Livre blanc fut inscrite dans le programme de la présidence belge dans son volet « sécurité et défense »⁴. L'objectif est

dès lors de lancer une dynamique qui pourrait conduire, à terme, à la rédaction d'un véritable « Livre blanc européen sur la Défense ».

Au final, un mandat fut donné à l'IESUE – qui a remplacé l'IES en 2002 – pour réaliser un modèle de Livre blanc européen. L'« European Defence. A proposal for a White Paper » sorti en mai 2004 avait à la fois assimilé la première stratégie de sécurité de l'UE (décembre 2003), pris en compte les tensions géopolitiques (Irak, Afghanistan) et transatlantiques, posé les jalons de l'assimilation du concept de sécurité intérieure et associé cinq scénarios et besoins capacitaires, y compris les lacunes à combler et les propositions de différents moyens pour y parvenir.

En effet, outil d'interrogation sur l'adaptation nécessaire des capacités militaires, le document rédigé en anglais – dont la moitié est consacrée aux scénarios

1. Le suivi fut réalisé en partie par le général Vankeirsbilck qui fut chef de cabinet militaire dans les cabinets Poncelet et Flahaut, par le colonel Aviateur Jo Coelmont et par Jean-Arthur Régibeau, conseiller du ministre Flahaut.
2. Elle fut réalisée par André Dumoulin (Université de Liège), Raphaël Mathieu (Centre d'études de défense – CED) et Vincent Metten (CED) entre le 1^{er} janvier et le 31 mars 2001.
3. André Dumoulin, « Analyse comparative des Livres blancs nationaux : vers une convergence européenne des politiques de défense vis-à-vis des États-Unis et de l'OTAN ? », dans *La sécurité de l'Europe et les relations transatlantiques au seuil du XXI^e siècle*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2003.
4. André Flahaut, « La présidence belge de l'UE : les priorités en matière de sécurité et de défense », *Revue de Défense nationale*, Paris, juillet 2001, p. 24.

de missions et de recommandations – fut, à l'époque, bien reçu par les ministères de la Défense européens mais sans que cela ne soit officiellement endossé.

Aussi, un futur « Livre blanc » européen de la sécurité et de la défense devra pouvoir tenir compte des enseignements du passé, d'une relecture des conditions d'affirmation de cet outil particulier en rebondissant sur l'essai, le « numéro zéro »¹ édité par l'IESUE en 2004.

Difficultés et enjeux

Quel qu'en soit le prix, l'exercice est souhaitable et même pressant afin de donner une assise opératoire, doctrinale et militaro-technologique à la Stratégie européenne de sécurité. Le Livre blanc devra également servir à engager une refonte des appareils de défense par harmonisation des calendriers et rapprochement des politiques nationales de défense, ceci afin de libérer davantage d'effectifs pour les missions extérieures de gestion de crise autant que pour lancer une réflexion doctrinale sur l'« *homeland security* » à conjuguer dans un esprit et un tempo « européens ».

Certes, plusieurs écueils sont déjà apparents. Le premier écueil repose sur la question du consensus préalable au lancement d'un nouvel exercice « Livre blanc » fragilisé par les enseignements tirés de la méthodologie de contournement engagée par les académiques pour rédiger le premier modèle, mais aussi et surtout par la crise « existentielle » actuelle de l'UE au travers de la crise économique en général et de la crise autour de l'euro en particulier.

Le deuxième obstacle est structurel. Rédiger un « Livre blanc » est plus complexe que s'en tenir à des secteurs spécifiques comme la coopération technico-militaire (via l'Agence de défense), la coopération académique (via l'Erasmus

1. Le travail fut organisé autour de débats et échanges lors des neuf réunions de la *task force* mise en place par l'Institut et qui ont débuté le 13 mai 2002 à Paris avec une fréquence bi- ou trimestrielle selon les périodes, l'objectif du groupe fut de réaliser un document descriptif pour les parties historiques, mais surtout prospectif et pragmatique, avec la définition d'options, de scénarios, d'hypothèses et de recommandations. La *task force* était composée de Rob De Wijk (Académie de défense, Pays-Bas); Jan Foghelin (Analyste de défense, Suède); Julian Lindley-French (chercheur IES) qui sera remplacé, pour cause de fin de mandat, à l'automne 2002, par Jean-Yves Haine (chercheur IES) qui sera le rapporteur final du rapport; Nicole Gnesotto (Directeur IES); William Hopkinson (RUSI, Royaume-Uni); Tomas Ries (Finlande, IES); Lothar Rühl (ancien secrétaire à la défense, Allemagne); Stefano Silvestri (IAI, Rome); André Dumoulin (ERM, Belgique); François Heisbourg (FRS, France). Ils seront rejoints parfois par Marc Otte (représentant de Solana), Hans Bernhardt Weisserth (Secrétariat général du Conseil). L'Espagnol Raphaël Bardaji, de l'IEEI, ne sera seulement présent qu'aux deux premières réunions. Relevons la réunion plénière spéciale du 24 juin 2002 réunissant la *task force* et des représentants des États membres afin d'assimiler les points sensibles nationaux

militaire autour du Collège européen de sécurité et de défense – CESD), la coopération opérationnelle (via les *Battlegroups*) ou la planification générique (*headline goal* 2010, objectif civil 2010). Non pas que ces différentes composantes recèlent moins de pièges, de rivalités et de limites souverainistes, mais elles forment des ensembles suffisamment cohérents pour se solidifier à la carte, avec leur propre logique, avec une certaine « autonomie ». Par contre, un « Livre blanc » suppose l'harmonisation de ces différents chapitres constitutifs, le document étant situé conceptuellement juste en dessous de la « Stratégie européenne de sécurité » de l'Union.

À cet égard, la méthode utilisée à l'époque par Javier Solana, les capitales et l'IESUE pour aider à la rédaction de ladite Stratégie pourrait être réutilisée pour asseoir la légitimité et l'assise d'un futur exercice « Livre blanc » avec ses différents allers-retours et évaluations croisées, les capitales ayant en définitive toujours le dernier mot, intergouvernementalisme oblige. Relevons que l'apport de l'IESUE sur la « Vision à long terme » (à vingt-cinq ans) est resté cantonné aux domaines civils ou dual (démographie, économie, énergie, environnement et science&technologie)¹, laissant le soin aux capitales et au Comité militaire de l'UE d'aborder les questions stratégiques et militaires. Le tropisme « relations internationales » plutôt que « défense » du nouveau directeur de l'IESUE renforcerait subtilement et « involontairement » cette séparation.

La troisième difficulté tient évidemment à la permanence d'un différentiel de culture militaire et stratégique qui s'exprime justement à travers les Livres blancs nationaux. Sauf à imaginer une addition surréaliste de Livres blancs rédigés par chaque État, créant de fait « le » Livre blanc européen, les capitales ne pourront faire l'économie d'une introspection à propos des critères de rapprochement dans le champ sécuritaire européen. C'est pour cette raison que certains auteurs suggèrent d'intégrer dans le « Livre blanc » le récit fondateur de l'UE pour « fixer » les représentations et entretenir la mémoire, avant d'aborder les différents aspects de la sécurité intérieure et extérieure, la hiérarchisation des intérêts, la sécurité des frontières de l'UE, le capacitaire, la mutualisation, etc.

Si les difficultés abondent et que l'environnement politique européen actuel ne prédispose pas à une large marge de manœuvre et à l'optimisme des engagements et des audaces, reste que plusieurs jalons ont déjà été posés pour que la relance du « Livre blanc européen de la sécurité et de la défense » ne soit pas considérée comme une utopie, un gadget, un texte théorique de plus dont les Européens, paraît-il, sont si friands.

1. Nicole Gnesotto et Giovanni Grevi (dir.), *The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?* IESUE, 2006.

Vers une relance du concept

Les petites phrases ont recommencé à resurgir il y a quelques années ; qu'il s'agisse de déclarations informelles dans les cercles franco-allemands, d'une étude du Centre militaire italien d'étude stratégique (CMISS), des rapports pilotes par Patrice Cardot dans le cadre du Conseil général de l'armement français (CGARM, 2006 et 2008)¹, des travaux du groupe de Venusberg (2004), du Livre blanc français de la défense (2008) qui s'est prononcé explicitement en faveur d'un Livre blanc européen de la défense et de la sécurité, des travaux du général Perruche (CR)² qui a travaillé sur une méthodologie de rédaction d'un Livre blanc européen³ ou de ce que révèle la déclaration de l'Association des industries aéronautiques et de défense du 31 octobre 2008, à l'issue de la Conférence de haut niveau sur les capacités européennes de défense (Marseille), qui soutint les initiatives de la présidence française de l'Union européenne visant notamment à harmoniser les besoins opérationnels des États membres.

Rappelons-nous également les déclarations de Pierre Lellouche au Cercle de Brienne en 2010, les analyses de Jean-Pierre Maulny⁴ ou celles de Sven Biscop et de Joe Coelmont⁵ sur les liens entre la grande stratégie, les missions et opérations de la PESD/PSDC et la nécessité de disposer d'un « *EU White Book* ».

Quant aux parlementaires européens⁶, ceux de l'Assemblée de l'UEO⁷ et ceux du SPD allemand⁸, ils insistent sur l'importance de lancer cet exercice⁹ qui doit aborder les différentes facettes de la sécurité-défense. Et d'estimer « que ce Livre blanc devrait constituer la base d'un large débat mené en public principalement parce que la SES définit les valeurs et objectifs fondamentaux de l'Union

1. « Éléments de réflexion sur la sécurité comme moteur de l'intégration politique », dans *Europe Documents*, Bulletin quotidien Europe n° 2473/2474, Bruxelles, 20 décembre 2007 ; « Du réexamen de la stratégie européenne de sécurité », dans *Défense* n° 134, IHEDN, juillet-août 2008.

2. Cadre de réserve.

3. Par exemple, que chaque État rédige un double document : un document de politique nationale et un document sur la politique européenne.

4. Jean-Pierre Maulny, « L'UE et le défi de la réduction des budgets de défense », *Papers*, septembre 2010, pp. 8-9.

5. Sven Biscop et Joe Coelmont, *A Strategy for CSDP Europ's Ambitions as a Global Security Provider*, Egmont Paper 37, Bruxelles, October 2010.

6. Herlmut Kühne, « La mise en œuvre de la stratégie européenne de sécurité et la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense », adopté en mai 2008.

7. Voir la partie « Livre blanc européen » dans le rapport de Daniel Ducarme sur « La révision de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité ».

8. « Vers une armée européenne », Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 31 janvier 2008.

9. Il y préconise l'élaboration d'un Livre blanc européen qui devra porter sur les progrès de la SES depuis sa mise en œuvre en 2003 ; la relation entre sécurité intérieure et sécurité extérieure, la protection des frontières, la sécurité de l'approvisionnement énergétique, les conséquences du changement climatique et des catastrophes naturelles pour la protection des populations ; le concept de sécurité humaine...

et illustre ce pourquoi elle est conçue ; souligne que l'évaluation future de la SES doit être menée en privilégiant une responsabilité démocratique accrue et, partant, doit s'effectuer en coopération étroite avec toutes les institutions de l'UE, notamment le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux »¹.

Rôle et opportunité de l'AED

Pour ce faire, et d'un point de vue opératoire, c'est probablement l'Agence européenne de défense qui pourrait lancer la dynamique, en liaison avec les capitales et avec certains apports de l'IESUE. Elle est en effet la mieux placée pour travailler ce concept dans la mesure où les politiques de défense sont d'abord l'addition de moyens, de capacités, de programmations et de planifications en équipements et en budgets. Elle est d'autant mieux outillée que sa mission est bien de tenter de surmonter les déficiences, à savoir les divisions et le manque de cohérence entre États et au sein de différentes communautés (planificateurs de capacités, experts en R&T, experts en armement, industrie) pour finalement aboutir à une vision globale. En travaillant sur l'association entre planification militaire, industrie de défense et recherche (harmonisation des besoins, standardisation, rationalisation, mutualisation, niches), elle opère directement sur l'anticipation des besoins capacitaires.

Le fait que l'Agence reste sous contrôle des États dans son fonctionnement permet de maintenir les garde-fous nationaux qu'aucune capitale ne veut lever aujourd'hui, mais peut aussi – dans les limites imposées par ces contraintes et précautions – favoriser paradoxalement les avancées à petits pas. Bref, la méthode qui fonde les progressions de l'Union dans les dossiers les plus délicats. Aussi, la « récupération » par l'AED de l'évaluation du concept de Coopération structurée permanente (CSP) introduite dans le traité de Lisbonne pourrait faciliter la rédaction de ce « Livre », comme semble nous le suggérer l'article 2-b du protocole n° 10².

Dans le rapport du député français Yves Fromion remis au Premier ministre français (2010) et qui concernait la CSP, il est dit que la politique européenne des capacités et de l'armement prévue par le traité de Lisbonne et qui reste à définir, doit l'être en corrélation avec l'élaboration d'un « Livre blanc européen »,

1. À propos des questions d'opinions publiques, voir André Dumoulin et Philippe Manigart, *Opinions publiques et politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune : acteurs, positions, évolutions*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2010.
2. Cet article mentionne en effet que : « À rapprocher, dans la mesure du possible, leurs outils de défense, notamment en harmonisant l'identification des besoins militaires, en mettant en commun, le cas échéant, en spécialisant leurs moyens et capacités de défense, ainsi qu'en encourageant la coopération dans les domaines de la formation et de la logistique ».

prélude à une « loi de programmation militaire européenne ». Il se rattache aux interventions insistantes de Karl Von Wogau (Parlement européen) pour donner au futur Livre blanc un cadre davantage capacitaire qu'institutionnel, symbolique et politique. Il poursuit ici les idées qu'il avait déjà émises dans son dernier rapport sur la stratégie européenne¹ et lors de son *workshop* du 6 mars 2008 au Parlement européen², mais cette fois à travers sa nouvelle Fondation pour la sécurité européenne qui se lance actuellement et de manière non institutionnelle dans une tentative de rédaction d'un modèle de Livre blanc. Mieux, les propositions franco-germano-polonaises de fin 2010 pour une nouvelle impulsion pour la PSDC sont telles qu'elles ne peuvent qu'imposer la rédaction concomitante d'un Livre blanc européen qui sera probablement soutenue par la lettre germano-suédoise³ et par les travaux de l'AED qui seront lancés cette année sur l'identification des domaines pouvant donner lieu à la mutualisation et au partage des moyens⁴.

Contexte et fenêtre d'opportunité

Reste que malgré ces multiples sollicitations et ballons d'essai, le concept achoppe encore et toujours autour des divergences entre États sur l'opportunité de s'y risquer. Il y a ceux qui y croient, ceux qui le veulent mais n'y croient pas en réalité et enfin ceux pour qui il faut se lancer mais pas tout de suite.

Pourtant, l'environnement international et la situation économique l'imposent. Nous subodorons que la profondeur de la crise va imposer aux décideurs politiques, militaires et économiques de rechercher de nouvelles synergies sous peine de voir s'effiloche ce qui a été construit depuis plus de dix ans dans le champ européen à travers la PESD. Les problèmes budgétaires peuvent donc être « une chance », peut-être la dernière. Cela doit inciter à lancer de nouvelles synergies, mutualisations, coopérations renforcées de manière dynamique et audacieuse dans le champ de la sécurité-défense.

Certes, cela impose une convergence des besoins, mais déjà nous pouvons constater que les lacunes et objectifs capacitaires sont du même ordre à l'UE et à l'OTAN. L'urgence est là au vu des contraintes budgétaires. Rappelons-nous que les convergences monétaires (soutien à l'euro et politique économique com-

1. Karl Von Wogau, *Rapport sur la stratégie européenne de sécurité et la PESD*, document A6-0032/2009, Commission des affaires étrangères, Parlement européen, Bruxelles, 28 janvier 2009.
2. Policy Department External Policies, *The Future of the European Security Strategy : towards a White Book on European Defence held on thursday 6 march 2008*, Directorate General External Policies of the Union, European Parliament, Brussels, March 2008.
3. EDD n° 370, Agence Europe, Bruxelles, 30 novembre 2010.
4. Cf. les déclarations sous présidence belge de l'UE sur « l'esprit de Gand » (2010).

mune) et militaires (mutualisation) au niveau européen participent du même processus de construction de tout État moderne. L'un ne va pas sans l'autre. Toute mesure de protection de la monnaie européenne « impose » en quelque sorte une maturation collective en matière de sécurité.

Et c'est ici que le Livre blanc européen pourrait voir surgir sa fenêtre d'opportunité. ■

Ce document n'engage pas les institutions de rattachement.



The Libyan Operation and Europe's Role in Defence and Security

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Summary

In the medium-term, and as witnessed during the recent operation in Libya, there may not be any dramatic change regarding the impact and shape of the Common Security and Defence Policy. For now, the CSDP and NATO are still compatible because the CSDP's initial goals are still unfulfilled; but in the future, how its relationship with NATO will evolve is uncertain. If European countries were to strongly boost their military capabilities, to the point that they fulfil the initial goals of the Saint-Malo Declaration, one may see the beginning of a new era of increased European contribution to defence and security. At the same time, this would pose new issues for its relationship with NATO and the United States in terms of sharing the burden of such responsibilities. In any case, the transatlantic relationship will also depend on the quality of the relationship between the United States and its European allies. As of today, seen as a whole in the multiplicity of its policies and within a broader understanding of the concept of security, part of a larger foreign policy framework, the European Union seems to be responding to an evolving world and has more and more means to articulate a relevant position that will enable it to be the meaningful and effective global actor that it has aspired to become. Yes, Libya led Europeans a little further, but much remains to be done to turn Europe into a single, effective and efficient actor in the field of defence.

The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, met with National Transitional Council (NTC) Chairman Abdel Jalil in Libya on November 12, 2011, marking the end of the successful NATO operation. However, this success was not that of the Common Security and Defence Policy [CSDP, formerly called the ESDP and the defence branch of the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)] - rather it was a success of a European initiative pushed within the NATO framework. These developments therefore provide an occasion to reflect on the European Union's role in defence and security affairs in the short and medium-terms.

Within the Union, Member States have on several occasions shown differentiated, if not divided, responses to international events. In this context, the Franco-British partnership has provided an engine for European military action, although irregularly and outside the frame of the CFSP.

This absence of internal cohesion and the lack of European military capabilities have spurred criticism from the United States, which has pressed Europe to shoulder its fair share of the security burden. At the same time, Americans have been concerned about the development of the ESDP insofar as the consolidation of an autonomous European defence and security force would be a potential challenger to the pre-eminence of NATO.¹ Yet, today, in view of the continuing lack of autonomy of ESDP/CSDP vis-à-vis NATO, this apprehension seems less relevant. Despite several noteworthy achievements, a number of constraints exist and they lead one to believe that a strong role for a united Europe in matters of defence and security may not develop significantly in the coming years.

The Lessons of the Libya Mission: Europe Divided

As mentioned earlier, the prominent European role in the Libyan operation was not the collective victory of European defence policy. Even though European countries today share a common line on Libya, one witnessed the same scenario of initial dissension that occurred in 2003: back then, France and Germany had opposed the war in Iraq, while countries such as the United Kingdom and Poland had actively supported the US position. This time, similarly, Member States disagreed over the suggestion of a no-fly zone over Libya, which *de facto* made the use of CSDP out of question.² Germany abstained on the UN vote for a resolution on Libya. In doing so, it found itself in the company of China

¹ The abbreviations ESDP and CSDP are used interchangeably. Earlier, policies were devised for the ESDP, which, since the Lisbon Treaty (2009), has been re-coined as CSDP.

² Toby Vogel, "EU divided over Libya", <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/march/eu-divided-over-libya/70525.aspx>.

and Russia, though for different reasons, and stood firmly by her post World War II preference for civilian solutions.³

On the other hand, the Libyan operation has shown the will of a strong Franco-British core, which had also crucially pushed for a European defence initiative through the Saint-Malo Declaration (1998). The Joint Anglo-French communiqué, adopted on November 10, illustrates a renewed commitment to a strong relationship: “the successful outcome of Operation Unified Protector in Libya bolstered our partnership... The parties examined the lessons to be learned at NATO and bilaterally from this UK- and French-led effort.”⁴ Indeed, while the American administration tried to circumscribe its engagement in Libya, France and the United Kingdom proactively favoured intervention.⁵ They strongly promoted the enforcement of a no-fly zone eventually adopted by a United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 in March 2011.⁶ They were also among the first countries to act militarily. Thus, these European countries demonstrated their will and capacity to significantly engage during the recent NATO-led operation in Libya.

In view of the milder involvement of France and the United Kingdom in the ongoing Syrian turmoil, the operation in Libya may suggest that the Franco-British dynamic in defence works particularly well when recognizable national interests are at stake. This was apparent in French foreign minister Alain Juppé’s comments to RTL Radio, when he said:

“What I know is the NTC [National Transitional Council] said very officially that concerning the reconstruction of Libya it would turn in preference to those who helped it. That seems fair and logical to me.”⁷

Allegations of a secret deal between France and Libya exposed by the French newspaper *Libération* last April assuring France of a third of Libya’s oil in exchange for French

³ The idea of a ‘civilian power’ Germany has been debated in academic circles. See S. Harnisch and H. Maull, *Germany as a civilian power?: The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester University Press, 2001).

⁴ Présidence de la République Française, *Joint Anglo-French Communiqué*, <http://appablog.wordpress.com/2011/11/10/joint-anglo-french-communique/>.

⁵ As stressed by newspapers, the US “signed on to the ‘time-limited’ mission, with the caveat that European and Arab governments would take the lead.” See, Kim Willsher, “As France takes the reins on, Sarkozy triumphs”, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/20/world/la-fg-libya-sarkozy-20110320>.

⁶ NATO and Libya – Operation Unified Protector, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B53C80A5-92FA1785/natolive/topics_71652.htm.

⁷ Adam Taylor, “France leads the charge for Libyan oil”, http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-09-01/europe/30128588_1_interim-government-oil-rights-total-crude-oil#ixzz1ecwWAWfP.

support to the NTC, point in the same direction.⁸ Besides oil, domestic reasons, such as the upcoming presidential elections in 2012 in France and the consequent desire of the French president to gain popularity, would have played a role in the decision to engage actively in the operation.⁹

On the British side, the revelation by the Guardian last September that British Petroleum was already in 'private' talks with the NTC¹⁰ and that part of the oil industry had been working with the UK government to change the regime in Libya, also underlines the British interest in Libya's oil.¹¹

That said, this argument has its limits as other countries have expressed the desire to have their share of the pie. Thus, Italy's former Foreign Minister Franco Frattini stressed in August on Italian television that the Italian company ENI '(would) have a No.1 role in the future' in Libya.¹²

In view of this situation, the role of the CSDP as an effective tool for providing defence and security remains doubtful.

Europeans and Americans, NATO and CSDP: Not that Simple an Equation

What about transatlantic relations? To recall, the US government earlier promoted the idea of a European Defence Community. But later the Americans seemed to have feared that a developing ESDP may clash with NATO.

However, in the post Cold War and post-Bosnian war context, it had been increasingly acknowledged that Europeans had to be able to manage the causes of instability in their neighbourhood. The Bosnian war had revealed the substantial capability gap that crippled European action and the change of strategic context had revealed the necessity to rethink the concept of security in Europe.¹³

⁸ Vittorio de Fillipis, "Petrole : l'accord secret entre le CNT et la France", <http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012357324-petrole-l-accord-secret-entre-le-cnt-et-la-france> (September 2011).

⁹ Angelique Chrisafis, "Sarkozy hopes Libya can boost France's reputation - as well as his own", <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/01/sarkozy-libya-france-reputation-reelection>.

¹⁰ Julian Borger and Terry Macalister, "The race is on for Libya's oil, with Britain and France both staking the claim", http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/01/libya-oil?CMP=twtd_f.

¹¹ Terry Macalister, "The next war in Libya is the one for oil", <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/02/next-war-libya-one-for-oil>.

¹² Clifford Krauss, "The scramble for access to the Libyan oil wealth begins", <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/business/global/the-scramble-for-access-to-libyas-oil-wealth-begins.html?pagewanted=all>.

¹³ A.J.K. Shepherd, "Irrelevant or Indispensable? ESDP, the 'War on Terror' and the Fallout from Iraq", *International Politics* 43 (2006), pp. 71-92.

Spurred by this realisation, France and the United Kingdom stated in the milestone 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” The parallel development of the ESDP that resulted from this intention had famously led former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to warn about the necessity to avoid the ‘3D’: discrimination against non-EU NATO members (such as Turkey), decoupling of European/NATO decision-making and duplication of defence resources.¹⁴

Thus, although the Saint-Malo Declaration had made clear that Europeans would act “in conformity with (their) respective obligations in NATO”, “(contribute) to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance” and “take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole (was) not engaged”, the US found the ESDP ambiguous, if not problematic. There was a risk of possible competition, whether geographically or sectorally; the same European assets would be needed for NATO and ESDP.

One potential bone of contention with NATO was the agreement between European governments on a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), reached nearly a decade ago. Indeed, while ESDP has been changing, NATO has also been undergoing reforms, partly to counter the pervasive critiques of its post-Cold War irrelevance. As mentioned by Robert Gates, one major change was “the transition from a static, defensive force to an expeditionary force – from a defensive alliance to a security alliance,”¹⁵ that is, a broadening of the scope of NATO operations that bring them closer to ESDP operations. This attempt to re-orient itself led to the launch of the NATO Response Force (NRF) in 2002. The coexistence of the ERRF and NRF have raised questions such as: Will there be a possible division of labour? What will be the resource base of the NRF and ERRF, given that, in view of the limited resources of European countries, it would probably be the same? Who will have the command and the right of first refusal? Ultimately, the creation of a more modest force, the EU Battle Group, following the new 2010 Headline Goal, made these questions less relevant.

To a large extent, ESDP missions are still very dependent on NATO assets and planning capabilities, which they use thanks to the 2002 Berlin Plus arrangements. This lack of autonomy, that is the ability to carry out missions independently, appeared again, though in another form; Mission Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, can be considered as autonomous insofar as it did not rely on NATO assets, but the fact

¹⁴ Madeleine K. Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future”, *Financial Times*, December 7, 1998.

¹⁵ Robert M. Gates, “Speech on the NATO strategic concept”, February 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/nato/gates-speech-nato-strategic-concept-february-2010/p21518>.

remains that one Member State, namely France, coordinated the operations as the framework nation.¹⁶ This was crucial for its success.¹⁷

Another crucial factor of the Europe-NATO relationship and thereby of the fate of the CSDP is the political will and orientation of key Member States. On the one hand, tensions have been nurtured by divisions between Member States, and consequently between transatlantic allies. One may remember the famous remark made by former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in January 2003, qualifying France and Germany as 'old Europe', as opposed to what would be the pro-US Eastern 'new Europe'. On the other hand, the relationship of Europe with NATO and the United States has been kept ambiguous by the coexistence of two strategic cultures, the British and the French ones, which have envisioned this relationship differently. Traditionally, France has understood the ESDP as a way to build a strong pole of independent European defence, while the UK has seen it as a way to share the burden with NATO, in order to keep the American ally interested in Europe.¹⁸ The 'constructive misunderstanding' that was witnessed by many at the time of the adoption of the European Defence and Security Policy at Saint-Malo, has not disappeared.¹⁹

Despite the recent reintegration of France into the military command of NATO, questions on this issue remain. Moreover, new ESDP structures, such as the creation of a EU planning cell and a liaison team in the EU military staff, have not helped to define a clearer European understanding of 'autonomy' towards NATO.²⁰ As a result of subtle negotiations, they provided ESDP with new tools, but did not impact the current balance between ESDP and NATO.

As noted by commentators, the ESDP has undergone important transformations over the past 10 years.²¹ By 2009, it had already been involved in 23 missions, as diverse as

¹⁶ The EU definition of a framework nation was derived from NATO and WEU concepts and is stated as "a Member State or a group of Member States that has volunteered to, and that the Council has agreed, should have specific responsibilities in an operation over which the EU exercises political control", http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2009.php#P129_11763.

¹⁷ Robert Gates (2010), Note 15.

¹⁸ See J. Howorth, "The EU as Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48 (3) (2010), pp. 455-474; and J. Howorth and A. Menon, "Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not Balancing the United States", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53 (2009), pp. 727-744.

¹⁹ C. J. Bickerton, B. Irondelle and A. Menon, "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49 (1) (2010), pp.1-21, p. 3.

²⁰ Shepherd (2006), Note 13.

²¹ European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), *European Security and Defence Policy – The First Ten Years*, 2009.

police, observation, peacekeeping, reforms of the judicial system and police training, on several continents. They intervened for instance in Chad, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, missions have showcased the increasing autonomy of EU actions: in March 2003, Operation Concordia replaced NATO troops in Macedonia and was followed by the police mission, Operation Proxima. In June 2003, the EU responded to a request from the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Interestingly, the ESDP developed a strong and integrated civilian dimension through the Petersberg Tasks, which include humanitarian and rescue work, conflict-prevention and peace-keeping as well as post-conflict stabilisation tasks.²² According to some scholars, it has been going towards more long-term civilian stabilization operations and counter-terrorism, instead of only military crisis management operations.²³

In order to enhance its capabilities and effectiveness, and respond to an evolving strategic environment, the European Council approved new targets for the CSDP. These were enumerated notably in the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999), the European Capabilities Action Plan (2002) and the Headline Goal 2010 (2004). The latter states that Member States commit themselves “to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union.” Last in line, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) showed a renewed European ambition for the ESDP/CSDP and strengthened it with several innovations, among which are the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Action Service, a mutual defence clause and a protocol of ‘permanent structured cooperation’.

That said, the most pertinent reproach by the US is about the weakness of Europe’s military power, which also impacts on NATO’s effectiveness. European countries have been engaged in NATO operations, for instance in Afghanistan. 24 EU Member States provided around half the International Security Assistance Force and took part in Provincial Reconstruction Teams.²⁴ But the US feels that this assistance does not meet the requirements and has urged many countries like Germany to expand their military commitments. As the commitment of European countries to the Afghan operations waned, so did the American desire to shoulder the burden alone.

The final speech given by US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates on June 2011 in Brussels,

²² See the Europa glossary at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm.

²³ Bickerton et al. (2010), Note 19, p. 4.

²⁴ At the same time, note that the EU as such engaged through a Europol police mission, launched in the Spring 2007 and involving 160 police, law enforcement and justice experts. It also contributed \$ 1.1 billion in aid to Afghanistan through the EC budget from 2002 to 2006.

reflected this sentiment clearly.²⁵ Gates clearly stated that the shortcomings revealed in Libya (as in Afghanistan), “incapability and will”, could put at risk NATO’s “ability to conduct an integrated, effective and sustained air-sea campaign.” Noting that the operation has “shown the potential of NATO, with an operation where Europeans are taking the lead with American support”, he stated “while every alliance member voted for Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission. (...) many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t.” At issue notably was the lack of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and the shortage of munitions that several allies faced only 11 weeks after the beginning of the operation. This makes the future prospects of the alliance uncertain. He stressed that future American leaders “may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost”, if European defence capabilities keep declining, and the Congress, even more so in a time of budget cuts, may be less willing to expend funds for Europe. The US may turn towards Asia. The remark on “the many areas where U.S. defense engagement and investment in Asia was slated to grow further in coming years” was significant as it alluded to the growing importance of Asia as an American strategic priority.

Bleak Prospects of a Significant European Role

Beyond considerations about NATO-CSDP compatibility, and despite a certain consolidation over the years, numerous challenges remain for the European Common Security and Defence Policy.

Lack of military capabilities in European countries and the related issue of under-financing and investment is today one of the main obstacles to the development of a significant European role. The Capabilities Improvement Conference in 2001 identified several shortfalls, many of which persist despite initiatives such as the creation of the European Defence Agency.

Troops and resources are still lacking. According to the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), although the cumulative defence expenditures of the Member States have increased in absolute terms from 160 billion Euros in 1999 to 210 billion Euros in 2008, they have relatively decreased as a percentage of GDP.²⁶ Robert Gates recently estimated that European defence spending declined ‘by nearly 15 percent in the decade following 9/11’. As a result, and despite the agreed NATO benchmark, only the

²⁵ Robert Gates, “Reflections on the status and future of the transatlantic alliance”, <http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Contentnavigation/Activities/Activitiesoverview/tabid/1292/EventType/EventView/EventId/1070/EventDateID/1087/PageID/5141/Reflectionsonthestatusandfutureofthetransatlanticalliance.aspx>.

²⁶ EUISS (2009), Note 21, p. 77.

UK, France, Greece, along with the US and Albania, spend more than two per cent of their GDP on defence.²⁷ The current debt crisis in Europe makes a substantial evolution in the short run highly unlikely.

As Robert Gates underlined, the question would be how to best allocate resources. Pooling resources and specialization are the other alternatives that have demonstrated a positive impact. For instance, during the operation in Libya, they allowed smaller countries such as Norway and Denmark to very effectively contribute; they struck almost one third of the targets, while providing only 12 per cent of strike aircraft.²⁸

Belgium and Canada also made noticeable contributions, as Gates explained, '*with their constrained resources, found ways to do the training, buy the equipment, and field the platforms necessary to make a credible military contribution.*' The Danes have specialized by discarding their submarine fleet and doubling their expeditionary force.²⁹ The 2010 UK-France Defence Cooperation Treaty, which envisions pooling of resources through the development of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, capabilities sharing and closer cooperation (notably on technology), is along the same lines. However, one may wonder what to expect on a larger scale. Defence remains a sensitive sector, which makes pooling of sovereignty an uneasy choice for countries.

The second important issue for CSDP is a lack of flexibility in decision-making, as decisions require unanimity in the Council of the European Union. As a result, and even more so with 27 Member States, decisions are hard to make.

A final problem is a lasting lack of coherence and clarity in European strategy. The 2003 European Security Strategy differs in several points from the 2002 American Security Strategy and seems thus to have helped to shape a European vision, that is, for instance, supportive of multilateralism.³⁰ Even though the Lisbon Treaty has presented renewed European ambitions for the ESDP/CSDP and thus strengthened its profile with several innovations mentioned above, there is the potential to enhance policy coherence, effectiveness and visibility.³¹

²⁷ Robert Gates (2011), Note 25.

²⁸ Example given by Robert Gates in his above-mentioned speech.

²⁹ Robert Gates (2010), Note 15.

³⁰ An important difference, as often argued, is the different approach that the EU takes on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

³¹ European Parliament, "The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on ESDP", Briefing Paper, January 2008, https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:TYw4v-pnE6AJ:www.statewatch.org/news/2008/feb/ep-esdp-lisbon.pdf+%E2%80%98The+impact+of+the+Lisbon+Treaty+on+ESDP+%E2%80%99,+Briefing+Paper,+Directorate+General+External+Policies+of+the+Union,+January+2008&hl=en&gl=in&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShEtvkDH3MUWMGwURW5Dnv0R0lmvU-WQ9IYIsvwum9zU5VZ8vGvNV88U2tYfHAKapiTj1MJYeif5SEiFjXielW4yo52T4seHf6U_88d_h2Riy1unXuzZn7YDqwb5uxH9knvmdo&sig=AHIEtbSGAZ9UlxygssuGFECJYxVn4vUgtg&pli=1, p. 3.

On the whole, as proved with the operation in Libya, the very legitimacy and coherence of a European strategy and action seem undermined by parallel, and sometimes contradictory, national foreign policies of Member States. This is partly why Europe has been compared to a ping-pong player, as opposed to the US, along with China and India, which would be regarded as chess players.³²

Conclusion

Thus, today, one may argue that the prospects of a strong role for Europe (i.e. the EU Member States) in matters of defence and security is limited. The future of the CSDP and its role in global politics remains uncertain. In this way, it mirrors the state of the European Union as a whole, which still seems to be looking for its place in a changing context.

In an emerging multipolar world, some scholars envisage a potential success of EU foreign policy and its global contribution more through '*forging multilateral bargains which can drive history forward in co-operative and consensual ways*',³³ as well as through military resources being integrated into the '*broader European integration project*'.³⁴

Within a broader foreign policy that furthers defence aims through non-military means, for instance through support against WMDs and support for multilateralism, the European Union seems to be better equipped. The Lisbon Treaty has given it new means to protect its interests (such as physical security, economic prosperity and value projection) through many policies. From that point of view, the CSDP is only a part of what was sometimes called the European '*grand strategy*'.³⁵

In the medium-term, and as witnessed during the recent operation in Libya, there may not be any dramatic change regarding the impact and shape of the Common Security and Defence Policy. For now, the CSDP and NATO are still compatible because the CSDP's initial goals are still unfulfilled; but in the future, how its relationship with NATO will evolve is uncertain.

Paradoxically, if European countries were to strongly boost their military capabilities, to the point that they fulfil the initial goals of the Saint-Malo Declaration, one may see the beginning of a new era of increased European contribution to defence and security. At the same time, this would pose new issues for its relationship with NATO and the

³² Howorth (2010), Note 18, p. 10.

³³ Ibid, p. 3.

³⁴ M. E. Smith, "A liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose and the EU's changing global role", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(2) (2011), pp. 144-163.

³⁵ Ibid.

United States in terms of sharing the burden of such responsibilities. In any case, the transatlantic relationship will also depend on the quality of the relationship between the United States and its European allies. As of today, seen as a whole in the multiplicity of its policies and within a broader understanding of the concept of security, part of a larger foreign policy framework, the European Union seems to be responding to an evolving world and has more and more means to articulate a relevant position that will enable it to be the meaningful and effective global actor that it has aspired to become. The CSDP has evolved and matured.

But we are still waiting with Madeleine Albright's plea: 'we want a Europe that can act.'³⁶ Yes, Libya led Europeans a little further, but much remains to be done to turn Europe into a single, effective and efficient actor in the field of defence.

³⁶ Albright, Note 14.

L'Europe de la défense...

Et après ?

Jean Cot | Général d'armée (CR). Ancien commandant de la 1^{re} Armée, ancien commandant de la Forpronu (1993-1994).

Au moment où j'écris, celui qui assumera la charge de l'État pour cinq ans n'est pas encore connu. Quel qu'il soit, et par nécessité, il donnera la priorité à l'économie, à la finance, à l'emploi. Il devra cependant se consacrer aussi aux relations extérieures et à la défense ; questions qu'il a, comme ses concurrents malheureux, pratiquement passées sous silence pendant sa campagne. Ces domaines régaliens de l'État s'imposeront à lui dès le 20 mai 2012, ouverture du Sommet de l'Otan à Chicago. De quoi va-t-on parler à Chicago ? De l'Afghanistan et du bouclier antimissile de l'Otan en particulier. On n'évoquera pas explicitement la défense européenne. On constatera cependant sans le dire, pour s'en réjouir ou le regretter, que le retour de la France dans l'Otan ne s'est traduit par aucune relance de la défense européenne mais par son « hibernation », comme le chef d'état-major des armées vient de le reconnaître. Je veux ici évoquer cette question de la défense européenne que je tiens pour une composante majeure de la construction politique de l'Europe.

De quoi parle-t-on ?

L'Europe de la défense, objet de la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC), n'a rien à voir avec la défense de l'Europe, de ses populations, de ses intérêts vitaux. La première s'est développée depuis 1999, cahin-caha, sous la forme de structures politico-militaires calquées en modèle très réduit sur celles de l'Otan, de missions « exotiques » limitées, pour l'essentiel, à la participation aux opérations de maintien de la paix, d'un corps d'armée « fantomatique » de 60 000 hommes avec son environnement naval et aérien, qui n'a jamais été engagé en tant que tel et ne représente que 5 % du total des forces des vingt-sept pays de l'UE. La seconde, appelée aussi défense collective de l'Europe, est la prérogative exclusive de l'Otan, comme pendant toute la guerre froide. Tous les grands traités européens, de Maastricht à Lisbonne, en passant par Amsterdam et Nice, évoquent bien la possibilité d'une évolution de la PSDC vers une défense commune, alternative à l'Otan « si les gouvernements en décidaient ainsi ». On ne saurait être plus prudent !

Mon propos, forcément incorrect dans ces temps de tropisme américain assumé, est de dire pourquoi et comment il faut absolument trouver les voies et moyens de l'indépendance stratégique totale de l'Europe par rapport aux États-Unis.

Pourquoi ?

La réponse est sans doute trop évidente pour être facilement acceptée. La crédibilité de l'Otan pour la défense de l'Europe repose depuis 1949 sur la certitude de l'engagement des États-Unis en cas d'agression extérieure. Faut-il rappeler que pendant la guerre froide cette certitude fut plus qu'un acte de foi puisqu'elle était fondée sur la présence de 300 000 *GIs* et de quelques milliers d'armes nucléaires sur le sol européen ?

Qu'en est-il aujourd'hui alors que les dernières unités et les dernières munitions nucléaires américaines sont en cours de rapatriement ? Certes, il y aura le bouclier antimissile de l'Otan. Mais on sait qu'il ne sera jamais efficace à 100 %, tout en remettant en cause les fondements de la dissuasion nucléaire. On sait aussi, ou on devrait savoir, que ce sera une opération juteuse pour le complexe militaro-industriel américain ; les contributions financières européennes venant d'ailleurs en déduction de celles qui pourraient être dédiées à l'Agence européenne de défense (AED) ; laquelle a déjà bien du mal à tenir les espoirs que sa création avait suscités. Plus généralement, nous devons cesser de nous aveugler avec ce mythe, ce leurre, d'une « communauté euroatlantique » que nous, Européens, nous plaisons à magnifier alors qu'elle est d'abord l'alibi hypocrite de nos gouvernements pour réduire toujours plus leurs efforts de défense au prétexte que le « grand frère » viendra en cas de nécessité réparer leurs démissions ⁽¹⁾. Il est scandaleux que les gouvernements des vingt-sept pays européens et les plus grands dont le nôtre, puissent s'en remettre pour leur défense, au travers de l'Otan, à une puissance extérieure. Comment des gouvernements de pays, dont le PIB cumulé est aujourd'hui supérieur à celui des États-Unis, peuvent-ils abandonner à autrui leur première prérogative régaliennne qui est celle de la défense ? Comment admettre que 500 millions d'Européens dépendent à ce point, pour leur sécurité, de 300 millions d'Américains ?

C'est pourquoi le retour de la France dans l'Otan fut un contresens politique absolu au moment où les États-Unis eux-mêmes se déprennent d'une Alliance pour eux trop contraignante. Si nous devons maintenir une alliance classique avec les États-Unis, nous devons comme eux nous déprendre de l'Otan et la laisser mourir à petit feu si nous n'avons pas le courage de la tuer d'un seul coup. Nous devons mettre sur pied une défense européenne globale capable à la fois de protéger le territoire de l'Union européenne et d'intervenir dans le monde sous l'égide des Nations unies. Si nous le voulons, l'Europe peut devenir cette « puissance sage » évitant la tentation américaine de la « nation nécessaire » appelée à exporter ses valeurs dans le monde, éventuellement au bout du fusil.

(1) « Les Européens entretiennent avec les États-Unis une relation infantile et fétichiste nourrie d'illusions, dont celle que les intérêts des Américains et des Européens sont fondamentalement les mêmes et celle selon laquelle la sécurité de l'Europe dépend encore de la protection américaine ». Cf. J. Shapiro et N. Witney, *European Council on Foreign Relations* ; cité dans *Le Monde* du 5 novembre 2009.

Comment ?

Comment sortir la PSDC de son hibernation ? Comment faire de l'Europe cette puissance sage qui pèse dans le monde, pour la bonne marche du monde ?

Voici trois propositions : un commandement opérationnel, une armée commune, un siège unique au Conseil de sécurité.

Un commandement militaire opérationnel interarmées européen permanent est proposé depuis longtemps par plusieurs pays, dont la France, l'Allemagne et la Pologne. Il aurait vocation à assurer le commandement des opérations conduites par l'UE en lieu et place des embryons d'état-major fournis aujourd'hui par cinq « nations cadres » volontaires. Les opérations en République démocratique du Congo ou en Tchad-Centre-Afrique ont montré les limites de ce concept. Ce commandement est exactement ce dont les Européens avaient besoin pour conduire la modeste opération de Libye, prise en charge « par défaut » par l'Otan, avec les lourdeurs et la sujétion aux États-Unis que cette décision a impliquées. Le coût d'un tel état-major serait de l'ordre de 200 experts européens supplémentaires, chiffre à comparer au quelque 10 000 de l'énorme machine de l'Otan et aux 900 que la France a dû mettre en place pour payer la note de son retour complet dans l'Otan. Il est étrange que la mise sur pied de cet état-major n'ait pas été posée par la France comme la condition non négociable de son retour dans l'Otan. Puisqu'il n'en fut pas ainsi et que les Anglais restent sur leur position fermée, alors il faut le créer sans eux, en utilisant la possibilité offerte par le Traité de Lisbonne de « Coopération structurée permanente » pouvant réunir un certain nombre de membres sur un projet qui ne ferait pas initialement l'unanimité.

Une armée européenne ? Quelle folie ! J'ai plusieurs fois testé cette idée auprès de chefs militaires français de haut rang en activité. Ils sont le plus souvent tellement inhibés par l'Otan, imbibés d'Otan, qu'une telle intégration leur apparaît comme un très gros mot. Je rappellerai cependant que ce projet était au cœur du traité de la Communauté européenne de défense (CED). Il fut hélas rejeté par la France ou, plus exactement, par le vote défavorable au Parlement d'une conjonction improbable des gaullistes, des communistes et de la moitié des socialistes. De Gaulle fut d'une rare violence dans cette campagne, menaçant de « s'associer aux Russes pour la (la CED) stopper ». Nous sommes ainsi passés à côté d'un véritable « pilier européen » de l'Otan et en restons à un pilier américain central et vingt-quatre « colonnettes » européennes. Ce déséquilibre constitue le problème majeur de l'Otan depuis soixante ans. Qu'est-ce donc qu'une armée européenne pour qu'elle fasse si peur ? Rien d'autre que l'Otan sans les Américains, tout en conservant l'acquis de soixante ans de coopération ; une armée ni plus ni moins intégrée que l'est l'Otan aujourd'hui ; une armée composée des forces de combat des pays européens, articulée comme aujourd'hui en corps multinationaux dont le corps européen de Strasbourg a été un précurseur. Cela est-il si difficile à

accepter par certains ? Pourquoi les citoyens européens se prononcent-ils à une forte majorité pour cette initiative comme l'indiquent tous les Eurobaromètres semestriels de l'UE ? En avril 2007, dans son discours de clôture du cinquantenaire du Traité de Rome, M^{me} Merkel déclarait que « l'un des objectifs principaux de la future Europe devrait être une armée européenne ». Elle l'a redit depuis. M. Sigman Gabriel, chef du SPD et successeur possible de M^{me} Merkel à la chancellerie dit la même chose dans une interview donnée au journal *Le Monde* du 16 mars 2012. Plusieurs autres pays y seraient favorables mais pas les Anglais bien sûr !

Un siège unique européen de membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU ? Mais ce n'est plus une folie, c'est une trahison ! Ce siège nous est revenu après notre victoire en 1945 ! De plus nous disposons de la bombe atomique, comme les autres membres permanents ! Nous devons conserver ce siège à jamais ! Bien que plus nuancés, les partis de gouvernement ont sur ce sujet caressé l'électeur dans le sens du poil pendant la campagne présidentielle. Il fallait bien ne pas se laisser déborder par les clairs souverainistes qu'embouchèrent les partis les plus à droite comme les plus à gauche. Revenons à la réalité. La révision de la composition du Conseil de sécurité est impérative, compte tenu de l'évolution du monde depuis 1945. Cinq membres permanents aujourd'hui. Demain, si chacun persiste dans ses exigences, trois pour l'UE avec l'Allemagne, quatre pour l'Europe avec la Russie. Comment imaginer que les autres continents n'exigent pas un nombre de membres permanents proportionnel à leur poids dans le monde ? Soit, sans entrer dans le détail, au moins quatre pour l'Asie, deux ou trois pour le Moyen-Orient, trois pour l'Afrique, trois pour l'Amérique latine. Soit plus de quinze membres permanents et le double de membres renouvelables ; ce qui est la proportion entre les deux catégories. Le Conseil de sécurité actuel à quinze membres est déjà difficile à gérer, un Conseil à quarante-cinq membres serait absolument ingouvernable. La France veut-elle tuer le Conseil de sécurité, au prétexte d'y « garder son rang » ? Si l'Europe ne revendique qu'un seul siège, alors on pourra contenir l'inflation pour les autres continents, par la vertu de l'exemple. Mais il faut aller au-delà de cette arithmétique. L'Europe a une Politique étrangère de sécurité commune (Pesc). Elle a une Haute représentante pour les Affaires extérieures. Elle met sur pied un Service européen d'action extérieure (SEAE) qui concrétisera la diplomatie de l'UE dans le monde. N'est-il pas de bonne logique que l'UE soit représentée à l'ONU par un siège unique de membre permanent comme le sont les grands pays qui comptent ? Certes, ce siège implique la définition de positions communes des États européens avant les votes du Conseil pour la résolution des crises menaçant la paix du monde. Comme il en est déjà pour l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) ou comme le pratique l'OSCE, l'existence même d'un siège unique rendra plus facile le *consensus* entre Européens. Je ne suis pas naïf, une telle avancée n'est pas pour demain. Le Royaume-Uni s'y opposerait. La France devrait donc proposer en premier lieu à l'Allemagne de partager son siège et ouvrir cette possibilité aux autres membres de l'UE qui le souhaiteraient.

Comment conclure ?

Le commandement opérationnel peut faire *consensus* auprès des lecteurs avertis de cette revue. L'armée européenne aura plus de mal à passer. Le siège unique à l'ONU pourrait être « le pont trop loin ». En une dernière tentative pour convaincre, je vais élargir le débat. Aucune chance auprès de ceux qui considèrent l'État-nation post-westphalien comme le grain ultime et sacré de l'organisation politique de l'Europe ; ceux pour qui tout commencement d'intégration politique, économique, militaire de l'Europe est l'expression d'une trahison.

Je m'adresse ici à ceux qui, plus ou moins clairement, comprennent que chacun des États-nations d'Europe ne peut plus compter dans le monde s'il ne consent des délégations de souveraineté au profit de l'UE, sans rien perdre de son originalité et de son génie, ainsi que le synthétise la devise de l'UE : « L'unité dans la diversité ». La Fédération des nations d'Europe est notre seule chance de compter demain au nombre de la dizaine de grands pôles de puissance et de prospérité qui émergent dans l'après-guerre froide. Si l'on souscrit à cette vision, il est évident que l'UE doit se donner au plus vite une politique extérieure et une défense communes, avec les conséquences qui en découlent, en particulier pour sa représentation à l'ONU et son outil de défense.

Ma crainte aujourd'hui est que tout ce qui a déjà été fait pour la construction européenne ne se détricote sous la pression de souverainistes convaincus ou démagogues et par la lassitude, l'incompétence ou l'irresponsabilité des pouvoirs en place. C'est pourquoi il faut moins que jamais « laisser du temps au temps », formule-alibi de ceux qui, parfois de bonne foi, s'accommoderaient d'une Europe rebalkanisée, absente au monde et retournant *de facto* à son tumultueux passé.

Extraits du traité du 27 mai 1952 instituant la Communauté européenne de défense

Préambule

... Résolus à contribuer, en coopération avec les autres nations libres, et dans l'esprit de la charte des Nations unies, au maintien de la paix, notamment en assurant contre toute agression la défense de l'Europe occidentale, en étroite liaison avec les organismes ayant le même objet ; Considérant que l'intégration aussi complète que possible, dans la mesure compatible avec les nécessités militaires, des éléments humains et matériels que leurs forces de défense rassemblent au sein d'une organisation européenne supranationale est le moyen le plus propre à permettre d'atteindre ce but avec toute la rapidité et l'efficacité nécessaires ; Certains que cette intégration aboutira à l'emploi le plus rationnel et le plus économique des ressources de leurs pays, en particulier grâce à l'établissement d'un budget commun et de programmes d'armement communs ; Décidés à assurer ainsi le développement de leur force militaire sans qu'il soit porté atteinte au progrès social ; Soucieux de sauvegarder les valeurs spirituelles et morales qui sont le patrimoine commun de leurs peuples et convaincus qu'au sein de la force commune, constituée sans discrimination entre les États participants, les patriotismes nationaux, loin de s'affaiblir, ne pourront que se consolider et s'harmoniser dans un cadre élargi ; Conscients de franchir ainsi une étape nouvelle et essentielle dans la voie de la formation d'une Europe unie ; Ont décidé de créer une Communauté européenne de défense...

Article 1 - Par le présent traité, les Hautes Parties contractantes instituent entre elles une Communauté européenne de défense, de caractère supranational, comportant des institutions communes, des Forces armées communes et un budget commun.

Article 2

1. La Communauté a des objectifs exclusivement défensifs.
2. En conséquence, dans les conditions prévues au présent traité, elle assure contre toute agression la sécurité des États membres, en participant à la défense occidentale dans le cadre du traité de l'Atlantique Nord et en réalisant l'intégration des forces de défense des États membres et l'emploi rationnel et économique de leurs ressources.
3. Toute agression armée dirigée contre l'un quelconque des États membres en Europe ou contre les Forces européennes de défense sera considérée comme une attaque dirigée contre tous les États membres. Les États membres et les Forces européennes de défense porteront à l'État ou aux Forces ainsi attaqués aide et assistance par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, militaires et autres.

Article 3

1. La Communauté emploie les méthodes les moins onéreuses et les plus efficaces. Elle ne recourt à des interventions que dans la mesure nécessaire à l'accomplissement de sa mission et en respectant les libertés publiques et les droits fondamentaux des individus. Elle veille à ce que les intérêts propres des États membres soient pris en considération dans toute la mesure compatible avec ses intérêts essentiels.
2. Pour permettre à la Communauté d'atteindre ses buts, les États membres mettent à sa disposition des contributions appropriées, fixées selon les dispositions des articles 87 et 94 ci-après.

Article 4 - La Communauté poursuit son action en collaboration avec les nations libres et avec toute organisation qui se propose les mêmes buts qu'elle-même.

Article 5 - La Communauté coopère étroitement avec l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord.

...

SURVIVING AUSTERITY

The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration

Tomas Valasek



Surviving austerity

**The case for a new
approach to EU
military collaboration**

Tomas Valasek



The Centre for European Reform is a think-tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on the European Union. It is a forum for people with ideas from Britain and across the continent to discuss the many political, economic and social challenges facing Europe. It seeks to work with similar bodies in other European countries, North America and elsewhere in the world. The CER is pro-European but not uncritical. It regards European integration as largely beneficial but recognises that in many respects the Union does not work well. The CER therefore aims to promote new ideas for reforming the European Union.

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1 Introduction: Defence budgets in crisis

There is a great contrast between the co-operative way in which European countries fight wars, and the insular manner in which most prepare for them. Since the UK fought Argentina in the 1980s, no EU government has gone into a shooting war alone.¹ In all conflicts since – in the Balkans, in Iraq, in Chad or in Afghanistan – European troops served as part of an EU, UN or NATO mission or in an impromptu ‘coalition of the willing’ (in Iraq). Yet in peacetime EU militaries revert to their national ways. They exercise together from time to time, try (and often fail) to observe common technical standards for equipment, and loosely follow EU and NATO ‘capability goals’ in deciding what to buy. Some European countries have even formed joint military units. But the vast majority of defence euros, pounds or kroner are spent by individual governments building national forces and equipping them, mostly with weapons of domestic provenance. Defence ministries make scant reference to what purchases their neighbours might be contemplating, what shortfalls other European militaries struggle with, and what opportunities for collaboration may exist.

¹ They did conduct smaller solo operations, such as the UK mission in 2000 to extract captured soldiers from Sierra Leone, Italy’s 1997 humanitarian intervention in Albania or France’s 2002 and 2011 interventions in Côte d’Ivoire.

This is a very wasteful way to build armed forces. The 27 EU member-states have half a million more men and women in uniform than the Americans; yet they can only deploy a fraction of the troops that the US does on ‘expeditionary’ operations – those far from home bases, which is where all recent conflicts have been fought. The reasons for this relative weakness vary. Too much heavy Cold War weaponry remains in place in Europe; it is

expensive to maintain and, unless modernised to include up-to-date electronics, nearly useless. EU countries also spend one third of what the Americans spend per soldier: this means that fewer EU servicemen and women get the expensive equipment and training necessary for overseas operations. But, chiefly, EU countries underperform because with 27 different governments managing, equipping and commanding 27 militaries they never enjoy the economies of scale the US does. They spend far more than the Americans on the multiple back offices and commands, and they waste money subsidising too many unviable defence companies – themselves a product of a fractured market.

For decades, Europeans had few reasons to look for savings. Lack of co-operation meant that there were inefficiencies but their forces were large and reasonably well-funded. And the Americans were essentially content with European militaries performing below their full capacity. The US made perfunctory noises about fairer ‘burden-sharing’; Congress even mandated the Pentagon to report annually on whether the European militaries were shaping up. But for most of the Cold War and right up until the early 2000s, the US saw itself as the dominant power in Europe. It sought a decisive say in matters of European security and at the height of the Cold War it had hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the continent. Washington understood that US predominance gave the European governments little reason to bolster their own militaries. It tacitly accepted Europe’s relative military weakness because it made it easier for the US to assume leadership.

Things are completely different today. America’s interest in Europe’s security has diminished. After the attacks of September 11th, US attention shifted towards the greater Middle East. In recent years, the rise of China, and its occasional sabre-rattling over Taiwan and the South China Sea, has prompted the Pentagon to move yet more resources away from Europe, into Asia. Because US armed forces are finite and already stretched thin by the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington

increasingly sees the continued presence of the 80,000 troops in Europe as a luxury. The Pentagon has made clear that it wants some of them to return to the US soon.² America's and Europe's military roles have partly reversed: NATO was founded to guarantee that the US would defend Europe if needed, but these days the US expects more and more help from allies in places such as Afghanistan. Seen from Washington, the weakness of European militaries has become a liability and a threat to transatlantic relations.

² *US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates said in January 2011 that "it is clear that we have excess force structure in Europe" (News briefing with secretary Robert Gates and Admiral Mullen, US Department of Defense, January 6th 2011).*

This 'new' US will also expect allies to take on more responsibility for policing their own backyard. Its prevarication over intervention in Libya is a sign of things to come. But it is not evident that the allies have the necessary money, personnel and equipment. As this report explains, their forces have shrunk much since the end of the Cold War. More recently, since the onset of the economic crisis, virtually all capitals have cut defence expenditure: Germany is reducing military spending by a quarter over the next four years; the UK defence budget will be cut by 7.5 per cent by 2015. Some of the smaller European countries have fared far worse; Latvia cut its military spending by almost 50 per cent between 2008 and 2010. With EU economies slated to grow a meager 1.8 per cent collectively in 2011,³ there is little hope that economic growth will lift defence spending in the near term. Publicly, those European governments that have slashed defence budgets argue that the improved security environment allows them to do so. Privately, the same officials often admit that the cuts are driven not by changing threats but by the need to economise. The overall impression is that Europe's cash-strapped governments are effectively building 'best-case' militaries: those suited for a benign security environment, but potentially ill-prepared to deal with consequences of crises in North Africa or a deterioration in relations with Russia.

³ *'Interim forecast February 2011', directorate-general for economic and financial affairs, European Commission, March 2011.*

European defence budgets and the financial crisis

Country	Defence spending in 2010 as % of GDP*	Budget cuts/ increases	Impact on forces
Austria	0.8	Budget to be cut by 20 per cent by 2015, reducing defence spending to 0.6 per cent of GDP	Conscription to be abolished
Belgium	1.1	Budget to be cut by 10 per cent by 2012	4,000 of 38,000 troops to be cut by 2013; 30 military installations to be closed
Bulgaria	1.7	Budget cut by nearly 40 per cent in 2010	Armed forces to be reduced by 20 per cent; cancelled or reduced orders for military vehicles and transport planes
Czech Republic	1.4	Budget cut by over 20 per cent between 2009 and 2011	4,500 ministry staff and soldiers let go in 2009; withdrawing most troops from Kosovo
Denmark	1.4	Budget to increase by 8 per cent between 2010 and 2014	Troops allocated to NATO and the EU maintained; tank force reduced by half; anti-tank and army air defence units abolished; combat aircraft and helicopters cut significantly
Estonia	1.8	Budget cut by 17 per cent in 2009	Some procurement projects and infrastructure projects delayed

Finland	1.6	Budget to be reduced by 7 per cent by 2013	Possible cuts to procurement and base closures
France	2.0	Budget cut by 3 per cent in 2010; further cuts expected	Ministry of defence staff reduced by 8,000; postponed upgrade to Mirage jets
Germany	1.4	Budget to be cut by one-fourth between 2010 and 2015	Armed forces to be cut from 250,000 to 185,000 and conscription abolished but number of deployable troops to double from 7,000 to 14,000
Greece	2.9	Increase of 7 per cent in 2009, then slight decrease in 2010 and more cuts expected through 2013	Money shifted from new procurement to paying off debt for past purchases; withdrew most forces from Kosovo; postponed more than half military exercises planned for 2010
Hungary	1.1	Defence spending dropped from 1.2 per cent of GDP to 1.1 between 2008 and 2010	Suspended participation in NATO helicopter programme; procurement programmes under review
Ireland	0.6	Defence budget to be cut by 15 per cent by 2014	Military to lose 500 personnel; army barracks closing; most troops withdrawn from Kosovo and Bosnia; flying hours for navy and air forces reduced

Italy	1.4	Budget to be cut by 10 per cent between 2011 and 2014	Cut 25 out of its order of 121 Eurofighter jets, reduced order of frigates
Latvia	1.0	Cuts of almost 50 per cent between 2008 and 2010	Closed number of headquarters and agencies
Lithuania	0.9	Cut of 9 per cent in 2009, another 1 per cent cut in 2010	No new procurement planned for the medium term
Netherlands	1.4	Spending to be cut by 'hundreds of millions of euros' starting in 2011 (budget in 2010: around €8 billion)	Delivery of spare parts delayed; exercises cut and maintenance work on army barracks suspended; plans under consideration include cutting 10,000 army jobs and reducing order of F-35 fighter jets
Poland	1.9	Budget reduced by 9 per cent in 2009	Withdrew forces from Lebanon, Syria and Chad
Romania	1.3	Budget decreased from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2008	Delays in command and control, operations and logistic support upgrades, may cancel or reduced planned purchase of fighter jets
Slovakia	1.3	Budget decreased from 1.5 per cent of GDP to just above 1 per cent in 2011	Cancelled plans to buy transport aircraft, postponed many modernisation programmes

Slovenia	1.6	Budget rising but annual rate of growth slowed from 9 per cent to 5 per cent	Reduced order for military vehicles
Spain	1.1	Defence spending cut by 7 per cent in 2010	Aircraft carrier refit called off, exercises cancelled, 3,000 troops to be cut in 2011
Sweden	1.1	Spending frozen until 2014	Conscription abolished and some research & development cancelled but buying new submarines, armoured vehicles and other equipment
UK	2.7	Budget to be cut by 7.5 per cent over next four years	Decommissioned aircraft carrier; retired Harrier jets; reduced future carrier fleet from two to one; delayed modernization of Trident submarines; withdrawing all troops from Germany

**There is too little information available for Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal to warrant inclusion in the table.*

Sources: Jane's Defence News, Defense Weekly, Forecast International, NATO, US State Department, EDA, Bloomberg and national media.

There are many things that European countries can do to improve their collective military might even as budgets remain low: these include getting rid of outdated Cold War weapons, ending conscription (conscripts are of little use in expeditionary operations) and opening defence markets to greater competition (which would make weapons more affordable). But the key prescription, one that holds much promise of savings, lies in significantly closer cross-border co-operation: common maintenance, training and education, more widespread sharing of infrastructure such as training grounds or storage facilities, and the creation of joint military units. Only if European politicians create greater economies of scale, reduce the number of officers and bureaucrats and shrink the number of support facilities will they be able to direct more money towards training and equipping first-rate militaries.

⁴ See Tim Garden and John Roper, 'Pooling forces', CER bulletin article, December 1999. Such 'pooling and sharing' is an old idea; many researchers and institutes, including the CER,⁴ have called for it in the past, as have most key EU strategic documents. Some successes are evident, both in the form of joint equipment purchases and in partial mergers of armed forces: the UK and the Netherlands have formed a joint amphibious unit and the Balts a common defence university. Allies have even entrusted NATO with managing a fleet of transport aircraft and air traffic control planes on their behalf. In 2004, EU member-states formed the European Defence Agency (EDA) specifically to foster collaboration. But progress has been episodic: for each partnership many more countries have opted to go it alone, because they fear that they may not be able to deploy their shared units, or because they worry about the costs. Indeed, because some collaborative projects have produced too little in the way of savings, appetite for pooling and sharing has waned: defence officials in key countries such as Germany say they want less of it in the future.

This reluctance is becoming unaffordable. With defence budgets falling and the United States less and less willing to intervene in

Europe, allies on this side of the Atlantic have two alternatives: either they bolster military strength through closer co-operation and partial integration, or face the prospect of not having enough force to intervene in situations where key European interests or principles are under threat. However, a new approach is needed to military pooling and sharing; one that maximises the prospect of real savings, thus tempting more governments into giving it a try and rewarding those who do. Above all, it must make political sense: EU governments will want to retain the right to decide where and when to deploy their forces, so they will be hesitant to integrate them unless the case for such co-operation is overwhelming. Luckily, the past few decades offer plenty of lessons on what approaches to pooling and sharing work, which ones do not and why.

This study identifies key lessons from past and current examples of cross-border defence co-operation, based on dozens of interviews with former ministers of defence, political directors, EU and NATO officials, soldiers and diplomats. Drawing on those experiences, the report suggests a new approach to pooling and sharing in Europe based on multiple but compatible 'islands of co-operation'. It argues that while governments would benefit from a quick move towards integration during the current round of budget and force-cutting, most will miss the opportunity. But the austerity measures adopted today will leave many EU countries with military forces so weakened that more co-operation and integration will become the only way to preserve meaningful fighting capacity. As the former Norwegian minister of defence, Thorvald Stoltenberg, observes: "The alternative to co-operation could be a situation where small and medium-sized countries lose their ability to maintain a credible defence."⁵

⁵ Thorvald Stoltenberg, 'Nordic co-operation on foreign and security policy', proposals presented to the extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers, Oslo, February 9th 2009.

2 European disunion

Think of European armed forces as a giant puzzle. Its pieces come together during military deployments to form one whole: countries support each other's contingents by sharing intelligence, providing security and transportation as well as access to spare parts, food and ammunition. The British-commanded airfield in Kandahar, Afghanistan, is mostly guarded by Slovak troops who, in turn, are supplied by the Canadians and fed by NATO's logistical agency (NAMSA). This form of co-operation is not just frequent, it is essentially the rule: most EU and NATO countries, with the exception of the largest ones, can only afford to take part in missions away from their borders if they share the burden of supporting the deployment with others. Otherwise, the cost of setting up separate protection for them along with food supplies, weapons and intelligence would be prohibitive. Even the big countries often rely on other nations to provide security or engineering units in order to save money.

But the moment foreign deployment ends, this multinational puzzle falls apart. In peacetime, each government looks after its piece – its national armed forces – more or less alone. While there are some permanent multinational military units, they are as rare as Siberian tigers: of the 1.6 million servicemen and women in EU countries, only a few thousand serve in these. Some 80 per cent of all defence equipment is bought from domestic suppliers,⁶ and more than 95 per cent of all equipment belongs to the individual nations rather than the EU or NATO.⁷ While European soldiers nearly always fight together, most study separately: multinational defence colleges such as the

⁶ 'Defence data 2009', European Defence Agency, 2010.

⁷ Brooks Tigner, 'NATO officials push for greater interoperability', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, February 23rd 2011.

NATO Defence College in Rome or the Baltic Defence College in Estonia are very rare. In peacetime, EU and NATO militaries remain as stubbornly national as they have been for centuries: monuments to the primacy of self-sufficiency.

Their philosophy made economic sense during the Cold War, when Europeans had much larger militaries than today. In 1989, the UK had

⁸ *Historic figures come from 'Financial and economic data relating to NATO defence', NATO, November 28th 1989.*

⁹ *'The military balance 2011', International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2011.*

¹⁰ *EDA, 'European – United States defence expenditure in 2009', December 21st 2010.*

320,000 military personnel, France 550,000 and Germany nearly 500,000; even small Belgium had bought 160 supersonic F-16 fighter planes. European members of NATO spent an average of 3.7 per cent of GDP on defence.⁸ By 2011, those armies had shrunk by more than half: the UK has just short of 180,000 men and women in active service and France and Germany have about 240,000 and 250,000, respectively.⁹ Belgium has scrapped or sold 100 of its F-16s. Average defence spending in Europe has fallen to 1.7 per cent of GDP.¹⁰ If European armies were corporations, they would have merged parts or all of their operations with one another to

maintain economies of scale. This, with few exceptions, they have not done. So the proportion of budgets that goes on overheads – salaries, maintaining equipment, operating bases – has soared at the expense of training and procurement of new equipment. To compound the defence ministries' woes, the cost of increasingly sophisticated weapons has risen far ahead of inflation. The Europeans buy less and

¹¹ *EDA, 'European – United States defence expenditure in 2009', December 21st 2010.*

less equipment and the number of soldiers ready for battle has shrunk. Less than 4 per cent of European troops are deployed on mission, compared with 16 per cent of US armed forces.¹¹

Pooling and sharing

There are ways to improve these figures. More EU countries should eliminate unneeded Cold War equipment. Many already have: in

recent years, the needs of the war in Afghanistan prompted several governments to shed units that are unsuited for overseas operations. The most aggressive reformers, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and some of the new allies in Central Europe, have been able to increase somewhat the percentage of their forces suited for expeditionary missions. The per-soldier spending in Europe has increased steadily in the past decade, from €73,000 in 2001 to €91,000 in 2009.¹² But some countries have already cut all there is to cut; besides, militaries cannot focus exclusively on expeditionary operations. As long as conventional wars in Europe remain a possibility, however remote, governments will want to retain the ability to fight them. Military skills, once discarded, are very difficult to re-acquire, so armed forces maintain skeleton capacity to fight in various types of conflicts.

¹² 'European defense trends: Budgets, regulatory frameworks and the industrial base', Centre for Strategic and International Studies, November 2010. Figures are in 2008 euros. The EDA lists an even higher per capita figure for Europe: €116,000 ('European – United States defence expenditure in 2009').

A more promising approach to efficiency therefore lies in pooling and sharing armed forces: that is, in improving economies of scale through closer collaboration. Pooling and sharing is a catch-all term that covers a range of different types of co-operation, but essentially they come in three basic forms:

- ★ Governments can pool and share their procurement of weapons and services. New weapons in particular are expensive to develop so some smaller countries choose to share test data or set up joint research facilities. Even big European countries choose to co-research and co-develop the most expensive items such as the A400M transport plane. Alternatively, governments can also pool orders for equipment which they are happy to buy from outside suppliers; this allows them to negotiate a better deal with the manufacturer.
- ★ Governments can integrate parts of their force structures. Militaries that own similar equipment can save by pooling its

maintenance and sharing training facilities. Countries can also set up entire joint units: these can save money by, for example, obviating the need for multiple headquarters or supply chains.

- ★ Another related form of co-operation lies in specialisation: instead of all European militaries maintaining a certain skill, such as the ability to dispose of unwanted ammunition, they can choose one country and pay it to develop and deploy its specialised unit when necessary.

In real life, 'procurement' and 'structural' pooling and sharing are often intertwined: for example, countries that buy weapons jointly are likely to want also to share the expense of looking after them and may form joint maintenance depots. Similarly, countries that form a joint unit may want to set up only one supply chain for it and buy from one supplier. But the two forms of co-operation raise somewhat different sets of complications. Many past attempts at pooling procurement have been plagued by participating

¹³ See for example Jean-Pierre Darnis, Giovanni Gasparini, Christoph Grams, Daniel Keohane, Fabio Liberti, Jean-Pierre Maulny and May-Britt Stumbaum, 'Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmes', *Occasional paper no 69*, European Institute for Security Studies, October 2007.

¹⁴ 'Defence data 2009', European Defence Agency, 2010.

governments' inability to agree common technical standards for the equipment they want to buy jointly. Past projects have also suffered from governments insisting on keeping a certain portion of manufacturing jobs at home; this has led to convoluted and expensive production arrangements. This study will not focus on pooling and sharing in procurement: the travails of this form of co-operation have been well documented.¹³ Moreover, the total potential savings from equipment procurement alone are limited: on average, European defence ministries spend only about 20 per cent of their budget on research, development and purchases of new weapons.¹⁴

A more promising kind of collaboration lies in structural pooling and sharing. The lion's share of defence budgets in Europe go on

costs such as salaries, exercises, upkeep of barracks and operations. This money could be better used if European allies were to agree to share facilities or pool their units. A key new notion in this field is 'permanent structured co-operation', enshrined in the EU's new Lisbon treaty. It calls on those EU member-states that have the most capable militaries, to form a defence *avant-garde*. The idea is that by coming together – by exercising together, forming multinational units – the presence of a core group will inspire other states to strengthen their militaries in order to qualify for membership of the group. But governments have been slow to use this option, mainly because they disagree on who should qualify for membership, but also because many past attempts at pooling and sharing ended in disappointment.

3 From past lessons...

Pooling and sharing is an old concept: it appears in the 2003 European security strategy,¹⁵ and both the EU and NATO have agencies dedicated to identifying joint projects (the EDA and the Allied Command Transformation, ACT, respectively). Governments from Norway to Slovenia have experimented with some form of structural pooling and sharing, though some with more zeal than others: the CER's research suggests that for each 'sharer' (such as the Netherlands or Sweden) there are many 'loners' (such as Romania or Spain). Encouragingly, there are more and more 'newcomers and potentials': countries that in recent months have started to experiment with, or at least think about, pooling and sharing as a way to mitigate the impact of defence budget cuts on their capabilities.

¹⁵ "Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities" ('A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy', Brussels, December 12th 2003).

Structural pooling in Europe

Country	Involved in The sharers	Main motivation
The Netherlands	Amphibious force with the UK; rapid deployable land headquarters with Germany; integrated naval command with Belgium; shared naval training and logistics with Belgium; member of European air transport command; non-permanent F-16 expeditionary wing with Denmark, Norway and Belgium	Reduce costs, encourage European integration
Belgium	Shared naval training and maintenance with the Netherlands; pooled naval command with the Netherlands; member of the Eurocorps land army corps headquarters; contributes battalion to Franco-German brigade; pooled fighter, transport, helicopter pilot education with France; member of European air transport command; non-permanent F-16 expeditionary wing with Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands	Encourage European integration, reduce costs
Sweden	Nordic defence co-operation (with Denmark, Finland, and Iceland) which includes joint centre on exchange of data on air traffic and specialisation in military education and more than 40 common procurement programs	Reduce costs, build common Nordic identity
Lithuania	Joint defence college with Latvia and Estonia; naval co-operation with the same countries, as well as a joint radar surveillance centre and specialised naval education	Reduce costs, integration in the EU and NATO
Germany	Land rapid deployable corps headquarters with the Netherlands; member of the Eurocorps land army corps headquarters, which also serves as command of the non-permanent brigade with France; member of the European air transport command	European integration

Country	Involved in	Main motivation
Newcomers and potentials		
UK	Amphibious force with the Netherlands; recently agreed wide-ranging co-operation with France including shared use of aircraft carriers and a jointly deployable force	Reduce costs
Czech Republic	Talks with Slovakia on sharing air force training and maintenance, logistics and education	Reduce costs
Slovenia	Talks with Croatia on building integrated air force	Reduce costs
The loners		
Romania	Non-permanent brigade with Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Macedonia and Turkey	Reduce regional tensions
Spain	Non-permanent amphibious force with Italy (with integrated command); land component command headquarters with France, Italy and Portugal	European integration

The table focuses on multinational structural pooling, not common procurement. It does not list all EU countries; merely best examples for each category.

Sources: Ministries of defence, EDA, Jane's Defence Weekly, Defence News.

Over the years, many US and European military experts have offered detailed suggestions on what opportunities for pooling and sharing exist. Many, particularly the American ones, have been driven by frustration at seeing Europe's contribution to common

¹⁶ See for example Michèle A Flournoy and Julianne Smith, 'European defense integration: Bridging the gap between strategy and capabilities', Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005.

¹⁷ See for example Guy Verhofstadt, 'The need for common European defence'. In: Karl von Wogau (Ed.), 'The path to European defence', Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2004.

military operations shrink, thus shifting the burden on to US forces.¹⁶ Others, mainly in Europe, have wanted EU militaries to improve co-operation as a prelude to forming one integrated European army in the future.¹⁷ But both those schools of thought have failed to appreciate how protective European governments remain of their right to build and deploy their armed forces as they please. EU governments may have abolished national borders and built a common (if troubled) currency, but for most of them, the integrationist instinct stops at military matters. The capitals clearly want to maintain control over which 'discretionary' operations – those not directly related to self-defence – they enter (a right that many EU countries exercised with regard to the Iraq war). And while Europe

has been peaceful for years, governments also want to have forces under their own control for self-defence, to hedge against an attack on their territory. They will gladly enter into mutual defence arrangements, which make defence cheaper and more convincing, but they will want to retain the ability, however limited, to defend themselves without NATO and to deploy without the EU.

Pooling and sharing projects challenge the member-states' desire for autonomy in military affairs in three key ways. They raise fears of entrapment: that if a state merges a portion of its armed forces with another, it will be pressured to join a mission because its pooling partner wishes to take part. Conversely, pooling and sharing lead to

¹⁸ The author wishes to thank Bastian Giegerich for these observations.

fears of abandonment: a state wishing to use a shared unit may be thwarted from doing so by its partner.¹⁸ Officials interviewed for this report

also expressed concerns that poorer and weaker states may try to 'free-ride': to reap benefits of co-operation with a richer neighbour, like the ability to use advanced training grounds, without contributing much in return. These concerns, along with other difficulties – such as the failure to save money or differences in industrial policies (see below for more) – have plagued past pooling and sharing projects and discouraged many defence officials from continuing. EU and US officials are fond of saying that European governments have 'no option' other than to co-operate – but they do have options, and many choose to forgo the savings that pooling and sharing offer because they fear loss of sovereignty.

There is little evidence that these political attitudes will change anytime soon: while falling defence budgets make a stronger economic case for pooling and sharing, the economic crisis has also made EU governments more protective of their political rights and somewhat more suspicious of the EU. Future proposals will therefore need to take into account these political sensitivities, and to incorporate other lessons learned from previous pooling and sharing projects. Those that have succeeded did so because the participating states had many or all of the following characteristics in common (listed in the order of importance):

Similarity of strategic cultures: France and Germany failed to use their combined brigade in Afghanistan because of disagreements over where and with what 'caveats' (limitations on types of operations) the force could be deployed. These disagreements, which are rooted in different national views on how much risk to subject soldiers to, cannot be easily 'managed' for the purpose of a joint operation. For that reason, the recently proposed Franco-British expeditionary force has an arguably better chance of being used in action: the two countries have a similar risk-taking, expeditionary mentality (see text box 'The Franco-British defence co-operation treaty', page 25). But commonality of strategic cultures will not guarantee success – the Netherlands and the UK, two relatively like-minded countries, failed to agree the terms

under which to deploy their joint amphibious force in Afghanistan. There are also ways to guard against differences in strategic cultures thwarting a pooling idea: the Belgian and the Dutch train personnel and buy parts for their frigates together but the two countries maintain separate ships and crews, and can deploy independently of each other. They thus reap benefits of pooling without giving up much in sovereignty. The design of the proposed Franco-British expeditionary force follows a similar 'pooled yet separable' model. Naturally, similarity of strategic cultures will be more pertinent in cases where countries pool capabilities that are meant to be deployed or those that directly support deployed forces; it will be less relevant in cases where countries pool training grounds or storage facilities, which can also bring substantial savings.

Trust and solidarity: when asked what made their co-operation possible, Nordic defence officials cite trust and shared sense of identity: "we think of ourselves as Nordics first, Europeans second", one official said.¹⁹ Sweden has even

¹⁹ Telephone interview, February 2011.

vowed unilaterally to defend its Nordic neighbours if they are attacked. Trust is always important but especially so when the forces that partners choose to combine are responsible, directly or indirectly, for defending home territories: governments want to be confident that their partners will not leave them without access to shared assets in times of crisis at home. Trust is often the key difference that determines whether joint projects save money or not: the German-Italian-American missile-defence system, MEADS, is meant to replace existing Hawk and Patriot missile defences. But the participating countries have had so little confidence in one another and in the programme's success that they have also pursued other national alternatives to MEADS. Instead of saving money by pooling their research and procurement they effectively paid twice (and in 2011 Germany and the US withdrew altogether, citing financial constraints). One way for co-operating countries to build trust is by committing to a treaty, as the French and the British did in 2010.

Forces of similar size and quality: when budget cuts forced the Czechs and Slovaks to turn to pooling and sharing in 2010, they automatically gravitated to one another. They have done so partly because of their shared past and similarities in language; but size also had much to do with their decision: while other neighbours such as Germany may have been able to bring more money into joint projects, and while Poland may be more similar in strategic culture to the Czech Republic than Slovakia, the trouble with big countries is that they do not always take smaller partners seriously. The United States has frustrated its European allies to no end by constantly changing timelines for the multinational but US-led F-35 fighter jet programme. Because so few countries make supersonic jets, smaller countries desiring them may have no choice other than to team up with a big one. But in most other cases, co-operation among countries of comparable size will work better than the alternative; asymmetry in size raises fears of one side 'dominating' the other and ignoring the smaller party's needs, thus undermining the all-important trust. Similarly, countries with advanced militaries will want to work with equally sophisticated partners. UK defence officials can sometimes be dismissive of pooling because they see their forces as the best in Europe. France, with whom they eventually agreed a co-operation treaty, is arguably the only peer power on the continent.

Level playing field for defence companies: pooling and sharing saves money mainly by allowing the participating states to reduce the amount of equipment they buy or to close facilities. But this invariably means that some company somewhere will not receive an order that it would have received otherwise. For partnerships to work and endure, these losses must be evenly spread. But some countries protect their defence companies more than others, and these asymmetries create friction that can cause co-operation to unravel. Not coincidentally, the UK-French defence co-operation treaty contains a clause urging both sides to buy more goods from one another. Officials familiar with the talks that led to the treaty say that the clause is a warning to Paris that for the partnership to work, France will have to stop shielding its defence companies from

UK competition. The Swedish-Norwegian relationship, which is at the core of the Nordic defence co-operation, came under strain in 2008 after Norway had chosen to buy US-made F-35s rather than Swedish Gripens. While pragmatic Oslo saw the US plane as the best match for the country's needs, Stockholm felt that Norway had failed to show regard for the needs of the Nordic defence industry. These attitudes reflect differences in the countries' views on the role of the government in the economy, so they are deeply rooted. But differences may narrow somewhat as the EU defence procurement directive, which will make it more difficult for governments to protect national defence champions, comes into effect (see the text box on page 37). As the above examples show, the absence of a level playing field for defence industries is not necessarily a deal-breaker – it has not kept the UK and France from signing an agreement – though some in the British defence establishment may reconsider support for the treaty should French companies benefit disproportionately from collaboration with the UK.

Clarity of intentions: some countries enter into co-operative projects because they want to save money (the Nordics, for example), others because they want to encourage deeper European integration (Germany with France), yet others because they want to bind non-EU neighbours closer to the European Union (Poland with Ukraine) or because they want to build trust among neighbours with a history of troubled relations (Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Macedonia, Turkey and Romania, which established a common brigade). These are all valid reasons but they lead to different conclusions. For example, countries that primarily want to save money may focus on integrating relatively mundane (but costly) tasks such as training or logistics, whereas co-operation for the sake of encouraging EU integration is more likely to involve the creation of high-profile joint units (which, however, may not necessarily save money and could be difficult to deploy). If co-operation is to leave both partners satisfied, there has to be clarity and agreement from the beginning of the discussions among partners on what purpose the initiative is to serve, because this will determine the scope, form and depth of their common project.

The Franco-British defence co-operation treaty

In November 2010, the EU's two largest military powers, France and Britain, formally agreed to intensify military co-operation, in a treaty. Among other things, they vowed to create an expeditionary force that would train and deploy together (but not be permanently integrated), make technical changes to allow UK and French aircraft to operate off carriers from both countries, jointly buy spare parts and services for their future A400M transport aircraft and develop common submarine technologies. More joint projects are to follow: the treaty calls on both sides to increase the range of co-operation and to build and operate joint facilities where possible. A separate treaty also sets out co-operation on nuclear arms research. The main treaty reverses Britain's previously sceptical stance on pooling and sharing with EU states (it has long had a close military relationship with the US and limited co-operation with the Netherlands).

The treaty and the accompanying declaration say much about why the UK and France have chosen each other as partners. The declaration stresses similarities in strategic cultures in its very first paragraph: "The UK and France... share many common interests and responsibilities... we are among the most active contributors to operations in Afghanistan and in other crisis areas around the world." The document also points out that the two parties' willingness to use force sets them apart from other EU countries: "We are ... among the few nations able and ready to fulfil the most demanding military missions."²⁰ Paris and London have clearly concluded that co-operation works best when pursued with a 'natural' partner, that shares many attitudes to force and foreign policy – and only if it is limited to such a partner. The declaration also emphasises the importance of trust: "Today we have reached a level of mutual confidence unprecedented in our history... We do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either nation could be threatened without the vital

20 'UK-France summit 2010 declaration on defence and security co-operation', November 2nd 2010.

interests of the other also being threatened." However, the countries have also decided to commit their co-operation to a formal treaty, which suggests that their trust in each other has limits.

²¹ *Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for defence and security co-operation*, November 2nd 2010.

The document also reveals concerns that differences in attitudes to the defence industry may derail the partnership. In what UK officials say is a veiled critique of France's protectionist stance, the treaty says that no party is to "hinder legitimate access to its markets and to its government contracts in the field of defence and security".²¹ The document foresees the eventual merger of companies making the most advanced weapons: "we will ...permit increasing interdependence [among companies and governments] and consolidate our complex weapons industrial base [and] work towards a single European prime contractor."²²

²² *UK-France summit 2010 declaration on defence and security co-operation*, November 2nd 2010.

Seriousness of intent: governments that take defence seriously – that see a real need to nurture and occasionally use their armed forces – will be more inclined to co-operate than others. Such governments will feel more urgency to mitigate the impact of the decreasing budgets on their capabilities, and will be more willing to accept and navigate the political risks (partial loss of sovereignty, industrial tensions) that cross-border defence co-operation entails.

Low corruption: defence procurement, with its technically complex and often classified contracts, attracts its share of corruption. In recent years, the Czech, Romanian and Hungarian governments have been named in UK and US graft investigations. When national procurement officials are corrupt, they will see pooling and sharing – which may require them to share or delegate authority over purchasing decisions – as a constraint on their ability to profit. If they have enough influence on the political leadership, they may well be in a position to thwart the joint purchase. And while this concerns primarily joint procurement, structural pooling projects can also suffer: if the countries that create a joint unit also want it

From past lessons...

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to have only one supply chain, some procurement officials in the participating countries will have to agree to share power with others. Countries with high levels of corruption will always find it more difficult to do this than their less corrupt counterparts.

4 ...to future policies

Several important prescriptions flow from the observations in the previous chapter. A lot of factors have to align for structural pooling and sharing to succeed, which is why European cross-border defence integration will remain an exception rather than the rule. While EU militaries may one day form a 'euroarmy', its creation presupposes far closer unity of military thought and political identity than is evident today, or will be for the foreseeable future. Similarly, the notion that EU defence should be built around a single core group, whose emergence would encourage others to join in a 'snowballing' effect, seems unrealistic. Formation of joint units requires enormous trust and similarity in strategic cultures. It works better if it is done among similar-sized countries. They need to have comparable industrial policies, and the freer they are of corruption the easier they will find it to co-operate. These conditions will only occur in some – and not necessarily connected – parts of Europe. Future pooling and sharing effort should therefore follow these key principles:

- ★ Rather than pursuing a single 'permanent structured co-operation', the focus of EU countries and institutions should be on encouraging the formation of multiple, discreet, regional 'islands of co-operation', whose members will partly integrate their militaries. Some of these islands are already well established: the Benelux countries have had much success with pooling and sharing forces and the Nordic states are moving in this direction. Other islands have just emerged: the French-UK co-operation treaty is only months old, and more countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, are in the early exploration phase. Some existing co-operative projects may well be red herrings rather than the beginning of an island: the

Franco-German brigade is one. Other countries remain without an obvious partner, which meets the necessary criteria to form an island of co-operation: Italy belongs in this category, as does Spain (though they do buy and develop new weapons jointly with others).

- ★ Exploration of potential pooling and sharing projects must begin with an analysis of the obstacles to integration. These will differ from region to region. The Germans have had bad experiences with multinational forces; they have focused on pooling combat units but have disagreed with their chosen partner, France, on when and how to deploy them. Elsewhere, as in the British-French case, different industrial approaches may yet hamper progress. Yet other countries such as those in Central Europe had simply not given the subject much thought until recently.

A sensible pooling and sharing policy will take into account these regional differences and produce strategies tailored for discreet parts of Europe. Germany should start focusing on sharing non-combat units; this approach saves money while allowing Berlin to avoid the trap of not being able to deploy its shared unit. Germany has recently agreed with the Netherlands to develop and store ammunition together; it should explore what similar opportunities exist for other weapons systems and whether it can do more to train personnel with others. Britain and France have gone as far as they want to go for now in their co-operation; they should focus on implementing their recent treaty and on allowing freer cross-border trade in defence goods, which would open the door to a closer military relationship in the future. The Czech Republic and Slovakia, which are holding early talks on pooling and sharing, should take their time to explore which areas for co-operation promise greatest savings and how to overcome possible political difficulties. They need to try harder to build wide domestic support for their

partnership, and continue their recently launched efforts to curb corruption. Elsewhere in Central Europe, NATO and the EU could encourage the formation of new islands of co-operation by advertising other countries' successes. Governments in Europe's north, whose forces have long fought alongside and exercised with each other, formalised their partnership by forming 'Nordic defence co-operation' in 2009. They should now move deeper into structural pooling: to merge some facilities and shut others and to agree to form future units, such as those to patrol the Arctic, on an integrated basis.

- ★ Governments should not strive to create identical groupings; the islands of co-operation will inevitably look different from one another and participating countries will want to integrate to different depths. This is because each cluster faces unique needs. The British and the French, for example, will want to retain their broad-spectrum militaries. They can afford a relatively high degree of self-sufficiency while still being able to deploy sizeable forces in operations. So they will shy away from fully integrating military units but will share certain niche capabilities (such as laboratories for testing nuclear weapons) to save money. Small and medium-sized countries are likely to have stronger bonds of trust and solidarity, which will allow them to integrate more deeply than the big states. They also have less choice; they face a 'share it or lose it' moment: unless they can cut cost of certain military skills and activities through collaboration they stand to lose them in the current round of budget cuts.
- ★ What areas the various islands select for co-operation will be as important as which countries participate. One lesson from past examples is that pooling efforts that focus on non-deployable forces tend to create fewer political complications than integration of deployable ones. Capabilities such as maintenance, training and education are least likely to be used

in operations: that also means that governments are less likely to fall out over the terms and conditions of their use. Countries that use identical equipment should think of pooling their training and maintenance, as many nations using the NH90 transport helicopter have done. Training facilities are another natural candidate for pooling; already many EU and NATO countries make extensive use of each other's exercise ranges. They should consider formalising these exchanges, which would allow them to shut some training facilities. Governments tend to focus on pooling deployable forces because that is where they often face the greatest shortages. But they forget that savings made by reducing or eliminating non-deployable capabilities can then be allocated towards building units earmarked for deployments abroad.

- ★ As a general rule, decisions on how to co-operate and with whom need to be rooted in a rigorous cost and benefit analysis, along with a thorough public discussion of their industrial and political impact. The more the media, the expert community and the political classes know about the advantages and risks of pooling and sharing, the more likely the islands of co-operation are to survive changes of government. The French and the British had taken years to agree which pooling initiatives make the most economic and political sense; they had rejected many ideas precisely because they wanted to focus on those which had a reasonable chance of succeeding. Even so, French defence experts worry that the treaty with the UK may be in jeopardy should a Socialist win the presidency in 2012 (some in the present opposition view collaboration with the UK as a distraction from efforts to build common European defences). Were the treaty to falter, other countries might take fright: they could be investing political capital into pooling and sharing only to be let down by their partners. A thorough public debate cannot completely avert such a risk, but it widens political support for the initiative, thus making it more durable.

★ The defence industry must be involved in deliberation on pooling and sharing from the outset. The companies provide a valuable service to governments by guarding the skills needed for national security. If they are left out of deliberations they cannot advise on the impact of pooling and sharing on the national skills base; in the worst case they may lobby against co-operation for fear of losing business. Industry will be more concerned about pooling of procurement if an agreement among several states to buy from one manufacturer instead of several may put those other companies out of business. But even structural pooling and sharing will have a direct bearing on the fortunes of the participating states' defence companies. Many provide not only goods but also services; some armed forces have outsourced entire training centres and maintenance depots to private companies. When countries choose to merge these facilities, some companies inevitably lose business. By involving defence companies in deliberations, and supporting mergers where companies wish to do this, governments can ease concerns and help to build a healthier, more consolidated industrial base.

The current round of budget cutting would appear to present an ideal chance to forge new, tighter military co-operation: most defence ministers who have been told to cut budgets have decided, sensibly, that it is time to abandon certain underused military capabilities. Entire forces are slated to go: the UK has given up most of its maritime surveillance fleet, and the German government has abolished conscription. In theory, this is the right moment to forge a more integrated, more 'European' force out of the 27 national militaries. But, European governments risk wasting this opportunity. While defence officials interviewed for this report say that the budget crisis has made them more open to co-operation, they worry that they do not have enough time to properly explore what forms of co-operation are politically acceptable and can save money – ministries of defence across Europe are under pressure from their treasuries to cut as soon as possible. Also, while

pooling and sharing saves money in the long run, it often costs more in the short term because bases may need to be closed, units moved or those made redundant paid off. And there simply is not enough money in budgets for any new outlays. There are exceptions to these observations: the Dutch and the Belgians are intensifying defence co-operation in parallel to their cost-cutting efforts, and so are the Nordics; the UK and France agreed a treaty, though their co-operation was for all practical purposes established long before the current round of budget cuts. Most EU countries will take the long way towards forming islands of co-operation: they will probably cut forces first, in isolation from their possible partners, and only then look for opportunities for partnership.

What role for the EU and NATO?

The EU and NATO should assist countries that are prepared to pool and share when they are ready. The role of these institutions will necessarily be limited because governments remain determined to defend their sovereignty in military affairs. But EU and NATO can nevertheless help in four important ways: changing mindsets, creating incentives, removing obstacles to pooling and sharing, and directly managing pooled capabilities.

Changing mindsets: pooling and sharing may be an old concept but it is far from universally known around Europe; many officials interviewed for this report professed general knowledge but little understanding of the pros and cons. The EU and NATO should help to spread awareness by distributing examples of best practice from co-operative ventures around Europe. As well as encouraging more countries to explore pooling and sharing, this would also have the benefit of helping governments that are only beginning to explore co-operation to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors. At present, they are left to seek out those lessons on their own; officials in the Czech Republic and Slovakia have sought advice from think-tanks because there was relatively little knowledge of the subject in the respective governments, and the EU and NATO were of little help.

The EDA has recently begun to catalogue regional pooling initiatives; it should also systematically gather data on what made these projects successful and why others have failed. NATO defence planners can help by analysing regional needs; they can also be useful by setting out measurable 'force goals' for islands of co-operation to accomplish. NATO's defence planners also conduct regular visits to capitals to assess their military readiness – they should consider adding experts at pooling and sharing to their teams, who could impart their lessons during the assessment visits.

Creating incentives: the EU and NATO could do more to use their multinational rapid reaction forces (the EU battlegroups and the NATO Response Force, NRF, respectively) to encourage pooling and sharing. While their primary *raison d'être* has been to give both institutions the ability to quickly respond to crises, the forces have also served to motivate member-states to reform their militaries (because only the most capable units can serve in the battlegroups and the NRF), and to encourage governments to build joint units. But on this last count, the experiment has disappointed: countries come together for the duration of one battlegroup and NRF 'rotation' (six months), but then go their own separate ways. Some relationships are built but they rarely have a lasting effect. The EU should adopt recent Polish proposals that the battlegroups should always be composed of the same states, and that they should be on rotation on a predictable schedule, for example every three years. This would give the member-states reasons to maintain close long-term co-operation with partners in the battlegroup, and possibly to pool their units on a permanent basis, not just for the duration of the rotation.

Removing obstacles: the EU is helping to smooth the way for future pooling and sharing projects through its procurement directive, which will remove many barriers to cross-border defence competition and trade. The European Commission should insist on the directive's vigorous implementation and use the threat of judicial proceedings against any government that drags its feet.

Both the EU and NATO should explore ways to encourage those countries that have problems with corruption in defence procurement to clean up. European governments are making progress: the UK recently tightened its laws on bribery and the Czechs want to change defence procurement rules to reduce the role of middlemen. Another possible approach may be to threaten suspension of assistance from NATO's common infrastructure programmes to countries that do not tackle corruption in their procurement systems. The large EU and NATO member-states have less need for such assistance and they also take a dim view of foreign officials advising them on how to run their militaries. But the EU and NATO can be effective in pressuring smaller and medium-sized states to address corruption where it exists.

The EU and NATO defence colleges can also assist pooling and sharing indirectly by narrowing differences in the strategic outlooks among future defence leaders in NATO and EU governments. They could make a more direct contribution by making pooling and sharing a more prominent part of their curriculum. Lastly, NATO and EU efforts to increase interoperability among member-states' forces directly pave the way for pooling and sharing: the more common technical standards and operating procedures European governments can agree on, the easier they will find it to pool portions of their armed forces.

The EU defence procurement directive

From August 2011, a new EU law will make it difficult for governments to shield national defence companies from outside competition. This will have the effect of curtailing member-states' protectionist habits and reducing tensions between those governments which have an open tendering system and those which prefer national suppliers.

The EU's directive aims to end protectionism in defence markets by setting out specific rules for procurement of military materiel.

At present, the defence sector is in practice largely exempt from the EU's single market rules, on national security grounds. Governments have routinely abused the exemption to give preferential treatment to national defence champions even where no justifiable 'national security grounds' exist: between 2000 and 2004, less than 13 per cent of all opportunities to tender for European defence related contracts were published.²³

²³ 'EU procurement directives', DLA Piper, March 2009. For more on the directive see: Clara Marina O'Donnell, 'The EU finally opens up the European defence market', CER policy brief, June 2009.

The EU has countered by setting out new procurement procedures for defence goods, which take into account the specificities of the sector (such as the need for guaranteed supplies in times of war). Under the new law, governments will find it more difficult to justify exemptions from these new rules. EU countries have until August 2011 to adopt legislation that transposes the directive into national law. If the European Commission enforces its new rules – and it may have to resort to the European Court of Justice because many member-states will be tempted to drag their feet on implementation – defence and security sectors will see much more cross-border competition.

By forcing EU governments to open more defence tenders to foreign competition on penalty of court action and fines, the directive will also help to smooth the way for military pooling and sharing across EU borders. At

present, protectionism often thwarts co-operation. If two countries, one of which tends to favour national suppliers and one that does not, form a joint unit, who should supply goods and services to it? The former country's government is liable to try to steer related procurement or service contracts towards its national supplier, putting companies from the partner country that do not enjoy the helping hand of their government at a competitive disadvantage. UK companies have expressed fears that the defence co-operation treaty with France will tilt the playing field in favour of their French competitors. By opening markets, the defence procurement directive will help level the playing field.

Managing pooled capabilities: the EU and NATO can manage capabilities on behalf of groups of member-states. NATO operates a fleet of airborne air-traffic control airplanes (AWACS); it has recently added three transport planes (C-17s), which it operates on behalf of twelve NATO members and partners. Instead of each participating state assuring their airworthiness and ordering spare parts and supplies, one NATO agency does it all, saving money. Small and medium-sized states seeking large and expensive platforms such as transport planes and satellites will often have no option other than turn to NATO or the EU; their budgets are too small to buy such equipment nationally. The EDA is also leading talks among EU countries on making more efficient use of existing transport aircraft in Europe. This will not include, for the time being, the purchase of new transport planes but the EDA can help states that already own such equipment to save money through arranging common training, exercises, basing and maintenance, among other things.

EDA officials say that they have had a lot more success with projects that only involve groups of member-states rather than EU-wide ones, lending further evidence to support the 'islands of co-operation' approach. But there are some systems which NATO and the EU should in the future operate on behalf of all member-states. The EU already runs a fleet of global positioning satellites, Galileo, which the member-states will use to guide bombs and missiles, a

centre (SitCent) which collates intelligence from national governments, and a facility in Spain that collects images and other information from member-states' satellites. It should also move into jointly building and operating observation and surveillance satellites. Several EU member-states operate such systems; France has Helios and Pleiades satellites, Germany has SAR-Lupe and Italy owns Cosmo-SkyMed. They would save money if other EU countries shared the costs and ownership. But progress on creating a common fleet of intelligence satellites has been slow: the member-states do not trust each other to keep secrets and they prefer to have the ability to gather intelligence on their own. Governments should also ask the EU and NATO to develop and manage less sensitive facilities needed for common operations: NATO has an extensive network of commands, and the EU should have a command of its own capable of managing an operation. For their part the two institutions will need to improve their collaboration (so that governments are not paying for duplicate efforts) and improve their management practices (so that they prove good stewards of their member-states money).

What about specialisation?

Admittedly, the 'islands of co-operation' approach does not by itself guarantee that the individual European pieces will add up to an effective, coherent EU or NATO force when necessary. Ideally, the member-states would not only form regional clusters but such clusters would specialise in discreet capabilities that complement each other. Either the EU or NATO would help to co-ordinate the choice of capabilities and monitor how well countries in the cluster did at developing their chosen skill.²⁴

²⁴ As Flournoy and Smith proposed ('European defense integration: Bridging the gap between strategy and capabilities', Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005).

Some specialisation of roles is taking place – only certain countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have theatre missile defences. Both the EU and NATO have encouraged their members to

establish 'centres of excellence' in a particular skill: the Estonians run a facility on NATO's behalf that studies cyber-threats and the Czechs specialise in detecting chemical, biological and nuclear materials. But many other governments have either maintained or are developing national capacity to do the same things; they do not want to rely on centres of excellence in some faraway country. The centres thus exist alongside, rather than in place of, national capacities. The EU and NATO as a whole are not saving money, which is the main purpose of specialisation (though the centres do allow smaller countries to gain access to expertise they would be unable to afford themselves).

Deeper specialisation among European governments or among the 'islands of co-operation', in which they effectively outsource certain military skill to another country or cluster, seems out of reach for the foreseeable future. Interviews with EU government officials suggest that they do not trust their partners to always bring their 'niche' forces to the battlefield when they are required; EU countries are uncomfortable with the dependency that specialisation creates. The EU and NATO should focus on what is achievable – and that is greater integration on the basis of islands of co-operation. They should also encourage specialisation within these clusters, whose members by definition share a higher degree of trust than European states collectively. Nordic military education is a good example: instead of all Nordic nations providing the same courses, each nation offers training within a specific subject area; the Finns teach courses for military observers and the Danes teach military police officer course.

5 Conclusion: The benefits of pooling and sharing in context

Pooling and sharing will never compensate for inadequate defence budgets: when average spending in Europe, as percentage of GDP, drops by half – as it has over the past two decades – militaries will inevitably suffer. However, properly applied, pooling and sharing can offset the impact of lower budgets, and structural pooling in particular holds promise of significant savings.

Critics will argue that a regional clusters approach runs counter to the idea of a stronger and more unified Europe. They should reconsider. If implemented, a strategy based around islands of co-operation will make participating countries militarily stronger, and this will give the EU and NATO access to more, rather than less, capability in the future. The regional approach merely recognises three realities: that individual states will retain the right to structure their armed forces as they see fit; that the needs, abilities and experiences of these states vary greatly from region to region; and that successful sharing arrangements have to be rooted in those regional commonalities and specificities.

Islands of co-operation are not meant to preclude the possibility that many military skills and hardware will be integrated at the EU and NATO level; many (such as the AWACS fleet) already are and more (such as surveillance satellites and command and control centres) should be. By definition, EU- and NATO-wide purchases offer greater economies of scale than the proposed islands of co-operation. But governments will want to retain control of most

defence capabilities at the national level. And if they share with anyone it will only be with the closest and most trusted partners. For all these cases, 'islands of co-operation' are as good as it gets.





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SURVIVING AUSTERITY

The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration

Tomas Valasek

A wave of budgetary austerity is weakening Europe's defences. The armed forces of Europe will lose important skills and capabilities unless they can find ways of saving money through collaboration. Tomas Valasek examines previous efforts at pooling and sharing, and explains why some succeeded better than others. The formation of joint units works better if the countries involved have similar sizes and strategic cultures, and if they trust each other and have comparable attitudes to the defence industry. European leaders should encourage various groups of compatible member-states to work together in military 'islands of co-operation'.

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I MILITARI

RIFORMA DEL GOVERNO

Difesa, sforbiciata su spese e carriere

Più integrazione europea, riduzione degli organici

FRANCESCO GRIGNETTI
ROMA

E' un'equazione difficilissima, quella che deve risolvere il ministro della Difesa Giampaolo Di Paola. In un colpo solo è chiamato ad aumentare l'efficacia dello strumento militare, spostare 2 miliardi e mezzo di euro dalle spese per il personale a quelle di investimento e addestramento, rispondere alle sollecitazioni atlantiche ed europee. La trasformazione che s'annuncia è talmente epocale che la riforma del Modello di Difesa sarà sottoposto martedì al consiglio dei ministri e il giorno dopo Di Paola lo illustrerà in Parlamento, ma il premier Monti lo inserirà nel Piano nazionale delle riforme che poi porterà personalmente a Bruxelles. Di questo ha parlato ieri mezzo governo al Consiglio supremo di Difesa,

alla presenza di Giorgio Napolitano. E dal Quirinale è giunta la piena approvazione: «Il sistema Difesa italiano - è scritto in una nota finale - deve essere razionalizzato per eliminare ridondanze e inefficienze, rimodulando, laddove consentito, alcuni significativi programmi di investimento». Tra le righe c'è il parziale ridimensionamento del contestatissimo progetto dei cacciabombardieri F-35, ma non solo.

L'Europa, al solito, è la stella polare di questo governo. Anche in materia militare. Di Paola auspica come nessuno altro un'integrazione tra europei. Il comunicato del Quirinale gli dà forza. «La progressiva integrazione multinazionale delle Forze armate, nell'ambito europeo della politica di sicurezza e difesa comune, rappresenta un passaggio ormai ineludibile».

Il retroscena è che gli stati maggiori dei Paesi Ue stanno progettando un avvicinamento alle future forze armate europee che già chiamano «la Maastricht della Difesa». Questo cammino, come fu per la moneta unica, sarà a tappe. E si sa qual è il primo «step» a cui le forze armate italiane dovranno tendere: riportare in equilibrio le diverse voci del bilancio della Difesa, attualmente squilibrato sul lato del personale. Ci sono 190 mila militari in organico che pesano per il 70% sul bilancio. Considerando che quest'ultimo è di 12 miliardi di euro (e così è fissato per i prossimi tre anni dall'ultima Finanziaria targata Tremonti) significa che il personale costa 8,4 miliardi. «Tropo», secondo Di Paola. La spesa dovrebbe scendere a 6 miliardi. Ma sarà una dura perché significa frenare drastica-

mente gli avanzamenti di carriera e parallelamente fare a meno di 40-50 mila uomini.

Ovviamente non si possono toccare i reparti operativi, ossia le missioni all'estero. Il taglio colpirà piuttosto nella fascia di ufficiali e sottufficiali sui 50 anni, che dovrebbero restare in servizio per almeno 10-12 anni, e per i quali si profilano prepensionamenti e mobilità. Di pari passo si procederà con il taglio di sedi di comando, accorpamento di reparti, chiusura di basi, dimagrimento dell'apparato. Il tutto alla ricerca di risparmi che finiranno, con orrore dei pacifisti, proprio in nuovi armamenti. Il numero e la qualità di aerei, navi e carri armati sarà infatti il passo successivo per l'integrazione europea. La Difesa intendeva sostituire 131 vecchi aerei (Tornado, Harrier e Amx) con 131 nuovi F-35. Qualcosa si taglierà, ma poco. Del programma saranno soprattutto rallentate le spese.

**Ridimensionato il
contestato progetto
dei cacciabombardieri
modello F-35**

Cambiano le priorità Forze armate integrate in Europa

Certo, la crisi economica. Ma l'indicazione del Colle è anche quella di risparmiare per arrivare a un nuovo modello di Difesa: un esercito di dimensioni elefantache non serve a nessuno

L'analisi

UMBERTO DE GIOVANNANGELI

Snellire per rendere più funzionale, e non solo più economico il nostro modello di Difesa. Risparmiare per rilanciare. E, soprattutto, legare strettamente le spese militari ad una idea più definita della politica estera dell'Italia. È tutta politica, e non "ragionieristica", la linea emersa dalla riunione del Consiglio supremo di Difesa.

È politica l'indicazione di una conferma dell'impegno del nostro Paese nelle missioni internazionale ma, e questo è il salto di qualità che emerge dal documento finale del Consiglio, questo impegno deve essere accompagnato da una specifica indicazione a determinare le priorità di intervento e ad investire in modo più mirato rispetto alle diverse aree di crisi in cui i nostri militari sono presenti. Razionalizzare la spesa è dunque funzionale a indicare le priorità del nostro intervento nelle diverse aree di crisi: il Libano, ad esempio, o il Kosovo, per un Paese che ambisce a giocare un ruolo di primo piano nel Mediterraneo o nei Balcani, hanno un valore strategico superiore all'Afghanistan. Ed è politica, e non "ragionieristica", l'altra indicazione strategica che emerge dal Consiglio supremo di Difesa: la conferma dell'intenzione di rimodulare alcuni dei principali programmi di investimento per i sistemi d'arma alla luce di un nuovo modello di difesa che possa essere più sostenibile e meglio

focalizzato sulle nuove priorità di sicurezza nazionale e di impegno internazionale dell'Italia.

F-35, ma non solo. Su questo, l'indicazione che emerge dalle conclusioni del Consiglio è molto netta anche se non viene formalmente esplicitata: se da un lato viene confermata al necessità di non chiamarsi fuori dal programma di acquisizione dei caccia F-35, dall'altro si manifesta la necessità di ripensare la dimensione del programma: 131 caccia F-35 non sono solo una spesa troppo onerosa, ma questa non appare modulata alla selezione delle priorità che l'Italia deve definire sia in chiave di una cooperazione integrata con gli altri partner europei, sia per ciò che concerne il rapporto tra Difesa e Politica estera.

Il concetto-chiave emerso dal Consiglio presieduto dal Capo dello Stato, non è quello dei tagli da compiere in una fase di crisi, ma quello, ben più strategico e politico, di razionalizzazione del sistema Difesa. Ed è questo, peraltro, un possibile terreno d'incontro tra un movimento pacifista che pone la questione del disarmo non in termini ideologici assolutistici, e quanti, anche nelle fila delle nostre Forze armate, si pongono il problema di una razionalizzazione degli investimenti e non accettano di veder ridurre l'esercito ad uno «stipendio assistenziale».

È lo sforzo di elaborazione che l'Unità ha cercato di sollecitare, e che le linee emerse dal Consiglio supremo di Difesa incoraggiano.

Si tratta di non restare prigionieri di due approcci ugualmente perdenti: quello di chi pensa che un Paese possa contare sullo scenario

Le missioni

Rivedere gli interventi all'estero, privilegiando il modello Libano

Fare sistema

Ora scelte coerenti: anche nel segno della trasparenza

internazionale smantellando *tout court* lo strumento militare; ma non meno perdente è il velleitarismo di chi pensa che l'Italia possa e debba permettersi uno strumento militare elefantaco, in uomini e mezzi. Si conta se si selezionano gli investimenti, se si definiscono priorità, se si ha l'ambizione di indicare una strada percorribile ai partner europei. In una parola, se si fa politica, in due ambiti cruciali come Difesa ed Esteri.

Rimodulare il modello di Difesa, e gli investimenti in questo campo, è una necessità che non può essere affrontata ed esaurita in una chiave "autarchica", nazionale, ma ha senso e respiro se viene proiettata in una prospettiva europea. Non è solo, e tanto, un problema di socializzazione di costi, quanto la non più rinviabile messa in atto di una cooperazione rafforzata, incisiva perché sovranazionale. Illuminante in proposito è un passato del documento licenziato dal Consiglio: «Un'innovativa iniziativa italiana in tale settore potrebbe inoltre concorrere al consolidamento della coesione politica europea e dare impulso al processo di integrazione economica e istituzionale dell'Unione, che sempre più si rivela di importanza davvero fondamentale per il futuro del nostro Paese». L'integrazione europea passa anche da qui. E passa anche per un ruolo attivo, propositivo, del Parlamento chiamato, al pari del Governo, a tradurre le indicazioni del Consiglio supremo di Difesa in scelte concrete, e coerenti. Razionalizzazione, dunque, ma anche trasparenza. ♦

Azione congiunta
in vista
del G8 di Chicago



ITALIA-USA

Rinviato il tema
di un mercato unico
Ue-America

Euro, missioni e strategie di crescita tutti i dossier aperti con Washington

Al centro dei colloqui anche le spese militari e l'emergenza in Siria

di ANNA GUAITA

WASHINGTON - Due anni fa, il presidente Giorgio Napolitano venne a Washington su invito della Casa Bianca. Mentre la lotta di Obama per arginare la crisi economica cominciava a dare i primi timidi risultati, dall'Europa arrivavano segnali preoccupanti. E dall'Italia ancor di più. L'idea di invitare Napolitano, che già nel passato aveva aiutato gli americani a capire il nostro Paese, e a non temerlo, pare fosse stata proprio di Barack Obama. In quel maggio del 2010, Napolitano assicurò che l'euro sarebbe sopravvissuto e che l'Italia avrebbe fatto la sua parte. Ieri, è toccato al presidente del Consiglio Monti venire per confermare che quelle previsioni si stanno avverando. Come si diceva in un saggio del Brookings Institute pubblicato in occasione dell'arrivo di Monti: «Il primo ministro è venuto per dire ai suoi amici americani che l'Italia ha fatto i suoi compiti a casa e l'euro forse è un po' scosso, ma sopravviverà». Ma se Monti è stato invitato alla Casa Bianca, e poi a Wall Street e all'Onu, non è solo perché gli americani vogliono essere rassicurati. Ieri tutte e due le parti miravano a creare un asse Roma-Washington più solido che negli ultimi anni, e che spazi su vari fronti.

L'economia. Monti vuole ottenere che Obama e il mondo finanziario Usa sostengano la battaglia per il fondo di salvataggio europeo, e che questo si farà nella misura e quantità auspicata da Monti e Sarkozy, che spingano il fondo monetario a parteciparvi con depositi ingenti. Monti è arrivato forte del fatto che solo tre giorni fa il premier

cinese Wen Jiabao ha lui stesso avanzato l'ipotesi che la Cina «partecipi alla risoluzione del problema del debito europeo» attraverso il fondo monetario. Peraltro Obama stesso ha un interesse diretto a che l'euro sopravviva, lo ha perfino riconosciuto Hillary Clinton qualche giorno fa a Monaco, «un collasso dell'euro alla vigilia delle presidenziali» sarebbe una crisi seria. A sua volta Obama ha visto confermata la sensazione che Monti è vicino più a lui che ai repubblicani sulla questione della crescita. Monti ripete in contrapposizione a Merkel e alle sue idee di rigore e austerità tout court che ci vuole anche investimento nella crescita, che è poi esattamente quello

che Obama predica, ottenendo però solo critiche dure da parte dei conservatori che vedono nel deficit federale la causa di tutti i mali.

Il G8 di maggio a Chicago. Nel carnet di Monti c'era anche l'interesse di coordinare una possibile azione congiunta per il G8, momento in cui l'Italia potrà presentare il riassunto delle riforme, e in cui si capirà se stiamo davvero uscendo dal guado. È girata

voce che Monti sperasse di porre i primi mattoni di un progetto a lui molto caro, e cioè quello un mercato comune che vada dall'Unione Europea agli Stati Uniti. Ma vari esperti hanno spiegato

che questo non è l'anno adatto: in campagna elettorale Obama è poco propenso ad ascoltare proposte di abbattere protezioni per i prodotti americani. Magari se sarà rieletto, l'argomento potrà essere ripescato con più speranze di successo.

Spese militari. Il presidente del Consiglio aveva incluso nei piani di discussione con Obama anche il tema molto


sentito e caldo di un esercito europeo. Per ora il progetto è lontanissimo dall'essere realizzabile. Ma comunque Monti intendeva presentare l'ipotesi di una crescente integrazione finanziaria e militare, che può apparire appetibile in questa stagione di economie forzate. Comunque anche questo sarà un argomento poi ripreso al G8, nel quale c'è infatti un capitolo dedicato alla «Smart Defense».

Politica internazionale. Siria, Iran e Afghanistan sono i tre temi caldi della conversazione fra Monti e Obama. Il ritiro oramai prossimo delle truppe dall'Afghanistan è stato il tema di certo più facile, visto che non incontra grandi resistenze in quasi nessun quartiere. Gli ossi duri erano l'Iran e la Siria. Ma di quelli ha parlato il ministro degli Esteri Giulio Terzi con la collega Hillary Clinton. Terzi, che è stato ambasciatore dell'Italia sia a Washington sia all'Onu, è stato accolto con grande cordialità, e la signora Clinton ha commentato che «una forte amicizia lega l'America all'Italia» e che gli Usa fanno molto affidamento sul governo italiano. Assieme i due Paesi stanno «lavorando a tutto campo: dal tema dell'Afghanistan alla preoccupante situazione in Siria».


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*Clinton a Terzi
«Facciamo molto
affidamento
sul vostro governo»*

I dossier aperti tra Roma e Washington



Misure
per la crescita



Crisi
siriana




Mercato comune
Ue-Usa



Ritiro
dall'Afghanistan



Embargo
contro l'Iran



F35 e forniture
militari

CONTINUA

Giulio Terzi ieri
a Washington
con Hilary
Clinton




Armamenti. Il Vecchio continente riduce gli stanziamenti a causa della crisi

Nelle spese per la difesa l'Asia sorpassa l'Europa

I budget militari


I PAESI ASIATICI SPENDONO DI PIÙ

Spese di difesa programmate nel 2011 per Regione. In % del totale




I PRIMI DIECI

I Paesi che hanno speso di più in difesa nel 2011 (mld.\$)



IL PESO DEL SETTORE

Spese di difesa in % del Pil



L'Iiss di Londra: Pechino aumenterà i fondi dell'11%

Leonardo Maisano

LONDRA. Dal nostro corrispondente

«La sfida per il mondo occidentale consiste nel riuscire a mantenere, in epoca di austerità, l'efficienza militare sviluppata in un decennio di operazioni multilaterali ora in via di conclusione». L'Istituto internazionale di studi strategici (Iiss) di Londra nel diffondere il Military Balance, valutazione globale degli equilibri della difesa planetaria, solleva dei dubbi sulla tenuta del «fronte occidentale».

La coincidenza di decisi tagli alla difesa con la fine imminente di importanti missioni nel mondo, mettono a dura prova il fronte euro-americano. Soprattutto quello europeo che per la prima volta nel-

la storia ha stanziamenti complessivi inferiori a quelli del cotè orientale, non più l'ex Urss, per decenni metro di paragone, ma l'Asia nel suo complesso. «In termini nominali scrivono gli esperti dell'Istituto britannico - nel corso del 2012 molto probabilmente la spesa per la difesa del blocco del Far East risulterà essere superiore a quella europea». Fra il 2008 e il 2010 sedici Paesi dell'Unione e membri della Nato hanno ridotto i propri budget in taluni casi fino al 10%, mentre gli stessi capitoli di spesa nell'area asiatica sono cresciuti complessivamente del 3,15 per cento. La Cina, colosso planetario anche su questo fronte, nel corso del 2012, secondo fonti di Pechino, aumenterà gli stanziamenti di un ulteriore 11,5 per cento.

Ciononostante, a parere del direttore generale dell'Istituto di studi strategici, John Chipman, il progresso tecnologico cinese «è più modesto di quanto si voglia far credere». Cina, India, Giappone, Corea del Sud, Australia con-

tribuiscono all'80% del bilancio globale della spesa militare nel Far East. Pechino ha, però, aumentato del 30% la sua quota nel complesso del budget della regione. Progressione preoccupante forse, certamente inevitabile essendo riflesso di una dinamica globale che vede lo sviluppo economico a Est a fronte di una dolorosa contrazione a Ovest. Almeno nell'Ovest europeo. «Anche gli Usa - scrivono gli analisti dell'International institute of strategic studies - hanno cominciato a ridurre la spesa militare dopo un periodo di espansione» ma, precisano, il bilancio cinese del settore è ancora un ottavo di quello americano. Ci vorranno almeno quindici anni perché Pechino possa raggiungere un livello simile a quello di Washington.

Al contrario il trend europeo è destinato a proseguire nel segno dell'austerità. Non si scorge nessuna inversione di tendenza come suggerisce il diffuso disavanzo delle finanze pubbliche dell'Unione.

E le conseguenze sono già evidenti. «Ci sono poche possibilità che la stretta ai bilanci sia allentata presto», sostengono gli esperti militari inglesi ricordando che la campagna in Libia ha svelato buchi nelle performance alleate sia sul fronte delle azioni aeree sia nelle operazioni di intelligence. Scenario che spingerà i Paesi europei, secondo Iiss, a condividere sempre di più strumenti militari, in linea con il concetto di "smart defence" proposto dal segretario generale della Nato Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Un processo che, secondo la tesi del Military Balance, crea un problema di dipendenza reciproca e che potrebbe essere pericolosamente dirottato da esigenze finanziarie o anche di semplice opportunità politica. «Per questo - a dare retta alla tesi britannica espressa dagli esperti strategici - dovrà essere la Nato» a dettare il cammino verso una crescente condivisione della capacità militare.

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CINQUE OBIETTIVI

Allargare la difesa comune europea

di GIAMPAOLO DI PAOLA e THOMAS DE MAIZIÈRE

Caro direttore, il Corno d'Africa è una delle regioni più povere e martoriate del mondo. Con l'operazione militare Atalanta, l'Unione Europea protegge le navi del World Food Program (Programma alimentare mondiale) e le flotte mercantili internazionali dagli attacchi della pirateria. Con le sue missioni di addestramento sta costruendo competenze regionali nel settore della sicurezza.

Ma perché parliamo del Corno d'Africa? Perché è l'esempio, forse il prototipo, di una politica europea di sicurezza e di difesa moderna.

In un breve arco di tempo l'Unione Europea è diventata un protagonista attivo nel campo del mantenimento della pace, della prevenzione dei conflitti e del rafforzamento della sicurezza internazionale. L'Ue ha da offrire molto più di quanto ha fatto finora, e più di quanto, forse, alcuni pensano. Al momento attuale manca un coordinamento efficiente tra Stati-membri e all'interno delle istituzioni Ue per la gestione delle capacità civili e militari esistenti.

È necessario un ulteriore impegno per ampliare il portafoglio di capacità europee civili e militari: ciò comprende anche il rafforzamento dell'integrazione tra le istituzioni Ue per la difesa e la sicurezza e della loro capacità di guida di missioni ed operazioni. Con il Trattato di Lisbona del 2009 le istituzioni europee hanno stabilito la rotta per il futuro e per il rafforzamento delle politiche di sicurezza e di difesa comune. Ma è chiaro che abbiamo bisogno di una politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune efficace e completa per poter perseguire i nostri comuni interessi con i partner dell'area atlantica. È ora di allargare la sfera di applicazione della politica di sicurezza e di difesa europea.

E, secondo noi, quest'allargamento deve toccare cinque punti. Con un obiettivo di fondo: solo lavorando all'unisono, l'Europa potrà soddisfare le necessità attuali e gestire le sfide future.

Il primo principio è quello dell'impegno. Anche in base alla maggiore enfasi strategica data dai nostri partner americani all'area del Pacifico, all'Europa verrà chiesto di assumersi responsabilità sempre maggiori nel campo della sicurezza. Questo è già oggi messo in evidenza dal vasto impegno europeo nei Balcani ed in Africa. L'apporto dell'Unione Europea come partner sul terreno sarà ancora più necessario in futuro.

Il secondo è quello della «comprehensive-ness». Il superamento delle crisi e il mantenimento di una situazione di sicurezza duratura possono essere garantiti solo dall'interazione mirata tra strumenti diplomatici, economici, di sviluppo, sociali e politici e mezzi militari. L'interazione tra un vasto numero di attori civili e militari — cioè il «Comprehensive Approach» — è d'importanza vitale. La forza specifica dell'Unione Europea sta nella sua capacità di applicare tale approccio civile-militare in maniera unitaria.

Il terzo principio è quello delle capacità. Se non integriamo i nostri sforzi per la difesa nessun singolo Stato, e quindi neanche l'Europa considerata come un tutt'uno, riuscirà mai a garantire la propria sicurezza nel lungo termine. Una cooperazione più stretta e più forte tra gli Stati europei è necessaria per motivi sia economici che strategici. Se non riusciamo a coordinare i nostri piani nazionali di difesa, potremmo correre il rischio di perdere capacità. È quindi tanto più importante coordinare la pianificazione nazionale a livello internazionale. Il prerequisito indispensabile è superare le riserve a livello nazionale preparandoci a rinuncia-

re a determinate capacità e ad accettare la reciproca dipendenza.

Il quarto principio è quello di complementarità. Unione Europea e Nato devono essere considerate organizzazioni complementari, non concorrenti: nel rafforzare la dimensione europea della difesa si rafforzerà l'intera comunità Euro-atlantica. Le due organizzazioni hanno entrambe i loro meriti: la Ue con il suo orientamento civile-militare e la Nato come alleanza per la difesa collettiva.

Quinto e ultimo principio: la cooperazione. L'importanza di cooperazioni e partnership sarà in continua crescita. L'Ue ha già stabilito un'ampia rete di partnership in tutto il mondo. Tali partnership, così come la cooperazione con organizzazioni internazionali quali le Nazioni Unite, l'Unione africana e l'Associazione delle nazioni dell'Asia meridionale dovranno essere ampliate ed intensificate.

La politica di difesa e di sicurezza europea non si alimenta da sola. Spetta ora agli Stati membri svilupparla ulteriormente — secondo noi — attuando i cinque punti. L'armonizzazione europea deve riuscire a farsi strada a livello di governi nazionali.

La Germania e l'Italia hanno entrambe sostenuto la causa di una maggiore e più stretta collaborazione tra gli Stati-membri dell'Ue non solo perché ciò è indispensabile per ragioni economiche; ma, soprattutto, perché si tratta di un imperativo strategico. È in tale spirito che la dichiarazione italo-tedesca del novembre 2011 supera il concetto di mera cooperazione bilaterale e va considerata come un impulso per una forte architettura di sicurezza europea.

*Ministri della Difesa
di Italia e Germania*

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Strategie L'Alto rappresentante per la politica estera traccia un bilancio su aiuti umanitari, stato della ricerca e sviluppo economico

«Valori e diritti, la forza dell'Europa»

Catherine Ashton: resta prioritario l'obiettivo di promuovere la libertà nel mondo

di CATHERINE ASHTON

Grazie al mio lavoro ho la fortuna di incontrare presidenti e primi ministri e di discutere temi della massima importanza con le personalità più influenti. Ma di solito non sono le persone che saluto in imponenti palazzi, di fronte alle telecamere, a colpirmi di più. Sono invece gli uomini e le donne che incontro su piazze cittadine e strade polverose, in affollate scuole e accoglienti case private. Sono le persone che hanno sfidato e sconfitto la tirannia, da Varsavia a Soweto, dal Sudan alla Birmania.

L'anno scorso a Tunisi, entrando nella sede di un'organizzazione per i diritti umani, mi sono unita a un'animata discussione tra persone che non si erano mai incontrate prima — benché ciascuna avesse dedicato la propria vita a migliorare quella altrui — e che per la prima volta avevano l'opportunità di lavorare insieme.

In tutto il mondo — a migliaia di chilometri di distanza dalla tribuna dell'Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite e dal Consiglio affari esteri di Bruxelles — queste persone lottano ogni giorno per rendere diverso il loro — e il nostro — mondo. Possono essere motivate da una piccola ingiustizia o da un grave crimine, possono essere consapevoli dei loro diritti o non conoscere la legge, ma hanno tutte in comune la volontà di superare la paura e l'oppressione e di combattere per un mondo migliore. È proprio per aiutare questo tipo di persone che sono entrata in politica; sono questi i campioni che intendo difendere, per i quali desidero che lavorino l'Ue e il Servizio europeo per l'azione esterna (Seae).

Per questo, da quando ho assunto le mie funzioni, mi sono concentrata sull'obiettivo di mettere la promozione dei diritti umani al centro della politica estera dell'Ue. Ma negli ultimi due anni e mezzo, durante i viaggi che ho effettuato in quasi tutti i continenti e nel corso di innumerevoli riunioni, mi sono resa conto che per difendere le persone che meritano il nostro sostegno l'Ue deve superare due sfide cruciali, ciascuna delle quali può minare la lotta — la loro e la nostra — per costruire un mondo migliore.

La prima sfida riguarda la coerenza dell'Ue. Troppo spesso sento chiedere se

la promozione dei diritti umani possa di fatto essere integrata nelle politiche dell'Ue in materia di aiuti, commercio, cambiamenti climatici e allargamento, o se l'Ue possa mai eludere il famoso «doppio standard» che tanti problemi ha causato in passato. Ma io sono certa che la nostra azione non sarà vincente se parleremo di diritti solo a chi vuole ascoltarci e taceremo con gli altri: mai dimenticare i diritti umani solo perché stiamo parlando con un governo di relazioni commerciali o di collegamenti energetici! L'etica è indivisibile.

La strategia dell'Ue sui diritti umani da me varata questa settimana si impegna quindi a porre i diritti umani al centro delle «relazioni dell'Ue con tutti i Paesi terzi» e a «promuovere i diritti umani in tutti i settori della propria azione esterna, senza eccezioni», incluse «le politiche in materia di commercio, investimenti, tecnologia e telecomunicazioni, Internet, energia, ambiente, responsabilità sociale delle imprese e sviluppo». Quando alcuni mesi orsono in Birmania/Myanmar ho incontrato Aung San Suu Kyi, ho potuto farlo con orgoglio, sapendo che l'Ue aveva promosso l'isolamento del governo birmano nonostante gli indubbi vantaggi, non da ultimo commerciali, che l'acquiescenza avrebbe offerto. Ora possiamo mitigare le sanzioni, e vi è fiducia nel fatto che troveremo modi per sostenere la transizione, in quanto i birmani sanno che sin dall'inizio ci siamo schierati dalla parte giusta della storia.

La seconda sfida riguarda l'impatto della crisi dell'euro. Prendiamo atto del fatto che per alcune persone la crisi finanziaria getta dubbi sulla forza di proiezione internazionale dell'Unione, in particolare sulla sua capacità di difendere i diritti umani a livello mondiale. Vi è addirittura chi sostiene che il successo economico di alcuni Paesi con governi autoritari abbia indebolito il nesso tra democrazia liberale e prosperità economica.

A mio parere si tratta solo di inutile disfattismo, non corroborato dai fatti e ben lontano da quanto le persone, all'interno e all'esterno dell'Ue, si attendono da noi. Non dimentichiamolo: l'Ue occupa un posto di primo piano sulla scena mondiale; la sua quota di scambi, investimenti, capacità militare, risorse energetiche, finanziamento della ricerca, strumenti diplomatici e il suo potere di influenza continuano ad essere considere-

voli. La gente vuole ancora aderire all'Ue o commerciare con noi. L'Ue ha una posizione di rilievo nelle classifiche economiche. L'economia dell'Unione Europea genera un Pil di oltre 12.629 miliardi di euro, il che ne fa la più grande economia mondiale; è anche la prima potenza commerciale del mondo, poiché rappresenta il 20 per cento delle importazioni ed esportazioni mondiali. Ciò conferisce all'Ue notevoli mezzi di pressione per promuovere le questioni che ci stanno a cuore, come il rispetto dei diritti umani e della dignità umana.

Inoltre, nel mondo intero le persone credono agli stessi valori cui crediamo noi. Prendiamo ad esempio la «primavera araba» e ciò che chiedevano i manifestanti in piazza Tahrir: lavoro, dignità e diritti. Riguardo al sostegno e alla realizzazione di tali richieste l'Ue ha un punteggio superiore a qualsiasi altra potenza! La politica mondiale sarà sempre più plasmata dalle richieste delle persone comuni: richieste di diritti, pace, prosperità, mentre i media sociali si faranno sempre più portatori del loro messaggio, consentendo agli attivisti di spezzare il loro isolamento, divulgare le loro idee e denunciare l'oppressione. Sono proprio i temi per affrontare i quali l'Ue fu fondata, e ai quali ha sempre garantito il proprio sostegno a livello mondiale. Nessun'altra potenza può dire altrettanto. Il nostro impegno a favore dei diritti umani non segue il ciclo economico.

Non ho perso tempo, quando ho assunto le mie funzioni, per spiegare chiaramente quanta importanza io attribuisca all'azione dell'Ue a favore dei diritti umani, e recentemente ho fatto sì che i ministri europei degli affari esteri riaffermassero il rango di primissimo piano che a tali valori spetta nella politica estera globale dell'Ue. Nominerò tra breve il primo rappresentante speciale dell'Ue per i diritti umani, il cui compito consisterà nel tradurre tale impegno a favore dei diritti umani nella prassi della politica estera. Sarà un lavoro difficile ma gratificante. Questa è la ragione per cui sono entrata in politica, per cui sono rimasta in politica e per cui desidero che anche il Seae sia conosciuto.

Vicepresidente della Commissione europea e Alto rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza

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Baronessa

◆ Catherine Margaret Ashton è nata nel 1956 a Upholland, in Inghilterra, da una famiglia di minatori. Esponente del Partito laburista britannico, nel 1999 è stata nominata baronessa e membro della Camera dei Lord

◆ Nel 2008 la Ashton è stata nominata commissario europeo per il Commercio e dal 2009 ricopre l'importante incarico di Alto rappresentante per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza della Unione Europea. È anche vicepresidente della commissione di Bruxelles

◆ Ha lavorato a lungo per i diritti dei disabili, per la tutela dei consumatori e la responsabilità sociale d'impresa

il Classico

Nuvola Bianca, Pioggia che Cammina, Piccolo Lupo: sono i «selvaggi» che la borghesia parigina si affolla a vedere intorno al 1845. Li ha portati lì un impresario. A raccontare queste vicende è George Sand (1804-1876) che torna con il suo *Pellerossa a Parigi* (Endemunde, pp. 46, € 5,85, traduzione di Zeno de Pardis).

Il progetto

Catherine Ashton, nel suo ruolo di vicepresidente della commissione europea e di Alto rappresentante dell'Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza, si sta battendo per l'obiettivo di mettere la promozione dei diritti umani al centro della politica estera dell'Unione Europea

Dalla Polonia alla Birmania

«Gli incontri che mi hanno colpita di più sono stati quelli con le persone che hanno sfidato e sconfitto la tirannia»



RILANCIO

L'interesse «nazionale» europeo

di GIULIO TERZI

Tra qualche anno i nostri figli e nipoti potrebbero trovarsi di fronte all'incapacità di arginare un dilagante terrorismo fondamentalista, o a minacce militari non convenzionali, a flussi migratori incontrollati, o ancora a concorrenti economici con i quali sarà difficile competere. Come ci difenderemo dall'accusa di non essere riusciti a dotarli di strumenti e politiche in grado di evitare all'Europa di diventare un «continente di scorta»? In una fase in cui siamo anzitutto impegnati a promuovere percorsi di crescita indispensabili a salvare l'Europa oggi, per rendere questa azione più efficace è necessario accompagnarla con un'altra, altrettanto convinta, che definisca obiettivi, strutture e programmi che permettano all'Europa di muoversi come attore globale al pari di Stati Uniti e Cina.

Qual è l'interesse «nazionale» europeo? È la domanda cui dobbiamo rispondere — oggi, non domani — nella consapevolezza che, come hanno scritto sul *Corriere* Alberto Alesina e Francesco Giavazzi, il consolidamento dell'eurozona passa attraverso una maggiore integrazione politico-economica, e che, nella costruzione di una casa europea più integrata sul piano politico, non possiamo dimenticare che elemento essenziale di questo edificio è un'efficace politica estera europea. Al pari di uno Stato, l'Europa si definisce, viene riconosciuta e rispettata se è capace di promuovere i propri interessi con un'azione esterna efficace e responsabile. È quanto accaduto in questi otto mesi per l'Italia, nei negoziati a Bruxelles e nei rapporti con tutti i nostri principali partners.

Su questo sta lavorando un gruppo ristretto di ministri degli Esteri europei per dare contenuto concreto alle proposte sull'«Europa del futuro» e su un'«Unione Politica». Con Guido Westerwelle, Laurent Fabius, José Margallo e altri colleghi, con-

dividiamo l'urgenza di una politica estera dell'Unione Europea che integri nella proiezione esterna dei Ventisette le questioni della difesa, dell'energia, delle migrazioni, dei valori dell'uomo. Argomenti che toccano interessi fondamentali per gli europei, sui quali è auspicabile un più intenso dibattito pubblico.

Alcuni parametri, su cui l'Italia ha molto da dire, dovrebbero misurare l'efficacia di una politica estera europea. La sicurezza anzitutto, nelle varie dimensioni in cui si declina e in particolare in quella della difesa. L'Unione Europea è produttrice di sicurezza. Negli ultimi anni ha avviato ventiquattro missioni di pace nel mondo. È un contributo di uomini e donne, risorse, esperienza che non può essere trascurato. Su questo dobbiamo sviluppare una vera politica di difesa con un alto grado di cooperazione, dalla pianificazione strategica agli approvvigionamenti, dall'addestramento allo sviluppo delle tecnologie. È quanto ci chiedono i nostri stessi alleati secondo un approccio sempre più complementare con la Nato ed evitando costose e non più sostenibili duplicazioni. Dovrà essere un processo esteso a tutti i Paesi che ne vorranno far parte, e nessuno dovrà sentirsi escluso in partenza. Ma, se necessario, dovremo anche procedere in formati più ridotti, utilizzando i nuovi strumenti che il Trattato di Lisbona ci offre, a partire dalla cooperazione strutturata permanente. In secondo luogo la dimensione «sociale», riferita in particolare ai temi dello sviluppo e dei flussi migratori. Nel mondo più della metà dei finanziamenti per lo sviluppo proviene dall'Unione Europea. L'Unione Europea deve inoltre essere consapevole e più in grado di utilizzare il suo ruolo, insostituibile, nel condurre la politica di vicinato ad Oriente e nel Mediterraneo, soprattutto per sostenere i processi di transizione democratica in corso. Le risorse riservate ai Paesi della sponda sud del Mediterraneo, dalla Libia al-

l'Egitto alla stessa Tunisia, non sono mai state, sinora, pari alla sfida che abbiamo di fronte, soprattutto nell'attuare partenariati di mobilità che riteniamo indispensabili anche per prevenire e gestire i flussi migratori.

La sicurezza energetica è un altro aspetto essenziale per lo sviluppo economico e sociale. L'energia alimenta il sistema produttivo, e proprio per questo è un tema politico oltre che economico per l'Europa e per l'Italia in particolare. Siamo un Paese fortemente dipendente dall'esterno, e, come il resto d'Europa, dobbiamo utilizzare il vantaggio geopolitico che ci viene dalla nostra collocazione in un'area di snodo cruciale dei flussi energetici. Occorre assicurare ai nostri cittadini un contesto energetico europeo sicuro nel breve e nel medio termine, ed è su questo che siamo impegnati nella definizione delle strategie di una politica energetica comune, in vista del completamento del mercato europeo dell'energia entro il 2014. Un mondo più sicuro inoltre è un mondo dove i diritti vengono rispettati. La politica estera di un'Europa credibile deve avere la tutela e promozione dei diritti fondamentali della persona al centro della propria azione. A cominciare dalla difesa della libertà di religione contro ogni intolleranza e violenza. Su questo importante aspetto un passo in avanti, su impulso dell'Italia, è stato fatto il mese scorso a Lussemburgo con l'approvazione di una nuova Strategia europea sui diritti umani, che indica nella tutela della libertà di religione una priorità. I cittadini italiani e quelli europei stanno affrontando grandi sacrifici e rinunce oggi in nome di maggiore sicurezza e benessere da realizzarsi in un'Europa che già domani sia in grado di difendere i loro interessi. È per questo che serve una politica estera europea.

Ministro degli Affari esteri

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La lettera**«Un'Unione della difesa per la sicurezza della Ue»**

Caro direttore, l'analisi di Massimo Franco offre profondi spunti di riflessione. Accertato che l'euro è un processo irreversibile, credo sia necessario rafforzarlo con un salto di qualità e rivalutare quella visione politica di chi ha voluto e perseguito l'ideale europeo. E di quella visione politica è a mio avviso componente indispensabile la dimensione di difesa e sicurezza. Provo a spiegarmi.

1) È vero che in Europa i diversi governi stanno avviando profonde riforme del sistema della Difesa. Ma credo che non sia corretto fin in fondo attribuire al fenomeno comune una scelta esclusivamente economica. Concordo con il presidente del Consiglio quando sostiene che la politica di austerità fiscale non debba essere attribuita a Bruxelles, ma sia la scelta di uno Stato sovrano di mettere ordine nella sua politica di bilancio. Di pari passo, la riforma dello strumento militare — il disegno di legge delega è al Senato — non serve solo per rispondere al necessario contenimento della spesa. Credo, al contrario, che un «dimagrimento» della struttura del nostro apparato della Difesa sia necessario, così da renderlo maggiormente funzionale al modello condiviso dai partner europei e atlantici. Nella sostanza, oggi, la Difesa non spende troppo; anzi, la nostra spesa è inferiore alla media europea.

Semmai, spende male: con un bilancio assorbito per il 70 per cento dal personale, quando in Europa questa voce assorbe circa il 50 per cento. La riforma serve proprio ad ammodernare il nostro sistema di sicurezza, per renderlo più adeguato a rispondere alle nuove sfide tratteggiate da Massimo Franco.

2) È ovvio, però, che la riforma — da sola — non basta. È certamente necessaria per migliorare l'integrazione delle Forze armate italiane con le altre Forze armate Nato ed europee. Ma credo che sia giunto il momento di alzare lo sguardo verso una riflessione più profonda sul ruolo della costruzione europea. Mi spiego. Oggi l'Europa è un condominio di 27 piani con una scala in comune, quella monetaria, a cui nemmeno tutti hanno accesso. Come ogni condominio, però, ha bisogno di un tetto che protegga la costruzione e la difenda dalle avversità. Il tetto — nella mia immagine — è rappresentato da un'Unione della difesa come parte del processo, una componente importante, dell'Unione politica. Il governo italiano si sta muovendo in questa direzione. La riforma dello strumento militare è una tegola importante di quel tetto che potrà essere l'Unione della difesa.

3) Non c'è nulla di più «politico» della politica di bilancio e della sicurezza: ce lo insegnano tutti i filosofi. Per queste ragioni credo che debba essere seguito il monito che viene dal capo dello Stato verso un'Unione politica che non può prescindere da un'Unione della difesa.

In tal modo, l'integrazione europea cesserà di essere «un'incompiuta», come dice Paul Krugman. Solo così si contribuirà a rafforzare quel legame

transatlantico che rappresenta l'altro pilastro della nostra sicurezza.

Giampaolo Di Paola
ministro della Difesa


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Terzi: ricomincia da Varsavia un'Europa più forte e solidale

«Nel documento dei Paesi fondatori Berlino accetta la condivisione dei rischi»

Intervista



ANTONELLA RAMPINO
ROMA

Per otto mesi i ministri degli Esteri dei paesi fondatori dell'Europa, assieme a Spagna, Portogallo, Austria, Polonia e Danimarca, si sono incontrati in riunioni informali e, sinora, coperte da silenzio, per discutere liberamente e senza vincoli negoziali dell'Europa del futuro. Poi, l'altroieri notte a Varsavia, hanno approvato un documento comune. Che contiene anzitutto un elemento politico macroscopico: per la prima volta la Germania ha accettato un documento che contiene un'espressione che sin qui provocava il tedesco raccapriccio, la «mutualizzazione dei rischi sovrani», sia pur «proposta da alcuni membri del Gruppo». L'importanza del documento, di cui La Stampa è in possesso, è tuttavia molto più ampia. Il disegno di quelle otto cartelle, limato sino' all'ultimo nella notte polacca, muove dalla necessità di una maggior consapevolezza europeista dei cittadini e va verso una maggior responsabilità delle istituzioni. Per la prima volta, oltre a una effettiva europeizzazione dei partiti, integrazione e rapporto di check-and-balance tra Commissione e Parlamento, si parla di responsabilità delle istituzioni sino all'accountability, al «render conto» che vige nelle società anglosassoni. «More Euro-

pe» era lo slogan con il quale era del resto partita, il 20 marzo scorso a Berlino, la serie di riunioni, declinata poi in «More democracy», «More capacity for action», e «Europe as global player» tra Bruxelles, Vienna, Palma di Maiorca. Nel documento, colpisce che mantenendo come «priorità assoluta» il rafforzamento dell'Unione Economica e Monetaria, si parli esplicitamente di «solidarietà europea» e, in sostanza, del welfare come un valore identitario del Continente. Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata ha accettato di commentare il documento.

Ministro, cosa succede adesso di questa proposta di nuova Europa? Fino a che punto impegna i governi?

«In questi giorni qualcuno ha usato l'espressione: "C'è un cielo azzurro

sopra l'Europa". Siamo partiti di certo con un cielo più buio, poi le decisioni della Bce, la sentenza sull'Esm della Corte Suprema tedesca e le elezioni in Olanda hanno aperto l'orizzonte. Il nostro scopo principale è portare le pubbliche opinioni, i cittadini, verso l'Europa. E contribuire ad accelerare il percorso di emendamento del Trattato di Lisbona. In queste ore, il documento sta circolando nel Parlamento europeo. Si parte da lì, per costruire il consenso».

La Germania per la prima volta sigla un documento che parla di mutualizzazione del debito. A parte questo punto, qual è stato il contributo italiano al documento?

«Quel punto è essenziale, ed è parte della strategia dell'Italia per l'Europa. Tutti i ministri degli Esteri hanno accettato di discuterne in modo approfondito, e il principio è stato inserito nel documento finale. È un principio di solidarietà, perché occorre che il rilancio dell'Europa avvenga avendo al centro i valori identitari, non solo gli interessi algebrici

e rispettivi...».

Non solo il Pil o le politiche di bilancio

e la loro sostenibilità, insomma. Ma questo, in che modo coinvolge la politica estera?

«E' semplice, si tratta della proiezione esterna dell'Europa. Dobbiamo rispondere a grandi sfide. Quelle che ci ha posto la crisi economica, che supereremo accelerando verso l'Unione fiscale e monetaria. Ma occorre anche, e c'è forte convergenza su questo punto, più incisività nella politica estera e di sicurezza: devono rientrarvi anche la politica migratoria, le questioni legate allo sviluppo... Al di là dei consolidati rapporti transatlantici, occorre lavorare per una vera politica di difesa europea, che guardi alla capacità militare integrata».

Nel documento non si fa mistero del fatto che occorra, certo a lungo termine, addirittura un esercito della Ue, e un visto europeo per l'accesso all'area-Schengen...

«Anche quest'ultimo è un contributo italiano, vogliamo mantenere l'area di libero scambio e insieme rafforzare gli strumenti per delimitare le frontiere dell'Unione. Il cuore del documento però resta la direzione generale, che riflette l'idea che Giorgio Napolitano ha offerto dell'Europa: una nuova forma di federalismo, una "poliarchia funzionale". E la necessità che le forze politiche, a cominciare da quelle italiane, si europeizzino portando l'Europa al centro del loro dibattito politico. Dobbiamo affrontare alle radici le tematiche, e far crescere la consapevolezza del valore e della necessità dell'Unione. Non avere solo "un'Europa più organizzata", come dicono a Londra».

Ministro quanto tempo abbiamo per la nuova Europa?

«Abbiamo varato Six pack e Fiscal compact in poche settimane. Per la politica estera e di difesa ci vorranno più di 2 o 3 mesi, e sono comunque tempi troppo lunghi. Alle porte abbiamo le primavere arabe, il consolidamento della Libia. La realtà non aspetta».

Ha detto

L'esercito comune

Al di là dei consolidati rapporti transatlantici occorre lavorare per una vera politica di difesa Ue che guardi alla capacità militare integrata

Il nucleo

Il cuore del documento è la direzione generale, che riflette l'idea che Napolitano ha offerto dell'Unione: una nuova forma di federalismo una «poliarchia funzionale»



L'Unione non basta

EUROPA FEDERALE LA LUNGA MARCIA

di GIOVANNI
SABBATUCCI

IL vertice europeo che si è concluso venerdì a Bruxelles sarà probabilmente ricordato non tanto per le soluzioni trovate o per i compromessi raggiunti sullo specifico delle singole questioni sul tappeto (in particolare su tempi e modalità della vigilanza bancaria centralizzata), quanto per lo scontro, poi rientrato, tra Francia e Germania sulla proposta tedesca di sottoporre i bilanci degli Stati membri al controllo, e all'eventuale veto, di un superministro o super-commissario: una specie di sceriffo della stabilità che andrebbe peraltro a sovrapporsi ad altre figure già esistenti e deputate agli stessi compiti, ma non dotate degli stessi poteri.

Non è la prima volta che i due partner maggiori, espressione del cuore carolingio dell'Unione, si confrontano sulla sovranità delle politiche di bilancio nazionali, tradizionalmente difesa dalla Francia e messa in discussione dalla Germania in nome dei comuni obblighi di rigore finanziario (la novità semmai sta nel deciso schierarsi dell'europeista Monti a fianco del presidente francese). Ma questa volta il confronto è stato duro ed esplicito, andando a toccare direttamente il punto centrale del dibattito europeo di questi anni di crisi: come conciliare la sovranità democratica degli Stati, garantita dal voto popolare, con la responsabilizzazione dei loro comportamenti al cospetto di un'autorità tecnica imposta dalla moneta comune? E come sfruttare questa contraddizione non per affos-

sare il progetto federativo fin qui solo parzialmente realizzato, ma per completarlo, facendogli compiere l'indispensabile salto di qualità politico? Così come era stata formulata, la proposta di Angela Merkel risultava irricevibile.

Tanto da giustificare il sospetto di una mossa tattica (dovuta vuoi alla prossima scadenza elettorale tedesca vuoi al desiderio di guadagnare crediti sugli altri tavoli del negoziato): infatti è stata prontamente ritirata. Anche prescindendo da qualsiasi valutazione di efficacia, l'arrivo di un super-commissario calato dall'alto avrebbe aggravato quel deficit democratico dell'Unione che tutti dicono di voler colmare, avrebbe accresciuto la sensazione di estraneità dei cittadini europei rispetto a decisioni prese in sedi lontane e mai oggetto di un vero dibattito politico-elettorale, avrebbe ulteriormente evidenziato il paradosso di organismi elettivi (i Parlamenti nazionali e quello europeo) di fatto spogliati della loro storica prerogativa in materia di spese e di tasse.

Ma il problema sollevato resta ancora aperto. Dopo sessant'anni e passa di lenti progressi e di brusche battute d'arresto, di faticosa routine e di strappi coraggiosi, non possiamo pensare che l'approccio economicista e «funzionalista» adottato, o subito, dai padri fondatori dopo il fallimento della Comunità europea di difesa

nel 1954 (partiamo dalle cose pratiche, unifichiamo i mercati, adottiamo regole comuni e addirittura una moneta unica: il resto verrà) possa produrre, per semplice accumulazione, il miracolo di un'Europa politica autorevole e riconoscibile, prima di tutto agli occhi dei suoi cittadini. Il salto qualitativo può venire solo da un vero processo costituente, che faccia tesoro delle precedenti e non brillanti esperienze, e che tenga fermo l'obiettivo di fondo: un parlamento e un governo federale dotati dei necessari poteri, accanto alla Banca centrale già esistente e operante e a una forza armata comune che è ancora di là da venire.

È inutile farsi illusioni: il percorso sarà lungo e difficile e non ci porterà d'un colpo a diventare come gli Stati Uniti d'America (abbiamo troppe lingue diverse, troppe storie pesanti alle spalle). Ma nemmeno gli Stati Uniti avevano un modello a cui uniformarsi. Il modello europeo dovranno inventarlo gli europei. E tanto meglio potranno farlo quanto più i loro governanti sapranno liberarsi dai «tabù incrociati» (così Federico Fubini sul «Corriere» di ieri) che ne limitano la libertà di azione: quelli, per intenderci, che obbligano la Germania a difendere i suoi schiacciati surplus commerciali in nome del rigore finanziario e la Francia di Hollande a coprire i suoi deficit di bilancio in nome della sovranità nazionale. Quella del passaggio all'Europa federale è una missione eminentemente politica, che non può essere delegata ai tecnici né tanto meno

surrogata da proposte estemporanee, arroccamenti o fughe in avanti.

GELO INGLESE EL'EUROPA

PIERO OTTONE

L'Europa è in crisi, e l'Inghilterra, ben sistemata oltre la Manica, ci osserva con crescente freddezza, con scetticismo: qualcuno sospetta, con ostilità. Che cosa succede? Pareva dopo la guerra che gli inglesi credessero nell'Unione europea. "Fu proprio Churchill - scrive Arrigo Levi sul *Corriere della Sera* - uno dei principali ispiratori dell'unificazione europea, insieme con Monnet, Adenauer e De Gasperi; nei suoi ultimi discorsi Winston si pronunciò (ma non fu purtroppo ascoltato) per l'ingresso senza riserve del suo Paese nella nascente comunità". Marcia indietro, dunque? Doppio gioco? Tradimento? Secondo me, per spiegare l'atteggiamento britannico, bisogna seguire un'altra strada. Gli inglesi non sono traditori, non fanno il doppio gioco. Ma hanno senso politico. Hanno idee chiare su quel che è possibile, o quando si sconfigna, a loro giudizio, nell'utopia.

Partiamo proprio da Churchill. Allora più che mai (ed è passato più di mezzo secolo) i fautori dell'Unione europea, sul continente, sognavano la federazione. Gli Stati Uniti d'Europa, sul modello degli Stati Uniti d'America: che splendido sogno. Abbiamo letto tutti con emozione il manifesto di Ventotene, scritto quando l'Europa era in fiamme. Nobilissimo: ma troppo bello per diventare realtà, per lo meno da un giorno all'altro. E allora si pensò di raggiungere la meta a gradi, un passo dopo l'altro. Nacque così il progetto (gli anziani lo ricordano, i giovani lo ignorano) della Comunità di Difesa. Si pensò di creare un esercito i cui reggimenti avrebbero avuto una composizione plurinazionale: un reggimento francese, un reggimento tedesco, un reggimento italiano, e così via.

Sarebbe stato un primo passo verso un'inscindibile unione militare. Ma quale fosse il giudizio di Churchill, lo leggo nelle memorie di John Colville, suo segretario privato: in contrasto con Dean Acheson, segretario di Stato americano, Churchill, nel 1959 di nuovo Primo ministro, lo definì "a sludgy amalgam", un viscido amalgama. Lui proponeva invece "una Grande Alleanza di eserciti nazionali". Giusto? O sbagliato? Sta di fatto che l'esercito europeo, l'amalgama, non si fece. Non per colpa degli inglesi,

ma per il voto contrario della Francia. Abbandonata la strada della difesa, si è deciso molto più tardi di tentare la strada della moneta. L'euro è il secondo tentativo per arrivare alla federazione europea a gradi: possiamo dire, per vie traverse. Non per via militare, dunque, ma per via finanziaria. Churchill non è più fra noi per esprimere un parere: ma possiamo immaginare qualche sarebbe il suo giudizio.

Così si spiega, a mio parere, l'atteggiamento inglese verso l'Europa. Gli inglesi sono favorevoli a una stretta collaborazione europea: adesso più che mai, avendo perso l'impero. Ma hanno abbastanza senso politico per capire che la federazione europea, quale è stata sognata da nobili personaggi in tempi ormai lontani, non è realizzabile. Pertanto, seguono gli Stati sul continente lungo le strade che ritengono percorribili, prendono le distanze in caso contrario.

Ormai l'euro esiste, sarebbe disastroso tornare indietro: questo lo si pensa anche oltre Manica. Per salvarlo si potranno conferire più ampi poteri alla Banca centrale, si potranno seguire altre strade. Ma ogni politica che abbia come premessa gli Stati Uniti d'Europa non troverà consensi oltre Manica: perché gli inglesi la ritengono un'utopia. Che definizione avrebbe trovato, il vecchio Winston, per rendere l'idea?

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